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Introduction: 
Skilful Survivals - Irregular Migration to the Gulf
Nasra M. Shah*
Introduction
 The overall objective of this volume is to advance existing knowledge about irregular 
migration to the Gulf, a subject about which huge research gaps remain. We focus 
on the role that legislation, policies and practices play in enabling and sustaining 
irregular, or undocumented, migration. Case studies highlighting these elements 
are presented on all the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely: 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). In addition, case studies of six major sending countries are included to 
better understand the entire pathway of irregular migration from a sending to a 
Gulf country: these countries are Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and 
the Philippines. The volume also offers an overview of the conceptual dimensions 
underlying irregular migration and a framework for providing protection to 
migrants in an irregular situation.
Why is irregular migration to the Gulf such an important topic? There are at 
least two major reasons. First, this kind of migration, by its very nature, is difficult to 
detect. It eludes measurement as well as regulation, both of which are essential for 
I
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a complete understanding and management of the labour market. Second, those in 
an irregular situation are in contravention of some laws and therefore reside in the 
host country in a permanently vulnerable position. They live in constant fear under 
the threat of apprehension and deportation. Also, they cannot compete for better 
jobs due to their illegal situation. Irregular migrants in the Gulf consist primarily 
of relatively lower-skilled workers and women, mainly in domestic service, as 
elaborated in a later section.
There is a general consensus among statements and reports by government 
officials, policy makers, and migration researchers that some foreign residents in the 
Gulf reside there in an irregular situation. Beyond this general agreement, however, 
there are questions about the definition of an irregular migrant, the length of time 
a person typically stays in the Gulf, and  the diverse and highly fragmented nature 
of Gulf migrants, as highlighted in this chapter. 
Defining Irregular Migration
Terminology and definition for irregular migration is not universally accepted leading 
to a certain amount of confusion. Also, irregularity is not a permanent situation. A 
migrant may move in and out of such a situation, depending on circumstances, 
changes in labour or other laws, not to mention the degree of compliance with such 
laws. A migrant may be in a regular situation in some respects but at the same time 
irregular in others: take freelance workers who may have a legal residence permit 
but who are employed by someone other than their kafeel (sponsor), contrary to 
Gulf laws. Different terms have been used to describe irregular migration in the 
Gulf. In newspaper articles, foreign residents apprehended in violation of one law 
or another are usually referred to as ‘illegal’ residents or simply ‘illegals’. In this 
volume, we consider that an action or a situation can be illegal or irregular, but 
that a person cannot be. We, therefore, use the term ‘irregular migration’ but avoid 
terms such as ‘illegal migrant’ or ‘irregular migrant’. We use, instead, ‘migrant in 
an irregular situation’ to refer to those persons who are residing in the Gulf and 
who find themselves in an irregular situation. They are in this state because they 
have violated a law relating to lawful entry, legal residency status, legal employment 
status, or any other situation regarded by the host country, or a sending country, as 
a breach of the existing laws.
One category of residents in an irregular situation that does not fit our 
definition, and that is, therefore, not included in this volume, is that of stateless 
persons living in the Gulf. The number of such persons in the region varies across 
countries and is estimated to stand at around 100,000 in Kuwait. Most stateless 
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persons are Arabs from neighbouring countries who may have lived there for 
decades or even generations, but who were not awarded the citizenship of the Gulf 
state where they live. In this volume we focus on international migrants who left 
their country of citizenship, legally or illegally, to enter a Gulf country for work, to 
join a family member, to visit, to study, or to perform pilgrimage.
Data on Irregular Migration
Regular data collection systems such as population registration, or the population 
censuses, do not collect information on those in an irregular situation in the Gulf. 
Such data are collected by the Ministries of Interior or other security related 
agencies, since they essentially relate to violations of the law. Absence of this data 
from routine data collection systems makes it very difficult to map the volume and 
characteristics of those in an irregular situation, as elaborated in the chapter by De 
Bel-Air empirical data on undocumented migrants are rarely revealed by the GCC 
countries. While some countries publish data on infiltrators entering the country 
illegally, and visa violators who may have overstayed their valid resident permit, any 
estimation of the number of migrants in other kinds of irregular situations (e.g. 
freelance workers) is problematic.
Several of the chapters in this volume have relied on qualitative methodologies 
to locate and interview migrants in an irregular situation. There is obviously no 
sampling frame that might be used to choose representative samples from the pool 
of irregular workers. Since many of them live in a perpetual fear of apprehension 
and arrest, such migrants are naturally reluctant to talk to a researcher unless they 
have assurances from some network member that they would not be reported to 
the authorities. Gaining the confidence of such migrants so that they are prepared 
to talk to an interviewer is a difficult and painstaking job. However, a wealth of 
data has been collected by the contributors of this volume to get a closer look at 
many facets of the lives of irregular workers, including: the circumstances that led 
to their irregular situation; their strategies for earning a livelihood and surviving; 
the network connections that enable and sustain their survival; and their plans and 
aspirations for the future.
Types of Irregular Migration
Migrants may be irregular for several different reasons. Jureidini, in his analysis of 
irregular migration to Qatar, identifies eight different pathways that can lead to 
an irregular situation for a migrant. Rajan and Jolin’s analysis of Indian workers 
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provides an even more exhaustive list of various situations relating to the migration 
process, employment conditions, and residency conditions that can lead to a 
person’s irregular status. In order to simplify our understanding of the many types of 
irregular migrants in the Gulf, at least five different types may be clearly identified, 
as follows: (i) entering unlawfully into a country; (ii) overstaying a valid residency 
permit; (iii) being employed by someone who is not the sponsor; (iv) running away 
from an employer, or absconding; and (v) being born in the Gulf to parents with an 
irregular status. Each of these types is briefly described below.
First, a person may enter a Gulf country illegally without the requisite papers. 
While this type of irregular migration is to be found in all GCC countries, it is 
especially large and problematic in the case of Yemenis entering Saudi Arabia, as 
described in the chapter by Fahad Alsharif. Of the 3.4 million illegal entrants to 
the Kingdom during 1978-2008, 98% were Yemeni. They kept returning to Saudi 
Arabia despite deportation. The story of one irregular migrant who had been 
deported thrice and came back within the same week exemplifies the relative ease 
with which this well-established pattern of movement may be negotiated. 
The second type of irregular migration, prevalent in all six GCC countries, 
consists of overstaying a valid residence permit. Published data on the number of 
such residents is available for some Gulf countries. In their chapter on Kuwait, 
Shah and Al-Kazi reported that 103,154 visa overstayers were living in the country 
in 2014. Almost three-quarters of these violators were Asian and about half were 
domestic workers. In the case of Bahrain, Alhasan reported that some 60,700 non-
Bahrainis (11% of non-Bahraini workers) were residing in the country irregularly; 
about 10% due to expired work visas. Other countries, such as Oman, provide data 
on the arrests and the deportation of irregular migrants, as shown in the chapter by 
Safar and Levaillant.
The third type of irregular migration is perhaps the most numerous and 
widespread in all the GCC countries, but it is also the most elusive to accurately 
measure. It consists of a migrant worker being employed by a person or institution 
that is not his sponsor or kafeel. It is well known that the kafala (sponsorship) 
system mandates that every non-citizen must have a sponsor in order to reside 
legally in a Gulf country. Working persons are sponsored by the employer while 
dependents, such as wives and children, are sponsored by the worker in cases where 
they accompany him. Once a person is hired on a valid work permit, issued by 
the concerned government authorities, he/she is issued a residency permit, usually 
for the period of the contract. Work contracts are usually renewable for varying 
lengths of time. If the regulations for renewal are followed by the employer in a 
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timely manner, non-citizens may reside in the Gulf for many decades, although 
in a temporary capacity, depending on the validity of the contract. Failure to 
issue or renew a work permit or residency permit can result in the worker’s illegal 
status. Thus, as summarized in the chapter by Fargues “Irregularity and illegality 
are unwanted but unavoidable by-products of regulations and laws,” the “kafala” 
system constituting a basic one.
One major practice that lies at the core of irregular migration, identified by 
almost all the authors in this volume, relates to the sale of visas by Gulf sponsors 
to potential migrants that they fail to employ. This practice is commonly known 
as ‘visa trading’. The demand for work visas among residents of sending countries 
exceeds the available supply of such visas. Also, the competition for securing a 
Gulf visa in the sending countries is quite intense, especially among relatively low 
skilled workers. Such potential migrants are, therefore, willing to buy a work visa, 
sometimes without the guarantee (or even the existence) of a job. Visas of this kind 
are commonly referred to as “free” or azad visas (visa maftoohah), implying that the 
migrant worker has an implicit permission to find a job on the open market. This 
practice is, however, unlawful and contrary to the legal framework for regulating 
the employment of foreign workers in the Gulf. Thus, as soon as a mismatch occurs 
between the person (or institution) who sponsors an individual and the one who 
employs him/her, the migrant worker’s employment status theoretically becomes 
illegal. If the sponsor colludes with the worker and tacitly ‘allows’ the worker to be 
employed by someone else, finding such persons is nearly impossible. Such workers 
are legal in as much as they hold a valid residency permit, but they are illegal in 
terms of employment. 
The fourth type of irregular migration results from absconding and running 
away from employers, accounts of which are provided by several contributors. For 
example, Safar and Levaillant report that of the 21,190 irregular workers arrested 
in 2014 in Oman, about 85% were runaways or absconders. Absconding was 
recognised as a serious problem in Oman since, in the first six months of 2015, 
official data showed “an alarming figure” of 57,420 workers who had absconded 
from their employer. In the case of Bahrain, absconding workers constituted about 
15% of the estimated 60,000 irregular workers in 2014, as reported by Alhasan. 
Once a worker absconds, or runs away, he/she is immediately faced with an irregular 
situation since he/she loses connection with the sponsor, an essential ‘custodian’ in 
the host country. They are unlikely to have any documents, such as passport, since 
those documents are usually taken and kept by the kafeel. 
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Running away from the employer is especially common among women, a 
majority of whom are domestic workers. Shah and Al-Kazi reported that half of 
all irregular migrants who had overstayed their valid residence permit in Kuwait 
in 2014 were domestic workers. Among the runaway workers they interviewed, 
a majority were female domestic workers. Among the Filipino irregular migrants 
interviewed by Alsharif, almost all had, also, run away from their employer.
Fifth, and perhaps less widely prevalent, is being born in the Gulf to parents 
in an irregular situation at the time of birth. Alsharif provides examples of this 
category from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where children were born to undocumented 
parents and had no option except to work as beggars on the street. Similarly, 
Mahdavi provides examples from her field research in Dubai and Abu Dhabi of 
children who were born to mothers in irregular situations. Fernandez provides an 
analysis of Ethiopian women who find themselves pregnant as a result either of 
rape or consensual relationships. They chose to become irregular, often by running 
away from the employer in order to avoid deportation. The children born under 
such conditions had no nationality documentation, and, therefore, were often not 
able to access formal medical services or education.
While I have tried to group irregular migrants into various distinct types, it 
must be recognised that the above five categories are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, a person may be a runaway and may have also overstayed his/her valid 
visa, and thus lack a sponsor. Similarly, overstayers may engage in freelance work 
for several employers, both situations being illegal. It should also be recognised that 
an irregular status is not permanent and those in this situation may be regularised, 
especially during amnesties that are periodically held by all Gulf countries.
Number of Irregular Migrants
In terms of the number of irregular migrants, perhaps the most widely cited estimate 
is that by Kapiszweski (2001) who concluded, largely on the basis of newspaper 
reports, that “in recent years, illegal immigrants in each GCC country made up 
at least 10 percent of the total population or 15 percent of the workforce,” with 
the number said to be as high as 700,000 in Saudi Arabia. In another frequently 
cited article, Shah (2009) provided some estimates of irregular migration by looking 
at departures during amnesty periods declared for the regularisation or exodus of 
irregular migrants. She reported that, in the case of Saudi Arabia, between 2-2.3 
million irregular migrants either left the country or regularised their status during 
1997-2000. In the UAE, 176,000 migrants regularised their status and more than 
174,000 departed in 2007. 
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The chapters in the present volume make a major contribution to our knowledge 
by showing some novel ways of arriving at estimates of irregular migration. For 
example, Rajan and Jolin use returnee migrant surveys in a sending community, 
Kerala, to estimate the number of Indians proceeding overseas in a potentially 
irregular capacity. They report that 20-40% of the returnees had proceeded to the 
Gulf on a “free” or azad visa, and not a work permit. Migration without a work 
permit implies that the person would work for an employer other than the sponsor, 
which puts them in an illegal situation. For Bangladeshi irregular migrants in Saudi 
Arabia, Ullah reports, on the basis of qualitative interviews, that the largest category 
consisted of persons who had arrived on a pilgrimage visa (for Haj or Umrah), and 
who overstayed the visa. In case of Filipinos, Batistella and Asis report that about 
150,000 of the 2.4 million Filipinos residing in the GCC countries were in some 
form of irregular situation. 
Deportations from Gulf countries also provide a very rough and partial 
estimate of irregular migration. In the case of Pakistan, Arif and Ishaq report that, 
during 2009-2014, about 193,000 Pakistanis were deported from the Gulf countries, 
constituting about 6% of all workers who were placed in the Gulf during that time 
period. Deportations of Egyptians during the latest amnesty held in Saudi Arabia 
from April to November 2013 amounted to around 300,000, corresponding to 23% 
of the total Egyptian workforce in Saudi Arabia, according to Awad and Aziz. 
For Ethiopians, Fernandez reports that 163,000 were deported from Saudi Arabia 
after the last amnesty that ended in November 2013. Deportation data provide 
some idea of the scale of irregular migration in the Gulf. But these figures probably 
represent only the tip of the iceberg, since the majority of irregular migrants may be 
able to regularise their status or may decide to continue living in the host country 
in an irregular situation.
Within the destination countries, records of regularisations and departures 
during the period of amnesty, when irregular residents may adjust their status without 
paying any penalties, also provide some idea of the scale of irregular residency in the 
Gulf. The recent record of regularisations conducted during the six-month amnesty 
in 2013 in Saudi Arabia indicates that the scale of irregularity was massive (De Bel-
Air, in this volume). Records of regularisation and departures following an amnesty 
in a Gulf country provide a useful but incomplete picture of the total number of 
irregular residents. During the last amnesty held in Kuwait in 2011, for example, 
only 37% of the known overstayers regularised their status or departed, while most 
decided to continue living in an irregular situation (Shah 2014). A similar situation 
was reported by Safar and Levaillant for Oman (in this volume) where around 
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50,000 undocumented and overstaying expatriates were expected to apply for the 
2015 amnesty, but only 14,254 (28.5%) made use of it.
Groups at Higher Risk of Irregular Migration
Two groups are at higher risk of being in an irregular situation: the relatively 
lower skilled workers and domestic workers. Some of the root causes of this are 
centered in migration environment in the sending country. As outlined for India 
by Rajan (2011: p.134) “Low economic opportunity, lack of information, a culture 
of migration, transnational migrant networks and the operation of unregulated 
intermediaries, organized racketeers and trafficking rings are key determinants of 
irregular migration from India.” Unemployment and underemployment are likely 
to be higher among the unskilled and lower skilled workers in the countries of 
origin, leading to a large potential supply of workers eager to find a job in the 
Gulf. The desire to work in the Gulf is exacerbated by the apparently successful 
experience of returnees, who often flaunt their wealth and assets when visiting the 
home country. Some of the low skilled workers pay exorbitant amounts to buy 
a work visa for a Gulf job that in reality may not exist. The money is frequently 
borrowed from friends, relatives, or money lenders. This kind of debt bondage is one 
of the reasons that compels and prolongs irregular residence in the Gulf.
Sending countries differ in terms of whether they encourage the migration of 
women, especially as domestic workers. Of the six sending countries included in 
this volume, most migrants from the Philippines and Ethiopia are women, while 
substantial numbers from India are in this category. However, Pakistani migrants 
contain almost no such women. The qualitative data presented by various authors 
provide vivid descriptions of pathways through which female migrants become 
irregular, even though most enter the Gulf legally. In Kuwait, about half of all 
overstayers in 2014 were domestic workers, many of whom are likely to have run 
away from their employer.
Why Irregular Migration is Perceived as Not Being that Bad
Policy makers, security officials, and researchers tend to think of irregular migration 
as being risky, unfair, and potentially harmful not only for the migrant but also for 
the sending  and host countries. However, the lived experiences of many interviewees 
described in this volume suggest that several migrants may not see their irregular 
status as being disastrous. Many, in fact, are willing to perpetuate this situation, 
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despite their awareness about possible arrest, jail term, and deportation. A theme 
that re-emerges repeatedly in interviews in several host countries relates to the lack 
of options open to migrants elsewhere, including their country of origin, and the 
perception of their current situation as being tolerable. To survive in an irregular 
status becomes normality for many. They learn to negotiate the formal and informal 
spaces and systems they encounter. Many have specific goals they want to achieve 
during their Gulf stay, whatever the cost. Education of their children and building 
a house  in the origin country are paramount among these goals. They are willing to 
suffer and sacrifice to achieve these goals for a better future. Most irregular migrants 
seem to share one characteristic: resilience. As their stay in the Gulf prolongs, they 
gather enough capacity to exercise their agency to achieve a skilful survival in the 
face of adversity.
Support by large networks of friends and relatives is a key enabler and 
sustainer of the skilful survival of irregular migrants. Not only do such networks 
initiate and finance the migration of their kin and friends, they also provide shelter 
and sustenance when necessary. As Rajan and Jolin report from the results of 
their Kerala survey among intending migrants, emigrant households and returned 
emigrants, over 70% of emigrants utilise networks of friends and relatives as their 
preferred emigration channel, with many of these flows falling outside the purview 
of legal stipulations.
In the case of some workers on “free visas” this situation may in fact be 
regarded as the preferred option rather than being tied down to one employer for a 
fixed sum of money, regardless of their irregular status. The financial and personal 
gains outweigh the risks in the migrant’s calculus. As Mahdavi points out for her 
interviewees in Dubai and Abu Dhabi “irregular migration can often be experienced 
as more lucrative, empowering, and safer for many migrants and their loved ones. 
Migrants often make decisions that are best for themselves and their loved ones, not 
necessarily in accordance with laws or formal migratory and labour trajectories. It 
is often the case that migrating or working irregularly is the more desirable option 
due to financial opportunities and available avenues for increased mobility—be that 
physical, economic, or emotional.”
In several respects, irregular migration may be beneficial not only for the 
migrant but also for several actors who indirectly profit from this situation. As 
pointed out in the case of Kuwait by Shah and Al-Kazi: “Sponsors gain by selling 
visas; apartment dwellers by sub-letting rental space; intermediaries by charging 
recruitment assistance fees; employers by a reduced cost in hiring workers etc. At 
the same time, social and familial benefits are gained by aiding the migration of 
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kin and countrymen, and the accumulation of social capital. Thus, a wide-ranging 
system of mutual benefits, constituting win-win situations exists.”
What Does the Future Hold?
The picture that emerges from the analysis in this volume illustrates that irregular 
migration is a complex, multifaceted, and deep-rooted phenomenon that will not 
be eliminated by simple policy changes. Many legal frameworks aimed at curtailing 
it already exist in sending as well as host countries, but migrants continue to evade 
these rules. Irregular migration will remain difficult to control as long as migrants 
are willing to maintain their irregular status and those who help them to maintain 
this status gain from the current situation.  
Instead of looking the other way and ignoring the existence of irregular 
migration, Gulf countries have become increasingly proactive in the last two 
decades. They have become so both in terms of making efforts to curb and contain 
irregular migration, but also in terms of reforming some regulations and practices 
that may help in reducing migration to a minimum. Qatar has probably been most 
active in this respect, followed by the UAE and Bahrain. At the same time, sending 
countries are trying to improve their efforts at discouraging irregular migration 
through awareness campaigns, better pre-departure orientation of migrant workers 
and better regulation of the work of private recruitment agents. The chapter by 
Frantz advocates that additional concerted efforts are needed in safeguarding the 
rights of migrants in an irregular situation, such as a ‘firewalling strategy’ where 
people can pursue legal claims against abuses by employers without being subject 
to arrest and expulsion. Finally, in the concluding chapter of this volume, Fargues 
addresses the broader global and regional contexts that will impact irregular 
migration in the Gulf and in the wider world.
Nasra M. Shah: Skilful Survivals
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Introduction
Spring–early summer 2015. Boats believed to be carrying up to 1,000 Rohingya 
Muslim migrants from Myanmar are still wandering the ocean after Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand pushed them back; Australia returns hundreds of asylum 
seekers smuggled by sea to Vietnam and declares a zero tolerance on migrant 
vessels approaching its shores; some 2,000 migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and 
Eritrea try every day to cross the Channel from France, where they are camped, 
to the UK where they are refused entry; hundreds of migrants landed in Sicily are 
stuck in Ventimiglia, northern Italy, where they have been forced back from France; 
Mr. Donald Trump, a US presidential candidate, declared in the course of his 
campaign: “We need to build a wall, and it has to be built quickly. And I don’t mind 
having a big beautiful door in that wall so that people can come into this country 
legally”; raids net more than 100,000 migrants in Jeddah and 25,000 in Madinah 
in six months since the beginning of 1436H, police announced; and thousands 
of foreign workers in Oman have filed for correction of labour status followed by 
deportation, etc. Whether they seek international protection or a better fate, many 
migrants find that they are increasingly unwanted in the global north as well as in 
the global south. 
This chapter first addresses the universality of irregular migration. It argues 
that rising irregular migration results from the forces behind international migration 
colliding with obstacles to international migration: from global interconnectedness 
between highly differentiated nations in terms of economic and political security 
conflicting with the reluctance of nation-states challenged by global processes to 
accept otherness. The second part is dedicated to what makes the Gulf States unique 
in terms of the production of irregular migration: a rigid sponsorship system that 
is not compatible with the free mobility of labour requested by markets and a strict 
closure of access to nationality that prevents the smooth integration of non-citizens 
whose limited rights mean that they are at risk of falling into an irregular situation. 
The third part looks at the social conditions of migrants in irregular situations and 
the spiral that drags poor migrants down into irregular migration and irregularity, 
a driver of precariousness and insecurity. The fourth part deals with the politics of 
irregularity and the two responses states can employ to eliminate a situation that 
they regard as an offence to their sovereignty:  deportation or regularisation. 
Irregular Migration in a World of Nations
We read, day after day, media stories and hear political statements about “irregular 
migrants,” “unauthorised migrants,” “illegal migrants” or more often and more 
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bluntly “illegals.” Such expressions have become so familiar that one may miss 
their implicit meaning, which is that migrants whose entry or stay breaches a host 
country’s laws are negated as persons. “No Person is Illegal” was the name of a 
movement born in Germany in 1997, and now known as No One Is Illegal (NOII), 
advocating rights for all migrants. Migrants in an irregular situation are denied the 
right of being present. Whether they have entered that country without proper 
authorisation or whether their authorisation to stay has expired, their situation 
results from a discrepancy between the two universal principles commanding the 
international mobility of people. On the one hand, exiting any country is a right 
enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 13) but, on 
the other, entering another country is a privilege, for the admission of foreign 
nationals is universally recognised to fall under the state’s sovereignty. Freedom of 
movement, which is recognised as a basic right within any (democratic) country, 
stops at the frontier, as international law does not provide for the right to move 
between countries (Weiner 1996; Benhabib 2004). 
This chapter will not use the above terms: first, because they are derogatory, 
offensive and unethical, and second, because they do not reflect reality. Irregularity 
must be situated in space and time. It does not characterise the person herself but 
his or her transient situation. Migrants are “people living in a country or area other 
than that in which they were born” (UN 2013). Those who do not fully comply 
with migration-related legislation of the country where they live are “migrants in 
an irregular situation.” The corresponding phenomenon can be called “irregular 
migration” keeping in mind that what is “irregular” in country A may be “regular” 
in country B as irregularity is a context-specific, not an absolute situation. The same 
person can, then, be in a regular situation at time t but no longer at time t+1; or 
vice versa, for being in a regular or irregular situation regarding migration law is a 
reversible status. 
“Irregular migration” is a widely used, though recent term. It dates back to the 
second half of the twentieth century, when the nation-state became a universal form 
of organising communities of citizens.1 Defined as one people, one territory and 
one narrative, the nation-state has erected borders, with inclusion from within as an 
1. An early appearance of the term is found in: Royal Institute of International Affairs (1946), 
Chronology of International Events and Documents, Vol. 2, No. 16 (August 12-25), pp. 489-
508. “Prague radio announced that the frontier with Poland had been closed in view of Brit-
ain’s decision to stop illegal immigration into Palestine” and later in Jon & David Kimche 
(1954), The Secret Roads: The ‘Illegal ’ Migration of a People 1938-1948, London, Secker & War-
burg.
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objective and exclusion from without as its corollary. Two forces came into collision 
here. On the one hand, the fundamental right of individuals to wellbeing and security 
makes the case for open borders (Carens 1987), as cross-border mobility may be the 
best (and sometimes the only) strategy for those born on the wrong side of a border. 
On the other, though, the state has a duty to protect its citizens. From the migrant 
receiving state’s perspective, admitting foreign nationals can be advantageous if 
they contribute to the nation’s wealth, but it must stop as soon as their presence is 
detrimental to citizens.  Safeguarding citizens’ employment, welfare, security and 
identity makes the case for restricting non-citizens’ admission, their stay and their 
access to labour. Irregular migration results from this tension between the forces of 
international mobility of persons and the nation-state’s reluctance to accommodate 
otherness.
Irregular migration is usually defined as the result of a violation − deliberate or 
not − by the migrant of conditions set down by the host state, i.e. as “international 
movement or residency in conflict with migration laws” (De Haas 2008). Some 
authors insist that it can either be the migrant that breaches the law or the law that 
changes and affects the migrant’s status: the situation of migrants initially admitted 
on a legal basis may, due to changing legislation on stay or labour, become irregular 
without them knowing it. This happens, for example, when activities employing 
foreigners become reserved to nationals, a change that often means that foreign 
workers are no longer eligible for residence (Fargues 2009). Finally, other authors 
dispute the relevance of the regular/irregular dichotomy preferring gradation in 
terms of compliance: yes, there are migrants who reside and work in full compliance 
with the law of their host country and, then, there are those who fully violate 
restrictions on entry, stay and employment. However, between these two, there are 
a wide spectrum of intermediate situations, which they term “semi-compliance” 
(Ruhs and Anderson 2008). As soon as full compliance with host states’ regulations 
is restricted, semi-compliance often becomes the only option left to migrants. 
Irregular migration is, therefore, a direct product of regulations that governments 
put in place to control the movement, settlement and access to employment of 
foreign nationals as part of a concern to establish the state’s sovereignty over 
territory as well as to protect citizens.
All countries are at the same time migrant senders and migrants receivers 
and irregular migration can be found everywhere in the world. Estimated to stand 
between thirty and fifty million, the (unknown) number of migrants in irregular 
situation worldwide is likely to have grown in recent years as a result of the two 
conflicting trends mentioned earlier. On the one hand, the structural forces 
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that make migration increasingly desirable or even necessary – from economic 
differentials between nations to conflict and political instability in many of 
them – have not abated. Moreover, communications, virtual or real, that make 
migration a realistic option have continuously intensified. On the other, states, 
increasingly challenged by global processes, tend to reaffirm their sovereignty, and 
societies and public opinions their attachment to national identity. In brief, reasons 
for, and hurdles to migration have risen in parallel.
Irregular migration exists everywhere but it is nowhere exactly the same. 
Migrants in irregular situation are in breach of laws that vary from one nation to 
another. Laws that can make a migrant’s situation irregular relate to the entry, stay 
and work of non-citizens. Migrants find themselves in an irregular situation as soon 
as they fall into one or more of the following non-exclusive situations: 
• Unauthorised entry: persons entered with no visa, including those who 
bypass border checkpoints, smuggled and trafficked persons; 
• Unauthorised stay: overstayers on a temporary entry visa (seasonal or short-
term worker, student, visitor of a family member, tourist, pilgrim, etc);
• Unauthorised employment: workers with a non-work visa or with an 
occupation that is not allowed by their visa. 
While they are universal, these categories vary in magnitude and in their causes 
and consequences: they change according to time and place. What is the prevalence 
of irregular migration in the Gulf ? Scarce and incomplete data offer only a glimpse 
of the situation (Table 2.1). 
Saudi Arabia stands out from all the other states with 5.3 million irregular 
situations detected in 2014 with 9.7 million recorded migrants. Even if the same 
person can have more than one form of irregularity and the proportion of migrants 
in irregular situation is smaller than 55% (5.3 / 9.7) numbers are still extraordinarily 
high. This is partly due to several peculiarities of the Kingdom, such as: the 
pilgrimage to the holiest sites of Islam, Haj and Umrah, which offers avenues for 
visa overstayers; the long border with Yemen that creates easy entry points by land 
for migrants with no visa; the size and diversity of the labour market; etc. Saudi 
Arabia also puts more efforts into tracking down migrants in an irregular situation. 
At the other end of the spectrum, in 2014, the number of migrants applying for 
status regularisation represented only 1.2% of all foreign nationals in Oman and 
4.3% in Kuwait while Bahrain (7.2%) is in an intermediate situation. Estimates 
provided in Table 2.1 suggest that the Gulf States differ greatly from one another in 
terms of the prevalence of irregular migration, and that they roughly compare with 
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major receivers of global migrants in the West. For example, in the United States, 
11.3 million migrants were estimated to be in irregular situation in 2013, 670,000 
were arrested and 400,000 deported the same year, representing respectively 26.7%, 
1.6% and 0.9% of the total migrant stock in the country (42.4 million). It must be 
noted, however, that statistics of apprehended migrants do not properly reflect the 
magnitude of irregular migration. In the Gulf, official data necessary for estimating 
irregular migration are not available. Moreover, deportees include not only migrants 
in irregular situations but also all those who engage in strikes and demonstrations.
Table 2.1: Foreign citizens apprehended in an irregular situation  
in the GCC states - most recent year in the 2010s
Dual Societies and the Production of Irregularity in the Gulf
With immigrants and their sons and daughters comprising between 32% (Saudi 
Arabia) and 88% (UAE) of the total population, can Gulf States be described 
as “immigrant nations”? Are they places where new societies emerge from the 
encounter between former local populations and a variety of new communities 
brought in by migration? Gulf States are the number one destination for migrants 
originating in the giants of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, 








In % of the 
Population
In Irregular Situation 
Regularised Deported Total
In % of Non-
Citizens 
Bahrain 1,338,400 683,000 51% 30,000 19,130 49,130 7.2%
Kuwait 4,169,410 2,884,849 69% 11,479 32,036 124,142 4.3%
Oman 3,887,000 1,696,000 44% na 11,051 21,150 1.2%
Qatar 2,230,800 1,911,000 86% na na na na
Saudi 
Arabia
29,994,272 9,723,214 32% 4,700,000 600,00 5,300,000 54.5%
UAE 9,350,000 8,277,000 89% na na 224,548 2.7%
50,969,882 25,175,063 49% na na na na
Sources: Total population computed from the UN Database  (http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/
unpp/panel_population.htm) except for Kuwait (Public Authority for Civil Information; 
http://www.paci.gov.kw/en/).
Stocks of immigrants on July 1, 2014 estimated by the authors assuming that their proportion 
has remained constant since the most recent population census (or survey), as calculated by 
GLMM (http://gulfmigration.eu/glmm-database/demographic-economic-module. 
Estimated numbers of migrants apprehended in Irregular situation are retrieved from the 
corresponding country chapters of this volume.  
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etc). Such massive flows from the East and the West have undoubtedly created 
new social realities at their confluence. But these are not cohesive societies. Neither 
first- or second-generation migrants are admitted into the citizenry despite their 
outstanding demographic weight. First, they have limited membership in society, 
in terms both of rights and social interaction. Their “right to have rights” (Arendt), 
understood as the right of individuals to be members of a political community and 
to enjoy protection from that community, is negated where they live. Second, their 
social integration is mediated by the sponsorship system specific to the Gulf States 
and to a few other countries ( Jordan, Lebanon). 
“Dual societies” (Fargues 1980) have emerged in the Gulf, in which citizens 
and non-citizens are separated in economic and legal terms. Citizens have the 
world’s lowest rate of economic participation and they are almost invisible on the 
labour market outside the public sector (with variations from country to country). 
Non-citizens, meanwhile, have the world’s highest rate of economic participation 
and fill almost all private sector jobs. By law, every non-citizen must have a national 
sponsor. Non-citizens have only limited access to basic rights, notably the right to 
bring one’s family, and to universal labour rights. Their access to citizenship through 
naturalisation is extremely restricted (if not inexistent). Moreover, as a result of 
nationality at birth falling under a strict jus sanguinis unmitigated by any jus soli, 
migrants’ sons and daughters who were born and grew up in the Gulf remain 
non-citizens. In Qatar, the Nationality Law of 2005 stipulates that Qatari women 
married to a foreigner cannot transmit their Qatari nationality to their children 
(Zahra 2014) and the same is true for other Gulf States. In the United Arab 
Emirates, Mahdavi (2012) reports the case of children born to a migrant woman (a 
domestic worker) and an Emirati man (her employer and sponsor). The children are 
Emirati nationals while the mother is a migrant in an irregular situation, subject to 
deportation, when she is fired by her employer and the father of her children.
Actually, opening the door of citizenship to migrants is regarded by Gulf 
States as a triple threat to local citizens. It is, first, a threat to their cultural identity 
(migrants bring in alien values); second, to their social cohesion (they bring in a 
working class with its potential for political protest); and, third, to their wellbeing 
(if naturalised, migrants would receive social benefits from the state). Instead of 
integrating migrants, reducing their numbers has been a persistent goal for the last 
quarter of a century (Fargues and Brouwer 2012): so far though it has failed and 
the proportion of non-citizens in all six GCC states has continuously increased 
(Fargues 2012). The above-described duality has an important bearing on the 
production of irregularity among migrants. 
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The legal obligation to have a sponsor generates specific forms of irregularity. 
Indeed, the sponsorship system collides with basic rules of market economies for 
it hinders two fundamental requirements: the free mobility of labour and free 
entrepreneurship. Because both are necessary for markets to work and as markets 
can be stronger than states, there are a number of situations where the law is 
bypassed (mostly by sponsors) and the migrant is put into an irregular situation. 
First, the sponsorship system hinders labour mobility thereby generating 
irregular situations. Irregularity can start with a visa. Visas available to migrant 
workers do not offer open access to the labour market as in other major migration 
destinations. A visa ties its bearer to a specific job and a specific sponsor, thereby 
creating two sources of irregularity: visa trading and sponsorship trading.
 Jureidini explains how in Qatar visa trading, the (unlawful) practice of selling 
visas between companies, is a common strategy to get around occupation quotas. 
If, as an employer, I have unused visas for recruiting migrant workers in occupation 
A and you have reached your recruitment quota in occupation B but still need 
to hire more workers, I can sell you the visas you need. The migrant workers you 
recruit will receive visas that do not correspond to their actual employment and as 
a consequence they will automatically be in an irregular situation as soon as they 
enter the country ( Jureidini 2014). 
The transfer of sponsorship, when migrants change sponsor in the course of 
their stay, is another common case of irregular situation. Indeed, this kind of transfer 
is not permitted to the migrants themselves. It must be done by their new and former 
employers and approved by the competent authority (the Ministry of Labour). The 
same applies to the temporary secondment of a migrant worker by one employer to 
another, which is forbidden and that exposes the migrant to the risk of detention 
and deportation. There are variations from country to country (Zahra 2014).  In both 
Qatar and Bahrain, however, domestic workers are excluded from the benefit of this 
new legal provision for it is the Ministry of Interior, not the Ministry of Labour, 
that is responsible for managing employment (Khan and Harroff-Tavel 2012). In 
Saudi Arabia, the recently implemented Nitaqat programme (quotas) provides for 
the labour mobility of long-term foreign residents under certain conditions and 
waives the obligation of the ‘No Objection Certificate’ normally requested for any 
transfer from one employer to another (De Bel-Air 2014).
Second, the sponsorship system hinders entrepreneurship and this might be a 
cause of the irregular situation for migrants. Migrants’ self-employment is not legal 
in the Gulf, except in a few specific activities. Yet there are gaps and opportunities 
for migrants in occupations that are usually performed by independent workers 
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(craftsman, shopkeeper, specific services, etc.). And actually migrants are found in 
these occupations even if this is in breach of the law. In order to get around the 
prohibition of migrant self-employment, the foreign worker is fictitiously employed 
by a sponsor who formally owns the business and receives an income for a job 
another does. As stressed by Dito (2013), this kind of employment is legal but the 
agreement between the local sponsor and the sponsored foreign national is not: 
being registered as an employee while he/she is actually self-employed, the migrant 
worker is in irregular situation.
Overstaying or misusing a visa is, in every country in the world, a breach of the 
law. In the Gulf States, however, the obligation to have a sponsor generates specific 
forms of visa overstay or misuse. For example, when the employer cancels the work 
permit before the original visa expires; when the migrant worker takes another job 
and the former employer/sponsor reports the employee as a “runaway worker”; when 
the employer fails to pay the work permit renewal fees; when the migrant engages 
in a work different from that provided for by his or her visa, etc. (Dito 2013). In 
some of these situations, the migrant is in irregular situation regarding stay and in 
others regarding work. In all cases, he or she risks detention and deportation. In the 
Gulf States, certain forms of irregularity are not a breach of migration law so much 
as an unwanted, but logical consequence of the law (Dito 2013). 
It has been stressed that the sponsorship system results in transferring to 
private citizens what is elsewhere seen as a state’s prerogative: the surveillance of 
non-citizens (Beaugé 1986, Lori 2012, Dito 2013). Therefore, migrants can find 
themselves in an irregular situation as a result of their sponsors using the law for 
private purposes. Domestic workers in particular are at the mercy of employers, who 
can arbitrarily put them into an irregular situation. In Saudi Arabia, for example, 
victims of trafficking who run away from an abusive employer break the law by 
fleeing from their sponsor and therefore are in danger of detention and deportation. 
It is the victim, not the perpetrator of trafficking and abuse, who is handed over to 
justice, for the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law of 2009 is not yet fully implemented 
and fails to protect such victims (Zahra 2014). 
Different Pathways to Social Predicament
As a general rule, irregular migration comprises many different situations, including: 
workers attracted by labour opportunities in mostly informal activities, which are 
not conducive to the right to a work permit; domestic workers employed by private 
households and not protected by labour laws; unrecognised de facto refugees, i.e. 
persons fleeing life-threatening conditions in their own country who do not want 
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or who cannot obtain the status of refugee; and transit migrants initially bound 
for a destination which they are unable to reach for lack of entry visa and who 
are waiting for a passage to that destination. The borders between the various 
categories of irregular migrant situations are fuzzy. In particular, there is a growing 
difficulty in distinguishing between forced and voluntary migration as their causes 
are closely related, their migratory paths often similar, and host states’ responses 
undifferentiated. Many economic migrants and political refugees come from the 
same weak, conflict-affected, underdeveloped states and take similar routes (Castles 
and Van Hear 2011). Often, individuals will jump categories to obtain work or as 
they acquire new information concerning legal categories. 
Regardless of the different motives for migration, the various categories tend 
to merge into one. Being in an irregular situation implies that migrants have to 
hide from the authorities, that they enjoy limited freedom of movement, little or 
no legal protection and poor access to basic rights. Their stay is often unstable 
and migrants’ two-way mobility can take several forms, from back and forth 
movements of temporary or seasonal workers to the forced return and deportation 
of apprehended migrants. Whether the reason is that the receiving economies 
already have surpluses of national workforce or that protectionist policies hamper 
labour market mechanisms, the supply of workforce through irregular migration 
most often exceeds local demand. Migrants in an irregular situation form a pool of 
underemployed workers whose availability contributes to keeping labour cheap and 
flexible: what was once called a “reserve army of labour” (Marx 1859). 
In the 1990s, when globalisation became an obvious economic reality and 
a popular topic in the social and political sciences, some scholars advanced the 
hypothesis that the rise of irregular, or unregulated, migration was one of the many 
symptoms of declining state sovereignty. They mused whether a new regime was 
emerging, whereby international agreements and conventions as well as rights 
gained by migrants themselves were gradually substituting states in controlling 
immigration. Acknowledging that unrecognised asylum seekers and migrants in 
an irregular situation must, as human beings, enjoy a number of inalienable rights, 
human rights advocates in receiving countries in the West started to defend this 
growing category, thereby speaking for an extremely vulnerable part of modern 
societies. In this vein, Sassen (1997 & 2008) interpreted popular support for 
undocumented migrants in Europe as international human rights law gaining 
momentum over sovereignty. Basic rights must be decoupled from citizenship 
status (Benhabib 2004), as, for example, does the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
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of 1990. Focusing on Europe and the growing influence of civil society and courts 
in defending non-citizens, authors like Soysal (1994) and Joppke (1999) hailed a 
narrowing rights gap between citizens and non-citizens and the emergence of an 
era of “post-national” citizenship. Liberal democratic societies were, then, believed 
to grant entitlements to migrants in irregular situation and asylum seekers, to give 
precedence to the plight of those who sought admission over the needs of the 
receiving society, therefore preventing large scale deportation (Weiner 1996). 
Two decades later, disillusion seems to have taken over the optimistic views of 
earlier times. Irregular migration has spread beyond the industrialised world and is 
now found, at varying degrees, in every nation, developed as well as developing. Has 
progress towards the recognition of non-citizen rights been limited to the western 
world (Gibney 2009), or did irregular migration drive pro-human rights action in 
the developing world as well? The collapse of the political order in the Middle East 
eloquently demonstrates that some Arab countries were able to absorb millions of 
refugees fleeing first Iraq under American occupation, then war-torn Syria,  while 
western nations would only resettle a few tens of thousands and reluctantly offer 
temporary protection to those smuggled across the Mediterranean at the risk of 
their lives. (At the time of writing, just 15% of all Syrian refugees have been accepted 
as asylum seekers in the European Union). As Australia, a nation of immigrants 
par excellence, pushes back boat people to Indonesia, who had made the long and 
perilous journey from as far away as Iraq and Syria, some Arab countries have taken 
a different stance, as illustrated below.
Despite the fact that Jordan had been receiving massive flows of Iraqi refugees 
since the 1990s, King Abdullah was able to declare in his speech from the throne 
in October 2008: “As for the Iraqi brothers who live among us, they are our 
brothers and our guests. It is our duty to care for them as brothers who are facing 
difficult circumstances, until the day comes when they will be able to return to their 
homeland and territory” (Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein). Lebanon, a politically fragile 
state where a National Pact of 1943 (slightly amended after fifteen years of civil 
war in 1990) continues to distribute power and responsibilities between the many 
religious communities, has been able to accommodate 1.2 million Syrian refugees 
(one quarter of its own 4.5 million population) between 2011 and 2015 despite the 
fact that the vast majority belong to only one community (Muslim Sunni). Morocco, 
which is host to a large population of “transit” migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa 
and beyond, a population stuck at the door of Europe for lack of entry visas, was 
able to launch in 2014-2015 the first ever systematic regularisation campaign of 
migrants to be carried out by a developing country.  
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There is a fundamental distinction between the social conditions of migrants 
according to whether they are in a regular or irregular situation. Because they 
are denied the right to reside, migrants in an irregular situation are left with no 
choice but to hide and to live in limbo. They have been described as “precarious 
residents” (Gibney 2009), i.e. persons that: hold fewer rights than legally residing 
non-citizens; are more exposed to deportation; risk economic exploitation − from 
unpaid wages to dangerous working conditions − and often sexual exploitation; are 
not in a position to claim that their basic rights be respected because “in the eyes of 
state officials (and large sections of the public) they are trespassers with no right to 
be present in the state” (Gibney 2009).
Human rights principles dictate that no one should be subjected to exploitation 
or abuse because of their residence status and these continue to inspire those who 
stand up for migrants in an irregular situation. However, migrants themselves are 
nowhere offered real opportunities to become fully fledged members of their host 
society. Citizenship is, meanwhile, impossibly far off. On the contrary, the low status 
attached to their irregular situation translates, more often than not, into social 
predicament and destitution. 
Because most state policies on immigration favour highly-skilled migrants, 
those left with no choice but irregular entry, stay or employment are usually the less 
skilled and the more disadvantaged. Because poor migrants are more likely than non-
poor ones to engage, or be engaged in irregular migration (Sabates-Wheeler 2009) 
and because, in turn, irregularity generates precariousness and insecurity, there is a 
spiral that makes immigrants in irregular situations one of the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged segments of society. For this reason, they have become a resource in 
modern economies in which they represent a cheap, tractable and flexible workforce 
(Castells 1975; Brennan 1984), one which is ready to fill labour positions unpopular 
with nationals. In a sense, irregular migration is an economic blessing that was once 
described as a deliberate process of “inclusion through illegalization” (De Genova 
2002). 
It is sometimes said that migrants in an irregular situation, since they 
are willing to accept underpaid work, have a depressing effect on wages that is 
detrimental to nationals. However, no evidence for this has been found (see, for 
example, Espenshade 1995). From the point of view of migrants, instead, the 
question is whether their economic benefits from finding themselves in a less 
destitute, or less insecure, environment than the one left behind in their country 
of origin, compensate or not for irregularity. On the basis of a series of surveys 
among African immigrants going to, and returning from, the UK, Sabates-Wheeler 
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(2009) argued that for poor migrants the priority is escaping poverty, not acquiring 
a legal status. In other words, irregular migration would bring benefits to individual 
migrants despite exploitation. Surveys find that the decision to migrate is made 
independently of legal status and that irregular migration may even bring higher 
earnings than regular migration because persons in irregular situation escape 
taxation (in countries where income is taxed), while  “regular” migrants pay income 
tax. According to this view, irregularity would be a free choice made in a context of 
non-free mobility. 
A particular mention must be made of “transit” migrants, i.e., persons 
en route to a country that they cannot reach for lack of entry visa and who are 
stuck in a neighbouring country waiting for a passage (legal or illegal) to their 
intended destination. While these “stranded migrants” (Dowd 2008) are unable 
or unwilling to regularise their situation in the transit country, they soon need to 
earn a livelihood and find themselves mingled with the larger category of migrants 
in an irregular situation in search of employment. The longer transit migrants are 
stranded, the more vulnerable to economic destitution and human rights abuses 
they become (Collyer 2006). Moreover, transit migrants are often found moving 
with “de facto refugees” (Bosniak 1991), i.e., persons who do not have the legal 
status of refugee, even if they cannot return to their countries “for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” 
(the definition of a refugee in International Refugee Law). For this reason, it is 
worthwhile flagging up the blurred boundaries of the “transit migrant,” often a 
political rather than a scientific term as it disregards asylum claims (Düvell 2006). 
To what extent is the category of transit migration relevant to the Gulf States? 
There is ample anecdotal evidence (including several chapters in this volume) that 
some migrants find themselves stuck in a Gulf country they cannot leave for lack 
of the proper documents, and that others are employed in country A waiting for 
a move to country B. Put in other terms: transit migration exists in the GCC as 
elsewhere. 
The Politics of Irregularity
Not only is irregular migration an economic resource for employers (and generally 
for migrants), it can also turn into a political resource for governments, in internal as 
well as international politics. Manipulating irregular migration can bring substantial 
benefits for states in search of legitimacy and, in democracies, to political parties 
hunting for votes.
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In crisis times when governments’ accountability is challenged, foreign 
nationals are often scapegoated and those in a (real or alleged) irregular situation 
may find themselves targeted. This happened more than once in the Arab world 
in the years preceding the uprisings of the 2010s. In Libya, for example, massive 
deportations of migrant workers in an irregular situation took place in 1995, when 
the economy was faced with an international embargo, and between 2003 and 
2005, when post-embargo recovery was slackened by cheap oil and gas exports. 
Larger deportations had occurred in Africa. In Nigeria, in 1983, while the country 
was hit by a deep economic crisis, foreign nationals were stigmatised by officials as 
being responsible for all evils: from the spread of armed robbery and transmittable 
diseases to inflation and unemployment. An estimated 1.2 million migrants in an 
irregular situation, most of them from Ghana, were given two weeks to leave the 
country (Adepoju 1984). In Côte d’Ivoire, when the country entered into political 
turmoil and civil war in the 2000s after a decade of economic downturn, the 20-30% 
immigrants who once carried the Ivorian economy and were hailed by the slogan 
“land belongs to who farms it” (Fargues 1986) became  “irregulars” and were chased 
away in the name of a newly invented “Ivorianity.” In the Gulf States, repeated, and 
sometimes massive, crackdowns on migrants in irregular situation in the 2010s can 
be tied to rising discontent on the part of young nationals faced with unwelcoming 
labour markets, even though undocumented migrants are most probably not their 
competitors. In 2014, the numbers of migrants deported amounted to 6.2% of all 
foreign nationals residing in Saudi Arabia (to be added to more than 10% the year 
before), 2.8% in Bahrain, 1.1% in Kuwait and 0.7% in Oman (Table 2.1).
Beyond internal politics, irregular migration has also become a resource in 
international politics. In particular, it has been a recurrent matter for bargaining 
between European states and their southern and eastern Mediterranean 
neighbours. Readmission agreements oblige states to readmit their own citizens 
caught in an irregular situation regarding entry or stay, but also sometimes third-
country nationals who transited through their territory. These agreements and their 
negotiating has become a leitmotiv of European migration policies. On the other 
shore of the Mediterranean, controlling territory and borders in order to prevent 
the exit of transit migrants to Europe has been an argument for obtaining aid for 
militarisation or for buying the silence of the West over anti-democratic practices. 
For example, cooperating with Italy to curb irregular migration across the Strait 
of Sicily was instrumental in Libya’s rehabilitation in EU diplomacy at the time 
of Col. Qaddafi. It is still a matter of legitimacy for the factions that have fought 
over what is left of Libya since Qaddafi was ousted in 2012. Until now, none of the 
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Gulf States have engaged as has Europe with states of origin on readmission issues. 
Detaining migrants in an irregular situation then sending them back to where they 
come from is, in the Gulf, a unilateral decision.
As a general rule, governments regard migrants in an irregular situation as 
a challenge to their authority. “Fighting illegal migration” has become a national 
political agenda objective worldwide. The fight targets the migrant and whoever 
helps them, from smugglers to simple citizens who hide the migrant from the 
authorities. Detaining and deporting migrants is common practice. For this purpose, 
special prisons – or “detention centres”– are built and special flights are chartered. 
This is the case in the Gulf just as in other large migrant receiving states, with 
outstanding variations from country to country, as shown in Table 2.1. 
Irregular migration is an offence that can be sanctioned or pardoned. 
Arresting, fining, detaining, deporting, but also regularising individual migrants 
caught in irregular situation are daily practices for states. Granting an amnesty to 
communities of migrants – whether they have been arrested or they are requested to 
spontaneously come to the authorities – is, instead, exceptional, a one-off measure 
often preceded by an advertisement campaign. Several amnesty programmes have 
been launched since the 1990s in the Gulf States. The most recent ones in Kuwait 
(2011), Saudi Arabia (2013-2014) and Oman (2015) reached respectively 124,142, 
up to 5 million and an expected 60,000 migrants in irregular situations (Shah 2014, 
Khaleej Times). Amnesties exempt migrants from (part of the) penalties but they 
can produce two contrasting outcomes: regularisation or repatriation. They can 
allow the migrant to stay, or they can lift the sanctions at deportation. While the 
objective is, in both cases, to reaffirm the law by eliminating a situation that offends 
it, regularising stay or regularising an exit have different meanings.  The first marks 
a recognition of the migrant’s place in the country and their right to be there, while 
the second is in line with the general purpose of limiting the presence of non-
citizens and restricting their rights.
Conclusion
Irregularity and illegality are unwanted but unavoidable by-products of regulations 
and laws. This common sense statement applies to any phenomenon, not least 
migration. Migrants in irregular situation can be found in every nation as soon as a 
nation legislates on foreign nationals’ entry, stay, and rights and duties. Terminology 
is important, however: a situation can be irregular or illegal, not a person. Irregularity 
is not a stable characteristic, it is one that varies according to time and place. 
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Migrants fall into irregular situations in different ways, from one country to 
the other. The most straightforward form of irregularity, that of a person bypassing 
police controls at the border and finding himself with no proper documents, is 
certainly possible in Saudi Arabia which shares long and porous land borders with 
non-GCC states.  It can also happen in the UAE, which has erected fences at its 
borders with Oman and Saudi Arabia to stop unauthorised entries (WikiLeaks 
2007). However, it is practically impossible in all other GCC states that are only 
accessible by air. Passports and visas are controlled at entry and “undocumented” 
migrants are here irrelevant. 
It is after entry that the situation of documented migrants can become irregular, 
because their visas or residence permits have expired or have been misused. And this 
is precisely where the Gulf States differ from all other major migrant destinations. 
The sponsorship system that governs the presence and activity of foreign nationals 
in the Gulf hampers the free mobility of labour and free entrepreneurship that 
go hand in hand with market economies. This simple fact causes a multitude of 
situations in which migrant workers can find themselves, often unwillingly, in 
breach of the law. Moreover, a system by which states delegate control over foreign 
nationals to private sponsors opens the door to arbitrary power and abuse. We 
see migrants absconding and falling into irregularity. Fighting against irregularity 
means the reform or the abolition of the Gulf sponsorship system.
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Irregular Migration in the Gulf States: 
What Data Reveal and What They Conceal
Françoise De Bel-Air*
Abstract: Since the late 2000s, all Gulf States have been conducting widely-
publicised campaigns aiming at regularising foreign residents in irregular 
administrative situation, as well as clampdowns on so-called “illegal” migrants, 
detentions and deportations. Using the material gathered by the Gulf Labour 
Market and Migration (GLMM) Programme, the chapter presents, discusses 
and assesses datasets touching on the topic of irregular migration, available 
in Gulf country statistics. Part I presents methodologies, statistical and 
administrative apparatuses involved in the production of data, and discusses 
estimates available on undocumented migrant stocks in the region. Part II 
assesses the sources and the limits posed by datasets aiming at estimating 
flows of migrants in irregular situation to and from the Gulf States. Part III 
deals with their socio-demographic profile. The chapter concludes that data 
is scarce in most countries in the region. The various aspects of irregularity 
and the process of falling into this state cannot be traced with existing 
datasets. These focus on specific subpopulations constructed for the purpose 
of policy action: deported or regularised populations, border arrests, etc., 
hence fragmenting the stocks and flows of undocumented migrants in various 
categories, categories that are sometimes overlapping, or disconnected from 
each other. Available data thus have to be used with caution: political stakes 
III
* Françoise De Bel-Air is scientific coordinator of the demographic module of GLMM.
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are at play in the constructions and representations of irregularity and in the 
selection of the data released to the public. Defining irregularity as a clear-cut 
and stable phenomenon is impossible.
Introduction
Since the late 2000s, all Gulf States have been conducting widely-publicised 
campaigns aiming at regularising and facilitating the exit of foreign residents in 
irregular administrative situation, as well as clampdowns on so-called “illegal” 
migrants,1 detentions and deportations. In this context, various sets of data 
have been released by the governmental bodies in charge of implementing these 
measures. However, data are still scarce. Moreover, available data have to be used 
with caution: providing estimates of migrants in irregular situation is fraught with 
political challenges, defining irregularity as a clear-cut and stable phenomenon is 
hardly possible, and many institutional logics and representations of irregularity are 
at play in the construction and selection of the data released to the public. 
Using the material gathered in the framework of the Gulf Labour Market 
and Migration (GLMM) Programme, this chapter presents the various sources and 
types of data available in each country and discusses how they can help us estimate 
the size, structure and dynamics of irregular migrant populations in the Gulf States. 
Part I presents methodologies, statistical and administrative apparatuses involved 
in the production of data and discusses estimates available on undocumented 
migrant stocks in the region. Part II assesses the sources and the limits posed by 
datasets aiming at estimating flows of migrants in irregular situation to and from 
the Gulf States, and Part III deals with the socio-demographic profile of these 
migrant populations. Qatar will not be covered as no data could be gathered on 
these populations in the country.
1. The chapter does not use the term “illegal” migrant. The terminology most suited to 
designate this category of migrant is currently debated in the press and among scholars and 
practitioners. We employ “migrants in an irregular situation,” instead of “illegal migrant,” as 
well as the less precise “undocumented” migrant (migrants do have documents, but not the 
right ones to be acknowledged as “legal” residents or workers), in order to avoid repetition. 
“Illegal” migrant may also be used with inverted commas in quotations from the Gulf press or 
official discourses on the issue.
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Stocks
Methodology and Sources Available for Estimating Stocks of Undocumented Migrants
Estimates of the number of undocumented migrants have been produced with a 
range of different methods. In the European Union (EU), for instance, the following 
methods were used:2 
• Residual methods compare regular migration data (taken from the records 
of relevant institutions dealing with non-EU citizens’ residency and labour) 
with broader data sources, which cover all residents irrespective of their 
status (censuses and population registers, for instance). 
• Survey-based methods aim to incorporate irregular migrants in survey 
samples, in order to improve weighting techniques and to ensure the better 
statistical representativeness of the sample.
• Capture-recapture methods adjust population biology techniques to 
estimate the size of a population from the repeated identification of 
individuals.3 
• Multiplier methods make extrapolations for the total population from the 
share of irregular migrants in an observed sample group. 
• Drawing of estimates based on regularisation data: evidence derived from 
such data is only a broad indicator of the extent of the phenomenon, for 
the following reasons: a) not all migrants in irregular situation can or do 
take advantage of the regularisation campaigns; b) regularised immigrants 
who are granted a short-duration work or residence permit risk falling back 
into irregularity; and c) the method runs on a closed-country assumption, 
while regularisations conducted in EU countries showed that migrants 
in irregular situation move to the country conducting the amnesty from 
neighbouring countries and try to benefit from the regularisation initiative 
( Jandle 2004: 7). 
2. See, for instance, the Clandestino research project on irregular migration to Europe: http://
research.icmpd.org/research-home/projects/irregular-migration/clandestino/. The methods 
for estimating numbers of migrants in irregular situation in the EU were taken from CLAN-
DESTINO 2009 and from Jandle 2004.
3. “At two specific moments in time and at one specific location, the population is being counted. 
The amount of population not present at that specific moment and location can be estimated 
by using the Poisson parameter and so the total population can be counted” ( Jandle 2004: 5).
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GCC sources for population estimates, hence making deductions possible on 
the scale of irregular migration, include:
• Records from sending countries’ embassies; 
• Population censuses;
• Population registers.
Embassy records and, more generally, sending countries’ data on their 
expatriate nationals are usually inaccurate and of little help in pinpointing the 
numbers of migrants in an irregular situation. Registration of foreign residents in 
their diplomatic representations abroad is voluntary and some migrants never come 
in touch with their embassy for any administrative procedure: to register changes, 
or renewal of identity documents, for instance. Those who registered in the consular 
records may omit to signal their departure from the country. Consular records, 
therefore, comprise migrants who are not residing in that country any longer.4 
Sending countries’ data more generally, also fail to capture citizens’ movements. 
Most countries do not record border exits very thoroughly and register only the 
emigrants benefitting from governmental and bilateral labour schemes, who are 
a minority among migrants. Those who find employment directly from abroad, 
through personal networks, may not be counted. Even in countries which control 
departures to enforce laws pertaining to employment abroad, some migrants will, 
for example, forge or borrow identity documents, or emigrate to the GCC from 
other countries, in order to pursue their project.5 
As regards censuses in the GCC states, they are conducted every ten years at 
best: the last census in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) dates to 2005; Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain conducted censuses in 2010; Kuwait in 2011; and Qatar alone 
in 2010 and in 2015. As migration patterns change rapidly, censuses miss important 
intercensal events and dynamics. Moreover, quality assessment of census data in 
some GCC countries revealed discrepancies with other sources of population data. 
In Kuwait, for instance, a comparison between the 2011 census results and records 
from the Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI), the institution in charge of 
delivering civil identification (ID) document to each resident of the country, pointed 
4. It should be noted that in the Gulf, dual nationals (Gulf nationality + non-Gulf nationality) 
are very few: naturalisation in these countries is rare and, officially, GCC countries do not 
acknowledge dual nationality. In countries where naturalisations of migrants are common, 
consular records of sending countries comprise sizeable numbers of citizens naturalised in the 
host country, or nationals born in that country by virtue of the jus solis. 
5. On the case of Nepal, for example, see Paoletti et al. 2014.
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to a discrepancy of 491,680 non-residents between the two sources. The assessment 
of both sources meant a significant undercount of certain categories of persons in 
the censuses (domestic workers, expatriates in an irregular situation, for instance) 
(Shah 2014). Similar conclusions were suggested for Oman. Figures of expatriates 
recorded in the 2010 census (816,143) were markedly lower than the more plausible 
number expected for that same year, on the basis of the intercensal yearly estimates 
drawn from the Civil Registration System for 2004-2009 (about 1,162,000) 
(De Bel-Air 2015: 7-8).
Population registers, on the contrary, seem to be more likely to provide a 
comprehensive coverage of the foreign populations residing in the Gulf, including 
those in an irregular administrative situation. Indeed, the six GCC countries have 
just finalised or near-finalised comprehensive recording of every national or foreign 
resident in each country, within the realm of the “smart identity cards” compulsory 
delivery programmes conducted across the region since the mid-2000s including 
for newborns. The data recorded on each cardholder (biometric, demographic, 
pertaining to the migration and economic status and more) constitute a 
de facto population registry. Moreover, this register is updated in real time: arrival, 
departure, return, application for dependents’ visas, birth of children, granting or 
change of labour permit, of sponsorship, change of address, etc. This is due to the 
centralisation of all information pertaining to the resident in one single institution 
in each country: the PACI in Kuwait; the Royal Oman Police; the Ministries of 
Interior in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; the Central Informatics Organisation (CIO) 
in Bahrain; the Emirates Identity Authority in the UAE. The last introduces its 
programme as follows:
“In order to reduce the cost of establishing and maintaining similar or 
repeated database and simplifying the governmental measures and services 
for the population, the Emirates Identity Authority will link the Population 
Register with other ministries and corporations so that the Register becomes 
a central source for decision making in the UAE, the matter which supports 
the UAE to become a pioneer and leader in various development aspects. The 
below diagram reflects the integration between the Population Register and 
the most critical sectors in U.A.E.”6 
6. Reproduced from EIDA website: http://www.id.gov.ae/en/emirates-id/emirates-id-strategy/
population-register.aspx.
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In a similar fashion for Kuwait,
“The Public Authority for Civil Information - Kuwait (PACI) is the 
government agency responsible for maintaining all information on population 
and civil event registration (e.g. births, deaths and immigration) for Kuwaiti 
citizens and residents. The information collected is held in a central national 
database and is used as a basis to provide a number of applications known 
collectively as the Civil Information System (CIS).”7 
In such a setup, living in an irregular situation becomes increasingly difficult 
for the migrant, who loses access to basic services:
“A civil ID card is necessary for most civil and legal transactions, including 
a visit to the clinic or hospital, opening or operating a bank account, and 
renting a house. A valid civil ID is also proof of legal residence in the country. 
The civil ID is therefore a vital document for all residents.” (Shah 2014: 4).
Additionally, in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the growing political 
instability in the Middle East and the threat of terrorist organisations further 
enhanced security concerns regarding the non-registration of expatriates or 
irregularities in their records. Identity-monitoring systems have been tightened: 
new generations of cards are now mandatory for every citizen and expatriates, and 
the renewal process highlights any irregularity. Police forces also run street and 
workplace controls to verify the registration of expatriates and the accuracy of their 
details.8 The registration of migrant populations may thus become increasingly 
complete and allow the use of the residual method, for instance, in estimating the 
7. https://intercede.com/the_myid_system/who-needs-this/customer-case-studies/kuwait-na-
tional-identity-card/.
8. On Qatar, for instance: http://dohanews.co/moi-announces-overhaul-of-qatar-id-system/.
Pensions and retirement... Etc
Financial markets














Source: Emirates Identity Authority website (www.id.gov.ae).
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size of the irregular migrant populations. However, the multifaceted, transient, 
context- and time-specific nature of the phenomenon of irregularity undermines 
the significance of figures.
Available Data on Stocks of Irregular Migrants
Overall estimates of undocumented migrant stocks are provided only sporadically 
and by certain Gulf countries for amnesties and crackdown campaigns. Moreover, 
the methods and sources used by the government and other institutions to establish 
these estimates are never made available to the public. 
Amnesty campaigns: Partial data. It might have been thought that improved 
identity-monitoring systems in most of the GCC allowed for better estimates of 
the numbers of migrants in an irregular situation. However, Table 3.1 suggests that 
the results of the last regularisation campaigns were clearly stated only in Kuwait.9 
The migrant stocks remaining in irregular situation are, thus, difficult to deduce 
from these partial data. 
Table 3.1: Estimates of stocks of migrants in an irregular situation before and 
after latest amnesties (as of March 2016) (selected countries)
9. The two figures presented in Table 3.1 for the UAE are 1) the “official” figure (as claimed in 
the press by government members, for instance), and 2) the “unofficial” estimates, as stated by 




Kuwait (1) March 1-June 30, 124,142 32,036 13,653 78,453
UAE (2) December 4, 2012-Feb. 2013 61,000-135,000 61,826 ? ?
Oman (3) May 3, - October 28, 2015 47,000-50,000 23,653 ? ?
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Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a peculiar case. In that country, estimates of the 
numbers of migrants in an irregular situation are not published by the official 
statistical bodies, save in very rare cases. In December 2012, for instance, Saudi 
authorities claimed in the press that up to five million migrants were working and 
residing illegally in the country.10 As a matter of fact, the figures of foreign nationals 
retrieved from sending countries’ embassies and published in the press in 2013, 
suggested between 13 and 18 million foreign nationals.11 These figures may not be 
accurate: note the concerns explored earlier, about embassy records. However, the 
estimate of five million migrants in an irregular situation seems plausible given the 
official figure of 9,7 million non-nationals in Saudi Arabia mid-2013.12 
A massive amnesty campaign was conducted between April 3 and November 
3, 2013, followed by a clampdown on remaining undocumented migrants after the 
end of the amnesty. The results of the amnesty and the regularisation campaign 
(Table 3.2)13 resulted in 9.9 million cases of administrative regularisations: for 
example, those working for someone other than their sponsor, hence contravening 
labour and residency laws,14 were registered under the name of their actual sponsor 
(i.e., their current employer). One worker could perform several administrative 
operations on his/her status (for instance, change sponsor and regularise labour 
permits): therefore, the number of administrative regularisations does not allow 
estimates for the number of actual expatriates having benefitted from the regulation 
campaign. The Ministry of Labour also announced that 713,524 undocumented 
foreign nationals left the country. No indication is available for how they exited: 
forced deportations after detention, or by free choice “chosen” exit. Whether these 
populations actually left the country or were given an exit visa, for instance, is also 
unclear. A further 1,086,593 migrants were registered as runaways,15 which does 




12. Published by the CDSI, and based on the results of census 2010.
13. http://gulfmigration.eu/saudi-arabia-amnesty-of-2013-april-3-to-november-3-number-
of-work-status-corrections-by-type-and-sector-final-results/.
14. The sponsor is meant to employ the worker but also grants him/her the de facto right to 
residency. 
15. Workers classified as “runaway” are persons who 1) absconded from their workplace but are 
thought to be still in the country; or 2) left on a “leave-and-return” visa but did not return.
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Table 3.2: Saudi Arabia, amnesty of 2013 (April 3 to November 3): Number of 
administrative operations performed by type and sector (final results)16 
The scarcity of data available on Saudi Arabia’s irregular migrants thus poses 
a challenge in estimating final numbers. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is a major hub 
for population movements. Beside attracting workers, Saudi Arabia also receives 
millions of Muslim pilgrims every year, to the holy sites of Makkah and Madinah. In 
2015, over two million came from abroad for the Haj (great pilgrimage) and around 
four and a half million for the Umrah (minor pilgrimage). Every year some of these 
pilgrims stay over in the country in search of job opportunities. Additionally, Saudi 
Arabia has thousands of kilometres of land and maritime borders, which facilitate 
unrecorded entries. The 1,800 km border with Yemen is considered particularly 
sensitive and Saudi Arabia resumed the construction of a fence between the two 
countries in an attempt to limit infiltrators. Ethiopians, Somalis and Eritreans 
can also cross the Red Sea to Yemen, in order to reach Saudi Arabia. The political 
chaos in Yemen that followed the collapse of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, and the 
ongoing war there, which began March 2015, also pushed Yemenis to go to Saudi 
Arabia or stranded them in an irregular position in the Kingdom: 463,562 of them 
were actually regularised in mid-August 2015,17 with visitors’ visas. In December 
2015, 420,000 Yemenis had their visit visas renewed for six months.18 
Sending states. Seen from the sending states, the difficulty of estimating stocks of 
nationals in an irregular situation abroad, and in Gulf States in particular, is aptly 
illustrated in the case of Ethiopia. Following the amnesty and deportation campaigns 
of 2013, in Saudi Arabia, the Ethiopian government was apparently expecting just 
23,000 nationals to be deported back to Ethiopia (Frouws and Horwood 2014: 68). 
16. Data and totals in Table 3.2 only indicate the number of regularised documents or situations. 
17. http://www.alriyadh.com/1073976.
18. http://www.gdp.gov.sa/.
Regularisation operation/ document/ 
Worker's final status Private sector Public sector Domestic sector All sectors
Change of profession 2,417,273 322 6,184 2,423,779
Transfer of services 2,512,041 2 103,237 2,615,280
Recruitment visas granted 570,242 26,691 338,508 935,441
Labour permits granted 3,890,916 3,890,916
Total administrative regularisations 9,390,472 27,015 447,929 9,865,416
Workers registered as runaway 1,034,265 538 51,790 1,086,593
Final exits 437,314 17,069 259,141 713,524
Source: Statistical Yearbook 2013, Ministry of Labour, Saudi Arabia.
The figures indicate the number of administrative operations performed, not of persons 
concerned.  
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However, about 160,000 eventually returned to their country, which is indicative 
of the levels of irregular migration in the Gulf among certain nationalities. The 
Nepalese government, too, stated that most of the 20,000–25,000 female Nepalese 
domestic workers in Saudi Arabia were working there “illegally” in the late 2000s 
(Paoletti et al. 2014: 46).
A Special Case of Irregularity: the Biduns and Stateless Persons in GCC Countries 
Stateless persons residing in the Gulf States constitute a special case as regards 
irregularity: they are not migrants, they are not nationals of any other state and 
they are denied the nationality of their country of birth. Some 100,000 stateless 
persons are said to live in the UAE,19 about 80,000 in Saudi Arabia,20 and 1,200 
to 1,500 in Qatar.21 As compared to the other countries’ biduns,22 the stateless of 
Kuwait had a peculiar fate. They originate from three broad categories: 1) those 
whose ancestors failed to apply for nationality or lacked necessary documentation 
at the time the 1959 Nationality Law came into force (these are mainly descendants 
of Bedouin populations); 2) those recruited to work in Kuwait’s army or police 
force during the 1960s, who settled in Kuwait, along with their families (coming 
originally from Iraq, Jordan and Syria); 3) the children of Kuwaiti mothers and 
stateless, or foreign fathers – nationality in Kuwait being transmitted by patrilineal 
descent, the children of a Kuwaiti mother and non-Kuwaiti father [with specific 
nationality] inherit the father’s nationality and are necessarily stateless if the father 
is stateless. Nevertheless, in spite of their statelessness, most of them enjoyed socio-
economic privileges on a par with Kuwaiti nationals, and they were not considered 
to be illegally resident in the country until the mid-1980s. 
Yet, as regional and domestic political tensions were rising during the period, 
they were accused of a double allegiance with enemy countries in the region, Iraq 
especially. After 1985, they were gradually deprived of all the socio-economic 
privileges they had shared with Kuwaiti citizens until then: employment on a par 






22. In Arabic: “without.”
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residency status was suddenly made illegal, placing them under threat of deportation.23 
During the year 2000, the biduns were deprived of the civil identity cards issued to 
citizens and legal non-Kuwaiti residents. The most recent “Bidun Committee,” the 
Central System to Resolve Illegal Resident’s Status, was set up in November 2010. 
According to the Human Rights Watch, 106,000 biduns who registered with the 
Committee between 1996 and 2000, were issued with security cards.24 In February 
2012, the Kuwaiti Government asserted that 93,000 individuals had been registered 
as “unlawful residents.” Shortly after it was established, the Committee announced 
a five-year plan to resolve the bidun issue and declared that eleven “facilities” would 
be granted to all biduns in Kuwait whilst the plan was implemented (Council of 
Ministers Decision No. 409/2011 of March 6, 2011). 
These facilities included access to free healthcare and medical care, the issuance 
of birth, marriage and death certificates, applying for a driving license and access 
to employment. Identity documents issued under this plan would include the term 
“non-Kuwaiti” in the slot for citizenship. However, anecdotal evidence from non-
governmental organisations and the bidun community suggests that the granting 
of these facilities has been inconsistent. Most importantly, these stateless persons 
are still considered illegal residents (Home Office 2014, Beaugrand 2014; Refugees 
International & Open Society Foundations 2011; Human Rights Watch 2011). In 
Kuwaiti statistics, however, they remain unaccounted for, be it in the total figures 
for Kuwait and non-Kuwaiti residents, or in the official figures of undocumented 
migrants. They may only appear under the heading “non-Kuwaiti” in the nationality 
breakdowns of persons departing from Kuwait.
Flows
Characteristics of Undocumented Migrants’ Flows
Flow data can take on several forms. 
• There are “demographic” flows: births of children whose parents are in an 
irregular situation and deaths of persons in an irregular situation. 
23. In 1986 the government began to apply the Alien Residence Act to biduns, effectively 
re-classifying them as “illegal residents” (Refugees International and OSF 2011; Beaugrand 
2011: 228).
24. Or better, “reference” cards, informally known as green cards, which display personal data 
including the registrant’s name, address and date of birth. The reverse of the card states that 
“this card does not serve as proof of identity, and may be used only for specified purposes.”
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• Another case is the cross-border flows of undocumented migrants. The 
only proxy for such flows are the three following datasets. First, there are 
the police records of inflows of arrested “infiltrators.” In the terminology 
used in the Gulf States, these are persons crossing international borders 
away from border posts and apprehended for lack of proper identification 
documents, entry permission or visa. These records are only available for 
Saudi Arabia. Second, there are police records that allow us to measure 
the outflows of migrants forcibly deported after they were arrested in 
an irregular situation inside the host country. The third kind of dataset 
records migrants in an irregular situation, being forced to exit after failing 
to regularise their administrative situation, or “deciding” to leave during an 
amnesty period (in order to avoid paying a backlog of fines, for instance). 
Their statistics may be published by Labour Ministries that conducted 
inspections on worksites with the police (Ministries of Interior) forces 
in most GCC countries. However, such data are most often released 
punctually, in the press.
• A third kind of flow data pertains to the modification of the expatriate’s 
administrative status in the host country, from regular to irregular (or 
reverse) category. For example, a migrant may enter the host state with 
a valid visa and labour documents but may eventually work for someone 
other than his/her sponsor, work in an industry other than that indicated 
on the iqama, or his/her sponsor will fail to renew the documents on 
time. Conversely, some migrants in an irregular situation fix their status 
by paying the fines, or by achieving regularisations during an amnesty. 
Statistics on such cases are usually maintained by Labour Ministries 
(Saudi Arabia, Oman), by Interior Ministries (Qatar, UAE, Kuwait) and 
by the Labour Market Regulation Authority (LMRA) in Bahrain. As 
indicated in Table 3.1, these kind of data are not readily provided by these 
institutions.
Assessing the Data Available on ‘Irregular’ Migration Flows to and from GCC States
Data on demographic flows (births and deaths of persons in an irregular situation) 
do not exist in separate published records of vital statistics in any of the six countries. 
As a matter of fact, persons in an irregular situation cannot obtain birth certificates 
for their children: in the UAE, for example, the parents’ passports, visas, Emirates 
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ID, and medical insurance certificates are mandatory for obtaining this document.25 
The de facto stateless irregular residents face the same problem and the tightening of 
identity-monitoring systems makes the process increasingly difficult.26 In Kuwait, 
the birth of the children of biduns who benefitted from the measures passed in 
2011 are probably classified with those of non-Kuwaiti Arab nationals.27 Using 
the estimates of cross-border inflows and outflows of undocumented migrants also 
raises a number of methodological and political issues.
Partial records of events. The main issue pertaining to this kind of data is that it only 
records the migrants in irregular situation who were arrested. These data, then, do 
not help us with the total numbers of infiltrators, or the general trends of infiltration. 
Figure 3.1 on Saudi Arabia illustrates this. 
Figure 3.1: Saudi Arabia: Arrests of infiltrators by Border Police  
(Nov. 2012-Jan. 2016)
Apart from the spike of arrests in May 2013, the general trend of the numbers 
of infiltrators captured seems to actually be decreasing. Does this confirm that, since 
the 2013 crackdown on migrants in an irregular situation, increased border patrols 
and the new fence made it more difficult to enter Saudi Arabia or that migrants are 
using different routes or means to ensure their successful crossing of the border, while 
resorting in larger numbers to people smugglers, for instance? Bram Frouws and 
Christopher Horwood from the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) 
suggest that this decrease in attempts to enter Saudi Arabia is due to a dip in the 
25. http://gulfnews.com/guides/family/how-to-register-a-birth-in-the-uae-1.1375738.
26. https://bostonreview.net/world/katie-cella-united-arab-emirates-stateless-citizens.
27. Vital statistics records from PACI: https://www.paci.gov.kw/STAT/SubCategories/Index? 
CategoryId=8.
Source: Ministry of Interior, Border Police.
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number of new arrivals on Yemen’s coasts from the Horn of Africa (Frouws and 
Horwood 2014: 37). Figures of arrests at borders thus tell us little about the larger 
picture of undocumented migrant numbers and characteristics.
Regarding exits, information on the number of deportees is not part of the 
routine statistics of the sending-country databases, and, in any case, existing police 
records of deportations provide only a partial account of the outflows of migrants 
in an irregular situation. First and foremost, they evidently miss the movements of 
those who are not arrested, either inside the host country or while leaving it. 
“Border spectacles.” Second, deportations serve political purposes: the wide publicity 
given in the national media to police clampdowns, arrests and deportations proves 
this. Likewise, the construction of irregularity as an issue to be combated is a “border 
spectacle,” a display of sovereignty enforcement addressed to nationals.28 Figures 
of deportations performed, especially when released through the press, should 
therefore be used with caution. Indeed, the politicisation of deportations sheds light 
on operations conducted over a specific period of time, hence undermining longer-
term dynamics: for instance, cumulated figures of deportations of migrants in 
irregular situation since April 2013 (the beginning of the “regularisation” campaign) 
amount to a stunning 1,648,798 migrants deported as of February 28, 2016. 
However, Figure 3.2 also highlights the relative stability of monthly deportations’ 
figures over the five-year span of March 2011 to February 2016 (notwithstanding 
the peak in November and December 2013). 
In Oman, too, in the run-up to 2015’s “anti-illegal migrants” campaign and the 
deportation of 23,000 residency laws’ violators, the Ministry of Manpower indicated 
that 15,885 arrests and 7,391 deportations of migrants in irregular situation had 
been performed in 2013, up from 7,694 arrests and 4,501 deportations in 2010. 
This proves the psychological effect of the widely publicised campaigns, which 
conceal longer-term dynamics and thus distort the perception of events (here, the 
movements of migrants in irregular situation).
28. As suggested by Nicholas de Genova, the “border spectacle” emphasises migrant “illegality” 
and renders it spectacularly visible, and thereby “sets the scene – a scene of ostensible exclusion, 
in which the purported naturalness and putative necessity of exclusion may be demonstrated 
and verified, validated and legitimated, redundantly” (De Genova 2005; 2013).
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Figure 3.2: Deportations of residents in an irregular situation from 
Saudi Arabia by month (3/2011 to 2/2016)
Overlap of categories. Third, the term “deportation” is not usually defined and neither 
are populations included in the category. For example, the Saudi Ministry of 
Interior’s records indicated that 665,960 deportations occurred during 2013 and 
605,420 during 2014.29 We have seen, too, that 2013’s amnesty campaign gave way 
to 713,524 exits as announced by the Ministry of Labour. How many of these exits 
are classified under the category of “deportations”? Figure 3.2 on monthly figures 
of deportations indeed shows a peak in the last two months of 2013 (123,470 and 
100,961 for November and December 2013, respectively). However, we do not 
know how to articulate the Ministry of Interior’s figures with the ones summarising 
the outcomes of the amnesty, published by the Ministry of Labour. Deportation 
data are thus not only incomplete in estimating the movements of migrants in an 
irregular state, they are also probably flawed by an overlap of categories used by 
the concerned bodies (in the Saudi case, the Ministries of Labour and Interior). 
“Enforced deportations” and “final exits,” are the overlapping terms used by the 
Saudi Ministries of Labour and Interior. This could lead to some double counting 
of exits.
Categorisation of migrants: migrants in an irregular situation vs. criminals. Fourth, 
those deported before and after the amnesty and crackdown periods, for irregular 
administrative status, are only a share of those deported routinely from those 
countries on a wide array of charges. The Kuwaiti Ministries of Interior and Justice 
29. See GLMM data: http://gulfmigration.eu/saudi-arabia-deportations-from-saudi-arabia-by-
month-march-2011-february-2016/.
Source: Ministry of Interior.
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publish deportation statistics by category of charges, which include violations in 
residency laws.30 However, Figure 3.2 highlights the following: the number of 
deportations was similar in 2008 and in 2014 (respectively 21,276 and 21,364), yet 
the share of the deportations conducted under “residency law violations” decreases 
steadily from 73 to 24% of all deportations between the two dates. This is puzzling, 
given the tracking down of migrants in irregular situation, implemented during 
the period in Kuwait. Moreover, these statistics record only 4,762 deportations for 
residency laws in 2011, while the four-month crackdown campaign alone resulted in 
32,036 exits on similar charges. This must mean that the results of the massive 2011 
crackdown on migrants in an irregular situation and overstayers are not included in 
these statistics. Exits which followed the crackdown operation are, as it happens, 
categorised as regularisations by departure, not as deportations.31 The distinction 
between the two categories of exits for undocumented migrants is puzzling. We, 
nevertheless, see here the inconsistency of the category of “residency law violator” 
or “irregular” in administrative records. Similar movements may be categorised 
as criminal, or not, according to the context in which they take place (within, or 
outside the amnesty period) and the administrative purpose of the file recording 
the event (regularisation, or criminal registry). In any case, capturing all exits of 
migrants in an irregular situation would mean collating data from different sources.






Source: Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Justice.
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 Data on status-related flows are very rare in Gulf statistical records. Kuwait 
publishes statistics on residency permits by type and holder’s group of country of 
origin, which comprise data on holders of expired documents (overstayers) for a 
given date.32 These include, therefore, migrants who have newly fallen into the 
category of irregular stay (overstayers only), and migrants who lost their legal status 
in earlier years. Disaggregated figures are not available. Figure 3.4 shows how 
increasing numbers of foreign residents have fallen into the category of overstayers 
since 2010: the number of recorded overstayers increased by 5.9 times over five 
years.33 
Figure 3.4: Number of holders of expired residency permits in Kuwait
(2010-2014)
Considering that records from the Public Authority for Civil Identification 
allow the government of Kuwait, as noted earlier, to pinpoint the bulk of migrants 
in an irregular situation without arresting them, the increase in figures probably 
does not reflect the tightening of policies applied to undocumented migrants. 
However, the nature of the data, which merges flows and stocks, does not allow us 
to highlight the dynamics characterising this category. For instance, how should we 
view undocumented migrants? Are they a growing stock of migrants living hidden 
from police arrests as years pass, unable to fix their status or leave Kuwait? Or 
are they, alternatively, a continuously expanding flow of newcomers who fall into 
32. “Migration Statistics,” Central Statistical Bureau, Kuwait’s Ministry of Planning. The reports 
tabulate the Ministry of Interior’s (Directorate of Migration) data on permits granted to 
foreign residents by type/ purpose of permit, sex and regional origin of holder.
33. The figures refer to foreign residents who are still living in Kuwait at the end of the reference 
year, but who were found contravening the law on residency by staying beyond the period 
allowed by their residency document.
Source: Ministry of Interior, Kuwait.
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irregularity and who are soon deported and replaced by new overstayers? Does the 
swelling of the numbers of overstayers reflect some jamming in the deportation 
procedures? These overstayers can, indeed, be: 1) still working for their employer/
sponsor who did not renew the employee’s documents; 2) in the process of renewing 
their documents; 3) detained, waiting to be regularised by the sponsor; 4) waiting to 
be deported, or 5) hiding away. No indication is available as to which measures are 
applied to the residency overstayers as a whole. 
Changes of category from irregular to regular, usually happen during amnesty 
or regularisation periods, or when the sponsor fixes the situation of the employee. 
No data is available on this last topic and the scale of routine regularisations cannot 
be evaluated. Reports on the outcomes of regularisation campaigns are the only 
source of information on regularisations, but, as noted before, they are partial 
sources. Kuwaiti data in Table 3.1 indicated that hardly 11% of the recorded 124,142 
migrants in an irregular situation, picked out in the 2011 amnesty campaign, were 
regularised, while 26% had their case settled by deportation. Sixty three per cent of 
the undocumented migrants remained in that situation. In Bahrain, regularisations 
were more generous when 52% of the approximately 61,000 unauthorised migrants 
shifted category and became legal, and 17% left Bahrain. Almost a third of all 
migrants in an irregular situation (31%) did not fix their status.
Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Irregular Migration
Very few data are available on the socio-demographic characteristics of 
undocumented migrants in the Gulf. Kuwait is again an exception. Records of the 
regularisation campaign of 2011, for example, give the nationality breakdown of 
these migrants before and after the campaign (Table 3.3). Three Asian nationalities 
(Bangladesh and India, first and foremost, then Sri Lanka) made up more than half 
of all migrants in an irregular situation, before and after the amnesty campaign.
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Table 3.3: Kuwait, amnesty of 2011: Migrants in an irregular situation
before and after the amnesty (top-20 most represented
nationalities among undocumented migrants)
If added to available figures of migrants in a regular situation as of December 
2011,34  the figures for migrants in an irregular situation after the regulation campaign 
(mid-2011) seem relatively low (Figure 3.5). Data suggest than Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka only have sizeable proportions of undocumented migrants (respectively, 
9.2% and 8.6% of these nationals in Kuwait). The other nationalities (at least, those 






Bangladesh 26,019 4,891 1,271 19,857
India 24,433 9,585 2,664 12,184
Sri Lanka 16,267 4,969 916 10,382
Egypt 9,338 2,532 2,740 4,066
Indonesia 9,199 2,116 399 6,684
Philippines 7,498 2,055 1,006 4,437
Pakistan 5,225 1,366 1,051 2,808
U.S.A 4,117 131 72 3,914
Nepal 3,788 2,035 487 1,266
Syria 3,442 477 873 2,092
Ethiopia 2,055 732 582 741
Iran 1,961 164 304 1,493
Afghanistan 1,477 246 216 1,015
Jordan 1,342 89 274 979
Britain 1,027 14 17 996
Lebanon 961 69 228 664
Iraq 945 47 136 762
Turkey 544 20 18 506
China 421 101 40 280
Sudan 396 148 32 216
Yemen 330 48 60 222
other nationalities 3,357 201 267 2,889




violators as of 
February 28th, 
2011




Source: Ministry of Interior.
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for which total numbers of regular migrants are available here), all, meanwhile, 
comprise less than 5% of nationals in an irregular situation. These low figures 
suggest that some migrants in Kuwait could have totally escaped registration at all 
stages of their entry and sojourn.
Figure 3.5: Estimates of the proportion of ‘irregular’ migrants in 
selected populations by nationality (Kuwait, 2011)
Kuwaiti data35 also indicate that migrant residency permit overstayers were 
mostly employed in the private sector (21% of all overstayers) and in the domestic 
sector (61%) in 2014. By comparison, “only” 42% of overstayers were recorded 
in the domestic sector in 2010.36 Moreover, data also tell us that nationals from 
African countries make up 21% of all recorded overstayers (5,219) in 2014, a 
tremendous hike since 2010 when they made up only 2% of expired residency 
holders (79 migrants). Asian nationalities make up 65% of all recorded overstayers.37 
This information is consistent with the concentration of expired residency holders 
among domestic helpers, who are most often from Asian countries: the Philippines, 
35. “Migration Statistics,” Central Statistical Bureau, Kuwait’s Ministry of Planning. The reports 
tabulate the Ministry of Interior’s (Directorate of Migration) data on permits granted to 

















Regulars, December 2011 Irregular migrants, June 2011  
Source: Ministry of Interior, Kuwait.
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Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and, to a lesser extent, India, as well as from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, particularly from Ethiopia.
Deportation figures recorded in Kuwait are also the only source of data 
regarding the gender distribution of this specific sub-category of migrants in an 
irregular situation. Table 3.4 indicates that the gender gap is progressively closing as 
regards deportations, but men outnumber women among deportees under charges 
of violating residency laws.
Table 3.4: Deportations from Kuwait (residency law violators;
all charges), by sex (2009-2014)
Conclusion
The chapter aims at presenting, discussing and assessing datasets touching on the 
topic of irregular migration, available in Gulf country statistics. Be it to estimate 
the stocks, flows, or socio-demographic characteristics of migrants in an irregular 
situation, data are still inexistent or scarce at best, in most countries in the region. 
Moreover, the various aspects of irregularity and the process of falling into this 
state cannot be traced with existing datasets. These focus on specific subpopulations 
constructed for the purpose of policy action: deported or regularised populations, 
border arrests, etc., hence fragmenting the stocks and flows of undocumented 
migrants in various categories, categories that are sometimes overlapping, or 
disconnected from each other. 
This confirms the elusive nature of irregularity: its multifaceted, transient, 
context- and time-specific nature, which undermines the significance of figures. 
Political stakes, the logic of public action and the limits of administrative body task-
descriptions all contribute to selecting specific populations and to shaping categories 
of populations: “who counts [matters] depends on who counts [enumerates]” 
Males Females Males Females
2009 16,021 7,928 11,228 4,937
2010 16,651 8,498 7,694 2,089
2011 8,894 7,027 3,403 1,449
2012 7,824 8,400 3,270 1,252
2013 12,373 10,931 5,778 1,590
2014 11,184 10,180 3,898 1,139
Year
All charges Residency law violations
Source: Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Justice, Kuwait.
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(Zarkovic Bookman 1997: 71). Migrants in an irregular situation may be viewed 
either as criminals to be deported, or as victims deserving regularisation. 
However, the more data that is made available to the public, the more 
metadata can be shared, and the better we will understand migration. This requires, 
nevertheless, different methodologies (field surveys, collation of administrative 
records), and, most importantly, it means that we must turn away from the ever-
tightening security approach to migration currently adopted by Gulf countries.
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The Legal Production of Illegality:
Obstacles and Opportunities to Protect 
Undocumented Migrants in the Gulf States
Elizabeth Frantz*
Abstract: Irregular migration has been identified as a major policy “problem” 
by Gulf governments. The prevailing approach focuses on punitive measures 
such as the imposition of fines on overstayers and law enforcement efforts 
involving detention and deportation. More recently, some governments have 
proposed that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states work together to 
reduce the number of irregular migrants by imposing GCC-wide entry bans on 
migrant workers who have absconded from their employers. These efforts are 
unlikely to succeed in curbing the phenomenon. This chapter argues that the 
large number of migrants in an “irregular situation” in the Gulf States should 
be understood not as a result of insufficient migration controls but rather as 
a product of the rules on entry, residence and employment to which non-
citizens are subject. Efforts to punish individuals are likely to be less effective 
than comprehensive policy measures designed to prevent and minimise 
irregularity. The chaper is divided into three parts: the first examines the 
production of irregularity – the constellation of factors driving migrants into 
irregular situations, including strict rules which create incentives for migrants 
to leave or avoid regular employment. The second part discusses the impact 
IV
* Elizabeth Frantz is a Programme Manager at the Open Society Foundations.
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of irregularity on migrants, particularly how this affects their engagement 
with the labour market and ability to defend their rights. The third and final 
section discusses the role governments of origin and destination countries 
could play to develop more effective, sustainable approaches to address both 
the causes and effects of irregularity. 
Introduction
In almost every region of the world, the question of how to respond to the problem 
of irregular migration is hotly debated. The prevailing government response in 
many countries has been to strengthen border controls, to introduce one-off or 
successive regularisation or amnesty campaigns, and to use punitive measures such 
as detention and deportation to assert state sovereignty and deter further arrivals. 
But these measures often fail to manage migration effectively or efficiently.  
Saudi Arabia’s recent crackdown on undocumented migrants is part of a 
familiar pattern. In 2013, the government embarked on one of the largest and most 
aggressive “regularisation” campaigns in the region’s history. Portrayed as an effort to 
reduce unemployment among Saudi youth, the campaign followed an amendment 
to the labour law empowering police to enforce provisions against undocumented 
workers, including by detaining and deporting all foreign workers found working 
for someone other than their sponsoring employer (American Bar Association 
2013). Some 20,000 workers were detained in the first two days (Human Rights 
Watch 2015: 1). By November 2013, when the “grace period” presumably 
meant to allow workers to regularise their status ended, five million workers had 
legalised their status, and at least one million had been expelled or left voluntarily 
(De Bel-Air 2014: 5). Hundreds of thousands more were deported in 2014 (Human 
Rights Watch 2015: 1). The campaign was accompanied by reports of ill-treatment 
of migrants, including attacks by Saudi police and citizens, and poor conditions in 
detention, including inadequate food and beatings by guards (Global Detention 
Project 2015: 68-9). 
These events took place against the backdrop of rising unemployment among 
Saudi nationals, and in a political climate in which migrant workers are perceived 
as an economic necessity but a cultural and demographic threat. In such contexts, 
regularisation and expulsion campaigns such as those implemented by Saudi Arabia 
serve as “border spectacles” (De Genova 2014), displays of enforcement that make 
undocumented migrants visible as subjects to be punished in ways that both affirm 
national unity and give the impression the state is “in control.” The stated goal 
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is to force undocumented migrants to leave or become included in the regular 
administrative framework. But this is only a stop-gap measure, a temporary fix 
rather than a holistic solution. Such approaches overlook, and in fact leave intact, 
the structures driving people to become undocumented in the first place. 
In much of the public rhetoric in the Gulf States and beyond, undocumented 
migrants are cast as transgressive for working and living in the country without 
authorisation. This chapter proposes a different view. The aims are, first, to 
demonstrate that the large number of migrants in an “irregular” situation in the 
Gulf States should be viewed not as a result of insufficient migration controls but 
rather as a direct product of the legal rules on entry, residence, and employment 
to which non-citizens are subject. I take, as a starting point, a view of irregular 
migration not as a form of deviance on the part of migrants but instead as the 
effect of a constellation of laws, regulations, and practices established by the state 
for the express purpose of controlling migration. As De Genova’s work on Mexican 
migration to the US shows, the irregularisation of migration is a regular, predicable 
feature of the routine functioning of border management (De Genova 2014:8). 
Second, while seeking to avoid the often state-centred approach taken by many 
who have written about this subject, this chapter does have policy in mind. The 
second half of the chapter proposes a policy approach to undocumented workers 
that would both protect migrants’ rights and reduce the drivers of irregularisation 
in Gulf labour markets.  
Terminology
There are dangers associated with taking policy categories as the starting point for 
analysis (Mezzadra 2014: 121). Fixating on the figure of the “irregular migrant” 
could serve to reify problematic taxonomies, asserting some forms of cross-border 
movement as legitimate and others not. While the term “irregular migration” 
is used in this chapter, when speaking of people I have opted to use the term 
“undocumented migrant” in place of more derogatory terms such as “irregular 
migrants” or “illegal migrants.” It is worth mentioning, however, that the migrants 
we refer to as “undocumented” are not necessarily without papers; they may or may 
not have in their possession valid identity documents attesting to their citizenship. 
The meaningful distinction is that they are people whose entry, stay, or employment 
is not authorised by the state. 
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Historical Genesis of Contemporary Migration Policies
Migration has been a constant feature throughout the Gulf ’s recorded history. 
The port towns of Manama, Kuwait City, and Dubai attracted migrants from the 
opposite side of the Indian Ocean long before the discovery of oil. During the 
nineteenth century, migrants from India, Iran, and farther east, along with groups 
from the desert and inland agricultural areas of eastern Saudi Arabia, flocked to 
coastal Gulf towns to work in the pearling industry and commercial trade (Fuccaro 
2005, 2009, 2010). Immigrants, settlers, sailors, and administrators from British 
India dominated the social landscape in early twentieth-century Manama (Fuccaro 
2010: 28). Government apparatus were minimal, and patronage played a key role 
in facilitating migration, with settled migrants sending for kin and providing them 
with employment and protection upon arrival. Economic migrants continued to 
represent a large proportion of the urban population in the Gulf port towns after 
the discovery of oil in the 1930s, when foreign labour was sought for oil production, 
manufacturing, and construction (Fuccaro 2009: 208).
But a dramatic transformation took place in the 1960s and 1970s, when the oil 
boom prompted massive social, economic, and political shifts in the region. The 1973 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo caused oil 
prices to quadruple. Many of the newly wealthy oil-exporting Gulf states became 
independent from Britain and began to launch large-scale infrastructure projects 
requiring manpower beyond the capacity of the local supply. The stock of expatriate 
workers began to swell. In the 1950s and 1960s, labour migrants to the Gulf had 
been predominantly Arab, but from the 1970s onward migrant workers from Asian 
countries were increasingly favoured. The proportion of Arab workers in the Gulf 
workforce declined from 72% in 1975 to 32% in the early 2000s (Kapiszewski 
2006: 7, 9). This turn to Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi labour was driven by 
the fact that Asians were less expensive to employ, easier to dismiss, thought to 
be easier to manage. Just as importantly, they were considered less of a political 
threat to ruling families (ibid: 6-7). The preference for Asian over Arab workers 
was not simply the result of market forces but had important political dimensions 
(Chalcraft 2010). Under the banner of Pan-Arabism, while Gulf monarchies were 
struggling to establish legitimacy among local populations, Gulf state borders had 
been relatively open to Arab labour. But from the 1970s onwards the popularity of 
the Pan-Arab concept declined, and Arab migrants were viewed with increasing 
suspicion by Gulf monarchies. Greater restrictions were imposed on Palestinian 
labour, and large numbers of Palestinian and Yemeni migrants were expelled from 
Saudi Arabia (Chalcraft 2010: 18), where the proportion of Arabs in the foreign 
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population dropped from 91 percent in 1975 to 33% in 2004 (Kapiszewski 2006: 
8). In contrast to their Arab counterparts, Asian workers were not only “more easily 
alienated from politics, in no small measure because of language barriers, but they 
came without intra-Arab and regional entanglements” (Chalcraft 2010: 19). They 
were politically disenfranchised and could be segregated from the local population 
and “rotated” every few years, which further limited any political threat they might 
pose to royal families. 
This trend accelerated, as seen in the example of Kuwait. While the inflow 
of migrant labour had been relatively unregulated at the beginning of the oil era, 
this also gradually changed. A new set of immigration and nationality laws began 
to create new legal and political divisions between nationals and non-nationals, 
Arabs and non-Arabs (Fuccaro 2009: 223). The notion that GCC nationals should 
be entitled to privileges above and beyond those of non-nationals began to take 
hold (Crystal 1990: 79). In Kuwait, in 1948, two decrees established the first legal 
basis for nationality (ibid). By the late 1950s, with the number of expatriate workers 
increasing steadily, more explicit policies were passed favouring nationals. Labour 
laws specified the hiring of nationals, expatriates engaged in labour disputes were 
swiftly deported, and the formation and activities of unions were tightly regulated 
(ibid: 80). In 1964, a private sector labour law was passed limiting employment 
contracts to five years, compelling workers to register with the state and establishing 
priority for the hiring of Kuwaitis, followed by other Arabs (ibid). According to 
Crystal, “These policies encouraged Kuwaitis, including potential dissidents, to 
set themselves apart from expatriates. In the 1950s and 1960s, as Nasserism grew 
around the world, this policy was a very important containment mechanism” (ibid).1 
Fuccaro writes of Bahrain, “Immigrants, who had been the building blocks of pre-
oil Manama, turned into possessors of visas and travel documents, a disciplined 
labour force subservient to the new economy” (2009: 211).
Opinion is divided over whether kafala requirements, as these restrictions 
became known, were in place when post-oil labour importation began in the 1940s. 
Longva writes with reference to Kuwait:
According to some testimonies there may have been a practice whereby 
migrants were vouched for by a respected citizen of Kuwait. If this was 
the case, then the practice was not formalized in the first decades of labour 
1. In 1964, a private sector labour law was passed limiting employment contracts to five years, 
compelling workers to register with the state, and establishing priority for the hiring of 
Kuwaitis, followed by other Arabs (Crystal 1990: 79).
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importation, since the text of the Aliens’ Residence Law issued in 1959 and 
amended in 1963, 1965, and 1968 made no mention of it. The 1960 Law 
of Commercial Companies did stipulate that foreigners might not establish 
businesses in Kuwait except with Kuwaiti partners who, in turn, were required 
to have 51 percent ownership. This requirement of partnership, however, was 
not strictly the same as the requirement of sponsorship… (1997: 78).
What is clear is that by the 1950s and 60s, while natives from other parts 
of the Gulf could enter and settle freely in Kuwait, Indian migrant workers were 
required to have guarantees from employers in order to enter (Longva 1997: 78, 
citing Joukhadar 1980). By 1969, all migrant workers, including Palestinians, had 
to be guaranteed by Kuwaiti employers ( Joukhadar 1980 and Russel 1989a as cited 
in Longva 1997: 78). While the sponsorship system had become common by the 
end of the 1960s, it was not until 1975 that it was finally codified in an amendment 
to the Aliens’ Residence Law (Longva 1997: 79). By the 1980s, all foreigners 
originating from non-GCC states had to be under the sponsorship of a private 
citizen or private or state institution (Longva 1997: 79; see also Kapiszewski 2001: 
202).
What is striking is how late what is now known as the “sponsorship system” 
became officially regulated. Longva’s work suggests it emerged only recently as an 
administrative tool institutionalising a broader system of patronage and control 
over labour that had long been in place. It now functions ostensibly to ensure that 
no more workers enter than jobs exist, that migrants are personally tied to a national 
sponsor, and – in principle – that migrants stay only as long as they are employed. 
The reality is different, as we will see in the next section. 
Contemporary Migration Policies and Factors Driving Irregularisation
Today, expatriates comprise 68% of the workforce in the GCC states (Gulf Labour 
Markets and Migration (GLMM) Programme 2013). The contemporary system 
under which migrants are recruited and employed is partially codified in law but 
also comes about through a constellation of regulations, administrative rules, 
bureaucratic procedures and practices. Although not homogenous throughout the 
region, the basic elements are similar: Foreign nationals must have local sponsors to 
obtain residence and work permits. These sponsors serve as the worker’s guarantor 
and sole employer. Comparisons can be drawn with guest worker programmes in 
other parts of the world that also tie migrant workers to their employers. In most 
instances, the worker cannot change jobs or even leave the country without the 
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sponsor’s consent, and the employer has the power to send the worker back to his 
or her country at any time. The fact that sponsors have the power to cancel workers’ 
visas effectively shields them from legal responsibility to respond to charges of 
non-payment, forced labour, or abuse by allowing them to petition authorities to 
cancel workers’ legal residency before a worker can pursue a claim. Employers often 
engage in practices that further the exploitative nature of the relationship, such 
as retaining passports and creating obstacles to prevent workers from leaving the 
country. The sponsorship system creates a labour market that is anything but free – 
migrant workers are bound to their employers for the terms of their service, which 
typically last two years. This contributes to profound inequality between worker and 
employer which, as the following passages describe, can produce “illegality.” 
Although the phrase “irregular migration” tends to conjure images of people 
breaching borders, in the Gulf States, as in Europe ( Jansen eds. 2014: xiii), most 
migrants do not arrive without documentation but rather fall into an irregular 
status after they have entered. This can happen in a number of ways. Migrants 
can enter an irregular status if they are brought to the Gulf by a recruiter or other 
intermediary under false pretenses, including being misled about the type of 
work they will perform. This can occur, for example, for women promised jobs as 
caretakers, domestic workers, or salespeople who find when they arrive that they are 
meant to work as sex workers. Migrants also may become undocumented if they 
overstay the time allowed by a valid residence permit or visitor’s visa; this could be 
either a tourist visa, which is commonly issued for three months, or in the case of 
Saudi Arabia, a religious visa for Haj or Umrah pilgrimage.  
The other three main ways migrants can become undocumented derive 
specifically from the workings of the sponsorship system. The first is through what 
is known as the “free visa” system, whereby sponsors sell visas to migrants, often 
with a substantial levy of several thousand dollars which they keep for themselves. 
In addition to the upfront cost, sponsors may also charge a yearly fee from the 
migrant to maintain the sponsorship relationship. In visas issued under this system, 
the sponsor usually has no intention of employing the migrant – the job under 
which the sponsor has obtained the visa is a fiction. Migrants in these circumstances 
may have a valid residence permit but are considered to have broken the law if they 
work for someone other than their sponsor and may be jailed or deported. In some 
instances, migrants do not know they are entering the “free visa” system until they 
arrive in the destination country. In other instances, workers intentionally seek out 
this arrangement, in some cases with help from kin or friends, as an alternative 
to the formal sponsorship system. Many come to realise that in contrast to the 
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highly rigid conditions imposed by the sponsorship system, working under a “free 
visa” gives them greater freedom and flexibility in employment. Work by Pessoa, 
Harkness and Gardner on “free visa” holders in Qatar found that while vulnerability 
permeated the daily lives of such migrants, many said they would not prefer to 
switch to the legal option (2014: 211). Under the “free visa” system, they could 
“shop around” for work, and they claimed they made higher salaries than officially 
sponsored workers (ibid). Another advantage is that they could leave jobs at will if 
employers mistreated or refused to pay them. They contrasted this with officially 
sponsored employers who are locked into abusive employment relations.   
A second way workers may become undocumented is if they arrive for the 
purposes of a specific job but their sponsoring employer fails to issue, prematurely 
cancels, or does not renew their residence permit. Although it is the legal 
responsibility of the employer to obtain and renew workers’ permits, and workers 
cannot do this by themselves, it is the employee who can be charged overstay fees 
if their employers fail to do this and they stay in the country, and it is the employee 
who can be punished with detention and deportation. 
The third way of becoming undocumented is if a worker absconds from 
his or her sponsoring employer. Rigidity in the sponsorship system preventing 
workers from transferring to new employers in case of a dispute means that 
workers with abusive employers may be forced to leave their sponsors and become 
undocumented as their only recourse to non-payment of wages or other types of 
mistreatment. Some people unwittingly become undocumented by leaving their 
place of employment, whereas others make deliberate decisions to enter an irregular 
situation. For domestic workers, the very act of leaving the workplace without 
permission can mean becoming undocumented, as they are often forbidden by the 
terms of their employment contracts from leaving their employers’ homes without 
permission. Their passports are commonly confiscated by their employers, so leaving 
an abusive employer usually results in loss of access to one’s identity documents. 
Many migrants know or come to understand that by going to their embassies, they 
may eventually be deported, and those who wish to remain in the country stay with 
friends and work illegally.  
The assertion that “regular” migration is less dangerous is questionable when 
we consider the realities of life for low-wage migrants in the Gulf. Many migrate 
through legal channels only to find themselves in situations in which employers 
have absolute power. The fact that they arrive legally with valid visas and work 
contracts does not lessen the risk of mistreatment. Their movement across national 
borders may be regulated, but the work itself seldom is. When it is regulated, it is 
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done in ways that are heavily slanted in favour of the employer. One of the ironies 
of this situation is that, in some instances, migrants may enjoy greater autonomy 
while in an irregular status. 
Employers of undocumented migrants have an unfair advantage in that they 
can pay them less for their services and discipline them with the threat of exposure 
to the authorities. Such workers are less likely than others to demand full pay or 
safe working conditions. They can be forced into some of the most hazardous work 
environments. The rise in the proportion of undocumented migrants in many 
countries is convenient to capital, sitting neatly alongside wider trends away from 
stability and towards flexibility in employment relationships. The undocumented 
migrant is “the prototype worker of informalisation” (Noll 2010: 263). They are 
maximally mobile, excluded from any welfare benefits, and utterly disposable.
Before concluding this section, it is worth mentioning that the children of 
irregular migrants – who may be second or even third generation migrants – are also 
usually undocumented. Even if they were born and spend their entire lives in one 
of the Gulf States, they will be considered foreigners and their legal status will be 
dependent on that of their parents. There is no data on the numbers of children of 
undocumented migrants born in the Gulf, but estimates for the number of children 
of migrants overall who are born in Saudi Arabia range from 1 million to 2 million 
(De Bel-Air 2014: 7). 
No Right to Have Rights: The Legal Position of Undocumented Migrants 
It is a common misconception that there are no strong laws protecting the rights of 
migrant workers in the Gulf States. In fact, labour laws in many of the Gulf States 
are progressive and contain a number of safeguards which should, in theory, apply 
to all workers. Most labour legislation in the region does not specifically distinguish 
between citizens and non-citizens, nor does it expressly exclude undocumented 
migrants. For example, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), labour matters are 
governed by Law Number 8 of 1980 Regulating Labour Relations, which applies 
to all private sector employees, whether UAE nationals or expatriates, but which 
excludes certain categories, namely employees of the federal government as well as 
municipalities and those employed in local government projects, members of the 
armed forces, police and security units, domestic workers and agricultural workers. 
In Kuwait, the Law of Labour in the Private Sector Number 6 of 2010, which 
replaced the 1964 Labour Law, provides workers with more protections on wages, 
working hours and safety, and broadly defines a worker as “any male or female 
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person who performs a manual or mental work for an employer under the employer’s 
management and supervision against a remuneration.” It applies to all workers in 
the private sector, excluding domestic workers, and represents a “minimum level of 
workers’ rights.”  
In reality, while the labour laws governing the private sector are thought to 
apply universally to all categories of paid work, albeit with exceptions for some 
categories, the safeguards they provide are de facto not applied to undocumented 
migrants. The letter of the law might not discriminate against undocumented 
migrants but its application does. In practice, the application of labour protections 
against basic employment-related infringements, such as non-payment of wages or 
unfair dismissal, presupposes having a residence and work permit, and in practice 
those who do not are usually detained and deported before they can pursue a 
legal claim against an employer or recruiter. Employment rights are effectively 
subordinated to immigration requirements. 
Further research is needed to understand the way the courts have dealt 
with migrants in an irregular situation. Do the courts affirm that undocumented 
migrants have a legal right to be paid for work performed even if they did not 
have authorisation from the state to undertake the work for that specific employer? 
Absent in-depth research, reports from NGOs and human rights groups suggest this 
population generally receives very little protection or support in the legal system, 
and that as soon as they are found to be residing without authorisation or working 
for someone other than their sponsor, they are swiftly detained and eventually 
deported (Global Detention Project 2015). They reportedly have very little room 
to challenge detention and deportation decisions. This means that employers who 
do not pay wages, impose excessive working hours, forcibly confine or physically or 
psychologically abuse workers without documentation go unpunished. In effect, by 
pursuing deportation before a migrant can pursue any legal claims against his or her 
employer, the state is neglecting its duty to fully enforce the labour law.
Writing about the plight of stateless people, Hannah Arendt coined the term 
“the right to have rights” with reference to those who, by virtue of losing their rights 
as citizens, were effectively rendered without rights (Arendt 1958). In the case of 
undocumented migrants, it is not that they have no rights but that their rights are 
systematically ignored. Any human rights and labour protections are practically 
inaccessible to them. In this regard, they represent a challenge to the notion that 
human rights are universally applicable (Noll 2010: 241).
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An Alternative Policy Approach to Reduce the Irregularisation of Migration
The interweaving of residence rights with employment relations such that individual 
sponsors/employers are empowered to control workers’ migration status creates the 
conditions by which many people either opt to or unwillingly become undocumented. 
At a policy level, the tools most commonly used by Gulf governments involve the 
issuance of general amnesties. Rather than being open-ended amnesties for all, such 
measures generally allow an opening for an administrative process lasting several 
months during which individual cases are assessed, and people without legal status 
can either leave the country without paying overstay penalties or regularise their 
stay and become assigned to a sponsoring employer. But amnesties may actually 
encourage migrants to gamble on future regularisation efforts, encouraging them to 
enter an irregular status if they assume there will eventually be a way out. Amnesties 
are often followed by crackdowns in which migrants without the proper documents 
are arrested and deported, resulting in considerable hardship for many migrants and 
generating considerable expenses for the state. 
A more effective, holistic solution designed to prevent workers from becoming 
undocumented in the first place would be to enable greater flexibility in the 
sponsorship system to allow workers to change jobs without individual sponsor 
approval and to repeal the power of individual employers to cancel workers’ visas. 
This would take away migrants’ fear of being deported by their employers and 
would give them greater flexibility to choose their employment, thereby removing 
the main incentives which lead them to opt into the “free visa” system. While there 
has been some experimentation with reforms to the sponsorship system to achieve 
greater flexibility, most notably in Bahrain, the governments of many Gulf countries 
so far have been reluctant to fully implement reforms that would dismantle the 
sponsorship system. One unstated reason may be the fact that the current system, 
and the disposable labour it produces, is convenient to many employers. The “free 
visa” system is also highly lucrative for the sponsors who make use of it.
Given states’ reluctance to dismantle the sponsorship system, this chapter 
proposes an alternative approach to address both the causes and effects of 
irregularisation. This approach involves separating enforcement of the laws and 
administrative procedures governing migrants’ residence and legal status from 
those governing their employment. This entails severing jurisdiction over labour 
matters from matters of immigration, two spheres which in most Gulf countries are 
already dealt with by separate organs of the state.2 Another way of describing this is 
2. In most of the Gulf States, although the nomenclature of government departments differs, 
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Carens’ notion of “firewalling.” Carens argues that states should establish firewalls 
“between the enforcement of immigration law, on the one hand, and the protection 
of general human rights, on the other” (2013: 132-133). This guarantees that people 
can pursue legal claims concerning employment-related abuses without exposing 
themselves to arrest and expulsion. Ultimately, such a strategy would privilege the 
implementation of the labour law over immigration enforcement and would have 
the effect of ensuring that the existing laws and regulations governing working 
conditions apply equally to all workers regardless of their migration status. One 
serious drawback in the context of the Gulf is that this approach alone would not 
sufficiently address the situation of domestic workers, who are specifically excluded 
from coverage in the labour laws of the Gulf States.
In order to maintain a firewall approach in practical terms, training and strong 
guidelines would have to be provided stipulating that labour inspectors should 
not be influenced by whether workers are documented or not in the course of 
their duties with respect to working conditions. This approach also would require 
ensuring that the courts and other administrative apparatus responsible for hearing 
migrants’ claims in employment-related matters would not provide information to 
the authorities handling removal proceedings. Legal immunity from deportation 
would need to be ensured to protect undocumented migrants filing claims against 
their employers. 
For a firewalling strategy to have a real impact, workers would need practical 
access to channels of legal redress in order to be able to make claims against abusive 
employers. At the moment, state systems for processing and adjudicating migrants’ 
grievances are extremely difficult to navigate even for those with valid legal status 
and written employment contracts.3 Steps would need to be taken to ensure that 
documented and undocumented migrants alike had access to the basic resources 
needed to make claims, such as access to translation services and the legal right 
to take up other remunerative work while cases are ongoing. These aspects of the 
workings of the justice system are within the state’s capacity to control, and this is 
an area of governance where incremental improvements could have a significant 
impact on the well-being of hundreds of thousands of workers.  
There is a risk that ensuring employment rights regardless of immigration status 
could serve to increase the incentives for other migrants to become undocumented. 
labour matters are dealt with by ministries of labour, and legal disputes resulting from them are 
adjudicated by the federal and local courts, whereas deportation matters fall within the remit 
of ministries of interior.
3. This is illustrated well for the state of Qatar in a recent report by Gardner et al. (2014). 
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But the benefits far outweigh this. There are moral justifications – it could make a 
huge difference in migrants’ lives, lessening their vulnerability and ensuring a basic 
standard of legal protection for all workers which today does not exist. It would 
take away the fear of detention and deportation which currently enables employers 
to exploit workers. There are also strong pragmatic reasons the state could be 
encouraged to consider this approach. Ensuring that employment laws apply to 
undocumented workers, and that employers who abuse them can be sanctioned, 
would effectively raise the costs of employing undocumented workers. This could 
decrease the incentives for those employers to hire them, ultimately leading to a 
reduction in the scale of irregularisation by tackling the “demand” side. 
There are clear precedents for upholding the employment rights of 
undocumented workers in international law. Although the Gulf States are not 
signatories to most international human rights and labour rights treaties, it is 
worth mentioning that two of the main treaties dealing with the rights of migrant 
workers guarantee employment rights to undocumented workers. This includes 
ILO Convention 143 of 1975, which guarantees undocumented workers “equality 
of treatment … in respect of rights arising out of past employment as regards 
remuneration, social security and other benefits.” Similarly, the United Nations 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families states in Article 25(3) that “employers shall not be relieved of any 
legal or contractual obligations, nor shall their obligations be limited in any manner 
by any reason of any … irregularity [in the workers’ stay or employment].” 
There have also been rulings affirming the need to separate the enforcement of 
legal provisions relating to working conditions from immigration law by the ILO 
body which examines the application of ratified ILO Conventions, the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR). In 
a decision on Malaysia in relation to the Labour Inspection Convention 81 of 1947, 
the Committee emphasized the fact that “the primary duty of labour inspectors is 
to secure the enforcement of the legal provisions relating to conditions of work and 
the protection of workers, and not to enforce immigration law.”4 The Committee 
requested the Malaysian government to provide information on “action undertaken 
by the labour inspectorate in the enforcement of employers’ obligations towards 
migrant workers, including those in an irregular situation, such as the payment of 
wages, social security and other benefits.”
4. See Malaysia, CEACR Observation, published 104th ILC session, 2015. http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID:3177140. 
70            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
At the national level, the intersection of migration and employment law has 
vexed the courts in many countries. Comparing jurisprudence in the UK, United 
States, and Canada, Bihari (2011) writes that while in the UK the courts have 
generally subordinated employment law to the enforcement of immigration law, 
courts in the US generally have been more inclined to enforce the employment 
and labour rights of undocumented workers. This has been the subject of a great 
deal of debate in recent years, however. In 2002, the US Supreme Court issued 
a decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB denying labour rights for 
undocumented migrants. The five-four ruling said that an undocumented worker, 
because of his immigration status, was not entitled to back pay for lost wages 
after he was illegally fired for union organising. Criticisms were made that this let 
the employer off the hook, and the four dissenting judges argued that labour and 
immigration legislation represent two independent spheres of law which should be 
upheld independently of one another (Bihari 2011: 19). Following the Hoffman 
case, other US government agencies including the Department of Labor and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have asserted their commitment 
to enforcing laws within their jurisdiction without regard to workers’ immigration 
status (Human Rights Watch 2004: 119). In 2013, the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights examined the Hoffman ruling and issued an advisory opinion 
holding that American states have an obligation to guarantee the labour rights of 
all workers, and that undocumented workers are entitled to the same protections as 
citizens and those working lawfully. There are also other examples from the US in 
which the courts have been more favourable to undocumented workers. In a 2002 
case involving allegations of illegal trafficking in persons and involuntary servitude 
of an Indian woman brought to the US as a domestic worker, a judge in New 
York refused to allow defendants to conduct discovery into a worker’s immigration 
status, noting that ‘[A]llowing parties to inquire about the immigration status of 
other parties, when not relevant, would present a danger of intimidation [that] 
would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights…’5  
France provides another perspective. There, all workers, regardless of their 
immigration status or whether they hold a valid residence or work permit, are entitled 
to a minimum level of labour protection (Murphy 2015). Undocumented workers 
are entitled to salaries not less than the guaranteed minimum wage, payment for 
overtime, annual paid holidays, and compensation if the employment ends early.
5. Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76 (S.D. N.Y. 2002).
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Conclusion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the current matrix of laws and 
regulations governing the recruitment and employment of migrant labour in the 
Gulf States developed as the region became increasingly intertwined with global 
capitalism through the oil trade with the interaction of money, capital, and the state. 
Migration policies emerged in the context of a particular kind of state – one that 
distributes oil rent to citizens in exchange for political acquiescence, the pursuit of 
free-trade policies, and a laissez-faire economy, and most importantly, one in which 
migrant worker populations vastly exceed the number of nationals. Under these 
conditions, the sponsorship system has been instituted as part of a broader dynamic 
generated by oil revenue alongside administrative policies aimed at separating and 
controlling expatriates. As it is currently configured, the system produces highly 
unequal relationships of control by employers over workers that create strong 
incentives for irregularisation. 
Although labour laws throughout the Gulf States do not distinguish between 
expatriates and migrants, or documented versus undocumented workers, in practice 
becoming undocumented puts workers in an extremely weak legal position. 
They have little or no recourse to any protection from the law. Any complaint 
about mistreatment by an employer or recruiter could result in removal, so most 
undocumented migrants avoid contact with the state. This means that in practice, 
they have few rights as workers, and their employers can exploit them with impunity. 
Despite the vulnerabilities, these constraints are why many migrants opt to seek 
more autonomy by becoming undocumented. 
The current policy tools used by governments in the region to tackle the 
problem of irregularisation involve short-term amnesties that are usually followed 
by crackdowns involving detention and deportation. These approaches ignore the 
factors that drive workers to become undocumented in the first place. They focus on 
punishing irregularity, both in fact and rhetorically, over the public policy interest of 
enforcing labour laws. An alternative would be for states to take steps to ensure that 
all workers, regardless of their migration status, have full access to legal remedies 
and protection against exploitation from employers. A firewalling strategy, or a 
bifurcated approach to legal jurisdiction separating matters concerning migration 
status from employment, would address the legal void vis-à-vis undocumented 
work that currently exists. This would guarantee undocumented workers the rights 
they are currently promised under existing labour legislation. The effect would be 
to raise the costs of hiring undocumented workers for employers, thus decreasing 
demand. The current situation of undocumented migrants is broadly favourable to 
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the prevailing power structures. Adopting a strategy that would penalise employers 
of undocumented migrants would threaten the interests of those who already yield 
power and influence in Gulf societies. Achieving this under the current political 
conditions would be difficult. But a firewalling approach has enormous potential, 
and unlike many law enforcement approaches currently deployed by states, it does 
not involve “managing” or “controlling” flows of undocumented migrants in ways 
that infringe their rights. This is important in a context of global wage inequalities, 
where people will continue to migrate to redress the balance despite the narrowing 
of legal migration channels to do so. 
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Irregular Migration in Bahrain:  
Legislations, Policies, and Practices
Hasan Alhasan*
Abstract: Irregular migration is a phenomenon widely observable in the six 
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), although information 
concerning its size, causes and the success of policy measures designed to 
address it remains scarce. This chapter attempts to close part of the knowledge 
gap that exists on the topic in Bahrain through an in-depth review of publicly 
available information and interviews. While irregular migration is naturally 
difficult to quantify, the task of doing so is even more daunting in the Gulf 
where a lack of transparency has created a shortage of reliable and official data 
on both the population and the workforce. Inevitably, this complicates any 
attempt at evaluating the effectiveness of policy measures implemented by 
the GCC states in order to address the issue. This is the case even in Bahrain 
where data tends to be more readily available by comparison. By compiling 
estimates produced by a variety of sources such as government officials, 
embassies of sending countries, local NGOs, international organisations 
and others, this chapter will seek to provide some understanding as to the 
size and composition of the cohort of irregular migrants. Like other GCC 
states, Bahrain has deployed a host of policy instruments aimed at identifying 
irregular migrants and more often deporting them. Amnesties, in which up 
V
* Hasan Alhasan is manager at the Economic Development Board (EDB) in Bahrain.
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to hundreds of irregular migrants at a time may be identified and deported 
without facing criminal prosecution, have occasionally been announced. 
Laws have been amended to include tougher penalties against visa traders. 
There is little evidence however to suggest that any of these policies had any 
significant impact on curbing the problem. This chapter will seek to trace the 
evolution of the legislative framework that addresses irregular migration. It 
will also attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms to the labour 
market in preventing individuals from becoming irregular migrants in the 
first place. Moreover, it will critically discuss the national framework put 
in place to protect irregular migrants from human trafficking and physical 
abuse and will explore whether channels for regularisation exist and their 
accessibility. Ultimately, the overall objective of this chapter is to better 
define the phenomenon in terms of its size, trends, and causes and trace the 
evolution and effectiveness of the legislative and policy framework adopted 
by the state to address it.
Introduction
Irregular migration has been a persistent feature of Bahrain’s labour market since 
at least the 1970s. The pool of irregular migrants – South Asian workers, for the 
most part – has expanded hand-in-hand with the growth of the economy. The 
government estimated early on that irregular migration has had a negative impact 
on the employment of Bahrainis within the labour market.1 While the government 
has implemented several measures to separate irregular migrants from the local 
population and limit the stock of irregular migrants residing in the country, it has 
done little to curb their flow into the black market. Although the government 
enjoys the legal prerogatives necessary to crack down on visa traders and employers 
of irregular migrants, seldom has it exercised its right to do so.
Several factors can be said to account for the government’s reluctance to bring 
about structural change in the irregular labour market. First, the government is not 
under significant pressure from the citizenry to crackdown on the practice. Citizens 
1. “Wazîr al-‘amal al-Bahraini: na/hnu bi-/hâja li-binâ’ al-thiqa bayn al-‘ummâl wa al-qi/tâ’ 
al-khâ/s li-/hal mushkilat al-ba/tâla,” Asharq Al-Awsat, February 3, 2003, http://archive.
aawsat.com/details.asp?section=6&article=150425&issueno=8833#.VZf7vEaFGro; Shah 
suggests that GCC states began to put policies in place to restrict irregular migration 
in the 1990s (see Shah 2008). These restrictive policies were not motivated by economic 
considerations alone; however, as the overall discourse on migration refers to perceptions of 
cultural and political threat too, see Louer 2008.
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do not perceive irregular migrants to be a threat to their livelihoods due to Bahrain’s 
dual labour market: citizens prefer employment in the public sector, which tends 
to be largely reserved for them, while migrants take on blue-collar jobs that attract 
only a relatively small portion of the citizenry (Shah 2009: 4).2 
Second, citizens are often the biggest beneficiaries of irregular migration. 
Consumers rely on such migrants to bring down the prices of services, while 
employers often view them as a source of cheap, temporary labour. A sizeable 
number of Bahrainis are implicated in illegal visa trading, charging irregular 
migrants a certain amount of money in return for allowing them to continue to 
reside in the country under their sponsorship. Collectively, these factors inform the 
political context within which the government has chosen to mobilise its policy 
instruments to address the phenomenon of irregular migration.
In order to assess government policy, we first need to quantify and draw up 
a profile of irregular migration in Bahrain, including the main channels through 
which migrants cross over into irregularity. Then, it is important to summarise the 
legal framework surrounding irregular migration and survey the legal instruments 
at the government’s disposal. Finally, we can begin to conceptualise government 
policy toward the issue, including measures to separate irregular migrants from local 
residents in response to popular demand, tools to control and limit the stock of 
irregular migrants, and initiatives to curb the flow of migrant workers into the black 
market.
Irregular Migration in Bahrain: A Profile
Stock Size and Composition
By its very nature, irregular migration is a phenomenon that is difficult to 
quantify with much precision. Neither the Labour Market Regulatory Authority 
(LMRA) nor the Ministry of Labour publish readily available data on the size and 
composition of the stock. Data released by the LMRA through a handful of press 
releases over the past decade provide very little insight into the trends and patterns 
that characterise the phenomenon.
2. For an expanded discussion of labour market segmentation in the GCC, see Hertog 2012.
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Table 5.1: Estimated population of irregular migrant workers relative to the 
total population of migrant workers in Bahrain, 2010-2014 3456789
These figures likely represent a lower bound. While the LMRA is able to 
account for irregular migrants whose employers have reported them as escaped or 
have had their visas expire or cancelled by their sponsors without them leaving the 
country, it is very difficult for the LMRA to account for the “free visa” workers, i.e., 
those whose sponsors continue to pay their visa fees on time, but are in fact working 
in violation of their work permits. That is because unless they are caught in an 
inspection or a raid, “free visa” workers appear to have a regular or legitimate status 
on the books. The LMRA therefore only provides an estimate of their numbers 
based on its inspections.10 
The majority of irregular migrants would be nationals of Bangladesh, 
India, and Pakistan, although there is a minority of Arab nationals, primarily from 
Egypt and Syria.11 Bangladeshis constitute 66% of all irregular migrants in the 
3. Figures quoted were collected from statements and press articles made towards the end of the 
year where possible.
4. Q4 data was quoted. Source: Bahrain Labour Market Indicators, Table A. Estimated total 
employment by citizenship and sector: 2004-2015, http://blmi.lmra.bh/2015/03/data/lmr/
Table_A.pdf.
5. “Number of Illegal Workers Drops to 34,000,” Daily Tribune, August 18, 2010. http://blog.
lmra.bh/en/2010/08/18/number-of-illegal-workers-drops-to-34000/ 
6. Safi, Al-Bilad, November 22, 2011.
7. Al-Sabbagh, Al-Ayam, August 10, 2012. 
8. Al-Wasati, Al-Wasat, March 4, 2015. 
9. Al-Wasat, March 4, 2015.
10. Safi, Al-Bilad, November 22, 2011.
11. This is more or less reflective of the broader migration patterns to Bahrain, although 
Bangladeshis are significantly overrepresented. For an expanded discussion of the broader 
trends, see De Bel-Air 2015. For a broader discussion of the prevalence of Arab vs. Asian 
migrant workers in GCC labour markets, see Kapiszewski 2006.
Irregular Migrant Workers 
Population3
Total Migrant Workers 
Population4
%
2010 34,0005 458,709 7.4
2011 40,0006 458,060 8.7
2012 44,0007 488,978 9.0
2013 51,0008 514,156 9.9
2014 60,7009 530,809 11.8
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country.12 While many of them perform a range of jobs including as cleaners, 
electricians, and so on, many of them tend to be concentrated within the construction 
sector.
Avenues to Irregular Migration13 
Figure 5.1. Irregular migrants, breakdown by type14 
 • Illegal entry – This involves smuggling people illicitly across the border. 
Illegal entry accounts for a negligible portion of irregular migrants in 
Bahrain, unlike in Saudi Arabia, which sees Yemenis illicitly cross the land 
border, and Oman and the UAE, where South Asians attempt to arrive by 
boat (Shah 2009: 9). Bahrain, an island, shares no land borders with the 
exception of a bridge connecting it to Saudi Arabia and is sufficiently far 
inside the Gulf to prevent South Asians from attempting to access it by 
sea.
• “Free visa” – The main method of visa trading, the “free visa” practice 
involves sponsors bringing migrant workers into the country on a valid visa 
and work permit. Once inside, sponsors – in violation of the work permit 
– fail to provide the migrant workers with employment or remuneration, 
12. Bangladeshis make up roughly 39,000 of 59,000 irregular migrants, as of July 1, 2015. Source: 
Personal interview with Mr. Aussamah Al-Absi, CEO of LMRA, October 1, 2015. By 
contrast, the Bangladeshi ambassador to Bahrain put the figure at 80%, although how he 
arrived at this estimate is unclear. See Grewal, Gulf Daily News, April 26, 2015.
13. For a further discussion on the definition of irregular migration, see Shah 2009, 3. 
14. Figures approximate, as of July 1, 2015. Source: Personal interview with Mr. Aussamah 
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leaving them to their own devices to find work and generate income. 
Sponsors continue to renew their migrant workers’ visas and work permits 
and pay any fees that are due to the LMRA. In return, migrant workers 
pay their sponsors an annual sum. The fact that “free visa” workers have 
valid visas that are legitimate “on the books” makes them much harder to 
detect. In the past, sponsors paid BD200 once every two years to renew 
their sponsored workers’ visas and received BD1,000-1,200 once every 
two years from the latter to uphold their end of the bargain. In 2008, 
however, the LMRA raised the two-year cost of sponsoring a foreigner 
to BD440 via a BD10 monthly levy. As a result, the black market rate 
payable by the “free visa” workers to their sponsors shot up to BD1,800-
BD2,000, rendering the model largely unfeasible.15 Whereas the “free 
visa” arrangement was responsible for the majority of irregular migrants 
before these reforms, it now accounts for only a quarter of them.
• Termination of work permit – This practice has taken over as the most 
popular method of visa trading. Migrant workers pay their sponsors a fee 
through intermediaries to bring them into the country in a legal manner. 
Once inside, the sponsor cancels the permit and visa in order to avoid 
paying visa renewal and labour fees. According to Bahraini law, unless the 
migrant worker can find employment elsewhere within a month, he or 
she must leave the country or become an irregular migrant. Many migrant 
workers continue to reside in the country irregularly with no valid visa 
or work permit, however. Visa cancellation accounts for roughly 51% of 
all irregular migration, as migrants fail to leave.16 Visa cancellation has 
gained in popularity since 2008 as the main method of visa trading as 
a result of the LMRA’s raising of visa renewal fees and imposition of 
monthly labour fees. Visa cancellation is presumably used by sponsors to 
circumvent the law; once they cancel their sponsored workers’ visas, they 
presumably can no longer be held accountable for their actions. To combat 
this phenomenon, Law No. 40 of 2014 amending certain provisions of 
Law No. 19 of 2006 Regulating the Labour Market was passed, making 
it illegal for sponsors to bring migrant workers into the country and have 
work permits issued for them without an actual need for doing so.17 
15. Personal interview with Mr. Aussamah Al-Absi, CEO of LMRA, October 1, 2015.
16. “60 alf ‘âmil “free visa” fî al-Bahrain,” Al-Ayam, March 4, 2015.
17. See Table 5.2.
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• Expiry of work permit – Employers often neglect or choose not to pay 
the annual fees required to renew their workers’ permits and visas, 
allowing them to expire. When this happens, the status of the migrant 
worker automatically becomes irregular, sometimes without the migrant’s 
knowledge.
• Workers absent from work (“escaped”) – By law, this includes workers who 
fail to show up for work for a period of at least 15 days with no legitimate 
cause. Their employers report them to the LMRA as “escaped.” The 
LMRA publishes their names and allows them a 30-day grace period to 
dispute the claim. Failure to do so renders them irregular.18 According to 
LMRA data, escaped workers account for roughly 15% of all irregular 
migrants in the country.19 
Legislation and Policy
Legal Framework for Irregular Migration
Bahraini legislation outlines a number of prohibitions and penalties in relation to 
irregular migration. These affect the migrants, their employers, and visa traders.
Three main pieces of legislation, in particular, are noteworthy:
• Aliens Immigration and Residence Act of 1965 – This is the main piece of 
legislation that governs the entry, exit, and residence of foreign nationals 
into Bahrain. In the context of irregular migration, the act criminalises 
clandestine entry and residence of foreign nationals without a valid visa.
• Law No. 19 of 2006 Regulating the Labour Market – This law created the 
LMRA and invested in it many regulatory prerogatives that were hitherto 
invested in the Ministry of Labour. It mandates the LMRA with the 
management of all issues regarding foreign workers active within the 
labour market, including the issuance of work permits and the collection 
of fees and fines.
• Law No. 36 of 2012 issuing the Labour Law for the Private Sector – This 
law replaced the 1976 labour code. It sets out the legal conditions that 
relate to the employer-employee relationship. The law was welcomed as a 
18. “Expatriate Employee Absence from Work,” http://lmra.bh/portal/en/absent_reported#.
VZUcoEaFF7w. 
19. Escaped workers make up approximately 9,000 of 59,176 irregular migrants, as of July 1, 2015. 
Source: Personal interview with Mr. Aussamah Al-Absi, CEO of LMRA, October 1, 2015.
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progressive piece of legislation for extending protection to domestic maids 
for the first time and prolonging maternity leave for female employees, 
although certain provisions relating to collective labour negotiations and 
strikes were a matter of concern.20 
The penalties can be summarised as follows:21 22232425262728
Table 5.2: Legal penalties on labour-related violations as per Bahraini law
20. The new law requires employers to provide written contracts to domestic workers, stipulates 
that workers must be paid at least once a month, imposes financial penalties on employers 
for late payments, etc. See: Law no. 36 of 2012 issuing the Labour Law within the Private 
Sector, http://www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/LegislationSearchDetails.aspx?id=2045#.ViOFiCu-
FEUI; Alhasan 2012. 
21. As of June 29, 2015. A similar summary prepared by the LMRA can be found here: http://
www.legalaffairs.gov.bh/Media/LegalPDF/RLAB7207.pdf.
22. Decree Law No. 21 of 1980 amending the Aliens Immigration and Residence Act of 1965, 
Art. 1.
23. Ibid.
24. Law No. 19 of 2006 Regulating the Labour Market, Art. 36 (B).
25. Law No. 19 of 2006 Regulating the Labour Market, Art. 36 (A).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., Art. 38.
28. Decision No. 75 of 2008 regarding the rules and procedures for settlement of crimes in 
violation of the provisions of the Law Regulating the Labour Market, Art. 2.
Category Violation Penalty 
Migrant Illegal entry • At least 6 months in prison and confiscation of vehicle22 
Overstaying visa • No more than 6 months in prison, and no more than 




valid work permit 
• Fine of no more than BD100, and permanent expulsion or 







• Between 3 months and 1 year in prison, and a fine 
between BD1,000 and BD2,000, or either one; for repeat 
offenders, between 6 months and 2 years in prison, and a 
fine between BD2,000 and BD4,000 25 
• Halt the commercial activity or close shop for no more 




• Administrative closure of no more than 6 months27 
• Settlement28 
Charging money 
from worker in 
exchange for 
issuing him a 
work permit 
• Between 3 months and 1 year in prison, and a fine 
between BD1,000 and BD2,000, or either one; for repeat 
offenders, between 6 months and 2 years in prison, and a 
fine between BD2,000 and BD4,00029
• Halt the commercial activity or close shop for no more 

















• Between 3 months and 1 year in prison, and a fine 
between BD1,000 and BD2,000, or either one; for repeat 
offenders, between 6 months and 2 years, and a fine 





• Administrative closure of no more than 6 months 
• Settlement 
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Government Policy toward Irregular Migration   2930313233 34353637
Separate
If the text of the cabinet decision on February 23, 2015 to set up a ministerial 
committee on irregular migration is any indication of official policy, it is clear that 
the government’s primary focus appears to center on isolating irregular migrants 
from locals, particularly in residential areas.38 Three of the committee’s four goals 
represented measures to implement the separation. Local residents, concerned 
in part with the downward pressure on property value that the presence of these 
migrants tends to generate, have repeatedly asked the government to prevent 
irregular migrants from relocating to their neighbourhoods.
29. Law No. 19 of 2006 Regulating the Labour Market, Art. 36 (A).
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., Art. 38.
32. Decision No. 75 of 2008 regarding the rules and procedures for settlement of crimes in 
violation of the provisions of the Law Regulating the Labour Market, Art. 2.
33. Law No. 36 of 2012 issuing the Labour Law for the Private Sector, Art. 185.
34. Law No. 40 of 2014 amending certain provisions of Law No. 19 of 2006 Regulating the 
Labour Market, Art. 1.
35. Law No. 19 of 2006 Regulating the Labour Market, Art. 36.
36. Ibid., Art. 38.
37. Decision No. 75 of 2008 regarding the rules and procedures for settlement of crimes in 
violation of the provisions of the Law Regulating the Labour Market, Art. 2.
38. Bahrain News Agency, February 2015.
Category Violation Penalty 
Migrant Illegal entry • At least 6 months in prison and confiscation of vehicle22 
Overstaying visa • No more than 6 months in prison, and no more than 




valid work permit 
• Fine of no more than BD100, and permanent expulsion or 







• Between 3 months and 1 year in prison, and a fine 
between BD1,000 and BD2,000, or either one; for repeat 
offenders, between 6 months and 2 years in prison, and a 
fine between BD2,000 and BD4,000 25 
• Halt the commercial activity or close shop for no more 




• Administrative closure of no more than 6 months27 
• Settlement28 
Charging money 
from worker in 
exchange for 
issuing him a 
work permit 
• Between 3 months and 1 year in prison, and a fine 
between BD1,000 and BD2,000, or either one; for repeat 
offenders, between 6 months and 2 years in prison, and a 
fine between BD2,000 and BD4,00029
• Halt the commercial activity or close shop for no more 

















• Between 3 months and 1 year in prison, and a fine 
between BD1,000 and BD2,000, or either one; for repeat 
offenders, between 6 months and 2 years, and a fine 





• Administrative closure of no more than 6 months 
• Settlement 
Table 5.2, continued
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As it stands however, the government is far from achieving a state of social 
separation. One challenge is to distinguish irregular migrants from regular low-
skilled workers who often live in the same areas. However, both the press and the 
government tend to conflate the two categories and frame the policy of social 
separation as being addressed toward irregular migrants alone. That said, the 
overwhelming majority of migrant workers live in Manama and Muharraq, which 
house many Bahraini nationals as well.39 A new law has been put before parliament 
that would allow companies to build labour camps for their workers near new 
industrial zones, thereby isolating them from local communities.40  The law would 
also impose minimum standards and safety features for labour camps.41 
Due to their low incomes and poor backgrounds, many migrants tend to 
live in relatively large numbers in downtrodden houses and ill-adapted buildings. 
This often results in fire and safety hazards, in addition to poor hygiene standards. 
According to the Ministry of Labour, only a minority of migrant workers – 150,000 
approximately – live in any of the 3,000 registered labour camps. By contrast, 
80% of all accommodation used by migrant workers are unregistered and plagued 
with building violations, according to the Ministry of Municipalities, often with 
devastating consequences for the health and safety of their residents. Twenty-six 
Bangladeshi workers were killed between 2012 and 2014 when buildings in which 
they were housed caught fire on three separate occasions.42 
Control
Beyond a policy of social separation, the government has implemented remedial 
measures to limit or control the stock of irregular migrants present in the country 
at any given time. Measures have included
• Biometrics – In 2007, the LMRA introduced a biometrics system and began 
recording fingerprints of all migrant workers. Migrant workers’ fingerprints 
are now recorded upon entry at the border and stored in a central database 
accessible to both the LMRA and the Ministry of Interior. The LMRA 
estimates that fingerprints for over 90 per cent of all migrant workers in the 
country have been recorded.43  
39. Al-Halwâji, Al-Wasat, January 16, 2013.
40. Ibid. 
41. Townsend, Arabian Business, April 1, 2015. 
42. Gulf Daily News, March 1, 2014.
43. Al-Dîn, Al-Ayam, February 19, 2011. The remaining 10% likely include irregular migrants 
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 The use of biometric data at the border allows the authorities to detect 
with greater accuracy whether or not a migrant worker has entered the 
country before, and, more importantly, whether or not he has been expelled, 
especially since irregular migrants often attempt to reenter the country on 
a different identity. The LMRA also uses mobile fingerprint devices during 
its inspections, which pulls up the migrant’s information on the spot. This 
allows inspectors to identify irregular migrants more effectively.44 
• Amnesty schemes45 – In vogue since the 1990s, amnesty schemes are widely 
used throughout the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) to encourage irregular migrants to leave willingly without facing 
criminal prosecution or paying the entirety of outstanding fees (Shah 2008, 
7-8). The prior-to-last amnesty scheme to enter into effect, called the Easy 
Exit scheme, took place in 2010, with up to 8,000 irregular migrants coming 
forward to register. 
 Outstanding fines on irregular migrants were waived, and irregular migrants 
were charged a nominal fee instead. The overwhelming majority of those 
who registered were Bangladeshis.46 The most recent amnesty began on July 
1, 2015 and lasted until December 31, 2015.  It ended with more than 10,000 
migrant workers in irregular situation leaving the country and 30,000 others 
regularizing their situation.47  
• Mass expulsion campaigns – Mass expulsion campaigns are used by the 
government to maintain a cap on the number of irregular migrants present 
in the country at any given time, particularly those that decide against taking 
part in the Easy Exit schemes. This was the case in January 2011 when the 
LMRA launched a mass expulsion campaign and promised harsh penalties 
directly following the end of the 2010 Easy Exit scheme, adding to the 
amnesty programme’s attractiveness.48 In 2013, Bahrain launched another 
who have been in the country for a long time. Source: Personal interview with Mr. Aussamah 
Al-Absi, CEO of LMRA, October 1, 2015.
44. Akhbar Al-Khaleej, November 2, 2013. 
45. For a further discussion on Kuwait’s and Saudi Arabia’s experience with amnesty programmes, 
see Shah 2014.
46. Daily Tribune, December 31, 2010. 
47. ArabianBusiness.com.   
48. Grewal, Gulf Daily News, January 1, 2011. 
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crackdown against irregular migrants, whose numbers were perceived as too 
high.49 These campaigns were held before the LMRA was set up.50  5152
Table 5.3: Number of deportations per year relative to the total population of 
migrant workers in Bahrain, 2011-2014
• Regular inspections – Over the past few years, the LMRA has significantly 
increased its inspection capacity and has doubled the number of inspectors 
at its disposal from 35 in 2011 to 72 in 2014. The LMRA reported roughly 
20,000 inspections in 2013 and 2014.53  
• Companies’ verification – The LMRA and the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce (MOIC) have cracked down on companies found to be 
employing irregular workers or unnecessarily maintaining work permits. 
In 2009, the LMRA and MOIC halted the activity of 12,000 commercial 
registrations out of 54,000 for failing to renew their workers’ permits and 
visa (which puts them in an irregular situation).54 The LMRA stated that 89 
per cent of companies responsible for violations were SMEs, although this 
may require nuance.55 
49. Grewal, Gulf Daily News, June 6, 2013. 
50. Mahdi, Gulf News, May 26, 2004. 
51. Source: Ministry of Interior. Also see Al-Wasat, March 4, 2015.  
52. Q4 data was quoted. Source: Bahrain Labour Market Indicators, Table A. Estimated total 
employment by citizenship and sector: 2004-2015. http://blmi.lmra.bh/2015/03/data/lmr/
Table_A.pdf.
53. Al-Ayam, December 20, 2011; Al-Wasat, August 10, 2014, http://www.alwasatnews.com/ 
4355/news/read/910617/1.html; Al-Ayam, March 4, 2015. 
54. Al-Ayam, April 19, 2009. 
55. Al-Ayam, March 4, 2015. Note: SMEs make up 99% of all registered companies in 
Bahrain, so compared to the baseline average, they are underrepresented when it comes to 
companies responsible for labour violations.  Moreover, while SMEs may constitute the majority 
of violators, there is no indication as to whether they are responsible for the majority of 
Year Number of deportations 51 Total Migrant Workers 
Population52 
%
2011 13,560 458,060 3.0
2012 14,077 488,978 2.9
2013 15,954 514,156 3.1
2014 19,130 530,809 3.6
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge            89
Hasan Alhasan: Irregular Migration in Bahrain
Prevent
While the government has mobilized a range of policy instruments aimed at 
controlling the stock of irregular migrants in Bahrain, it has so far failed to take 
meaningful steps to alter their flow.
• Police and judicial action – One way to do this is to enforce police and judicial 
action against violators, providing a disincentive against irregular migration. 
So far, however, it has failed to pursue “visa traders” who sponsor tens, if not 
hundreds of irregular migrants to enter the country and work illegally in a 
variety of jobs. It has also avoided targeting individuals and homeowners 
who, comprising a large portion of Bahraini citizens, hire irregular migrants 
on a temporary basis to perform a variety of tasks – doing so would prove 
politically challenging in practice. While the law imposes strict penalties 
against visa traders and employers of irregular workers, including time 
in prison, enforcement is difficult to assess.56 The US State Department’s 
Trafficking in Persons Report 2015 states that the Ministry of Labour handled 
600 cases relating to labour law violations, although none were reported to 
pertain to visa trading or hiring irregular workers.57 
 Several members of parliament and politicians have claimed that visa traders 
comprise highly influential businessmen and officials. This, they argue, 
explains the government’s supposed reluctance to enforce the law against 
them.58 In reality, it appears as though the only category of actors within the 
market of irregular migration targeted by police and judicial action on any 
significant scale are the irregular migrants themselves.
• Market dynamics – Another perhaps more effective mechanism to curb the 
flow of irregular migrants consists of altering the feasibility of irregular 
migration. The introduction of the LMRA significantly altered the dynamics 
of the irregular labour market. As discussed, it helped decrease the popularity 
of the “free visa” arrangement and prompted employers to terminate their 
employees’ work permits instead.
violations. See “SMEs Make up 99% of Bahrain-registered Companies,” Bahrain News 
Agency, February 25, 2015.
56. See Table 5.2.
57. http://bahrain.usembassy.gov/news_from_washington/bahrain-trafficking-in-persons-re-
port.html. 
58. Al-Wasat, March 4, 2015.
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Conclusion
Given the poor track record so far of separation and control policies in downsizing 
irregular migration in Bahrain, it becomes apparent that the government would 
have to deploy a serious set of preventive policies in order to curb the flows and alter 
the fundamentals of the market for irregular migration. 
As far as visa traders, employers, and intermediaries are concerned, the 
government could provide a muscular disincentive against their bringing irregular 
migrants into the labour market, using targeted police and judicial action. When it 
comes to the irregular migrants themselves, the government could seek to render the 
arrangement financially unfeasible, mainly by raising visa fees beyond the workers’ 
break-even point.
Some of Bahrain’s top labour officials, specifically Mr. Aussamah Al-Absi, 
CEO of LMRA, envision fundamental changes to the labour market in the future. 
Emulating the model of most North American and Western European countries, 
Bahrain would impose strict border and entry controls, subjecting incoming 
migrants to stringent criteria and evaluation. Once migrants obtain legal residency 
and enter the country, however, they will integrate in a fully flexible labour market 
where they are free to switch employers and jobs, in a manner similar to nationals. 
Such a model, the argument goes, would eliminate migrants’ dependence on 
their employers, afford them greater bargaining power, and decrease their level of 
precariousness, all key ingredients for irregular migration in Bahrain.59 Admittedly, 
however, such a transformation of Bahrain’s labour market remains quite farfetched.
Ultimately, the direction that government policy takes toward the labour 
market – and by extension irregular migration –depends on the government’s 
interaction with private interest groups that hold a stake in the status quo. Beyond 
pure economic policymaking rationale, private interest groups have the ability to 
help shape government policy. The government’s appetite to dispense the political 
capital necessary to manage and overcome these groups’ resistance to shifts in policy 
could impact its ability to implement them successfully. To identify and understand 
these forces, and how economic gains from any policy shift would be distributed 
among them, it is important to analyse irregular migration and the labour market 
from a political economy perspective. This task is left for further research into the 
topic.
 
59. Personal interview with Mr. Aussamah Al-Absi, CEO of LMRA, October 1, 2015.
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Irregular Migration to and within Kuwait:  
Enabling and Sustaining Factors
Nasra M. Shah and Lubna Al-Kazi*
Abstract: Kuwait has formulated a series of laws aimed at banning 
irregular migration, in terms of entering the country illegally, overstaying 
one’s legal residency permit, or buying a residency permit to work for 
someone other than the employer. At the end of 2014, Kuwait was home to 
103,154 non-Kuwaitis who had overstayed their valid residency permits. 
About half of the overstayers were domestic workers, mostly females. There 
were several “runaway” workers who had sought shelter at their embassies 
or in the government facility set up for females. There were also several 
persons – their numbers were unknown – employed by someone other than 
the sponsor. Interviews with 18 irregular migrants provided insights into the 
factors that lead to the emergence and prolonged stay of such workers in the 
country. First, informal networks are pivotal facilitators that initiate, protect 
and sustain irregular migration. Second, irregular employment reduces the 
recruitment cost for employers. Third, irregular migrants have very specific 
goals to be achieved prior to return. Four, irregular migrants are highly 
resilient and willing to take risks. Five, irregular status in some cases provides 
higher remuneration, combined with flexible arrangements for employers. 
VI
* Nasra M. Shah is Professor at Kuwait University and Scientific Director of GLMM. 
Lubna Al-Kazi is Director of the Women’s Study and Research Center (WRSC) at Kuwait 
University.
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Six, longer duration of residence in Kuwait provides social and linguistic tools 
to survive. A wide array of actors benefit economically and socially from the 
existence and perpetuation of the irregular migration phenomenon, including 
those who sell visas, intermediaries who arrange them, those who provide 
rental accommodation and family members who fulfill social obligations. This 
makes the implementation of existing laws very difficult.
Introduction
To map irregular migration in Kuwait, this chapter has three objectives: First, 
to provide a numerical estimate of the residents of Kuwait who may be defined 
as “irregular” according to various criteria, such as the validity of their residence 
permits and employment conditions; second, to outline the legal framework within 
which irregular migration may occur, highlighting the legislative and executive 
orders that define and regulate legal residence in the country; third, to discuss the 
experiences of several irregular residents who are in violation of the various laws 
and could be deported or jailed, if caught. The chapter is organised into two main 
sections. The first section outlines the major types of irregular migration within the 
context of laws and regulations designed to manage each type. The second section 
narrates the experiences of 18 migrant workers in irregular situations and identifies 
several common features that underlie the processes leading to irregular migration 
as well as the multi-faceted factors that enable the protracted stay of such migrants 
in the country.
Defining and Measuring Irregular Residents in Kuwait, and the Related 
Legislative Context
In mid-2015, Kuwait had a total population of 4,183,658 of whom about 69% were 
non-citizens (PACI 2015). The main reason for the large number of foreigners in 
the country centres on its labour force needs. Non-citizens comprise, primarily, 
migrant workers and the families of those workers earning a minimum specified 
salary. According to Article 1, Ministerial decree 2/1992, workers in the government 
sector must earn no less than KD450 and those in the private sector must earn no 
less than KD650 for being entitled to bring their wife and children with them. In 
actual practice, however, anyone earning a minimum salary of KD250 can obtain a 
visa for his wife and children. Employed women are generally not entitled to bring 
their spouses and children. Moreover, there is a limitation on the number of children 
(up to three) who can join the worker without the payment of a yearly residence fee. 
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At the end of 2012, of the 2,299,691 non-Kuwaitis with residency permits (iqama), 
475,688 (20.7%) were residing in Kuwait on dependent visas (GLMM, Kuwait, 
Table MOV 2.3).
A non-Kuwaiti may enter Kuwait for the following specific purposes: visit, 
transit, work, to accompany a family member, or study. A total of 48 nationalities, 
mostly from developed Western countries, are granted visit visas on arrival at the 
Kuwait airport. Visitors from all other countries must be sponsored by a relative, 
friend, or a company. Any person who comes to Kuwait for employment must arrive 
with a work visa sent by the employer, who acts as the sponsor or kafeel for that 
person. Dependents of a worker are sponsored by the worker. Domestic workers are 
sponsored by the Kuwaiti (or non-Kuwaiti) employer who hires them. Thus, other 
than visitors from some countries, every non-Kuwaiti resident must have a sponsor, 
in the form of a company, an institution, or an individual. Once in the country, all 
non-visitors must obtain an iqama, which is generally issued for two years and is 
renewable, depending on the mutual agreement of the employer and employee. 
Once hired, the employee may change his job after a specified number of years and 
after getting a release letter from the previous employer. Detailed laws, rules and 
regulations are in place to manage the various forms of migrants.
Given this apparently well-defined system, how does a non-Kuwaiti become 
an “irregular” resident of the country? Four main types of irregular migrants may 
be identified: illegal entrants; overstayers; those in irregular employment situations; 
and runaways or absconders.
Illegal Entrants: In terms of illegal entrants into the country, no published data 
are available. However, this type of irregular migration is likely to be negligible in 
view of the generally non-porous and well-guarded borders that Kuwait shares with 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq. However, migrants may be cheated or trafficked in terms of 
being brought in legally but then being used for certain types of criminal or illegal 
activities, such as prostitution. Kuwait has formulated laws regarding Trafficking in 
Persons and Smuggling of Migrants to punish anyone involved in such activity. It 
states that “anyone who has committed the crime of trafficking in persons shall be 
sentenced to 15 years in prison” or lifetime imprisonment in cases such as when the 
smuggled person is a child or a woman (Law No. 91 of 2013). In response to some 
incidents of trafficking of women in the early 1980s, the Bangladesh government 
requested the Kuwait government to prohibit the issuance of work permits for 
Bangladeshi female workers, with the exception of doctors, engineers and teachers 
(Ministerial Order 83/1984). The extent to which the law on trafficking is being 
98            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
implemented is unknown. As assessed by the 2014 Trafficking in Persons report for 
Kuwait, “The (Kuwait) government did not demonstrate efforts to prosecute nor 
convict trafficking offenders using the 2013 anti-trafficking law or other laws that 
address trafficking crimes” (US State Department 2014).
Overstayers: The legal system does not contain any provision for a non-visitor 
to remain in the country without a valid iqama. Doing so results in residency 
violation due to an expired iqama. Once a worker’s employment is concluded, 
the employer (sponsor) must “cancel the work permit” and “bear the cost of the 
employee’s repatriation” (Ministerial order 106/1994, article 16). The worker must 
cancel the residence permits of any dependents under his sponsorship. In some 
cases, an expatriate may be granted a temporary residence for up to one year for 
personal emergencies such as illness, or to settle a disputed court case. Also, a person 
may sponsor himself and obtain residence for up to five years if he fulfills several 
conditions such as having worked in Kuwait for at least 25 years, owning a minimum 
capital of KD10,000, producing a certificate of good conduct, effectively residing 
with his family, etc. Apart from these exceptions, a worker and his family must leave 
the country within one month after cancellation (or expiry) of the work permit.
If the iqama is not renewed prior to expiry date, the person immediately 
becomes an irregular resident and each day of overstay is subject to a fine of KD2 
($7). Periodic amnesties have been held to allow residents in an irregular situation 
to either regularise their status or leave the country without paying any fine. The last 
such amnesty was held from March 1 to June 30, 2011. According to the Ministry of 
Interior database, the country had 124,142 overstayers at the time that amnesty was 
declared. Of these, 45,689 (36.8%) either regularised their stay or left the country; 
almost 63% maintained their irregular status (Shah 2014a). In a previous amnesty 
held in 1998, 15,842 were regularised and 4,458 were repatriated (Shah 2009). 
Recently, a partial amnesty was declared for more than 33,000 residency violators 
who are registered with suspended companies. Such visa violators were granted a 
grace period from June 1 to August 1, 2015 to either transfer their work permits to 
other sponsors or cancel them to leave (Kuwait Times, May 26, 2015, Page 1). 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the number of residency violators (i.e., overstayers) 
for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013, according to nationality groups and type of 
residency permit, respectively. During each year from 2011-2013, the number 
of residency violators showed an upward trend from 5,695 in 2011 to 16,288 in 
2013. In terms of the nationality group, Asians constituted about 76% in 2011 
but declined to 65% in 2013. The percentage of Africans more than doubled from 
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about 9% to 21% from 2011 to 2013. More than half of the violators were domestic 
workers, their percentage increasing from 52% to 61% in the period 2011-2013. The 
second largest group comprised those working in the private sector.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 also show the cumulative number of residency violators 
at the end of 2014 (including all previous years), amounting to a total of 103,154 
persons. Almost three-fourths were Asians and about 16% were Arabs. In terms of 
the type of permit, about half (51.2%) of all violators were on a domestic service 
visa, 27.9% were engaged in the private sector and 13.8% had entered on temporary 
visas.
The concerned authorities conduct regular raids and checks of necessary 
documents at public places where expatriates gather, and in selected residential areas, 
especially where low-skilled workers reside. In 2011, 16,315 residency law violators 
were apprehended (GLMM Table IRR.1.2). Newspaper articles periodically report 
the number of those apprehended.
Table 6.1: Residency violators according to nationality group and year,  
2011-2014 (Percentage)
Nationality groups 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Arabs 14.2 12.8 14.3 15.7 
Asians 76.2 73.6 64.7 72.9 
Africans 8.5 13.2 20.6 10.4 
Europeans 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 
North Americans 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.6 
South Americans 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Australians Oceanians  0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number  5,695  9,859  16,288  103,154 
Source: Ministry of Interior, Kuwait.
* Total number of residency violators at the end of 2014, including 2011-2013, as well as all 
previous years.
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Table 6.2: Residency violators according to type of residence  
permit and year, 2011-2014 (Percentage)
Those in Irregular Employment Situations: A probably much larger group of irregular 
workers consists of those persons who are employed by someone other than their 
sponsor, which is illegal. According to the 2010 Labour Law for the private sector, 
Article 10, “The employer shall be prohibited from employing foreign manpower 
unless the competent authority has granted them a permit to work for him.” Also, 
“Employers shall not bring workers from outside the country or hire workers 
from inside the country, then fail to provide them employment at his own entity, 
or subsequently be found not to have an actual need for them.” Furthermore, 
providing residence or work to anyone in an irregular status is illegal according to 
the Nationality Law of 1959, amended in Law number 6 of 2011, which prohibits 
“providing residence to or employing a foreign national whose residence in Kuwait 
is illegal. It also prohibits employing a foreign national sponsored by another 
employer for the duration of his contract.” 
In violation of the above laws, a sponsor may in fact arrange a residence permit 
for a worker not needed by him, in return for a fee. A Kuwaiti sponsor may “sell” a 
work visa (# 18 for the private sector) or domestic service visa (# 20) to a prospective 
worker, who is not really needed by him. A tacit understanding exists between the 
Kuwaiti sponsor and the non-Kuwaiti worker that the sponsor allows him/her 
Type of permit (#) 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Temporary (# 14) 16.7 13.1 11.8 13.8 
Government sector (# 17) 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.9 
Private sector (# 18) 24.3 21.3 20.8 27.9 
Business (# 19)  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Domestic help (# 20) 52.2 59.2 61.4 51.2 
Dependent (# 22) 5.8 5.6 5.5 6.0 
Study (# 23) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Self-residence (# 24) 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number  5,695  9,859  16,288  103,154 
Source: Ministry of Interior, Kuwait. 
* Total number of residency violators at the end of 2014, including 2011-2013, as well as all 
previous years.
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to work for someone else. This understanding has led to the prospective migrant 
considering this as a “free” or “transferable” or azad visa. Interviews with several 
such workers, reported in the next section, provide insights into the dynamics that 
are employed to obtain and renew such visas.
No one arranging employment for a foreigner is allowed to charge any money. 
This is true not only for individual sponsors but also for employment agencies. 
“Anyone licensed to operate an employment agency for private help or anyone 
working for him may not charge the employee any amount of money for his/her 
recruitment and may not retain him/her either directly or indirectly” (Ministerial 
order, 40/1992, Article 2). Art. 3 sets the penalties for violating the provisions of 
the order. 
No published data are available on workers who may be employed illegally in 
terms of working for someone other than the sponsor and may have bought the 
visa from a Kuwaiti sponsor, or his/her intermediaries. Observation and experience 
suggests that this type of employment is rampant. In a survey of Asian male 
migrants in Kuwait conducted in late 1995, 14.6% said that they had come on a 
“free visa;” the percentage being 33.8% among the ones who came through friends 
and relatives (Shah 1998). In a small pilot survey to estimate the recruitment costs 
paid by migrants to Kuwait conducted for the World Bank in 2014, a question 
was asked about whether the interviewee was working for the same person who 
sponsored him. It was found that 22 of the 105 (21%) low-skilled workers reported 
that they were employed by someone other than the sponsor (Abella and Martin 
2014; Shah 2014b). If this survey is reflective of the current situation in the country, 
the number of such workers in Kuwait might be fairly substantial, probably ranging 
between 15-20% of all workers, especially among the relatively low-skilled.
Absconders and Runaways: Another group of irregular residents results from 
absconding or running away from the employer. Although most runaway workers 
are female domestic workers escaping difficult situations, some male workers also 
abandon their jobs without the permission of their sponsor, resulting in an irregular 
status. Although the number of runaway workers is not known, such incidents have 
caught a great deal of media attention as well as vehement criticism from human 
rights agencies (Human Rights Watch 2008; Harroff-Tavel and Nasri 2013; US 
State Department 2014). Embassies of several countries, such as Sri Lanka, India, 
Philippines, and Nepal have been playing an active role in providing protection to 
runaway domestic workers by providing them shelter, mediating in conflicts, and 
arranging their return to the home countries. 
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The Kuwait government has also set up a shelter designed to assist up to 700 
female workers in distress. The shelter provides accommodation, food, and health 
care and has arranged the repatriation of several workers. The shelter accepts a 
worker only if referred by an embassy or an international agency. Since the shelter 
was opened in April 2013, it has provided shelter and assistance to 1,970 migrant 
women (US State Department 2014).
A final group of persons who are defined as “illegal” residents by the government 
consists of the bidun (stateless persons without a nationality), estimated currently 
at about 100,000. Stateless persons have been a part of Kuwait’s population since 
the country’s independence in 1961. Until 1989, they were counted as Kuwaiti 
nationals and benefitted from many of the same privileges as Kuwaitis, e.g., free 
access to educational and health facilities provided by the government. Since 1989, 
the biduns have been designated as non-Kuwaitis for political as well as statistical 
purposes and have lost access to the various facilities provided free of charge to 
them earlier. The government contends that the biduns are in fact nationals of other, 
mostly neighbouring countries, who should reveal their original nationalities instead 
of trying to claim any rights of citizenship as Kuwaitis. The decision on the eventual 
status of this group is likely to emerge from political forces within the country, the 
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Case Studies of Irregular Workers in Various Situations
In order to gain insights into the multi-pronged dimensions that lead to an irregular 
status, we interviewed 18 non-Kuwaitis living in Kuwait in an irregular situation, 
in a language they could understand and speak comfortably (English, Hindi, or 
Arabic). A gender and nationality breakdown of our respondents according to type 
of irregular status is given in Table 6.3. The interviews were generally conducted at 
the home or office of the authors after due assurance about anonymity and safety 
of the respondents. Irregular workers were found through our networks. The real 
names of our interviewees are not revealed here.
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Table 6.3: Gender and nationality of irregular workers interviewed in Kuwait, 
according to type of irregular status
Our interviewees were from different countries and included both males 
and females. A striking point gleaned from the interviews was the existence of 
several commonalities in their migration experiences. Several similar threads seem 
to typify their varied experiences and enable us to highlight some commonalities 
that characterise irregular migration in Kuwait. At least six such commonalities are 
worth noting and are elaborated here.
Commonality 1: Informal Networks Play a Pivotal Role in Initiating, Facilitating, 
Protecting and Sustaining Irregular Migration
Apart from the formal licensed agents who act as intermediaries in arranging the 
recruitment of many workers, the role of informal networks consisting of family 
and friends is pivotal in the irregular migration situation. Among our interviewees, 
migration to Kuwait was arranged and paid for by a close relative in at least six of 
Type Name (not real) Gender Nationality  
Overstayers    
1 Amir Male Bangladeshi  
2 Umar Male Bangladeshi  
3 Amina Female Bangladeshi 
4 Lisa Female Filipina  
5 Norma Female Filipina  
6 Sara Female Somali  
7 Abdulaziz Male Egyptian  
    
Kafeel other  than employer    
8 Kamla Female Indian  
9 Hari Male Indian  
10 Kumar Male Indian  
11 Maria Female  Indian  
12 Zeenat  Female Bangladeshi  
13 Nasser Male Egyptian  
14 Nina Female Sri Lankan  
    
Runaways/Absconding    
15 Mansi Female Indian  
16 Sunali Female Nepali  
17 Hassan Male  Bangladeshi  
    
18 Illegal second job Emad Male Bangladeshi  
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the 18 cases. Visas were arranged by a brother, sister, aunt, or uncle, all living in 
Kuwait, and buying the visa for a fee paid from their own pockets. The experience 
of Kamla, an Indian freelance worker who has been in Kuwait for the last 14 years, 
illustrates the role of networks very vividly.
“My aunty (my father’s sister) arranged for my visa and job in Kuwait. I was 
married and had two children but my husband was not good. My father 
pleaded with my aunty to arrange a job for me so that I could take care of 
myself and the future of my children. My aunty bought a visa from a Kuwaiti. 
I paid her back of course. I came after my younger son’s second birthday. I was 
so sad. I lived with my aunty and worked at a parlour in the beginning. I have 
had the same sponsor for the last 14 years. I pay my Kuwaiti kafeel KD200 per 
year, plus KD10 for stamp. My aunty also arranged the visa for her sons and 
other relatives; five of my family members are sponsored by the same kafeel ’s 
family members; my kafeel is very good.”
Amina, a Bangladeshi domestic worker, got her visa through her brother-in-
law. But her brother-in-law left Kuwait and she did not know the kafeel to renew 
her visa. She came to Kuwait 20 years ago, when she was 18 years old and worked 
in the first house for five years. By this time her visa had expired and to get a 
sponsor she would have to pay a fine for the three years. Therefore she began to 
work without iqama. She has been working for a household for the past 10 years 
but they cannot arrange a visa for her without paying the fines. She sends all her 
income to her handicapped brother and is waiting to find a kafeel as she has not 
gone home for 20 years. 
Hassan, also a Bangladeshi, came to work for a company through his uncle, 
who works there too. The employer made him work after office hours in his house 
so he ran away. Now for two years, Hassan has been working in a farm in Wafra and 
keeps enquiring if anyone can sponsor him. But he is afraid to pay in case the person 
cheats him. He even asked someone in the Ministry of Social Affairs and they said 
that visas for Bangladeshis are now no longer given.
Informal networks can also arrange employment for overstayers without 
valid iqama and can provide residential space. In the case of Umar, who came from 
Bangladesh nine years ago and worked in a Kuwaiti’s home as a gardener and 
outdoor cleaner, he lost his job when the Kuwaiti hired someone else. He did not 
find another kafeel and overstayed his valid visa. In the meantime, Umar’s relative, a 
foreman in a cleaning company, found him a job with his own company to work as 
a cleaner in a mosque in a walled compound. Umar has been living in the mosque 
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along with another compatriot who has a legal residence permit. Umar’s relative 
gives him salary in cash (KD60 per month) from the company. Umar has not left 
the compound since he started working there. His friends help him with buying 
foodstuff and other necessities, as well as sending money home to his dependents.
Another overstayer, Amir, has been living in the apartment of a professional 
inside a walled compound for the last nine years. Amir came to Kuwait in 2005 
on a visa that his brother bought and worked first as a helper and then as cleaner 
in a company. He had a disagreement and was fired by his company. Since then, 
he has been living in the walled compound in the maid’s room provided in the 
professional’s apartment. He not only works in the professional’s house but cleans 
several cars inside the compound earning about KD150 per month. Amir has not 
left the compound in the last nine years. His friends help him by sending money to 
his family, buying him clothes and other necessities. 
Sunali, a Nepalese runaway domestic worker, lives with her distant cousin 
in a partitioned apartment rented by some Indians. Like Sunali, another runaway 
domestic worker from Andhra Pradesh in India, Mansi, is living in a rented space 
with some people she knows from her hometown. They both work, illegally, in a 
private school as cleaners. Sunali came to Kuwait about four years ago and describes 
her transition into an irregular status as follows:
“After two years instead of sending me home as agreed, my employer sold me 
to another Kuwaiti, who was a ‘harami’ (i.e., person with a bad character). He 
tried to grab me and abuse me sexually. I worked in that house for one month 
and left. I begged a taxi driver to take me to the Nepalese embassy since I was 
in great difficulty. I paid KD5 to the taxi driver. I stayed in the embassy for 
two months and then I left. There were 150-200 runaways at the embassy, 
both men and women. I left because the embassy could neither send me back 
nor do anything else. I left the embassy 9-10 months ago.”
Abdelaziz, an Egyptian overstayer, came to work for a company in 2007. In 
just three months, the company closed down and the owners disappeared. He had 
some Egyptian friends, and since his visa was still valid they helped him find work 
as an office boy. But when his visa expired, the employer fired him. Since 2009, he 
has been working without an iqama as a Haris (for KD70) in a building along with 
one of his friends. He hides when inspectors from the Ministry of Social Affairs 
come.
Sara’s story is sad and unusual. She could not have survived without network 
support from her family who also live in Kuwait. She was a nurse in the Kuwait 
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health ministry for 20 years starting from the 1970s. During the invasion, Sara and 
her husband, both Somalis, went back to Somalia. He wanted to live in Somalia, 
but life was too difficult for her so her sister in Kuwait arranged a visa for her in 
1995 and she returned to work. Separation as well as stress caused by her husband 
led to a nervous breakdown and she locked herself at home. Both her passport and 
visa expired while her family got her psychiatric help. Now they are seeking mercy 
exemption for her on psychological grounds to get her a visa again as a dependent 
of her brother who also lives in Kuwait.
Lisa and Norma, both Filipino overstayers, live in a rented room and work for 
a man who is their friend. He is a partner with a Kuwaiti who sends them to serve 
guests at parties and funeral gatherings. He is paid KD10 per woman for the party 
and gives the women only KD5 each per event. The friend takes them to and from 
events, and as these events are usually in people’s houses they do not get caught. The 
work is seasonal and they make the most money during Ramadan when women 
have parties. They get tips especially if it is a wedding or a funeral gathering. But 
they cannot go out in case the police stop them and deport them. 
Commonality 2:  Irregular Migration Reduces the Cost of Recruitment for the Employer 
Networks can be used in a structured manner where an intermediary can, in fact, 
act as an informal agent on behalf of a company that wishes to hire foreign workers, 
reducing the cost of such recruitment. This is illustrated by the experience of 
Hari, who has worked in Kuwait for the last eight years. Currently, he works as a 
salesman in a company, but his visa is not sponsored by his company. He bought a 
“transferable” visa for KD530 and believes that he will be able to get release from 
his sponsor whenever he wants. On the side, he arranges the migration of workers 
from Andhra Pradesh, India, where he has links with several recruitment agents. 
Hari describes his role as follows:
“An insider employee (agent) within the company (X) tells me how many 
workers of each kind are needed, on the basis of work visas that the company 
has obtained from the government. The company insider employee charges 
KD100 for this service from each prospective migrant. In addition, the 
employee charges KD80 for the ticket. The ticket money is, in fact, paid by 
the company, but the insider employee charges this amount to the prospective 
migrant. Once a match is found in India, I send them the work visa. I charge 
KD150 per migrant for this service. The money for me and the company 
insider is paid through “hundi” whereby the prospective migrant gives the 
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money in rupees in India and a trusted source gives me the money in dinars in 
Kuwait. The whole system works on trust and reputation. I have a very good 
reputation with agents in India.”
 When asked why the company hires the services of Hari, who is not licensed 
for such work, rather than a licensed recruitment agency, he explained that the 
company would have to pay KD350-450 per worker to the licensed recruitment 
agency and that can be saved by working with him. Also, the company insider 
cannot earn any money from transactions through licensed agents.
Kumar is a South Indian and works in a company where the sponsor is not his 
kafeel. On the side, he helps Kuwaitis get male workers for farms for KD100. He 
is reliable and so many Kuwaitis have got workers through him as it is quicker and 
less costly than going to an agent.
Similarly, by hiring Mansi and Sunali as cleaners, the school saves the cost 
of paying for their housing, health insurance, iqamas, and other expenses. Since 
these workers do not have a contract, the school would not acknowledge them as 
employees and would not protect them in case of a police raid.
Commonality 3:  Irregular Migrants Have Very Specific Goals They Wish to Achieve 
Prior to Their Return
Most of our interviewees were able to specify in detail what they wish to accomplish 
as a result of their sacrifice and hard work in Kuwait. Educating their children was 
a common goal among men as well as women from different countries. Building 
a house was another common goal. However, prior to their return to their home 
country, they wanted to put in place plans to secure their own future. For example, 
Kamla clearly describes her vision of her future life in India:
“I will live and work in Kuwait for another four years. As soon as my children’s 
education is completed, I will go back to India. I have saved one lakh rupees 
in my NRI account and will use 50,000 to open a parlor and 50,000 to buy 
readymade clothes to sell in the parlour as a side business. My main aim is to 
get a good education for my children. I will not stay in Kuwait even if I have 
citizenship. How can I live without my children and relatives? India now has 
good work opportunities. So I will go back.”
 Similarly, Hari wishes to establish a dairy farm with 10-15 cows, which he 
estimates will cost 10 lakh Indian rupees. And, Amir is already buying land for 
orchards that he wants to own when he returns. 
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Zeenat, a Bangladeshi, works as a cleaner in a school but is not on the school’s 
sponsorship. She pays KD600 every two years and has been with same kafeel for 
seven years. She says he is very nice and does not delay getting her papers done. 
Her daughter is now in a technical college and her son is in his last year of school. 
She plans to work till they finish their education and then go back home. Zeenat 
describes her situation as follows:
 “My husband, who was with me, cannot see and therefore went back; so my 
salary is paying for my children’s education. I don’t want them to be like me 
with no degree.”
Despite the relatively clear vision for the future and a timeline that appeared 
quite firm at the time of our interview, it also seemed that this timeline could shift 
forward quite easily as the plans of migrant workers became more expansive. In 
some cases, such postponement was motivated by unforeseen circumstances, such 
as Kamla’s son getting admitted to a Doctor of Pharmacy programme that will take 
another six years to complete, or the wastage of some of the money that Amir sent 
home for buying the orchards that was used up by his brother. 
Commonality 4:  Irregular Migrants Are Highly Resilient and Are Willing to Take 
Serious Risks
We found that our respondents were generally willing to work for very long hours 
with the common goal of earning (and saving) as much money as possible prior to 
their return. Female domestic workers were willing to take up any tasks ranging 
from cleaning floors and windows to cooking, massaging, babysitting, and parlour-
related work such as waxing, threading, and facials. Consequently, a worker may 
have up to 20 or more employers engaging her for specific tasks and paying her on 
an hourly basis for each task performed. Those cleaning cars (usually males) may 
spend many hours cleaning as many cars as they are able to get.
Engaging in a second job after 8-12 hours of duty by some workers is a vivid 
example of the resilience of some of these workers. Emad, a Bangladeshi worker 
with a cleaning company, held a regular job involving 12 hours of duty from 5 am to 
5 pm. He then worked at a second job in a from 8 pm to 5 am the next morning. He 
took only one day off. The second factory job was illegal since he was not certified 
to work in that factory and could be deported, if caught. However, he was able to 
double his salary by working at the second job.
The risk of deportation is a real and serious danger that irregular workers face. 
Thus, the overstayers are careful to avoid public spaces. The continued residence of 
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Amir in an irregular capacity despite the last amnesty declared in 2011 illustrates 
the degree of risk that these workers are willing to take to fulfill their life plans. 
When asked why he did not regularise his status or leave, Amir responded that he 
was in Kuwait to earn more money to enable his future settlement in Bangladesh. 
However, Amir had a clear plan about what he would do when he was ready to 
return, based on information and experiences of friends and relatives he trusts.
“Once I decide to go back I will buy a ticket, go to the police and tell them 
I want to go. They will put me in jail for 15 days, or one to two months, 
and then they will deport me. I cannot come back for five years once I am 
deported. However, that does not matter since visas for Bangladeshis are 
banned anyhow. I will not have to pay a fine if I am deported.” 
Commonality 5:  Irregular Status Provides More Lucrative Remuneration than Regular 
Status for Some and Flexible Terms for Employers
Since the primary motivation of most workers, especially low-skilled ones, is to 
earn the largest amount of money in the shortest possible time, several of them 
opt for irregular employment. For example, Nana, a Sri Lankan domestic worker 
is employed in four different homes and earns KD200-210 per month. If she were 
employed in a private home with legal sponsorship, she would earn only KD60-70. 
Thus, the risk of being defined as illegal by the authorities is worth the financial 
benefit accruing from this. Kamla, who performs more varied activities and works 
in more homes than Nana, earns about KD250-300 per month, equivalent to the 
salary of a mid-level clerical or sales worker.
Maria came from Goa, India, on a visa she bought from a kafeel 15 years ago. 
She has been working as a babysitter for a British family, from 7 am-2 pm; the 
employer is a teacher. She works as a cleaner in the house of another expatriate in 
the afternoons. Maria prefers her working and visa arrangements and said:
 “This way I earn KD150 and I can go home and rest in my room. I am in 
control of my life. I see my kafeel every two years for visa renewal, and I have 
no problems with him and I give him no problems.”
In addition to the benefits for the worker, the availability of part-time freelance 
workers provides an efficient and convenient source of finding help, especially for 
non-Kuwaitis who usually live in flats that do not have space to house a domestic 
worker, or the requisite income to sponsor a domestic worker. By using a freelance 
worker, the employer saves a considerable amount of fees (usually KD800-1,000) 
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that he would have to pay to bring in a live-in worker through a recruitment 
agency. The employer can also maintain the privacy of his living space and avoid the 
responsibilities he would have had if he had a live-in worker. Thus, the incentives 
for hiring part-time workers are very attractive. 
Commonality 6:  Longer Duration of Stay Provides Social and Linguistic Tools to 
Negotiate the Host Country Environment
A majority of the irregular workers we interviewed had been living in Kuwait for 
more than five years. Most had learnt some basic Arabic to converse with their 
employers and others and had developed extensive social networks that could be 
relied upon in many different situations. For example, despite his own irregular 
status and confinement to the compound, Amir has built enough network resources 
to have recently arranged a visa for his brother to come and work in a cleaning 
company. Amir has spent more than KD1,000 on buying the visa and bringing his 
brother to Kuwait where he will initially earn KD60 per month. He accomplished 
this through a relative who works as an unlicensed agent and is able to arrange visas 
for those seeking one. 
With a longer duration of stay, migrants develop friendships that make the 
absence of their own family less painful. They also engage in religious and social 
activities centering around the church or mosque and become comfortable with 
the physical environment of the country. They usually learn enough Arabic to get 
around and communicate with (potential) employers and others, as needed. Several 
feel that Kuwait is home and they miss it when they go on a holiday.
Conclusion: The Laws, the Regulations, and the Reality
In an earlier section, we highlighted various laws and Ministerial Orders designed 
to prevent and punish irregular migrants. However, our interviews with 18 irregular 
migrants clearly indicated that such laws are being commonly violated. Friends, 
relatives and countrymen find ways to employ, house and feed those who had 
overstayed their valid visas, in violation of Law No. 6 of 2011. The authorities in 
charge of nabbing and deporting irregular workers have been able to do so only 
in a minority of cases. Kafeels and informal agents, acting as middlemen, were 
charging money for issuance and renewal of iqamas in violation of Ministerial order, 
40/1992, Article 2. Migrant workers were either working as freelance workers or 
were employed in various capacities by employers who were not their sponsors in 
violation of Article 10 of the Labour Law, 2010. The following general conclusions 
may be drawn from the insights we gathered in this study.
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First, our interviews with many different types of irregular workers vividly 
highlight the complexity that underlies the social relations that enable the origin, 
growth and sustenance of irregular migration. These social relations hinge around 
many familial efforts to secure a better future, perhaps a brother or sister helping 
his/her sibling, a mother striving to educate her children, a worker trying to build a 
house, arrange for his sisters’ marriage, or support his aging parents. Migrants who 
have dreams to secure and maintain such a future are willing to pay a price both 
in terms of money to secure employment and endure hardships in Kuwait. On the 
other hand, the profit motives of the middlemen (in Kuwait as well as in the home 
countries) and the Kuwaiti sponsors, keep on fuelling the demand for this market in 
view of the abundant supply of workers in relatively less affluent countries. 
Second, this study reaffirms the difficulty that irregular migration poses for the 
agencies responsible for eliminating it. The six commonalities that we highlighted 
from our interviews show that several irregular migrants are not helpless victims. 
They choose certain alternatives, such as working on a freelance basis rather than 
for a single employer, to maximise the gains from their move. They have fairly well 
defined goals that they wish to accomplish and are willing to take the risks this 
involves. A whole range of actors attain financial benefits by facilitating irregular 
migration: Kuwaiti sponsors by selling visas; apartment dwellers by sub-letting 
rental space; intermediaries by charging recruitment assistance fees; employers by a 
reduced cost of hiring workers, etc. At the same time, social and familial benefits are 
gained by aiding the migration of kin and countrymen. Thus, a wide-ranging system 
of mutual benefits constituting win-win situations exists. Several of our respondents 
with valid iqamas they had bought from Kuwaiti sponsors were very happy with the 
arrangement (and treatment by) with their sponsors. Thus, in circumstances where 
the migrant worker and his sponsor/facilitator/sustainer/protector are of one mind 
in terms of enabling the irregular situation, policies to eliminate this are indeed hard 
to formulate and implement. 
Third, the runaways and overstayers appear to be faced with more vulnerable 
circumstances than the ones with iqamas from a sponsor other than the employer. 
The former group frequently transition from a regular status to an irregular one, a 
situation where they have little or no negotiating power in most spheres of life. The 
“free visa” holders are probably better informed and have relatively more flexible 
work and life conditions. The runaways and overstayers do not have any valid papers, 
are highly restricted in terms of physical as well as income mobility, and are always 
in fear of being apprehended by the police. In addition, many of the runaways 
are likely to be female domestic workers. As shown in this chapter, about half of 
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the 103,154 residency violators in 2014 were domestic workers. Only a handful of 
these violators are being provided shelter and assistance by their embassies, or the 
government shelter, while the rest are likely to be faced with situations similar to 
Amir, Sunali, Mansi or others in our study.
Finally, it is clear that any simple policy based on apprehending and deporting 
irregular migrants is likely to barely skim the surface of the problem, as shown by 
the disappointing response to the last amnesty in 2011. There is an urgent need to 
analyse and comprehend the mechanisms and pathways that result in the transition 
of a migrant in a regular situation to an irregular one and address the root causes 
that underlie such a transition. Policy measures should also recognise the differences 
between the various categories of irregular migrants such as runaways and “free visa” 
workers. Formulation and implementation of a labour law for domestic workers 
would also be an important part of these efforts. In the case of “free visa” workers, a 
more flexible management of the labour market may help in curbing irregularities. 
For example, if freelance work in selected sectors was legally allowed, people like 
Kamla would not have to live in fear of being apprehended while on her way to 
attend church services or to the home of an employer who is not her sponsor. There 
is a need to reduce the worker’s vulnerabilities in the workplace by ensuring safe 
and humane working conditions and regular payment of wages and to provide 
protection against abuse, when needed. Thus, a deeper and objective understanding 
of the reasons for the existence of irregular migration is necessary for meaningful 
policies to address this problem and eventually minimise its prevalence. 
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Irregular Migration in Oman: Policies,  
Their Effects and Interaction with India
Jihan Safar and Mélissa Levaillant*
Abstract: Omani newspapers regularly report cases of undocumented 
migrants being caught or deported by the police during crackdowns: these 
crackdowns have been ongoing since the social unrest of 2011 and were 
intensified by April 2014. In 2015, following several raids, conducted by the 
Ministry of Manpower’s joint inspection team with the Royal Oman Police 
(ROP), a period of general amnesty was announced. It was implemented from 
May 3 till October 28. The issue of irregular migration has, therefore, raised 
serious concerns among Omani decision-makers, especially in the context of 
the nationalisation process, which has been active in Oman since the early 
1990s. Yet, strangely, there has been no study so far on this issue in Oman. 
This chapter will fill this gap to some extent by examining the evolution and 
efficiency of the policies and measures adopted in Oman and the interactions 
with the sending countries, with particular reference to India. The study 
will first describe the possible complexity of irregular situations in Oman, 
which relate to a variety of statuses. It will then highlight the structural 
factors in Oman and India that contribute to the persistent irregularities 
among migrants. Lastly, it will give an overview of how Omanis and Indians 
VII
* Jihan Safar is Senior Researcher at GLMM and Mélissa Leviallant is researcher at the Centre 
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cooperate on irregular migration by analysing the 2015 amnesty in Oman. 
The empirical portion of this chapter is based on twelve qualitative interviews 
conducted mainly in Muscat in May-July 2015. Interviews were conducted 
with key representatives at the Omani Ministry of Manpower and the Indian 
embassy who were likely to provide information on the migration system and 
the amnesty programme as well as with key Indian informants who knew 
about the amnesty’s implementation and evaluation (which took place during 
the authors’ stay in Oman).
Patterns of Irregular Migration in Oman 
Composite Categories of Migrants in an Irregular Situation
The notion of irregularity relates to ill-matched public perceptions. In official terms, 
undocumented workers are, indeed, designated as “non legal labour” [al ‘umâlaghayr 
al shar’iyyîn] or as “violators of the Labour Law” [mukhâlif în li qanûn al ‘amal]. Other 
expressions are also negatively tinged, such as the word for foreign manpower “al 
sâ-i-ba”, meaning those “persons released out of nowhere, who celebrate and have 
fun [tafrahwatamrah] without a kafeel.”1 
Beyond this negative view of foreign workers, it is important to stress the 
complexity of irregular situations in Oman and the many ways in which a migrant 
may acquire an irregular status. 
Infiltrators [mutasalilîn]: Most migrants smuggled into Oman enter via the north 
and south coasts of Al Batinah. The increasing presence of security authorities, 
especially in industrial areas and farms, brought down the number of infiltrators by 
43.3%, from 8,619 in 2013 to 4,884 in 2014.2  
Violations of Visa Status: Overstaying the valid visa period is one way of falling into 
irregularity.3 The fine imposed on a person who overstays is OMR20 per month, 
paid to the Immigration Department. After 25 months of delay, the fines rise to 
OMR500, and they remain at this level immaterial of how long the person has 
stayed in the country. Undocumented workers need to pay OMR19 to the Ministry 
of Manpower for every month of delay. As a consequence, all workers who become 
undocumented would prefer to stay in Oman and wait for an amnesty, as 
1. Interview 1.
2. Gulf News, May 24, 2015. 
3. Visa validity for a worker is two years. 
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“They know that at least every two or four years, an amnesty will take place 
and they will go back home. By this time, they will have the opportunity to 
extend the working period and earn additional money.”4 
Irregular situations may also arise when the sponsor fails to renew the labour 
card or visa of his worker and to pay the required fees. In normal cases, the employer 
has to pay OMR200 for the visa renewal every two years and a fee of OMR50 per 
month in case of non-payment. Finally, other cases of violation of the Labour Law 
relate to migrants working with a tourist visa, a dependent (family) visa or a “short 
visa,” along with other residency law violators. 
Absconding workers: Workers often abscond because of exploitation, unfair 
treatment and abuse, or simply because they want or have been offered better 
working conditions elsewhere. The sponsor also might not have met the rules of 
the contract: salary specified in the contract, working hours, and provision of proper 
shelter or food, for example. As the kafala system makes it difficult for workers 
to legally change employers during the contract period, exploited migrants (or 
opportunists) have little choice but to escape. Runaway migrants usually go to areas 
like Hamriya (a street in Muscat), where they can find a “free visa” job through their 
personal networks, typically paid on a daily basis.5  
Absconding workers are usually reported to the police by their sponsors who 
fill out an absconding file [balâghhurûb]. An absconding worker is punishable under 
Omani law and has to pay OMR400, even if he or she absconds only for a week. 
In the case of an amnesty, the worker has simply to arrange a return ticket which 
would cost around OMR100.
The “free visa” system: Other undocumented workers include those who come to 
Oman with a “free visa.” In such a case, the worker pays regular fees to his sponsor 
(who only takes care of the residency and employment visa). However, the worker 
might at the same time choose to work for another employer, and not the one who 
hired him legally. Many migrants do not actually realise that these visas are illegal. 
Sponsors might, in fact, bring workers to Oman without having definite jobs to 
offer.
4. Interview 2.
5. In the “free visa” system, the expat gives a monthly payment to his sponsor who then allows 
him to work for another employer. 
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“Interestingly, if a sponsor has 10 labourers who are paying him monthly 
20 rials each, he will then earn 200 rials per month and he does not have to 
provide them with any facility or service, like medical care, shelter, food…
nothing, he is just making 200 rials monthly.”6 
While sponsors who sell “free visas” to migrant workers are rarely held 
accountable, the workers concerned are considered to be illegal and face the risk 
of being jailed for a month, in addition to paying a fine of OMR400-800. In some 
cases, an employer may also compel his employee to work in another job for him so 
as to get some extra profit. A journalist records, in a metaphorical way, the story of 
workers employed in jobs different from the ones mentioned on their labour card: 
“A lion was brought to Dubai and put in a cage there. The manager would 
give the lion some bananas in the morning and in the evening; he would give 
him the same food every day. So the lion got upset and called the manager: 
‘I am the king of the jungle, you are serving me bananas and apples, don’t 
you know I eat meat.’ The manager answered: ‘You might be the king of the 
jungle, but you are here on a monkey visa, so you are supposed to be served 
only bananas and apples!”7
Workers with a “free visa” also run away when they cannot afford to pay a 
monthly fee of OMR20-30 to their sponsor, and this usually happens when a worker 
does not find a job. As the worker has to renew this “free visa” every two years, he (or 
she) thus becomes undocumented when he ends the relationship with the official 
sponsor and is not able to renew his visa. Most runaway workers, therefore, wait for 
an amnesty, knowing that “it is impossible to find another sponsor”  and as they are 
unable to pay the required fees to regularise their situation. 
In addition to “voluntary” runaways, “fictive” runaway are subterfuges from the 
kafeel. There are other practices that reveal the complexity of defining the situation 
of irregular migration. In order to avoid paying the OMR2,000 fine for the violation 
of the worker’s license, a sponsor might declare to the authorities that his worker 
has run away. When the moment comes for the renewal of the worker’s visa, he will 
declare again that his worker just came back. 
A former inspector reported another case of subterfuge, explaining how the 
kafeel might transfer a monthly salary to his worker’s bank account8 to prove that 
6. Interview 2.
7. Interview 2.
8. Interview 3. 
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the migrant actually works for him and not under a “free visa” for another employer, 
while the debit card would be kept by the sponsor, thus preventing the worker from 
debiting his account.
Data on Undocumented Migrants
Foreign Population in Oman: General Remarks 
The number of foreign workers in the Sultanate reached 1,631,560 in July 2015,9 
with the largest portion of expatriates working in the private sector. Most were male 
and Indians10 were the most numerous nationality (Table 7.1).
Expatriate workers are concentrated in the construction sector: 38% of all 
expatriate labourers work in construction.11 As for their education level, most expat 
workers had preparatory school certificates. Most of the expatriate workforce is to 
be found in the Muscat Governorate, Al Batinah North and Dhofar (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Characteristics of the expatriate population 
9. The total population in the Sultanate reached 4,170,556 in July 2015 (2,350,860 Omani and 
1,819,696 expatriates) (NSCI 2015). Expatriates constitute around 44% of the total popula-
tion. 
10. Historically, most Indian expatriates in the Gulf come from the state of Kerala, followed by 
the southern states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. Nevertheless, in the last 
decade, there has been a rise in emigration from Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh. Bihar has been, since 2012, the leading source state of emigration from India.





by Nationality Indians 641,225 606,499 34,726 1.0
Bangladeshis 561,301 532,869 28,432 0.3
Pakistanis 216,167 215,001 1,166 0.3
Ethiopian 28,099 258 27,841 -3.3
Indonesian 37,264 620 36,644 -2
Filipinos 32,482 10,795 21,687 0.6
Egyptians 22,810 18,186 4,624
Nepalese 12,892 9,507 3,385 0.5
Sri Lankans 14,252 6,839 7,413 1.4
Other Nationalities 65,068 41,603 23,465 0.8
  by Sector Government 59,466 38,891 20,575 -0.2
Private 1,318,760 1,288,649 30,111 0.6
Family 253,334 114,637 138,697 0.2
    by Governorate Muscat 734,970 655,323 79,647 0.8
Dhofar 177,965 162,568 15,397 0.3
Musandam 13,910 12,740 1,170 0.9
Al Buraymi 47,835 40,527 7,308 -0.2
Ad-Dakhiliyah 91,061 77,987 13,074 0.2
Al Batinah North 209,643 183,007 26,636 0.1
Al Batinah South 920,38 79,389 12,649 0.7
Al Sharqiyah North 84,619 73,293 11,326 0.2
Al Sharqiyah South 84,318 76,305 8,013 -0.1
Ad Dhahirah 48,001 41,094 6,907 0.1
Al Wusta 17,888 16,933 955 -0.3
Not Stated 29,312 23,011 6301 0.8
  by Educational level Illiterate 21,538 19,260 2,278 0.6
Reads and Writes 426,816 376,881 49,935 0.4
Primary 148,012 128,382 19,630 0.9
Preparatory 599,831 532,873 66,958 0.5
Secondary 248,123 230,919 17,204 0.9
Diploma 52,876 43,851 9,025 0.0
University 91,58 76,015 15,565 -0.3
HigherDiploma 4,86 4,106 754 -0.7
Master degree 5,816 4,725 1,091 -0.5
PhD 2,748 2,109 639 -0.3
Not stated 29,36 23,056 6,304 -0.8
    TOTAL 1,631,560 189,383 0.51,442,177
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Data on Undocumented Workers
Data on undocumented workers are difficult to obtain, as local authorities do not 
publish accurate and updated information. Though incomplete and underestimated, 
recent data on arrested, deported and absconded workers have been published by 
the Ministry of Manpower. These data do not take into account other types of 
undocumented migrants: e.g., migrants who are not arrested but take advantage of 
the amnesty to get regularised. During the amnesty period, foreign embassies also 
produced data on undocumented workers who were registered for an amnesty.
Table 7.1, continued
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Number of Arrested and Deported Migrants
Crackdowns on irregular migrants have intensified since 2012 (Figure 7.1), leading 
to an increase in the number of arrested workers and deported migrants. This has 
been accompanied by an increase in inspection teams since 2007 and especially 
in 2012, when more than 100 new labour inspectors [mufatishîn] were recruited. 
In addition, the Ministry of Manpower has recruited more inspectors, as “this is 
inevitable in view of the economic growth and the call for more foreigners in the 
country.”12 Also, as part of the Ministry of Manpower’s policy, inspection visits and 
re-visits to companies are regularly carried out to check and organise the labour 
market, in addition to the organisation of “awareness workshops” [wirashtaw’iya].13 
These measures help establish a “sentiment of fear” and increase the responsibility 
of employers and employees.14 
Figure 7.1: Number of arrested and deported workers 
In 2014, out of 21,190 arrested migrants, Muscat saw a total of 10,111 migrants 
arrested, followed by the Al Batinah governorates (North and South) (Figure 7.2). 
Despite the fact that each region has its own directorate and team of inspectors, the 
number of inspections is actually less than in Muscat and “some time will be needed 
to have well established structures in the other regions.”15 
12. Interview 5.
13. Interview 3. 
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Figure 7.2: Percentage of arrested migrants by governorates 
In terms of nationality, 59% of arrested foreign workers were from Bangladesh, 
20.8% from Pakistan, 12.5% from India and 7.7% from other countries (Figure 7.3). 
Figure 7.3: Number of arrested workers by nationality 
The percentage of Indians arrested in Oman has decreased from 17.5% of 
the total arrested expatriates in 2012 to 12.5% in 2014. By contrast, there has been 
an increase in illegal workers of other nationalities, especially Bangladesh. The 
percentage of arrested Bangladeshis grew from 45.2% in 2013 to 59% in 2014. The 
experience, the maturity and the high level of organisation of the Indian community 
are some of the reasons that explain the decrease in irregular migrants. We might, 
indeed, note a change in the attitudes and the behaviour of Indian workers, 
particularly regarding “visa trading.” Indians are now increasingly refusing to buy a 
visa (around OMR700-1,000) through brokers, as they are aware that this is not a 
guarantee for obtaining a job and that this would force them into irregularity. For 
this reason, visa trading is used more by Bangladeshis, who have less experience in 
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In 2014, of the arrested workers, 17,546 were commercial workers in first to 
fourth grade companies.17 Only 3,644 were private service workers (housemaids, 
farm workers, etc.) (Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4: Percentage of arrested by work type
Among the illegal workers arrested in 2014, 9,158 were runaways, 9,022 were 
absconding workers and 3,010 were workers without a labour card (for e.g., on a 
tourist visa) (Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.5: Categories of arrested workers 
17. The registered companies are classified into 1) “Big companies” (International; Consultancy; 
Excellent; and First Grade), which employ 95% of the Omani workforce; and 2) “Small and 
Medium Enterprises” (Second, Third and Fourth Grade). The number of expatriate workers 
allowed depends on the grade of the company: 15 workers (Fourth grade); 30 workers (Third 












Source: Ministry of Manpower, Annual Report, 2014.
124            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
Data on Absconding Workers 
In the first six months of 2015, official data showed “an alarming figure” of 57,420 
workers who had absconded from their employers.18 Absconding workers made up 
8% of the foreign workforce and 3% of the expatriate population in the country. 
A recent study showed that out of the 42,900 absconders (registered during 
2010, 2011 and 2012), 63% were commercial workers and 37% were private 
workers.19 More than half of the sample was between 26 and 35 years old, and 
41.1% were low-skilled workers. Among the commercial workers, 72.8% ran away 
because of low salaries and for a better income. For 71.3% of the employers, their 
workers ran away because they found a more profitable job. Also, 45.7% had been 
working for their employer for less than one month.
The Unintended Effects of Regulations on Migration to Oman 
We must now look at two structural factors that explain the growing irregularities 
in the Omani labour market, both in terms of the host and the sending countries. 
While analysing the case of India’s emigration governance, we will also show the 
failures of national regulations in the management of irregular migration on both 
sides of the system. 
Structural Issues in Oman
Though it relies on a foreign workforce, Oman faces a high rate of national 
unemployment, particularly among the young. This issue was one of the main triggers 
of the political uprisings in 2011-2012, which puts some light on the negative 
perception of expatriates among the Omani population. In fact, the growing flow 
of foreign workers to Oman has generated among the locals a “fear of becoming a 
minority like other Gulf countries.”20 Popular resentment is particularly oriented 
towards irregular workers, who are considered as being responsible for several 
socio-economic issues and are increasingly being criminalised. As a consequence, 
the integration of national citizens into the labour market is an important social, 
economic and political challenge for Oman. 
18. Times of Oman, July 20, 2015. 
19. Ministry of Manpower 2013.
20. Despite all the steps taken by the state, the proportion of foreigners did not decrease. “The 
number of Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, the three main nationalities in Oman, has 
increased, whereas the number of Europeans and skilled Asiatic did not increase in the same 
way. This situation is not contributing to real economic growth” (Interview 8).
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Since the 1990s, the Omani government has tried to expand the proportion 
of national labour, both in the private and public sectors.21 The government has 
imposed several restrictions on the recruitment of foreign workers in certain sectors, 22 
through the implementation of quotas and the reservation of jobs, while at the same 
time trying to create market incentives for nationals.23 The Omanisation policy was 
quite successful in the 2000s as it led to increasing the number of Omanis employed 
in the private sector by 138%, from 2003 to 2010.24 This policy has, nevertheless, 
stalled since 2011, mainly due to the opening of new posts in the public sector 
in early 2011 and the creation of an unemployment benefit for nationals. Due to 
the better conditions of work offered in the public sector, the young have shown 
a strong preference for government jobs. The year 2014 saw a very high turnover 
among the national workforce, with around 89,301 nationals leaving their jobs.25 At 
the end of that year, Omanis made up only 13.1% of the workforce in the private 
sector.26 At the same time, the employment of foreign workers in the private sector 
has continued to rise and the number of undocumented migrants has increased as 
well. 
The interventionist policies of nationalisation adopted by the government of 
Oman have been constrained by this imbalance between nationals and expatriates 
in the private sector, combined with a migration regime that provides the 
employers with access to cheap international labour. In this context, the private 
sector companies are willing to bypass the mandatory hiring of Omani nationals 
that has been imposed on them. This is illustrated in the many cases of phantom 
employment of nationals and the informal hiring of expatriates. In addition, a recent 
study reveals that Omanis are unlikely to take up the 88.5% of the jobs held by the 
expatriates, mainly in the construction and service sectors.27 As a consequence, bans 
imposed in these sectors can lead to an increase of workers in an irregular situation. 
21. De Bel-Air 2015. 
22. Several professions and occupations have been reserved exclusively for Omani citizens: cashier, 
security official, lawyer, accountant, TV cameraman, typist, electrician, taxi driver, director of 
human resources, marketing or customer service, etc.
23. For example, the government has increased the minimum wage for nationals in the private 
sector from OMR120 to 324 since 2013.
24. Oman faces a high rate of unemployment among locals. This issue has significantly contrib-
uted to locals’ negative perception of migrants in an irregular situation. 
25. Ministry of Manpower, 2014, p.37.
26. Times of Oman, July 11, 2015.
27. Times of Oman, June 20, 2015.
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A recent incident at Muscat International Airport offers an example. More than 
1,000 Bangladeshis were caught working for a construction sector company that 
was not mentioned on their card.28 The majority of these arrested workers had been 
recruited by sub-contracting agencies. 
Finally, “masked” or hidden commerce [al tijâra al muqana’aor al mustatira] 
represents another obstacle in the regulation of the labour market. This refers to 
an irregular situation in which the foreign employees are the ones who run the 
companies instead of the Omanis. As reported by four interviewees, this is a 
widespread phenomenon within companies where the number of foreigners stands 
at some 600,000 workers.
“Omani employers leave the company to foreigners, and they know nothing of 
what is happening inside the company (…) we don’t know who is responsible, 
and this foreign employer does not hesitate to bring members of his family to 
integrate them into this business.”29  
In order to tackle this issue, the Ministry of Manpower has implemented new 
measures for small and medium enterprises. Companies are allowed to employ a 
certain number of foreign workers, but only with the provision that the Omanis 
are actually “dedicated to their activities” and that they do not combine this activity 
with a governmental job.30
Structural Failures in Indian Emigration Governance 
India also exemplifies the failure of sending-country institutions to protect its 
unskilled and low-skilled workers in the Gulf and to regulate overseas employment. 
In particular, the over-reliance of the Indian state on private Recruiting Agencies 
(RA) that act as brokers between employers in the Gulf and the Indian workforce has 
been a crucial factor in the rise of irregular migration. Under the 1983 Emigration 
Act, all RAs must register with the government before recruiting for employment. 
These agencies are supposed to ensure that employers protect their employees. 
Nevertheless, the proliferation of illegal RAs, subagents, visa merchants and the 
resort to informal links by workers has increased the opacity of the emigration 
process.31 The failure to monitor the practices of registered RAs and to punish the 
illegal ones creates a fertile ground for the development of irregularities once the 
28. Times of Oman, May 25, 2015.
29. Interview 8. 
30. Interview 8. 
31. Rajan, Varghese, Jayakumar, 2011, p. 57.
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workers reach the Gulf. Following the ban implemented since May 2007 on the 
emigration of Indian female workers, younger than 30, to the Gulf and other listed 
countries, this special category of workers is particularly vulnerable to informal 
recruitment networks. 
In order to fight against bad recruitment practices, the Indian embassy in 
Muscat recently set up an “eMigrate System” in coordination with the Indian 
Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs.32 Since June 2015, Indian workers can only be 
recruited through online registration with the Indian government’s overseas affairs 
office. This new device should help to streamline the recruitment procedure and 
thereby diminish the risks of irregularities. 
In addition, India signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Sultanate 
of Oman on November 8, 2008 and the two countries then planned the creation 
of a joint committee in order to exchange information that will prevent illegal 
recruitment and human trafficking. Nevertheless, this MoU is not binding and its 
role in the regulation of Indian migration has been very limited. Indian diplomats 
have been extremely cautious in their negotiations with GCC governments on 
labour-related issues. They fear that too much activism might lead to a temporary 
ban on their workers.33 There is also a shared feeling among Indian officials that 
“At the end of the day, migration is based on an individual choice, and (that) these 
people should take their own responsibilities.”34 
The embassy, nevertheless, has recently been more active in helping irregular 
migrants in need, especially those imprisoned, in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Manpower.35 Yet, no general policy has been defined and actions are taken on a case-
by-case basis. The effectiveness of the negotiations between diplomats and sponsors 
is also questionable, as not a single sponsor has yet been put on the embassy’s black 
list. And yet, an Indian official recognised that it would be the “only good option 
that could ensure the protection of the workers.”36   
To conclude, India was until recently largely indifferent towards the issue of 
irregular migration. Notably, neither the ministries in India nor Indian missions 
in the Gulf have an accurate knowledge of the number of undocumented workers 
32. MOIA was merged with the Ministry of External Affairs in January 2016.
33. Ilias 2011.
34. Interviews 10, 11. Informally set up in 2008, it was officially institutionalised and registered at 
the Oman Ministry for Social Development in 2012. 
35. Interview 2. 
36. Interview 9. 
128            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
present there.37 This might change as the issue of expatriate workers takes priority 
in India’s diplomatic agenda, especially during periods of amnesty in the Gulf 
countries. 
Ambiguous Effects of “Good Practices”: The Amnesty
Announced in April 2015 by the Ministry of Manpower, the amnesty ran from May 
3 till July 30, and was then extended by three months. This is the fourth amnesty that 
has been implemented in Oman.38 The amnesty (also called “outpass”) is a period 
that gives migrants with an irregular status the opportunity of returning to their 
homeland or of regularising their situation in Oman. Undocumented workers are 
exempted from the payment of a fine and only have to pay for their return ticket.39 
Infiltrators and workers who have pending judicial cases are not included in this 
measure. The analysis of the implementation of the amnesty process by both Oman 
and India shows the ambiguous dimensions of this policy. Despite an improvement 
in the coordination, transparency and efficiency of the procedure, it did not yield the 
expected results in terms of the registration of irregular migrants. 
Improving Practices, from Registration to Departure
The succession of amnesty periods shows significant improvements, both from 
the Omani and Indian sides, in the process of the registration and deportation of 
irregular migrants. While the first amnesties in the region were characterised by a 
lot of confusion in procedures, the 2010 amnesty implemented in Oman marked 
a turning point in terms of better communication and transparency throughout 
the process.40 In 2015, new steps were adopted to improve coordination between 
institutions. For the first time, the Omani Ministry of Manpower issued guidelines 
about the amnesty procedure. Labour attaches of the relevant foreign embassies in 
Muscat gathered together to discuss how registration would work, which gave some 
space for the improvement of practices.41 The procedure took almost a month and 
involved several steps:42  
37. Interview 9. 
38. Previous amnesties had been granted in 2005, 2007, and at the end of 2009 – it lasted until the 
start of 2011.
39. Shah 2014. 
40. Interview 7.
41. Interviews 9, 10. 
42. Interviews 9, 10. 
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First, the irregular migrants had to register at their embassy. They got a receipt 
as well as a file, a blue coloured one for India. On the same day, they had to go to an 
official typing centre in order to translate it into Arabic. 
The second step was the registration of the migrant at the Ministry of 
Manpower. The day allotted for Indians was Sunday and a maximum of 500 people 
were allowed to come every week. After registering, the migrants had to go to the 
emigration police for clearance. Those who had a criminal record were not allowed 
to leave the country. 
The following week, the migrants had to go back to the Ministry of Manpower 
and get registered on a website. If after one more week, no employer put forward 
any claims for the registered irregular worker, the latter was allowed to leave the 
country. Should an employer put out a claim, negotiations were held between the 
embassy, the sponsor and the Ministry of Manpower. According to an official of the 
Indian embassy, this rarely happens. 
Overall, interviews conducted at the Indian embassy as well as at the Ministry 
of Manpower during the Indian registration days show that the 2015 amnesty was 
much more efficient than prior amnesties. 
“Since 2010, and especially 2015, the procedures and services are more organised. 
There is less waiting time and more efficiency. Omani authorities have even agreed 
to have an ‘officer from the embassy’ in the room during the procedures to help 
Indians.”43 
Nevertheless, the Indian embassy still faces a shortage of staff and facilities 
that impedes the process. This is to some extent counterbalanced by the Indian 
Social Club’s Charity Wing,44 which unofficially takes care of workers in an irregular 
situation and helps in the organisation of the amnesty. Since 2010, Indian social 
workers have arranged a shelter dedicated to distressed undocumented women 
waiting for their case to be solved by the Omani authorities.45 In May 2015, fifteen 
women, mainly from the state of Andhra Pradesh, were at the shelter. Among them, 
eight were to be returned to India under the amnesty scheme and the others were 
waiting for their situation to be regularised. In addition to the shelter, the Indian 
community also funds the return tickets of absconded workers.46
43. Interview 12. 
44. Interview 7.
45. Although it was set up by the Indian Embassy in 2010, the shelter only functions with the 
presence and resources of the Indian Charity Wing’s volunteers. Interview 11. 
46. Interview 11. 
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The embassies of all sending countries have been involved in the process. In fact, 
being economically dependent on the remittances received from the Gulf, sending 
countries need to ensure the regular flow of their workers to Oman. Therefore, they 
have a strong interest in the reduction of undocumented workers, which would help 
them promote a good image for their nationals in Oman. Nevertheless, interviews 
conducted with Indian officials show that they do not have much leverage in 
discussing with Omani officials some of the causes that contribute to the rise of 
irregular workers, such as mistreatment by sponsors. The return of absconding or 
undocumented workers to their home countries is seen as a new job opportunity 
for workers, as the employers can then get clearance to hire a new foreign worker. 
Mitigated Results
While around 50,000 undocumented and overstaying expatriates were expected to 
register for the 2015 amnesty, according to official sources, only 14,254 made use 
of it (7,382 workers had been deported and 6,872 cases were still under study for 
deportation).47  
Looking at India, we observe a decrease in the registration of undocumented 
migrants, with only 800 Indians turning up in the first weeks. Eventually, 3,240 
migrants made use of the amnesty.48 By contrast during the previous 2010 amnesty, 
22,000 Indians registered and 15,000 made use of the opportunity. Multiple 
economic reasons might explain why, despite the fear of detention, migrants 
would decide to stay in Oman illegally: the lack of job opportunities in their home 
countries, combined with the need to send money to their families back home and/
or of reimbursing debts; the belief that another amnesty process might happen 
later and, therefore, it is worth extending their stay in Oman; the fear that they 
might not be able to come back to Oman, if there is a visa ban on their nationality. 
Lastly, the absence of a comprehensive repatriation programme offered by the home 
government is a strong incentive for workers to remain in an irregular situation.
Apart from these economic reasons, two other social factors contribute to 
explain the limited results of the amnesty. Perhaps workers staying in remote areas 
had not received accurate information about the amnesty. On the other hand, 
workers who had been residing in the country for a long time and had a good social 
network might have the resources that help them to survive in Oman in an irregular 
status. 
47. Uman (Al Iqtisâdi), July 15, 2015. 
48. Interview 7.
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Overall, the disappointing results of the 2015 amnesty hint again at the 
complexity involved in the regulation of irregular migration, beyond crackdowns. 
Despite improvement in the state’s practices, the amnesties might paradoxically 
contribute to the persistence of irregularities, as many undocumented workers 
simply wait for the next amnesty to regularise their situation. 
Conclusion
This chapter provides an analysis of the evolution of policies initiated by host and 
sending countries to curb irregular migration, taking India as a case study and the 
amnesty as one measure of institutional cooperation. While pointing out the main 
structural factors and policies that explain the continuance of the irregular situation 
of migrants, it also shows the efforts that have been made by both Oman and India 
to curb this issue. Nevertheless, the implemented legislation remains insufficient, 
and the measures are too sporadic. This reveals the absence, on both sides, of a 
holistic approach that would deal both with the socio-economic causes of irregular 
migration to Oman and labour force rights. 
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Irregular Migration in Qatar:  
The Role of Legislation, Policies, and Practices
Ray Jureidini1 *
Abstract: Little is understood about the extent and circumstances of 
irregular migrant workers in Qatar. The system and means of entry into 
Qatar is highly securitised by land, sea, and air and there is no evidence that 
foreigners (seeking work or asylum) enter illegally, or are smuggled into 
the country in surreptitious ways – neither from its shores on the Arabian 
Sea, nor through Saudi Arabia, its only land border. Although statistics are 
unavailable, qualitative evidence shows that irregular migration does exist, 
mainly through visa trading, of so-called “free visas” that originate through 
the corporate visa quota system. Other forms of irregularity arise from 
“absconding” from employers, a breach of the Sponsorship Law; being left 
stranded by an employer/sponsor due to business failure or cancelling of 
contracts. It is also a violation when there is a mismatch between the job 
1. My thanks to the organisers and participants of the workshop “The Role of Legislation, 
Policies, and Practices in Irregular Migration to the Gulf ” at the Gulf Research Meeting in 
Cambridge, August 24-28, 2015, and particularly to Dr Elizabeth Franz for her insightful 
comments and suggestions.
VIII
* Ray Jureidini is Professor, Migration Ethics and Human Rights, Center for Islamic 
Legislation and Ethics, College of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar 
Foundation, Doha, Qatar.
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specification on the visa and the actual work being undertaken, although 
this is very common and generally undetected. The chapter provides a brief 
overview of the laws regarding expatriates and the current policies in policing 
these laws. It also gives case examples that highlight the various circumstances 
which migrant workers experience as they reside and work illegally in Qatar. 
It will be argued that the workers themselves are not always hapless victims of 
deception, fraud, and exploitation, although this certainly occurs. Others may 
be well informed but willing to take risks to find work and an income that can 
support their families at home.  
Introduction
The status of migrants as irregular is a function of protectionist policies that 
restrict entry into a country, administrative requirements that restrict access 
to residency and employment and the criminalization of those who do not or 
cannot comply. (Düvell 2012: 78)
In terms of purchasing power parity, Qatari citizens currently have the highest 
GDP per capita in the world (IMF 2015). At the same time, the population 
and workforce of Qatar has the largest proportion of foreigners in the GCC 
and the world. As of 2013, Qatari nationals comprised 9.6% of the population 
(1.8 million), and this is declining as more and more migrant workers enter the country 
for the construction and infrastructure projects for the 2022 Football World Cup 
as well as the social and economic development plans of the Qatar National Vision 
2030. According to the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, as of 
May 31, 2015, the population had risen to 2.38 million, with a male-female ratio 
of 8:1 and the large majority of males alone (IMF 2015), without family members 
(De Bel-Air 2014). In 2013, Qatari nationals were only 6% of the workforce 
(1.5 million), with Qatari males at 4% of the total male workforce. Nationals are 
employed primarily in the public sector and comprise only 1% of the private sector 
workforce. 
The Qatar Statistics Authority Labour Force Survey of 2013 identified the 
main industry sectors of employment as: Construction (37%), Wholesale & Retail 
Trades (13%), Household Domestic Work (10%), Manufacturing (8%), Mining & 
Quarrying (6%), Public Administration & Defence (6%; with 51% Qatari nationals), 
Administration & Support Services (3%) and Transport & Storage (3%). Low-skill 
occupational categories such as “Craft & Related Trade Workers” to “Elementary 
Occupations” account for 72% of non-nationals (De Bel-Air 2014).
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There are no official statistics providing a breakdown of nationalities in the 
workforce. However, from a 2012 survey of low-income (less than $550 per month) 
workers in Qatar, the largest numbers came from Nepal (39%), India (29%), Sri 
Lanka (9%), Bangladesh (9%), Philippines (5%), Pakistan (3%), Egypt (3%), and 
Others (2%) (Gardner, et al. 2013). From data supplied by embassies, those from 
India (particularly Kerala) are the most numerous in the overall workforce, followed 
by Nepal and Philippines. Non-Gulf Arabs are significant in higher income 
supervisory, managerial, and entrepreneur positions. In 2002-04, the proportion of 
non-Gulf Arab expatriates was around 19%, down from 33% in 1975 (Kapiszewski 
2006).
Since the awarding of the 2022 World Cup, relentless criticism has been 
directed at Qatar from the United Nations, human rights organizations, and 
the mass media (see Human Rights Watch 2012; Amnesty International 2013a; 
Amnesty International 2014a; Amnesty International 2014b; International Labour 
Organisation 2013; International Trade Union Confederation 2014; Crepeau 2014; 
DLA Piper 2014; Jureidini 2014; Booth 2013). All of these reports focus upon 
the abuses of the kafala system of sponsorship as well as corruption in migrant 
labour recruitment, wages, excessive working hours, sub-standard accommodation 
facilities, health and safety, and call for radical reform. Very little attention is given 
in these reports to irregular or undocumented workers and none provide estimations 
of the possible number of irregular workers in Qatar.
Qatar’s wealth and reputation as a source of lucrative employment is a 
major pull factor for people from the poorer countries of Asia, the Middle East, 
and Africa. According to the IMF and World Bank, in 2014, remittances from 
Qatar reached $9.5 billion (AFP 2013; Global Research 2015). This attraction 
felt by individuals and their states of origin also feeds greed and corruption by 
middlemen brokering employment opportunities and, coupled with the labour 
restrictions of private sponsorship, leads to irregular conditions and a culture of fear 
and trepidation against complaints and legal remedies, although some reforms are 
underway and more are promised. The stringent restrictions on migrant labour that 
lead to irregularity are discussed later.
In considering how foreign labour is identified and treated as being in an 
irregular situation, this chapter begins with the legal framework that focuses 
primarily on the Law of Sponsorship and, to a lesser extent, the Labour Law. These 
laws define the conditions of control over the entry, exit, and movement of foreign 
labour in the country. The second section considers government policies towards 
irregularity through the government departments dedicated to implement these 
138            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
laws. In the third section detailing the practices, I identify eight circumstances that 
lead to irregularity. Not all of these are serious, for some are temporary and some are 
not of concern to the authorities. Qualitative data and case studies are provided on 
the more important categories of visa trading and absconding. The main objective in 
the chapter is to show how migrant workers arrive into Qatar in a regular condition 
and how they may become irregular once they are in the state. 
Original data was obtained from interviews with individuals in irregular 
circumstances and with interlocutors who are actively trying to assist them, 
including members of the NHRC and community representatives. Actual names 
have not been used as requested by the interviewees.
The term “migrant worker” is used here as “a person who is to be engaged, 
is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he 
or she is not a national” (UN Migrant Workers’ Convention, 1990/2003, Art. 
2).2 However, the terms “migrant worker” or “migrant labour” are considered 
unacceptable by Qatari authorities because they are perceived to imply permanent 
migration (immigration). They prefer the term  “temporary contract worker.”
The Legal Framework
In Qatar, irregular migrants include:
1. Foreign nationals without residence status, but who are in regular employment 
– usually when the employers do not renew the residency permit because 
they do not want to pay, or through negligence. Companies who do this can 
be blacklisted and banned from further recruitment. 
2. Foreign nationals who entered on tourist visas and are employed in 
unregistered jobs. These are often those who find a job, commence work, 
but are in the process of regularising their status with a work visa. These 
will more likely be white-collar, managerial, or technical professionals. 
Overstay on tourist visas is not thought to be a particularly significant issue 
in Qatar. Tourist visas are strictly controlled and for most countries require 
pre-arrangement through an embassy. Nationals from 38 mainly developed 
countries can obtain a one-month visa on arrival, but require a credit card 
2. Note that Qatar as well as the other GCC states and generally migrant destination countries 
have not ratified this convention and thus are not bound by its coverage, in particular the 
rights conferred upon irregular migrant workers.
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to pay the visa charge (QAR50-100).3 None of the low-skilled labour origin 
country nationals can obtain a visa on arrival, including Muslim majority 
countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
3. Foreign nationals who may have residency status, but are working without 
permission in unregistered jobs, namely those who are working for an 
employer who is not their sponsor, or a resident spouse or offspring who 
does not have a work visa.4  
4. Foreign nationals who may have residency status and work visa, but are 
working in unregistered jobs. This may be with informal, unregistered 
permission from their sponsor (who expects payment in return for renewal) 
or because they have absconded from the sponsor and are working for 
another employer, that is, “freelancing.”
5. Foreign nationals who have left their employer without permission 
(absconded), who may or may not be working, but are still resident. 
6. Foreign nationals who may have a work visa but no residency status. This 
happens usually after the first three months’ probationary period where the 
employee has not been processed for a residency ID card.
7. A foreign national whose occupation is not commensurate with the 
classification on the work visa is also going against the law. However, because 
of a non-transparent quota system based upon nationality and occupation, 
this is very common, but not recognised in practice as conferring an irregular 
status, perhaps partly because of the difficulty in monitoring. It is, however, a 
major means by which recruitment agents and traffickers in origin countries 
and their collaborators in Qatar are able to deceive prospective workers who 
expect jobs that are more lucrative and prestigious than what is stated on the 
visa. The occupation on the work visa is presented as a minor bureaucratic 
problem that can be ignored. For example, they may promise a position 
3. Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland (Rep.), Italy, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Monaco, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA, and Vatican City. 
4. Penalties for employing workers not under their sponsorship can be “imprisonment not 
exceeding 3 years and/or a fine of not more than QAR50,000 and in case of repetition an 
imprisonment for a period not less than 15 days, and not exceeding three years and a fine of 
not less than QAR20,000 and not more than QAR100,000.”
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as a soccer player, but the worker may be asked to accept a work visa for 
a labourer or security guard (see the case of Togolese workers in Jureidini 
2014).
8. There are also those who become irregular if their employing company ceases 
operations, goes bankrupt, or is blacklisted without making provisions for 
the employees. Often employees go unpaid and the sponsor is not accessible 
to return the passports, sign an exit visa, and pay their return airfares. 
The multiple differences of these irregular circumstances suggest that we 
should move away from a binary conceptualisation of regular versus irregular. 
Although in cases 1, 2, 3 6 & 7, irregularity may be temporary or may not be of 
immediate concern to the authorities, it is important to identify them as gradations 
of irregularity in accordance with the law and which may or may not be policed.
The status of non-nationals in Qatar is administered by Law No. 4 of 2009, 
“Regulating the Entry and Exit of Expatriates in Qatar and their Residence and 
Sponsorship.” This is the result of a number of amendments since the original Law 
No. 3 was enacted in 1963. It is generally referred to as the Sponsorship Law and 
is the legal foundation of the kafala system, although there is no mention of kafala 
in the law itself.
Much has been written about the kafala system as having honourable, 
religious-based historical functions for loan guarantees, guardianship of orphans, 
and security guarantees of strangers, but which has become a means of exploitation 
of labour in modern times (Frantz 2011). More than a system of administration 
where responsibility and authority over foreigners is delegated to private citizens, 
the kafala also “cements” the relationship between the state and its citizens as an 
efficient alternative for the state’s lack of capacity to manage an excessive foreign 
population. It also acts as a means for government wealth distribution among the 
citizens in both public and private industry sectors, minimising the competition 
between elite families and the maintenance of socio-political power structures, 
to the exclusion of foreigners (Dito 2014). It has been argued that the difference 
between pre-oil and post-oil employment relations was the conscious exclusion of 
foreign employees because they could not be trusted, as they had previously trusted 
members of the same community (Longva 1997). 
By way of summary, under the contemporary kafala system of sponsorship, all 
foreign nationals who wish to work or establish a business require a Qatari citizen, 
foreign resident or company to sponsor them (Sponsorship Law, Article 19).5 In the 
5. The Sponsorship Law distinguishes between a “residence sponsor” and an “exit sponsor,” 
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case of businesses, a Qatari sponsor (kafeel) must have 51% controlling partnership 
of the company (Commercial Companies Law No. 5, 2002; Latham & Watkins, 
n.d.).6 In the case of an employee, the sponsor must also be the employer (Article 
15 and Article 25: 3 of the Labour Law). The employee requires the permission of 
the sponsor to leave the country (Article 18) or to change employers (Article 22). 
The employee must be engaged in the work as classified on the work permit (Article 
48). The work visa and residency ID (iqama) contains the name of the sponsor as 
well as the job classification. Thus, the sponsor/employer (or kafeel) controls the 
entry, exit, and employment transfer of all employees. These provisions have been 
challenged as constituting violations of international labour conventions and the 
right of freedom of movement for foreigners in the country.7 They are also part of 
the legal restraints that result in placing migrant workers, willingly or unwillingly, 
into an irregular status.
The requirement for all foreigners in Qatar to obtain an exit visa from their 
employer/sponsor to leave the country is a particularly vexed issue. Article 18 of the 
Sponsorship Law states: 
Other than women sponsored by the father and the minors and visitors 
visiting the state for no longer than 30 days, expatriates may not leave the 
state temporarily or permanently unless they provide an exit permit issued by 
the Residence Sponsor.
This has been a highly controversial regulation that is only operative in Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia and has led to many cases of foreign workers as well as high 
profile professional expatriates being unable to leave the country (see, for example, 
Parry 2010; Hope 2009; Amnesty International 2013a). 
They are usually the same person or entity, but both roles can be delegated for administrative 
purposes.
6. See: Commercial Companies Law No. 5, 2002, Article 68; Article 2(1) of the Foreign Invest-
ment Law restricts foreign ownership to a maximum of 49% of a company’s capital. However, 
Article 2(2) provides that foreign investors can own up to 100% of the capital if: a. the entity 
operates in the agriculture, industry, healthcare, education, tourism, exploitation and devel-
opment of natural resources, and energy or mining sectors; and b. the project contributes to 
Qatar’s development plans. The Minister of Business and Trade is officially responsible for 
determination of the percentage of foreign ownership. See: Latham & Watkins LLP Doing 
Business in Qatar, n.d. p.3. http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2782_1.PDF 
(accessed June 16, 2015).
7. To this it may be added that, contrary to Article 9, it is also common practice for employers 
to hold the passports of their employees. Employers argue that it is voluntary and for their 
safekeeping, but it is a violation of the law. 
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However, there is a clause in Article 47 of the Sponsorship Law that allows 
selected foreign residents to exit without permission:
A person who has a residence permit may exit from the State during its 
validity period without obtaining permission or authorisation.
This provision is related to Article 43 and offers an exemption to the exit visa 
requirement for investors, owners, and benefactors of real estates and any other 
categories decided by a ruling of the council of ministers.
More importantly, Article 15 of the Sponsorship Law states: 
No natural or corporate person may permit expatriates brought to the state for 
work to be employed by other entities or employ any workers not sponsored 
by such person.8   
Thus, foreign nationals must be employed by their sponsor and a person who 
has absconded from a sponsor cannot be employed by anyone else, unless they have 
a valid case against the sponsor/employer, in which case, the sponsorship can be 
transferred by the authorities (Article 12).
However, Article 15 goes on to state:
Notwithstanding the above, the competent authority may authorise a sponsor 
to lend his Expatriate workers to another employer to work for such employer 
for no later than six months, which may be renewed for similar terms.  
 This “lending” provision facilitates the use of outsource labour (or manpower) 
suppliers, who obtain work visas and employ migrant workers only to hire them out 
to others. They provide accommodation, food (or food allowances) and pay their 
wages and are, in turn, paid by contractors or subcontractors who use the workers 
without having to hire them directly. The contracting of outsource labour suppliers 
has been increasing but is seen as highly problematic. This is because of a lack 
of transparency and oversight, creating a “corporate veil” where actual employers 
do not check or monitor whether the outsourced employees are irregular or have 
been trafficked ( Jureidini 2014). With professional or white-collar expatriates, 
“lending” is referred to as “secondment” when a contractor, for example, may second 
an engineer to a subcontractor. In this provision, the law is quite liberal, as long as 
the sponsor grants approval (Zahra 2014).
8. Violators of this law to receive a jail period “not exceeding 3 years and shall pay a penalty not 
exceeding QAR50,000 or either one of them.” Repeat violators will be jailed for “a period not 
less than 15 days and not more than 3 years and shall pay a penalty not less than QAR20,000 
and not more than QAR100,000” (Article 51).  
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The other important legislation relating to irregular status is the Labour Law 
State of Qatar No. 14 of 2004, administered by the Ministry of Administrative 
Development and Labour and Social Affairs. Provisions of the Labour Law 
relate primarily to employment relations in the private sector, covering the rights, 
obligations, and limitations of employees, employers, and workers’ committees; 
minimum standards on working hours; vacation and public holidays; safety 
standards; workers’ committees; and termination of employment. With regard to 
issues such as entry and exit, sponsorship, and visas, the Labour Law defers to the 
Sponsorship Law. 
The Labour Law (Article 25) on “absconding,” a major cause of irregular 
status, states that a work permit may be cancelled “[i]f the worker discontinues 
the employment for a cause related to him without acceptable excuse for more 
than three months.” However, Article 51 allows, among other conditions, that if 
the employer breaches the obligations of the contract or the Labour Law, or if the 
employer or his representative has misled the worker, the worker may terminate the 
contract “and retains his full right to obtain the end of service gratuity.” However, 
Article 49 requires that notice of termination must be given, which varies from one 
week to two months, depending on the duration of the contract. The dilemma that 
employees face in terminating their contracts is that they may not be able to prove 
the employer’s violation of the contract or have access to the courts to do so (see 
Gardner, et al. 2014) and they may not be in a financial position to be repatriated 
home and may want to remain in the country to work. Thus, “absconding” and 
becoming irregular, rather than resigning may be seen as the only option. 
Major Policies
With the extraordinary demographic imbalance between nationals and non-
nationals in the state, a major burden on the authorities is the management and 
control of foreigners. 
There is a clear policy that permanent immigration for citizenship is not an 
option. Foreigners are to remain temporary.  The Qatar National Vision 2030 makes 
it clear that the country’s objective is to develop a knowledge-based economy, 
“highly qualified persons and specialists,” and reduce the dependency on low-skilled 
foreign nationals (Permanent Population Committee 2011). 
In reality, with the development plans, particularly for the 2022 World Cup, 
the dependence on strictly temporary foreign labour, both highly skilled and low 
skilled, will be maintained (Babar 2013).
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The administration of the Sponsorship Law is overseen and policed by the 
Search and Follow Up Department (SFUD) under the General Directorate of 
Border Passports and Expatriates Affairs at the Ministry of Interior. According to 
its website, the functions of SFUD include:
• To follow up violators of the laws and decisions that organise the entry and 
exit of expatriates and the regulations of their sponsorship and residence
• To search and investigate in the cases and complaints related to violation 
of laws and decisions regulating the entry and exit of expatriates and the 
regulations of their sponsorship and residence and to take legal action on 
violators and offer reconciliation in the crimes that allow reconciliation 
legally
• To carry out inspection campaigns with the aim of enforcing the laws, 
regulations and decisions that organise the entry and exit of expatriates 
and the regulations of their sponsorship and residence in coordination 
with concerned authorities
• To take necessary procedures to implement the legal decisions of 
deportation for expatriates and the decisions issued for cancellation of 
residence permit and deporting from the country in coordination with 
concerned authorities
• To manage the deportation reserve and supervise it
• To organise and keep the data of those sentenced for deportation and 
leaving the country and to take necessary measures to ensure they are not 
entering the country violating the law and systems followed
• To take executive procedures for temporary and permanent sponsorship 
transfer decisions in case of abuse or public interest in accordance with 
concerned law and in coordination with involved authorities.
The SFUD also maintains a detention centre for the custody of irregular 
workers and others who have been sentenced to deportation. The number of foreign 
nationals detained in the deportation centre is not an indicator of the number 
of apprehended irregular workers in the country. Most are not detained, but are 
required to report to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) on a daily basis. 
At any one time, the deportation centre may contain 1,000-1,600 men and 300-500 
women who may be there under a thirty-day deportation order that is renewable 
under the Sponsorship Law (Article 38). The women are mainly domestic workers 
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who have absconded from abusive employers. Some can remain there for a year or 
more when they are unable to pay fines, or acquire their passport, exit permit and 
airfare, the latter being required from their sponsor. The Sponsorship Law (Article 
24) states that the sponsor must pay all deportation expenses of the absconded 
worker, unless they cannot be found after a month following official notification. If 
someone other than the sponsor employs a foreign national, that employer must pay 
the deportation expenses. The SFUD facilitates these payments, but if the sponsor 
cannot be found, or if there are long delays, the department may obtain a ticket 
for them. Despite claims by the SFUD that the detention facilities are hospitable 
and humane, a UN investigation found otherwise (Crepeau 2014). However, in 
2014, the SFUD did provide air tickets to more than 5,000 expatriates who were 
in detention but whose financial arrangements could not be finalised with their 
sponsors (Qatar Ministry of Interior 2015a). 
Migrant Domestic Workers
As in most other Arab states, migrant domestic workers are excluded from the 
protection of the Labour Law (along with drivers, nurses, cooks, and gardeners of 
the household).9 With an estimated 132,000 migrant domestic workers, the Qatari 
Advisory Council approved legislation in 2010 specifically to cover domestic work, 
but it was never implemented (Human Rights Watch 2012a). The exclusion of 
migrant domestic workers from the Labour Law means that they are unable to seek 
assistance from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Amnesty International 
2014b).
Article 12 of the Sponsorship Law allows the Ministry of Interior to transfer 
sponsorship if domestic workers are abused (for workers who are not governed by 
the Labour Law). This is rarely used, for victims are more likely to abscond and 
seek illegal freelance work or attempt to return home, depending upon the severity 
of the abuse. The detention of absconding domestic workers has added dimensions 
compared with other migrant workers. For example:
Too often, instead, domestic workers are treated as the offenders themselves, 
detained for “absconding” or otherwise breaching the Sponsorship Law. In 
March 2013 over 90% of the women detained by the authorities awaiting 
deportation were former domestic workers. And when domestic workers 
report rape or sexual assault, they risk being charged, instead, with consensual 
9. Exclusions also include employees of Qatar Petroleum and its subsidiaries, ministries, public 
institutions such as the armed forces and police, workers at sea, casual workers and members 
of the employer’s family (Labour Law No. 14 2004, Article 3.)
146            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
sex, under the charge of “illicit relations” [under Law no. 11 of 2004, the Penal 
Code, Article 281]. (Amnesty International 2014b: 8)
In 2009, the Qatari Population Policy sought to reduce non-national 
employment in manufacturing to 50% by 2020. One of the sub-objectives of 
“Qatarization” (giving preference to Qatari employees)10 was to “dispose of surplus 
labour, particularly household labour, and work to change some of the habits that 
require increased numbers of domestic workers and personal services” (Permanent 
Population Committee 2011: 19). However, as evidence of the continuing 
dependency, the government has been continually engaged in negotiating increased 
supplies of migrant domestic workers. In November 2012, negotiations with the 
Philippines to supply domestic workers broke down when Qatar refused to accept 
their mandatory minimum $400 monthly salary. Consequently, in April 2013, 
they reached out to Bangladesh, coming to an agreement for the supply 30,000 
Bangladeshi women for domestic work and other services ( Jureidini 2014: 15, 20).
Absconding Workers
If an employee, whether a construction worker or domestic worker, leaves 
employment without permission from his sponsor/employer, he or she is deemed to 
have “absconded,” and he or she after three months becomes a criminal offender as 
an irregular, unauthorised resident. When an employee leaves without permission, 
the sponsor is obliged to report the case to the SFUD and the employee can be 
arrested, detained, fined, and deported. 
The absconded employee has a further restriction in that s/he is unable to leave 
the country without an exit visa signed by the sponsor or someone authorised by the 
sponsor to sign on his/her behalf (exit sponsor). 
Absconding workers are a major concern for the Qatari authorities who 
emphasise not only the illegality of absconding, but also the illegality of those 
who employ them. Both face prosecution and workers face deportation. This 
provision in the Sponsorship as well as the Labour Law (Article 25) is often used 
as a threat against employees, and particularly irregular workers, who are being 
employed illegally. While there are provisions for workers who have absconded 
to provide valid reasons for leaving their employer without permission, there are 
no public reports that detail how many have had their complaints accepted and 
10. The Labour Law (Article 23) states that a work permit is subject to: “The non-availability of 
a qualified Qatari worker registered in the registers of the [Labour] Department and to carry 
out the work in respect of which the work permit is applied for.”
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been allowed to remain in the country. In 2013, there were 1,046 complaints by 
workers of human rights abuses by their sponsors. In the first four months of 
2014, there were 877 complaints (Walker 2014). According to the embassies in 
Qatar, the main complaints by workers concern non-payment, under-payment, and 
delayed payment of wages, as well as excessive working hours and lack of freedom of 
movement (Human Rights Watch 2014; Jureidini 2014). Curiously, it may be noted 
that the Ministry of Interior considers that preventing employees from changing 
employers without permission is a means to deter trafficking (Qatar Ministry of 
Interior 2015b), but it is more likely that it prevents “poaching” of employees, rather 
than “trafficking.”
There is no doubt that the law and policy that accepts the notion of “absconding” 
or “runaway” workers has undertones of forced labour. Instead of acceptance of 
an employee “resigning” without permission from the employer/sponsor, the law 
facilitates workers becoming irregular and thus criminalised. Night patrols check 
identification papers of suspected irregular workers. 
We conduct the inspection campaign in a very secret manner all over Qatar, 
and round the clock. We advise expatriates to always carry the necessary 
documents with them, not necessarily the original, but at least a copy. Now 
we are using a handheld device during the inspections. Using fingerprints, 
the device can give all data about a person in 20 seconds and we can know if 
he has a valid RP or he has run away from his sponsor. (Doha News, April 3, 
2013)
It has been argued that the CID is rarely sympathetic to the reasons a worker 




Employers are required to renew residency and work permits within 90 days of 
expiry. Administrative data from the Qatar authorities could show the number of 
non-renewals of employees who have not left the country, which would indicate the 
number of irregular workers in this category. Unfortunately, this data has not been 
made available. However, in 2013, 2,442 companies were blacklisted for various 
violations, including the failure to renew residence permits of their employees, 
employing absconding workers, non-payment of salaries, and other violations of the 
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labour and residency laws. At the same time, 1,263 individuals who allowed their 
employees to work for others were banned from being able to recruit or sponsor 
workers for a period of one year (Qatar Ministry of Interior 2013a).
According to the embassy of Nepal in Qatar, in 2014, out of a migrant 
worker population of around 400,000, approximately 5,000 Nepalese workers were 
“stranded” or in distress. In an interview with the author in March 2015, the labour 
attaché at the embassy explained that their problems included non-payment of salary, 
no ID card, no exit visa, or no proper jobs. Embassy data, however, is usually only 
indicative and not always reliable, for many cases may not be heard or a file opened. 
Thus, the number may be higher. In one recorded case, six Nepalese construction 
workers arrived in February 2011 with five-year work visas, but by September 
2012 they were stranded because their company, a sub-contractor, had gone out of 
business. The employees’ telephone calls to their sponsor went unanswered and they 
were left sleeping in the street because they were evicted from their labour camp in 
the industrial area. Money was raised to assist them, and their case was given to the 
National Human Rights Committee (NHRC) at the end of December 2012 which 
threatened legal action against the sponsor. Within a few days, the sponsor provided 
tickets for them to return to Nepal. However, three months’ unpaid salaries owed 
prior to the company closing down were still not paid. Once out of the country, it 
was unlikely that their salary claims could be followed up.
Visa Trading
Visa trading of “free visas,” mainly by small and medium sized companies, is a major 
source of irregularity in Qatar. “Free visas” are well known in the labour origin 
countries. They are not free in the monetary sense, but free of an employer or job. 
Many migrant workers pay exorbitant amounts of money to obtain the “free visas.” 
However, where “normal” recruitment charges can vary from $600-5,000, “free visas” 
may sometimes cost less because there is no job on arrival. The critical question is 
whether the migrant worker knows there is no actual job before departure. Irregular 
workers under these circumstances may or may not be victims of deception, fraud, 
and, possibly, trafficking. 
Many sponsors in Qatar, whether nationals or non-national residents, use the 
kafala system as a business by using multiple visas as an easy means of generating an 
income, initially from recruitment agents who, in turn, charge the migrant workers 
and, subsequently, through annual rent for residency renewal while in an irregular 
situation (Migrant Rights.Org. 2015). For example, Halli (not her real name), an 
Asian woman in her early forties, who came to Qatar seven years ago to work in a 
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hairdressing salon, went into debt to pay the recruitment agent before departure. 
On arrival, her passport was taken from her and she was told there was no job for 
her. They placed her in an accommodation with a number of other women and told 
her to pay a rent of QAR17,000 ($4,650) per year for her visa renewal. She was 
threatened that if she did not pay, she would be reported to the police as having 
absconded. She was not well educated and ended up in prostitution in order to be 
able to pay such a large amount. After seven years, her passport has still not been 
returned, but she has found someone who is willing to regularise her residency and 
provide her with legitimate employment.
All companies that register in Qatar are given a quota for work and residency 
visas, based upon their stated needs for managers, supervisors, drivers, construction 
workers, clerks, shop assistants, cleaners, etc. These can sometimes be “fake” 
companies designed specifically to trade in visas. A company may apply for its quota 
of visas, even if there are no positions available. Once the visas are obtained, the 
company can sell them to other companies, including outsource labour suppliers. 
The company (or personnel within the company) can offer the visa freely to a friend 
or relative who has to merely pay the government charge for the visa (QAR250, 
approx. $68), pay for his passage to Qatar, stay with the relative or friend, and 
try to find a job with another company. On the other hand, the company (or an 
individual within the company) may sell the visa, which typically would bring in 
QAR2,500-3,000 ($685-822) but could be more if there are other intermediaries 
involved, such as a recruitment agent/s. 
Acknowledging the sale of visas where there may be no actual employment 
on arrival in Qatar, the Director of the SFUD, Col. Nasser Muhammad Al Syed, 
argued that the “large presence” of victims of visa trading “poses a serious threat to 
social security in the country” (Walker 2014). To address this, in 2013, 51 companies 
were prosecuted by the SFUD for illegal visa trading. 
More than 40 executives of private companies, including Qataris, were 
given prison terms for fraudulent visa trade. A total of 50 companies were 
referred to the Public Prosecution and 84 cases were registered for their 
alleged involvement in ‘visa trading’. The Qatari and expatriate executives 
will undergo jail terms of one year to three years. The individuals and 
companies were charged a total of QAR4.27 million [$1.17 million] in fines. 
(The Peninsula, April 3, 2014) 
A company selling “free visas” must offer guarantees to the purchaser who 
falls into an irregular condition, because he or she does not have an employer. The 
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company must guarantee that when an employer is found, which must be in the 
first three months after arrival (probation period), it will provide an NOC (No 
Objection Certificate) to allow the transfer to another employer. If no employer is 
found within the first three months, there are only two alternatives. The first is that 
the company will proceed to obtain an ID and residency permit for the irregular 
worker, but the migrant worker will have to pay for the charges of approximately 
QAR1,200 ($330). This allows the worker to continue to search for an employer, 
at his/her own expense. Thus, the worker must arrive with some financial resources 
to cope with such exigencies. Second, if the worker cannot pay for the residency 
permit and ID, he must borrow from friends or relatives, or must return home 
– again, at his own expense. In such cases the effort may result in a devastating 
financial loss. The level of difficulty will also depend upon whether the loan/s was 
taken from friends, relatives, recruitment agent, bank or a loan shark. The inability 
to pay may elicit threats or retaliation against the person and his family.
Visa trading and deception of prospective migrant workers who arrive without 
jobs is not necessarily “trafficking.” Although there is exploitation in the form of 
exorbitant payments required by brokers in the origin country, there may not be 
ongoing involvement or exploitation after they arrive, so it is unclear. Brigadier 
Nasser Mohammed Al Sayed, Director of the MOI’s SFUD argued, “The trading 
of illegal workers’ visas in Qatar is at the heart of the country’s problem with human 
trafficking” (Walker 2014). At the same time, Ibrahim Abdullah al-Qubaisi, 
Solicitor General in the Public Prosecution Office, explained:
Based on the legal definition of human trafficking crimes, no such offences 
were recorded in Qatar in 2013. Crimes such as visa trade could be considered 
as fraud, deception, and greed rather than human trafficking. The crime 
usually happens outside the borders of Qatar, where the victim pays money 
for people to get them into the country. Our local legislation applies only to 
the country. (ibid)
It is a curious assumption that the crime is perpetrated outside Qatar, because 
the visa and its sale originate from Qatar.
In many countries, particularly those with precarious employment and 
insecurity, Qatar is viewed as a wealthy labour destination that promises high 
salaries, not only for low skilled workers in construction, services, and domestic 
work, but also for skilled professionals and white-collar workers. As people search 
for circumstances to better their lives, Qatar is characterised (in the media, on the 
Internet and through word of mouth) as a strong emerging economy with many 
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opportunities for those looking for more lucrative employment and a means to 
utilise and enhance their skills and work experience. Since Qatar was awarded the 
soccer World Cup for 2022, many young men, particularly from African countries, 
have been deceived by promises that they could come to Qatar to play professional 
soccer, only to arrive and find some demeaning position waiting for them with 
much less salary than expected or no job at all. Thousands of educated irregular 
African migrants –from Nigeria, Cameroon, Uganda, Kenya, Senegal, Togo and 
elsewhere– with university degrees in building technology, civil and mechanical 
engineering, geology, accounting, and other professions have arrived in Qatar to 
face similar situations. From 2011, over 5,000 Nigerians (almost all Christians) 
came to Qatar having paid up to $15,000 to an agency at home for a work visa, but 
there was no job waiting for them on arrival.
The Qatar authorities claim they are well aware of visa trading and its 
consequences (Doha News, April 3, 2013), but the fear of being reported to the 
authorities and deportation is strong because the victim still has a large debt to 
repay and does not want to return home with the shame of failure. At the same 
time, and perhaps unknown to most, the NHRC argues that if the sponsor’s date 
of notification of absconding is later than the complaint by a worker, the sponsor 
can be prosecuted for false accusation (NHRC community representatives meeting, 
May 2015).
The kafala system prevents a local domestic labour market from operating 
because of the stringent control and restrictions in changing employers and 
exiting the country as well as on the formation of trade unions and strike action. 
However, if victims in an irregular situation are looking for work, it means there 
is an “underground” informal labour market operating for irregular workers who 
are unwilling or unable to leave because they need to earn enough money before 
returning home. One of these is located in an area of the furniture market. Here, day 
labourers wait in the hope of being picked up in cars, trucks, or vans to get work. 
Several irregular African men reported sexual harassment when picked up by men 
who promised them a job. Quite often, because of the clandestine nature of such 
operations, the migrant may not be paid and is not in a position to complain. One 
frightened worker has not left his room for a year after he was beaten and threatened 
by a gang of his countrymen when he dared to complain. Another interviewee, an 
African engineer in his mid-forties, finally found work, but after six months the 
company laid him off and refused to pay his salary. After several months agitating 
for the money, he was given a cheque for the full amount, but there were no funds 
in the bank account. He presented the cheque through a friend’s bank account and 
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reported the case to the NHRC. Their lawyers retrieved the money. However, the 
long ordeal and humiliation affected his mental health and he has returned home, 
as one respondent put it, “a broken man.”
Irregular migration with “free visas” also operates through social networks 
between workers in Qatar and may not always be sinister. For example, PJ, a young 
Bangladeshi man (27 years) has been working in Qatar for three years. Under 
pressure from his family, he decided to find a way to bring his brother (25 years, 
with accounting qualifications) to Qatar as he had been out of work for over six 
months in Dhaka. Having made friends with a Bangladesh civil engineer working in 
middle management for a trading company (established by an Indian entrepreneur 
from Kerala), PJ asked him for a work visa (he refused to call it a “free visa”) for 
his brother. The engineer dutifully arranged a visa for a clerical officer through his 
company’s quota arrangement. A bogus job offer was drawn up, sent to the Ministry 
of Labour and passed through the Chamber of Commerce and the Bangladesh 
embassy. According to PJ, he only paid the government charges for procuring the 
work visa ($80), the pre-departure medical examination ($25), a welfare fund ($10) 
that will pay for repatriation of the body if he dies abroad, and a death insurance 
policy ($20). The airfare was approximately $330. In all the cost to PJ was $485. 
When he arrived, PJ fed and sheltered his brother and tried to help him find a job 
within three months. When a position is found, he will readily obtain an NOC 
from the trading company and his brother’s stay will be regularised.
Regularisation
Article 12 of the Sponsorship Law makes provision for the SFUD in conjunction 
with the MLSA to transfer sponsorship of a worker to another employer without 
permission of the original sponsor, including on a temporary basis if there is a 
lawsuit between the employee and employer. Regularisation of migrant workers 
with a work visa but no employer is usually at the discretion of the CID in 
conjunction with the SFUD and Ministry of Immigration. In early 2014, during a 
crackdown on irregular migrant workers, the SFUD announced it had transferred 
the sponsorship of over 1,000 workers to other sponsors (Marhaba, April 23, 2014). 
The Nigerian and other African cases suggest it was a much larger number than this 
between 2013-2014.
A prospective employer who is willing to take over sponsorship can process this 
independently, or through the NHRC. One philanthropic company has undertaken 
many such “rescues” of stranded workers, either providing them with work, or 
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helping to regularise their residency while they look for a job, and providing an 
NOC when they find one. 
If the original sponsor cannot be found, the CID is approached with a request 
for sponsorship transfer. The CID checks the passport and visa number in its 
database to determine if the worker is in the country legally. For example, they can 
immediately determine if the sponsor (whether Qatari or non-Qatari) is blacklisted 
or inoperative. If the CID is able to contact the sponsor, arrangements are made 
to obtain an NOC to transfer sponsorship. Depending upon the difficulty of the 
case, the CID may immediately detain the worker and a decision could be made for 
deportation. However, if the CID is sympathetic, particularly if the foreign worker 
has an advocate in the company willing to employ him/her, it is more likely to be 
approved. The original visa is cancelled and through the Department of Immigration 
an application is made for a new visa with the new sponsor with a labour demand 
letter from the company. 
At this point, there are fines to pay for overstay (QAR200 per day: $55), in 
addition to QAR2,100 ($575) for the application and another QAR1,200 ($330) 
for the new ID card. There is a mutual interest here in that the company does 
not have to pay middlemen for recruitment costs as the worker has already paid 
these. Paying the above transfer costs and fines may well be considerably less than 
recruitment costs. 
Employees who have been blacklisted because they have absconded are 
required to pay QAR6,500 to expunge their name from the list, as long as there is 
no criminal or sordid issue behind the blacklisting. Those who have absconded and 
turned themselves in to the authorities giving a valid reason for having left their 
employer must still pay the fine, but their ban will be lifted for a period of time to 
allow them to apply for a new work visa under a new sponsor.
Reforms
There has been some effort to facilitate complaints about sponsors that include 
opportunities for irregular workers to seek assistance. For example, hotlines have 
been established by the Qatar Foundation for Combating Human Trafficking 
(QFCHT), the NHRC, and the Qatar Foundation (still in its inception), but 
historically these have not been particularly effective. The Ministry of Labour is 
also planning a special hotline for domestic workers. At a new government website 
(Hukoomi e-Government Services), there is a distinction between employment-
relations complaints (workplace disputes) and human rights complaints. For rights 
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complaints, the website transfers to the NHRC website where it explains that 
complaints must be submitted by fax, telephone, email, or personal attendance. The 
Human Rights Department of the Ministry of Interior is mentioned on the website 
portal “Qatar Living,” but there is no reference to it at the e-government website 
(Hukoomi).
Under the “Karama” (dignity) initiative, the Qatar Foundation Mandatory 
Standards for Worker Welfare for contractors and sub-contractors was launched in 
April 2013, introducing comprehensive ethical and legal standards to be followed in 
labour recruitment, accommodation, transport, health and safety, and contracts. The 
standards include the principle of ethical recruitment where migrant workers are 
not to pay any recruitment charges. The Labour Law (Article 33) prohibits workers 
being charged for recruitment, but the standards made it clear that this should be 
applied whether in Qatar or in their countries of origin. These standards were also 
adopted by the Supreme Committee for the 2022 World Cup in January 2014 and 
adopted by other clients of the state, including Q-Rail, Rasgas, and other major 
construction contractors. All corporate tenders for projects are required to adopt 
these standards, and various organisational welfare teams have been established to 
monitor and evaluate compliance, including in the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs. These reforms were designed without any demands for legislative change, 
but to be implemented at a commercial level.
Following from the standards, in 2014, seven main legislative changes were 
promised for early 2015 but have been postponed to late 2015. They include: 
reform of the kafala system from private to public sponsorship; a bank transfer 
wage protection scheme; abolition of the exit visa; abolition of the need for the 
employer’s permission to change employers on the completion of a work contract; 
reduction from 2 years to 6 months for former migrant workers wanting to return 
to Qatar with another employer; stricter standards for worker transportation; 
and significantly increased fines for withholding employee passports. The reform 
legislation has been passed by the Shura Council and is waiting for the Amir’s 
signature. A one-year grace period will be given for compliance with the changes.
While these proposals did not meet the standards recommended by various 
international rights organisations, they have been seen as a major step forward. 
The implementation of the reforms may increase the liberalisation of workers 
in the country and reduce the incidence of irregularity through visa trading and 
absconding, but this remains to be seen. The move to allow transfer of employers 
after the completion of a contract will more likely prompt employers to increase the 
contractual period. 
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Conclusion
The several different types of irregularity that exist mean that there cannot be one 
undifferentiated category of irregular migration.  The nuances are important because 
they can have different repercussions for the individuals affected. Irregularity, as we 
have seen, may or may not be a condition imposed upon the recipients by a situation 
beyond their control. Many may be fully aware of the risks they are taking, but are 
undeterred by the promise of higher incomes than they would receive at home.
The two main sources of irregular migrant labour in Qatar result from trading 
of “free visas” besides employees’ absconding from their sponsors. An additional 
aspect to this is the payment made by workers for the visas, whether resulting 
in irregular status or not. Those who are irregular from absconding because of 
abusive treatment may still need to remain in the country and work to pay off 
debts and support their families back home. With some evidence presented in this 
chapter, there are indications that the Qatari authorities are more sympathetic to 
the regularisation of visas, if an alternative employer can be found. The “free visas” 
are themselves a function of the labour quota arrangements provided to registered 
companies that can be manipulated by sponsors or their representatives and treated 
as a business in itself. When workers pay large amounts for work visas, they become 
trapped in a form of forced labour until they can recoup the money by working 
under whatever regular or irregular conditions they find themselves in. In this 
sense, the risks of migration do not always register with people in poorer countries 
desperate for work, particularly for those who are blinded by the promise of riches 
by unscrupulous labour brokers, even if they read about it (Gardner 2012).
While reform is underway in Qatar at the commercial level, serious reform 
in the current labour recruitment system can be achieved only by international 
bilateral or multilateral agreements. Simultaneously, there is a need to establish an 
accreditation programme for “ethical” labour recruitment agencies as preferred or 
exclusive labour suppliers throughout the labour supply chains of all organisations 
doing business in Qatar. Ethical recruitment agents will not take money from 
workers. This will assist with corporate due diligence requirements both within Qatar 
and abroad. For example, following a meeting of the ministers of labour of Nepal 
and Qatar in Kathmandu, it was stated unequivocally that future Nepalese workers 
deployed to Qatar would not pay fees and charges. These statements, however, were 
met by considerable scepticism by the Nepalese press where it was argued that 
such promises had been articulated many times over the past decade (The Peninsula, 
April 6, 2015; Khatri 2015; Rai 2015; Editorial 2015; Sehai 2015). Indeed, largely 
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because of pressure from the Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies 
(NAFEA), the agreement between the two countries was never signed.
Despite the delays in the reform of the Sponsorship and Labour Laws, the 
NHRC and other philanthropic individuals and organisations have been working 
for the cause of irregular workers and seeking to have their cases brought to the 
courts, avoiding further victimisation, which gives cause for some optimism. In the 
past year or so, there continues to be improvement in terms of job availability and 
how CID and SFUD are processing people if they are found to have defective 
documentation. There is evidence of more flexibility toward regularisation via an 
administrative “repair” of work visas. This is important for “free visa” recipients who 
may have found themselves with blacklisted sponsors or with no sponsorship at 
all and perhaps also for those who have absconded from their employers for valid 
reasons. 
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Communities in Jeddah
Fahad Alsharif *
Abstract: In the last few decades, Saudi Arabia, and Jeddah in particular, has 
experienced a massive flow of undocumented migrants. This is particularly 
interesting because it involves migrants from different continents and countries 
offering the opportunity for a cross-sectional analysis of their communities. 
This chapter focuses on Jeddah as a case study for the whole country. For the 
first time, using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, a researcher has 
been able to access some of the undocumented migrant communities in the 
city in their own environment and through face-to-face interviews gather 
accounts of their lives as part of the undocumented. In particular, this chapter 
analyses two Yemenis and a Filipino. These two communities make for an 
interesting comparative study because of their differences and similarities. 
Despite sharing the common experience of living as undocumented migrants 
in Saudi Arabia, their relationship with the members of their communities, 
IX
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other communities, and with the Saudi society are as different as their 
backgrounds. This chapter also discusses the immigration policies adopted by 
Saudi Arabia and their failure in tackling the problems of the undocumented 
migrants in the country. 
Push and Pull Factors
Prior to analysing the data collected from the interviews, it is important to discuss 
the push factors which lie behind the migrants coming from Yemen and the 
Philippines and the pull factors in Jeddah.  
Yemen, with one of the highest rates of population growth in the world 
(3.45%) is a demographic time bomb. Nearly 50% of its population of 24 million 
is under the age of 16 and the country has the highest unemployment rate (35%) 
in the Arab region. The individual average Gross National Income (GNI) is under 
$1,000. More than half of the Yemenis are illiterate. Yemen is politically unstable, 
with shaky regimes. Besides, in addition, to generating many migrants, Yemen is 
also a transit country for undocumented migrants from various parts of Africa 
making their way to Saudi Arabia (Thiollet 2007). 
The Philippines shares some of Yemen’s economic characteristics. The country 
has a large population of 96.5 million (UN 2012) and GNI per capita of $2,210 
(World Bank 2011), which is higher than that of Yemen but still among the world’s 
lowest. Unemployment is nearly 20%. At least 40% of those employed work in 
the informal sector and poverty afflicts about a quarter of the population.1 The 
Philippines differs from Yemen in having a much better education system and a 
literacy rate of 95%. The vast majority of Yemenis are Muslims, while the Filipinos 
are predominantly Catholic with a Muslim minority.2 Regardless of the differences 
in some demographic variables, the previously mentioned issues provide strong push 
factors for migration from both communities, some of which is undocumented.
Jeddah began shifting from an economy centered on the Haj and Umrah 
to one with a more diversified base after oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia in 
the 1930s. The sudden increase in oil prices in the 1970s brought huge revenues 
for Saudi Arabia and allowed it to embark on ambitious infrastructure and other 
economic development plans. Many of these government projects were carried out 
by the private sector that started to make huge profits, which eventually trickled 
down to the ordinary Saudi household. All these factors increased the demand for 
1. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html.
2. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15578948, accessed July 1, 2013.
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skilled and semi-skilled foreign labour to meet the requirements of the economy’s 
growing sectors.
Saudi Migration Policies
The Saudi kafala (sponsorship) system has expanded to meet the increasing demand 
for workers in both the public and the private sectors. It includes all types of foreign 
professional expatriates, including engineers for construction projects, and doctors 
and nurses for private hospitals and clinics, not to mention, of course, a vast number 
of semi-skilled and low-skilled workers.
When unemployment rose among Saudi citizens, policy makers adopted 
“Saudization” as a national policy to employ Saudis in the private sector with the 
aim of reducing the number of foreign migrants in the country. This government 
policy achieved its goals only to a small degree, resulting in yet another policy, the 
Nitaqat system, as an effective tool to enforce Saudization. The word nitaqat means 
“areas” or “zones” in Arabic. This programme was introduced by the Ministry of 
Labour in June 2011. 
The Ministry of Labour teamed up with the Ministry of Interior, employing 
1,000 inspectors to enforce the new laws. The government established jail terms 
and fines for Saudi citizens who do not comply with the laws and it promised to 
deport any foreign guest worker who violated the new policy. As a consequence of 
the deportation policy, many undocumented migrants were pressured to go into 
hiding in order to avoid being deported. From 2012 to 2014, more than one million 
expatriates were deported under the two new laws. Parallel to the deportation policy, 
amnesty policies were adopted to address international human rights concerns 
about migrant conditions in Saudi Arabia.
The standard procedure for the amnesty initiative is to provide the migrants 
with a grace period in which to rectify their legal status or face a fine or jail, and 
deportation. Very often, after the deadline, the Saudi authorities would launch a 
crackdown and round up thousands of undocumented workers: this crackdown 
could last from a few weeks to a few months. Different government agencies carry 
out raids on all types of local markets, restaurants, mini-grocery stores, shopping 
centres, and residential areas.3 
3. Reuters, March 27, 2013.
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Methodology
The researcher used qualitative methods, particularly a face-to-face semi-structured 
anonymous interview questionnaire with closed and open-ended probing questions.4 
Migrants were interviewed while they were free (i.e., not under arrest, or under 
threat of arrest), living and working in the city. They were, thus, able to respond 
freely, without fear, to questions about their real experience in the city.5 Using the 
snowball sampling technique, the researcher interviewed 55 undocumented females 
and males from the Yemeni and Filipino communities6 based on one or more of the 
following four criteria:
• Entered the country without obtaining an official visa, for example, smuggled 
into the country by land or by sea;
• Entered the country legally with Umrah or Haj visas but overstayed;
• Entered legally with a work permit visa, but left the Saudi employers without 
consent; 
• Born in the city to undocumented parents.
Twenty nine undocumented Yemeni migrants and 26 undocumented 
Filipinos were chosen. The interviewees agreed to talk in detail about their plight 
and experiences with regard to their legal status.7 
4. The confidentiality of the interviewees was protected and care was also taken not to flout 
standard norms and rules of professional ethics in fieldwork research.
5. See, for example, the work of al-U’thman (2002), Ba Eshin (2002), Sultan (1984), Assaf 
(1987), Al-Azim (1992). It should be noted that a recent exception to this approach is Ahsan 
Ullah (in this volume). The author conducted face-to-face interviews with members of the 
Bangladeshi community in the city.
6. It should be noted that we use the word “communities” in this chapter to differentiate the 
two groups of migrant labour under study. In other words, we used the snowball sampling 
technique to study these hidden populations of undocumented migrants. They were not a 
representative sample. 
7. The author managed to interview all the Filipino men and women himself; however, many 
of the female Yemeni women were interviewed by a female research assistant, who had been 
trained to do these interviews. This was done to maintain sensitivity to Yemeni traditions.   
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Data Analysis of Undocumented Yemeni and Filipino Migrants in Jeddah
The demographic data collected from interviewing the two communities in Table 
9.1 reflects an average age of 29 for the Yemenis and 26 for the Filipinos. The 
average Yemeni migrant had four children, twice the average number of children 
in the Filipino community. All the 29 interviewees from Yemen were Muslims. 
Twenty four interviewees from the Filipino community were Catholics and two 
were Muslims. The education level in the Yemeni community ranged from no formal 
education to a university degree. The average years of education for the Yemeni 
interviewees was 5.6, which equals the years of school between grade five and grade 
six. The average education level for Filipinos was twice as high, corresponding to 
grade 11.8 
Table 9.1: General overview of the demographic characteristics
8. We used the American high school system where grade 1 stands for the first year of school and 
grade 12 is the final year prior to entering university.
Nationality  Yemeni  Filipino  Total  
  f % f % f % 
Gender  
Female  14 48 16 61.5  30 54.5  
Male  15 52 10 38.5  25 45.5  
Total  29 100  26 100  55 100%  
    
Average age  28 32 30  
Level of education   5.5   11  8.1  
Marital status  
Married  13 45 10 38 23 42 
Single  15 52 16 62 31 56 
Divorced  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Widows 1 3 0 0 1 2 
Total  29 100  26 100  55 100  
              
Average number 
of children  4 100   2 100  3.05    100  
Religion  
Muslims  29 100  2 8 31 56 
Christians  0 0 24 92 24 44 
Total  29 100  26 100  55 100  
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The Migration Process 
As noted previously, we identified four types of undocumented migrants in Jeddah. 
This section will discuss these four types with emphasis on Yemeni migrants.
Table 9.2: Issues related to illegal migration to Saudi Arabia 




f %  f % f %
Smuggled 13 44.80 0 0.00 13 23.63
Overstay 11 37.90 2 7.70 13 23.63
Run away from 
Sponsor 0 0.00 24 92.30 24 43.64
Born in the city
with no documents   
5 17.20 0 0.00 5 9.10
Total 29 100.00 26 100.00 55 100.00
Reasons of 
migation f % f % f %
Economic 20 69.00 26 100.00 46 83.60
Social to join 
family or friends
4 14.00 0 0.00 4 7.30
Religious 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Born in the city
with no documents  
5 17.00 0 0.00 5 9.10
War & Famine 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Total 29 100.00 26 100.00 55 100.00
Worthiness of 
migration f % f % f %  
Yes 24 82.75 26 100.00 50 90.90
No 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Born 5 17.25 0 0.00 5 9.10
Total 29 100.00 26 100.00 55 100.00




in $ 560 0 N/A
Average age
at arrival 20 25 22.36
Average years as an 
undocumented 3 4 3.47
Average number 
of deportations 0.79 0.076 0.45
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Undocumented Entry, Smuggling
It is important to note that Yemen shares a border with Saudi Arabia making it is 
easy for Yemenis to enter clandestinely. Regardless of the technologically advanced 
surveillance equipment that the Saudi authorities use, the border cannot be fully 
watched or protected. Of all the arrests that were made at the Saudi borders at 
various times from 1978 to 2008, an overwhelming majority was that of Yemeni 
nationals: 3,419,207 out of 3,464,492 (or 98.7%). No Filipinos were arrested 
clandestinely entering the country.  
In our study, all the undocumented Filipino migrants are persons who entered 
the country with a work contract but who, then, overstayed their visa. The Philippines 
does not share a border with Saudi Arabia, which makes the clandestine entry of 
Filipinos practically impossible. However, the long Saudi-Yemeni border is porous, 
and Yemenis can enter illegally without a visa. Thirteen of the 29 undocumented 
Yemeni migrants were smuggled into Jeddah using different routes from Yemen: 
simply crossing the 1,100 mile long Yemeni-Saudi border on foot, or getting a 
lift from a Yemeni or Saudi driver, or paying a smuggler to guide them across the 
border.   
The cost of smuggling declared by Yemeni interviewees was on average $560. 
Most interviewees noted that both Saudi and Yemeni nationals are involved in the 
smuggling of undocumented migrants of many different nationalities into Saudi 
Arabia. The average cost of this trip for the smuggled interviewees varied over the 
years but, most recently, it stood at between $507 and $614. A typical example 
was provided by interviewee number 11: “I paid a Saudi or a Yemeni national 
approximately $26 from Taiz to Harad (also known as Hardh, Wadi Suleiman) and 
from Harad we were smuggled to Jeddah for around $500.”9 
Overstaying Umrah and Haj Visas
Table 9.2 indicates that eleven of the 29 Yemeni migrants used Umrah visas to get 
to Jeddah and, then, overstayed their visa. From the interviews, it is evident that 
most of those who arrived in Jeddah using an Umrah visa were female relatives 
of a documented Yemeni migrant who already worked in the city. In this case, 
they obtained Umrah visas to enter the country by using their husband’s proper 
9. Many Yemenis noted that a large number of individuals, who could not afford the cost of 
being smuggled to Jeddah, smuggle themselves all the way to Jeddah on foot and many of 
them were subject to arrest once they crossed the border or while in the desert on their way 
to Jeddah.
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iqama (residency permit) and then overstayed their visa period in violation of Saudi 
migration laws.  
Interviewee number 3 was an undocumented Yemeni wife who had overstayed 
her Umrah visa by eight months. Her husband, interviewee number 4, was 34 years 
old and had a kafeel (sponsor). The undocumented wife has one daughter from 
her present husband, and at the time of the interview she was pregnant. She had 
formerly been married and was now divorced. She has two girls from her previous 
marriage who live in Yemen with their grandparents. She was brought to Jeddah by 
her husband, who noted: 
I had to bring my wife here to Jeddah even if I have to smuggle her across the 
border…I was born in Jeddah and I feel I am more a Saudi than a Yemeni. 
Why can’t I get an iqama  for my wife? I am afraid to drive around Jeddah or 
even take her to Makkah for Umrah because if I was stopped by the police for 
a minor traffic violation or at a road block, they might ask for my wife’s iqama. 
Then both of us will be subject to arrest and deportation.
He also wonders if he remains in Jeddah – and he plans to stay – how his 
children will receive an education without proper documents. He is trying to save 
money to buy visas for his wife and children.
Breaking Work Contract
These are the migrants who entered the country legally on a work visa, but who 
left their Saudi employers without their employers’ consent: i.e., they ran away 
from their sponsors. Twenty-four (92.3%) Filipino migrants in our sample found 
themselves in this category while none of the Yemenis were “runaways.”  
Born in the City with no Proper Documents
Another important group constituted of those undocumented migrants born in 
the city. Five of the interviewed Yemeni migrants (17%) were born in Jeddah to 
undocumented parents, who either entered the country with proper documents 
to work for a kafeel or were smuggled across the border. For example, two of the 
females, aged 14 and 17, were born in Jeddah to an undocumented father and a 
mother from, respectively, Yemen and Myanmar. In this regard, the older female, 
interviewee number 27, noted:
We were born in Jeddah with no proper documents which made our lives a 
disaster. I don’t understand why my parents married in this country without 
being documented migrants first. This kind of marriage has made it difficult 
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for my sister and me to live a normal life like other children and have an 
opportunity for proper education. How we are going to get married? Should 
we get smuggled back to Yemen? We do not even know the address of our 
father or his family in Yemen. Or should we marry another undocumented 
migrant? We have lived in secrecy all of our lives and we do not know what to 
do. Our parents got divorced ten years ago when we were little children….we 
live with our mother and work as beggars…
Individuals who were born in Jeddah but who do not have proper residency 
or Saudi nationality cannot enrol their children in public school or university. This 
particular group are the victims of their parents’ circumstances. There are possibly 
thousands of them across the Makkah region especially in its three major cities: 
Makkah, Madinah, and Jeddah.
Table 9.3: Issues related to working conditions
Issues related to 
work 
Nationality  
Yemeni  Filipino  Total Average  
f %  f %  f %  
Average number of 









3.1 100  
       















No  6 20.69  3 11.54  9 16.4  
Total  29  100  26  100  55  100  
 
Average # of working






















Standard of living since coming to Jeddah  
Improved  24  82.75  24  92.3  48  87.3  
Same  5  17.25  2 7.7  7 12.7  
Declined  0  0 0 0  0  0  
Total  29  100  26  100  55  100  
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The average income of all the interviewees from Yemen is $328 a month in 
exchange for twelve hour-long working days and they change jobs more frequently 
than Filipinos. Filipinos change job less frequently, and their average working hours 
are less than the Yemenis at nine hours. The average Filipino monthly income in 
our sample is more than double that of the Yemenis and stands at around $750. It 
should be noted that, unlike most other communities, the undocumented Filipino 
migrants in Jeddah never have problems getting a job in the city. There is both an 
ever increasing demand for their services, and they have a reputation for being 
outstanding housemaids, nurses, etc. Like other undocumented migrants in Jeddah, 
Filipino migrants receive their salaries in cash. More specifically, the monthly 
income of a Filipina housemaid is around $500. Those who work in healthcare make 
on average $1,000; a hairdresser would make $1,300. Males from both communities 
who work as private taxi drivers for other undocumented or documented migrants 
from their communities earn up to $2,000 per month. In Jeddah, both Yemenis and 
Filipinos make more money than other undocumented migrant communities, e.g., 
Ethiopians and Nigerians (Alsharif 2015). 
The rate of job change is related, for both communities, to the number of years 
spent in Jeddah. Migrants change jobs for many reasons, the vast majority of our 
interviewees indicated that they did so for better pay.  
Even though the majority of interviewees from the Yemeni community did 
not have a kafeel, and their opinions are based on what they have heard from others, 
they have their own views and attitudes towards the kafala system. In this case, 22 
(76%), of the interviewees from Yemen believe that the kafala system is unfair and 
should be abolished because it resembles a modern form of slavery. Furthermore, 
many of them noted that they do not need a kafeel, even if they were provided 
with one. They strongly believe that they can make more money working in an 
undocumented fashion because they do not have to deal with the Saudi kafeel who 
will control their life and pay them less money.  
Interviewee number 25 said:
I think it is not fair. The kafeel always takes advantage of you. When my father 
was alive, he was always complaining. And yes, it is like modern slavery. Many 
Saudis get so many visas and sell it to anyone who pays more. And always ask 
for more money when it is time to renew the iqama.
Interviewee number 26 noted: “Some kafeels ask for monthly payments if they 
allow you to work for yourself.” In general, the interviewees noted that they do not 
need a kafeel to enter Saudi Arabia, for the simple reason that they have come into 
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the country illegally. As such they do not have to renew their iqama or pay a Saudi 
kafeel part of their earnings. 
As interviewee number 15 revealed:
I am freer to work or not…. The kafeel controls your life and very often pays 
me little money compared to what I earn from my job now. The problem 
that most of us face without a kafeel is the threat of the Baladiyyah (a local 
police authority)… Also, without legal documents, we are subject to raids 
by the Jawazat authority (Office of Passports and Naturalisation) here in 
Al-Hindawiya.
This shows that most of the temporary migrants consider this system to be a 
social problem that should be abolished. The Filipino reaction to the question was 
almost the same.
When the researcher asked the interviewees about whether they will take 
advantage of the most recent amnesty initiative by the Saudi government, 25 (86%) 
of the 29 Yemeni interviewees said they will not take advantage of the amnesty. The 
majority of the men noted that they do not need it to go back to Yemen, as they 
can smuggle themselves easily between the two countries. None of the 26 Filipino 
migrants intended to sign up for the amnesty. 
There was also a probing question about whether living standards had 
improved, stayed the same, or not improved since they came to Jeddah. Forty-
eight (87.3%) interviewees from both undocumented communities noted that their 
standard of living had improved. Only two (7.7%) Filipino interviewees claimed 
that it had stayed the same, while five (17.3%) Yemeni migrants who were born in 
the city with no documents stated that it stayed the same. In this connection, they 
could not compare it to a different place due to their special circumstances.
Employment and Income
It is difficult to list all the types of work that undocumented migrants from the 
Yemeni and Filipino communities undertake while living in Jeddah. In general, 
Yemeni migrants work in minimum wage jobs, but quite a few worked in more 
complex construction-related jobs. They also work in interior decoration, car repair, 
car bodywork (known as panel beating in the UK) and painting, and tailoring. Many 
also worked selling near-expired goods, as house painters, cooks in restaurants, and 
porters. Some, meanwhile, are forced to beg. Filipino males worked in different 
jobs as tailors, private taxi drivers, waiters or cooks in oriental restaurants, medical 
technicians, electricians, painting cars (detailing), and mechanics. 
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Fourteen of the female Filipino interviewees worked as housemaids or nannies 
for Saudi or non-Saudi families. The remaining two females were unemployed at 
the time of the interview, but explained that they were receiving training in women’s 
cosmetics and hairstyling from an undocumented Filipino hairdresser in the city.    
The income of the undocumented migrants in the city seems to depend on 
supply and demand conditions. For example, in the case of housemaids or cooks, 
the supply of female maids from the Philippines as well as of other females from 
other nationalities goes down in Ramadan. This pushes up the average wages for 
their services. Filipino housemaids are also subject to wage fluctuations because 
of negotiations with their own government and the Saudi Ministry of Labour 
regarding their contract details, i.e., salary and living conditions. During these 
extended periods of labour negotiations, the salary of undocumented Filipina maids 
rises due to their scarcity. 
Legal Issues Facing Undocumented Labourers in Saudi Arabia
It was important to ask about the interviewees’ concerns regarding their legal status 
because each community has a different way of relating to the Saudi authorities or 
to their own representatives in the country. For most Yemenis, in contrast with the 
undocumented migrants of other communities, the fear of deportation is mitigated 
by the fact that most of them know they can easily re-enter the country.
Years as an Undocumented Migrant
In this study, the time spent in Jeddah as an undocumented migrant varied for 
our Yemeni and Filipino sample between one year (only one migrant) and twenty 
years (three migrants). The average time spent in Jeddah without documents for the 
Yemeni migrants was approximately three years, while for the Filipinos it was four 
years. It should be noted at this juncture that we did not include five interviewees 
from Yemen, who were born in Jeddah, in the calculation of the average time spent 
in Jeddah with no documents. The mode (i.e., the most repeated numbers of years) 
was twelve years, as reported by five Yemeni migrants.  
The number of times an individual was deported from the two communities 
varied from no deportation to being deported four times. In total, the 29 Yemeni 
interviewees experienced 23 deportations: i.e., each Yemeni had been deported 
an average of 0.7 times. In the case of Filipino migrants, only two males had 
experienced deportation, and only once. The average number of deportations of an 
undocumented Filipino was significantly lower, then, just 0.08 as set out in table 
9.2.
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Some Aspects of Undocumented Migrant Life
Communication
Modern technology, for example, the mobile phone, seems to play a big part in the 
interviewees’ lives in terms of communicating with their family members and friends 
inside and outside Jeddah. Most of the interviewees socialise mainly with their own 
community members, with a few exceptions. This socialisation pattern with their 
own communities also runs across all communities in the city. When asked about 
the number of times they call their families while living and working in Jeddah, the 
frequency varied between twice a week and once a month for the Yemeni migrants. 
The average number of contacts per month for the 29 Yemeni migrants is four. Many 
interviewees actually sneak back to Yemen to visit their family. For instance, seven 
of the male subjects interviewed were married and all noted that they, like many 
other married Yemenis, migrate across the borders from Saudi Arabia to Yemen to 
visit their wives and children and come back: all this without documentation. For 
the Filipino migrants, the number of contacts with family ranged between 30 and 
60 contacts per month with an average of 50 per month. The number of contacts 
with family members by the undocumented Filipinos in the sample is very high 
compared to the Yemeni and other communities of undocumented migrants in 
the city. The Filipinos use, in addition to mobile phones, more free communication 
media such as Skype, Lines, Tango, etc. perhaps because of their higher education 
level, higher salaries and better English. 
Social Life
Most of the Yemenis socialised largely within their own community. Many of them 
noted that they are open to socialising with other communities, but they admitted 
that the bulk of their social gatherings or “hanging out” is with Yemeni friends 
and relatives. In this regard, twenty interviewees (68.9%) said they only participate 
in social life with their own Yemeni community. Nine (31%) of the interviewees 
indicated that they participate socially with all other communities. The great 
majority of Filipinos also socialise mainly with their own community. It should 
be noted that the average number of friends and relatives reported by the Yemeni 
undocumented migrants is more than double that of the Filipino migrants. For 
example, table 9.5 indicates that the average number of relatives for the 29 Yemenis 
interviewed for this study was twelve, while those for the 26 Filipinos was only 
six. In addition, the average number of friends for the Yemeni interviewees was 
31 versus 17 for the Filipinos. Overall, these 55 interviewees have a total of 1,845 
relatives and friends, documented and undocumented labour migrants, who live and 
work in the city of Jeddah.
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Table 9.4: Social ties
Remitting
Fourteen (48%) of the interviewees noted that they were the only breadwinner for 
their families. Fifteen (52%) indicated that they were not the only breadwinner for 
their family. Only two females (7%) indicated that they were the only breadwinner 
for their families. 
Twenty three of the Yemeni interviewees (79%) noted that they regularly 
(usually on a monthly basis) remit part of their income to relatives in their native 
countries. Six interviewees do not remit money. The ratio of remittances to income 
varied from 0% to 70%. As far as remittance from females is concerned, on average 
16% of their income was remitted, while the males’ average was 52%. 
The average percentage of remittances for both female and male interviewees 
stands at 40%. Most of their remittances are for paying a previous debt or to assist 
families. The vast majority of the Yemeni migrants, like other undocumented 
Family and Social Ties
Nationality 
Yemeni Filipino Total 
f % f % f %
Do you remit?
Yes 23 79.31 23 88.46 46 83.6
No 6 20.69 3 11.54 9 16.4






Average # of people in
the same residence 
 
8 4.5 6.34
Average # of contact
with family per month 
4 50 25.74
Average # of relatives
in Jeddah  
12 6 9.16
Average # of friends in
Jeddah
31 17 24.38
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migrants, remit funds by giving it to someone of their own nationality who has 
connections with the communities of origin. 
In the Filipino case, the ratio of remittances to income varied between 0% and 
55% of their monthly income. Ten (38.4%) of the interviewees noted that they are 
the only breadwinners for their families, sixteen (61.5%) indicated that they were 
not the only breadwinners for their families. Twenty three interviewees (88%) from 
the Filipino community noted that they regularly (usually on a monthly basis) remit 
part of their income to relatives in their native country.  Only three interviewees said 
that they did not remit money. Overall, Filipino males remit more than their female 
counterparts, respectively, about 55% and 50%. The average monthly remittances 
rate for both female and males is 50%. 
Medical Needs
In the case of undocumented Yemeni migrants, all the interviewees (100%) noted 
that, in case of a medical emergency, they have no access to public hospitals in 
Jeddah and that their only possible option, if they can afford it, is to go to a private 
hospital or clinic. However, Yemeni interviewees often receive medical care in the 
various districts in which they live. For example, in the Al-Hindawyia district where 
some of them reside, there is a small clinic that functions in the early morning where 
minor illness and injuries are treated.10 The cost is around eight dollars. In addition, 
if there is no access to medical care, the vast majority noted that they would seek 
consultation with the nearest pharmacist, or see one of the local Attar (traditional 
medical/herbal practitioners) for medical advice. In the case of pharmacies, 
pharmacists provide all types of medical advice and can sell any type of medication, 
except those that are usually prescribed by psychiatrists. In emergencies, according 
to the interviewees, private hospitals are accessible because they do not ask for 
identification cards.  
Medical access is, on the basis of our sample, rather different for Filipino 
migrants. Eighteen (69.2%) of the Filipino interviewees noted that in case of a 
medical emergency, they have access to private hospitals and medical clinics 
in Jeddah. In this regard, interviewee number 32, a 28-year-old female Filipino 
hairdresser said:
I have many female and male Filipino friends who work in private hospitals or 
clinics who help me receive medical treatment without asking me to provide 
iqama … sometimes free of charge.
10. All the doctors and nurses are foreign professionals from India and Pakistan.
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Eight (30.85%) of the interviewees said they do not have access to hospitals 
and that they would seek the advice of a pharmacist.
Hopes and Plans for the Future
This section deals with the hopes and plans of these two undocumented migrant 
groups in Jeddah based on a few questions listed below.
Table 9.5: Hopes and plans for the future
Are you satisfied with how you live and work in Jeddah? 
Regardless of the difficult lives of these undocumented migrants in the city of 
Jeddah, the vast majority of Yemeni migrants, almost 26 (90%) are content with 
their lives in the city and only three (10%) are not happy. Fifteen (57.6%) of the 
Filipino interviewees (eight males and seven females) said they were satisfied. 
Eleven (42.4%) of the interviewees (two males and nine females) said they were 
not satisfied.
Does living in Jeddah with no documents bother you? Please give details. 
Only ten Yemeni interviewees (34%) admitted that it bothers them to be in the city 
undocumented; seventeen (59%) interviewees noted that having no documents did 
Future plans  
Nationality  
Yemeni  Filipino   
f %  f %  f %  
Are you satisfied with living in Jeddah? 
Yes  26  89.70  15  57.70  41  74.5  
No 3 10.30  11  42.30  14  25.5  
Total  29  100  26  100  55  100  
Does living in Jeddah with no documents bother you? 
Yes  10  34.48  26  100  36  65.5  
N o  19  65.52  0 0 19  34.5  
Total  29  100  26  100  55  100  
Are you going to use the amnesty issued by the Saudi government? 
Yes  3  10.30  3 11.54  6 10.9  
No  26  89.70  23  88.46  49  89.1  
Total  29  100  26  100  55  100  
Total 
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not bother them; and two (7%) did not answer. Most agreed that the city provided 
them with the opportunity to make a living, while sending money to loved ones 
back home, but that happiness is not a permanent condition. The majority admitted 
that the harsh labour conditions, the long hours they spend every day at work, and 
the continuous threat of deportation does not favour a normal life. Many of the 
Muslim interviewees noted that living close to the two holy cities of Makkah and 
Madinah, with the possibility of performing Haj and Umrah, gives them a sense 
of spiritual satisfaction. This assists many of them in easing their difficulties. On 
the other hand, all (100%) of the Filipino migrants, men and women, noted that it 
bothered them not to have proper documents.
What are your long-range goals and objectives in terms of work and or living in Jeddah? 
How do you plan to achieve your expected goals?   
Ninety per cent said that their objective is to stay in Jeddah to save as much money 
as possible in case they are deported. In particular, the youngest ones hope that 
they can regularise their status. The major concern for Filipino migrants is to save 
enough money to allow them to go back and get married, if they are single, or to 
buy a home or a small business, if married. Many of the females want to go back 
with enough money to go to a nursing school or get a university degree. Many of 
the males will attempt to stay as long as possible in Jeddah in order to save money 
so that they can open small businesses in various industries such as, for instance, 
garages.
If you were pressured to leave Saudi Arabia for any reason, would you attempt to re-enter 
the country with a permit or without?  
In response to this question, many Yemeni interviewees’ answers were similar to 
these words:
I was deported three times from Jeddah and came back twice in the same 
week I was deported and, on the third occasion, I stayed with my family for a 
whole month. I was caught by the Jawazat (police) at the work site twice and 
at the place where I lived once. I was deported because I have no permit to 
work in Saudi Arabia.
Of the Yemenis, 25 (86%) said that if pressured to leave Jeddah they would 
definitely try to come back. Four of them (14%), three women, said they would 
not come back. One can safely assume that the undocumented Yemeni migrants 
in Jeddah have calculated all the risks involved in being smuggled to Saudi Arabia, 
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taking into account variables such as the possibility of being arrested and deported. 
They have, then, balanced this against the benefits that they can gain if they live and 
work in Jeddah. The undocumented Filipino migrants’ response differs. Twenty four 
of them (92.3%) noted they would not attempt to re-enter Saudi Arabia. In this 
case, they said that the new fingerprinting system would stop them from entering 
the country.  Only one Muslim female (7.7%) said she would try to re-enter using 
a Haj or Umrah visa, if she could. 
Conclusion
It is important to note that the Yemenis outnumber all other communities in 
Saudi Arabia. One of the main reasons for this is the geographical and cultural 
proximity to the country. Most of the undocumented Yemenis have relatives or 
friends already living in the Kingdom and, due to the lack of any language barrier, 
they can circulate more easily in the country. This allows them to enjoy relative 
freedom in comparison with members of other communities, such as Filipinos. 
Yemeni migration to Jeddah is circular. For many undocumented migrants, it is a 
continuous circular round trip from Yemen to Jeddah. Yemeni migration goes back 
in history, when compared to the Filipinos who began arriving after the 1970s.
Both Yemen and the Philippines face domestic and external problems. 
Over the years, many migrants from Yemen11 have fled to Jeddah to seek better 
incomes that allow them to save money to invest in a better future once they return 
to their country. In addition, due to the historical links between the two countries, 
Jeddah in Saudi Arabia has always been the primary destination for Yemeni migrants 
not least because of the many Saudi nationals there who are of Yemeni origin.
Most undocumented Yemeni migrants are young with an average age of 28. 
They are physically fit and able to smuggle themselves into Saudi Arabia regardless 
of the harsh conditions of the journey. Despite the fact that the way they became 
undocumented resembles other communities’ experiences, it is important to note 
that most of them are aware of the fact that they can come and go from the country 
at will without being caught. This is an important point that distinguishes them 
from the Filipinos and other undocumented communities in Jeddah.
11. During 2014, we witnessed major political developments in Yemen, as the Houthi Movement 
– also referred to as Ansar Allah – solidified control over the capital, Sanaa and the central 
government collapsed. This will, likely, result in more migrants seeking safety and economic 
stability in Saudi Arabia.  
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All this suggests that, for our sample, many variables contribute to the presence 
in Jeddah of these two communities. As can be gauged from the interviews the 
main reason is economic, but in the case of Yemeni migrants, the presence of family 
and friends in the city contributes greatly to their migration in addition to the ease 
of arrival through a long and porous border. 
Filipinos’ personal narratives sound less dramatic than those of Yemeni 
migrants. This is due to the fact that the Filipinos enter Saudi Arabia with a work 
visa and, at least at the beginning of their lives in Jeddah, they enjoy a legal status. 
However, their working contracts sometimes subject them to a long working day 
and, for many of them, the option of clandestine work is attractive because of the 
higher wages they can earn. 
Accusations of rape and mistreatment have been put forward by housemaids 
as a reason for breaking a work contract before the three months granted by the 
authorities. However, our interviews with undocumented Filipino migrants did not 
pick up any such problem. It is sometimes claimed that the real reason for the 
accusations is so that the worker can enter an underground economy, which enables 
the women in question to earn more money than in a household. In addition, they 
can move more freely in the country and change jobs more frequently.
In addition, the Filipino migrants arrive in Saudi Arabia better prepared 
to work in more skilful jobs. Compared with Yemeni migrants, they are more 
educated, and most of those in our sample work in the health services mainly as 
nurses. This gives them the possibility of living in more organised and integrated 
communities even if they share, with the other groups of migrants, the status of 
being undocumented. Their internal organisation is also evident from the way they 
teach each other the skills they need for their jobs, for example, hairdressing. 
Obviously, this situation which is almost privileged has an impact on the way 
the members of the Filipino community live and imagine the future. For example, 
most of them are aware that in case of a forced deportation they cannot return 
easily, due to the distance of Saudi Arabia from their country. This is why their 
hope is to save a sufficient amount of money in order to open a business back 
home. Living as undocumented migrants in this way makes them more flexible and 
less vulnerable to the many challenges documentation poses. It is evident from the 
interviews and fieldwork that the Filipinos have a better relationship with the city 
and, together with the Yemenis, manage to construct a better life for themselves and 
their families back home. This can be deduced from the high remittances that they 
send to their home countries.
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There is no magic or quick-fix remedy that will totally eliminate the 
phenomena of the undocumented migrant community in Saudi Arabia, either now 
or in the future. This chapter contends that if the issue of undocumented migrants 
is not resolved creatively, especially for those born in the city who have no access 
to Saudi documentation, then the country, in general, and the city of Jeddah, more 
specifically, is sitting on a ticking time bomb which is set to explode. 
The undocumented who have no access to good education and healthcare will 
continue to live in an underground, unregulated economy, which can only lead to 
future problems. The following are some recommendations that could guide those 
Saudi government bodies concerned with the issue of undocumented migrants and 
help them determine reasonable steps to solve this serious problem:  
1. Expose those who are involved in illegal, underground activities such as 
selling work visas to poor foreign workers
2. Impose fines on recruitment agencies and Haj and Umrah travel agencies 
for each individual who violates the requirement of departure after the 
pilgrimage season or overstays his/her residency permit. 
3. Establish Economic Free Zones straddling the Saudi-Yemeni border and 
encourage Saudi companies to construct factories that will employ both 
Saudis and Yemenis and provide them with the appropriate training. This 
will serve two purposes: it will reduce the flow of Yemeni migration to 
Saudi Arabia while limiting rural-urban migration within Saudi Arabia. 
Constructing infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and vocational 
training facilities within these zones will benefit both the Yemeni and 
Saudi communities. Once the current conflict between Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia ends, the GCC should draw up a long-term plan to have Yemen 
join the regional bloc.
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Producing Irregular Migration: Living and Labouring 
under Laws in the United Arab Emirates
Pardis Mahdavi*
Abstract: This chapter focuses on the ways that policies designed to 
counteract the perils of “human trafficking” as well as the structure of the 
guest worker (kafala) programme in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has 
created a situation wherein more migrants to the UAE are relegated to or 
choosing irregular migratory routes or irregular employment in-country. This 
research is based on over ten years of ethnographic fieldwork with migrants, 
survivors, activists, law enforcement officials and employers in the Emirates 
of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Ras Al-Khaimah from 2004 until the 
present. This chapter juxtaposes the lived experiences of migrants who either 
migrated or now work irregularly in the UAE with policies about gendered 
migration, human trafficking, and the guest worker programme. Through a 
close examination of the guest worker programme and the recent slew of anti-
trafficking laws since 2005, it shows how the construct of exclusionary labour 
laws creates a situation wherein irregular migration becomes the only option 
and the informal economy is preferable to working under the harsh contours 
of kafala. It argues that the disconnect between migrants’ lived experiences 
X
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and policies on trafficking, migration and guest work occur because migrants 
are typically seen only through the lens of their circumstances or labour. The 
chapter concludes with an assessment of the challenges and opportunities 
present in the UAE for the protection of irregular migrants and their families.
Introduction
This chapter chronicles the trajectories of migrant women who, in increasing 
numbers, enter into migratory status and journeys that could be considered 
“irregular” due to movements and employment outside of the legal sphere. As one 
of the largest migrant receiving countries in the world, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) currently has a growing number of migrants who either migrate outside of 
formal channels, work in spheres that would be considered informal (unregulated, 
untaxed) economies, live as undocumented persons in the UAE, or are a combination 
of the above. Interestingly, many of these migrants have deliberately chosen to work, 
stay, or migrate irregularly in response to migration policies that are overly stringent 
and seek to restrict the movement of certain categories based on gender, race and 
age. These policies were framed in the last decade with the intention of decreasing 
the numbers of irregular migrants and increasing migrants’ rights. Paradoxically, the 
opposite has occurred.
Policies and discourses about migration, particularly gendered migration, 
in the UAE tend to fall into one of three categories. The first are local policies 
pertaining to the kafala or sponsorship system regulating migration in the Gulf. 
The kafala system, which is widely practiced throughout the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries, tethers all migrants to a citizen sponsor or kafeel, who 
effectively controls their movements and legality in-country. Most notably, the 
kafala system subjects migrant workers to a long list of responsibilities but does not 
afford them the necessary protection of rights.1 This particularly affects domestic 
workers and agricultural workers who make up a large percentage of migrants in 
the UAE.2 The second set of policies both originates and operates at the local level 
1. United Arab Emirates, Federal Law No. 8 for 1980 Regarding the Organization of Labour Rela-
tions, issued on April 20, 1980. English translation available at: http://www.gulftalent.com/
repository/ext/UAE_Labour_Law.pdf. See also Human Rights Watch, “UAE: Draft Labor 
Law Violates International Standards,” Human Rights Watch, March 26, 2007, http://www.
hrw.org/news/2007/03/24/uae-draft-labor-law-violates-international-standards/. For fur-
ther information on the status of domestic workers in the UAE, please see Mahdavi (2011).
2. Data on migrant labour is limited, particularly as official records largely do not take into 
account irregular migration. In addition, countries do not always provide complete statistics. 
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and includes policies and discourses around the somewhat nebulous category of 
“human trafficking.” Policies to address human trafficking create some of the largest 
obstacles facing migrant workers in the Gulf because they seek to place migrants 
into artificial categories that erase their lived realities. The official definition of 
trafficking as stated in Article 3, paragraph (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons prepared by the United Nations Office of Drug 
Control (note the disjuncture in the UN agency designated to monitor human 
trafficking – an agency dedicated to organised crime and the movement of drugs 
rather than the human rights arm of the UN) is as follows:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of 
a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution 
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
That this policy has been constructed within a framework of criminalisation 
(rather than a framework of rights) is just one aspect of the problem. Perhaps one of 
the most striking issues with the interpretation of the definition of human trafficking 
has been the exclusive focus on the sex industry, as well as the construction of 
one archetypal “victim”: a young woman. This narrative eclipses instances of abuse 
experienced by men or women outside the sex industry. As anthropologist Carole 
Vance has expertly noted, a moral panic (Cohen 1972) over movement into the 
sex industry is not new, nor localised to the US. Indeed, panic over the movement 
of female bodies, particularly into the sex industry, undergirded much of the panic 
over “white slavery,” which began at the turn of the 18th century in England (Vance 
2011). Current political initiatives to fight human trafficking are also markedly 
focused on sex, while the moral panic about human trafficking remains suffused 
with racial undertones.
Beyond this reductive focus on sex, the discourse on human trafficking 
oversimplifies complex decision-making processes. The ideal “victim” cannot (and 
must not) have had any agency in her circumstances. Either she was forced, and 
Based on a report by Martin Baldwin-Edwards, we can estimate that 4% of migrant labourers 
work in agricultural sector and that about 15% of migrant labourers work in households. See 
Baldwin-Edwards 2011.
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therefore trafficked, or she (or he) chose to migrate and therefore is not trafficked. 
But this simplification extends further. “Victims” are typically women who have 
been forced by a particular trafficker. In some forms of legislature, such as the 
provision of trafficking or t-visas in the United States, the awarding of a t-visa is 
predicated on the “victim’s” willingness and ability to testify against her trafficker. 
The third category of policies originates and operates at both local and global 
levels and includes laws pertaining to citizenship transfer and familial reunification. 
Recognising, as policies fail to do, that migrants are not “disembodied individuals (or 
by default men) but are adults or children traveling with or leaving family members 
behind,” as Bhaba and Benhabib note, we need to understand that “the mobility 
of some has consequences for or corresponds to the immobility of others.”3 Many 
migrants wish to reunite with or form families throughout their migratory journey. 
However, citizenship and reunification laws in the UAE make this increasingly 
challenging. Many migrants get caught in the unfortunate crossfire of incongruent 
local and global laws (on parental citizenship transfer, for example), thus producing 
irregular migration as the comparatively desirable option.
In this chapter, I seek to explore some of these policies in order to highlight 
their shortcomings in capturing the realities of the lived experiences of migrants’ 
journeys and intimate lives. By understanding the stark disconnections between 
policy and lived experience, the route to irregular migration and employment can 
be better highlighted. In understanding the realities of migrant experiences, we 
can also see how irregular migration can often be experienced as more lucrative, 
empowering, and safer for many migrants and their loved ones. Though undesirable 
from the perspective of the state or international community, it is important 
that policy makers recognise both their roles in producing irregularity and the 
comparatively desirable space that irregular migration and employment offer. 
Policies and discourses are disconnected from lived experiences because they fail to 
see the migrant in the context of their lives, or as human beings with intimate lives, 
desires, and subjectivities. Recognising the intimate lives of migrants allows for a 
foregrounding of the multidimensionality of lived experience, which also highlights 
decision-making processes, risk calculation, and preferences for types of migration 
and employment in various industries.
Throughout this chapter, I try to pay special, etymological attention to the use 
of words and the artificial nature of categories embedded within language. Most 
importantly, investigating and unpacking falsely dichotomised binaries around the 
3. Benhabib and Resnik, 2009: 4.
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economies or migratory schemes within which migrants operate leads to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the structures surrounding migrants and how they 
negotiate these structures. These binaries, reified as a result of the moral panic that 
colours conversations about migration and underwrites perceptions of trafficking, 
have become objects of concern and query. Two frequently used binaries are legal/
illegal and formal/informal, neither of which captures the grey areas of lived 
experience. Many of my interlocutors migrated legally (i.e., through legal visa entry 
processes), but then worked in the informal (or unregulated, untaxed) economies of 
care work or sex work. Others came illegally (were smuggled or engaged in the ever 
popular visa trading) but work for companies in the formal economy. Still others 
migrated legally but then overstayed their visas or absconded from their employers, 
thus rendering them illegal in their visa status. What it means to migrate or work 
legally or illegally, and where the formal economy ends and the informal economy 
begins encompass many shades of grey. The terms “illegal” and “informal” carry with 
them some pejorative weight, especially when used to describe real people, and it is 
for this reason that many scholars – myself included – have used the terms regular 
and irregular migration, not to dichotomise the two, but in an attempt to find more 
neutral terminology. When I write about irregular migration or employment, I refer 
to movement or work that takes place outside the spheres governed by formal legal 
and economic structures. 
This chapter draws on ethnographic research conducted in Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi between 2008 and 2014. In 2008, I began by conducting fieldwork in the 
UAE with domestic workers, sex workers, care providers, and service workers. This 
led me to interviews with state officials and embassy personnel in the UAE and also 
back home in the United States. Between 2008 and 2014, I made annual extended 
field trips to the UAE for periods ranging from one to three months. During this 
time, I interviewed 213 female intimate labourers, 89 state and embassy officials, and 
57 male migrant workers. I also interviewed 14 stateless children of varying ages and 
33 employers. The fieldwork entailed participant observation at detention centers, 
hospitals, NGO offices, courtrooms, employment locales, orphanages, shelters, and 
informal shelters at embassies in addition to my interviews. I conducted participant 
observation and in-depth interviews with migrant women from several major 
sending countries including Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Madagascar, and Nepal. I also conducted media analysis of articles appearing in the 
UAE and in the US about migrant labour in the Middle East. Finally, a review of 
policies on human trafficking, domestic work, migration, the kafala system in the 
Gulf, and citizenship transfer laws supplemented the ethnographic fieldwork.
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Current statistical estimates show a dramatic increase in numbers of female migrants 
in the last three decades.4 It is believed that “fifty to seventy-five percent of the legal 
migrants leaving Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka are women, most of 
them hoping to earn money as domestic workers in the Middle East and other 
parts of Asia.”5 Statistics and numbers about female migrants in particular and the 
industries into which they migrate suffer from a lack of accuracy and transparency 
but nevertheless provide evidence for the increasing feminisation of migration.
Migrant labour in Dubai is structured by a kafala, or labour sponsorship 
system. Those migrating into the formal economy must operate on the basis of their 
contracts and work with a sponsor. This system is unique to the GCC countries and 
structures the lived experience of migrant work in the formal economy. Under the 
kafala system, each migrant worker is tied to a sponsor, or kafeel, who also functions 
as his/her employer. Residence and legal working papers for the migrant depend 
on the relationship with the sponsor. In the case of disputes with the sponsor-
employer, migrant workers can be left without legal permits to remain in the UAE.6 
As Andrew Gardner has noted in his thorough study of male migrant workers 
in Bahrain, and later Qatar, the kafala system renders extreme variability in the 
experiences of workers in that the governance of the individual depends entirely on 
the sponsor. Migrant workers describe sponsors as ranging from accommodating 
and vested in protecting their labourers to exploitative and abusive.7 Even when tied 
to sponsors who are sympathetic and take their concerns seriously, migrant workers 
often report difficulty in communicating with them, particularly as middlemen can 
present barriers in accessing help from the sponsors. Within the kafala system, 
sponsors often confiscate employees’ passports (though this is now technically 
against UAE law, my interviews revealed that it is still a common practice), effectively 
restricting employees’ mobility and their ability to pursue other employment 
opportunities. Many workers who choose to break employment contracts attempt 
to stay in the country as illegal aliens – a better option for them than returning 
home empty-handed. Certain labour laws allow workers to take employers to court 
for the violation of labour contracts, yet during the proceedings workers become 
and remain undocumented and are often forced into the informal economy to make 
4. See Parreñas (2011), Benhabib and Resnik (2009), and Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003).
5. See Varia 2007.
6. Longva 1999.
7. Gardner 2010.
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ends meet.8 Additionally, according to the 1959 Residency Law, an alien can be 
deported as a result of a judicial or administrative decision if “the alien has been 
convicted and the court has recommended deportation, if he/she has no means 
of sustenance, (or) if the Ministry of the Interior objects to his or her presence 
on national territory for ‘security or moral reasons.’”9 Indeed, collapsing employer 
and sponsor into a single category may be the root of the problem. Migrants have 
no place to turn to because the law is written to protect the employers rather than 
migrant workers. 
While I argue that the articles of the law outlined previously need serious 
revision, there are, in fact, a series of articles that in theory protect labourers’ rights; 
however, these are rarely enforced. Articles 65-73 outline appropriate working 
hours and the need to give workers time off at regular intervals. Similarly, Articles 
80-90 outline a long list of occupational hazards and diseases that the employer 
must provide treatment for, both in the short and long term. These laws protect 
migrants’ time and health, but are often not adhered to due to the lack of inspectors. 
According to a Human Rights Watch Report, “though a decree in 2006 asked for at 
least 2000 new labor inspectors, the number currently stands at just 48.”10 
Laws pertaining to citizenship transfer and family reunification, yet another 
set of laws at the national level, can often seduce migrants into work in the 
informal or irregular economies. It is important to recognise that many migrant 
women move to the UAE during their most fertile years; however, those women 
who migrate formally under the kafala system are contractually sterilised. These 
women are banned from any engagement in sexual activities, and evidence of such 
transgressions in the form of pregnancy (even if it results from rape by an employer 
or other person) is grounds for termination, incarceration, and deportation – often 
without the child. Two dozen of my interlocutors had found themselves in such a 
situation. They had migrated to the UAE and become pregnant; eighteen of them 
had engaged in consensual sex and were involved in long term relationships, while 
the remaining six were raped (four by employers, two by policemen). They had 
all been incarcerated for a period of time, and all but one deported without their 
babies. Unfortunately, incongruences between citizenship laws in sending countries 
and the UAE both confined their children to the UAE and left them stateless, 
unable to migrate to join their mothers. With glaring fatefulness, these children 
8. Ibid., 22.
9. See Nagy (1998), Longva (1999), Sabban (2004), Garnder (2010), Mahdavi (2011), and 
Ahmad (2012).
10. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch 2007.
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will be working irregularly because they do not and will never have access to formal 
working papers. And so labour systems that are particularly restrictive of women, 
incarceration, and incongruent citizenship laws actually contribute to the irregular 
labour force.
Citizenship laws define the rights and obligations of citizens and the manner 
in which citizenship is acquired and lost. Typically, citizenship can be attained 
through jus sanguinis (blood-based transfer) wherein the parent – and sometimes 
the gender of the parent is significant here – can transfer their citizenship to their 
offspring, or jus solis (soil-based transfer) which refers to acquiring birthright 
citizenship by being born in a particular country, or naturalisation. The UAE does 
not allow jus solis, and naturalisation is very difficult. Jus sanguinis, the primary mode 
of citizenship transfer, was typically passed only through the father in the UAE, 
which had led to much controversy. Today, however, children of citizen mothers are 
allowed to obtain citizenship as of 2011.11 
In the UAE, citizenship laws are based upon Federal Law No. 17 for 1972 
and amendments made by Federal Law No. 10 for 1975. Citizenship can be 
gained by residing in the Emirates from 1925 or before, by being born to a male or 
female citizen whether abroad or in the country, or by being born in the country 
to unknown parents. Citizenship by naturalisation requires migrant labourers from 
non-Arab states to reside in the country for at least thirty years, with at least twenty 
of those years after the citizenship law of 1972 entered into force. Migrants are able 
to become citizens through the extension of marriage and naturalisation according 
to the laws stated under the first chapter of the citizenship law. Children, regardless 
of their country of birth, are able to gain citizenship given they are born to a father 
citizen, or, as of 2011, born to a mother citizen. Anyone born in-country to unknown 
parents is also able to gain Emirati citizenship, but it must be established, legally, 
that neither parent is known.
While some migrants sought out irregular journeys or employment in order to 
circumvent punishment or contractual sterilisation, others migrated irregularly to 
join family members and loved ones who could not afford to formally bring family 
members from home. In the UAE, family reunification laws vary depending on 
the relation between the migrant worker and the family member accompanying 
them. When it comes to family sponsorship, a migrant worker must either be a 
spouse or a first affinity relative to the person accompanying them in order to 
qualify as a sponsor. For example, if a child, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law meets a 
11. Issa 2011; also see, US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy 2012.
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minimum salary requirement, holds a valid residency visa, and can provide sufficient 
accommodation supported by appropriate documentation, they are able to sponsor 
their parents and parents-in-law.12 Sponsors must receive a monthly salary of at 
least Dh3,000 plus accommodation allowances or a monthly salary of Dh4,000 
without any accommodation allowances.13 
Children born in the UAE to foreigners do not have rights of local citizenship 
and automatically assume the nationality of the parents. Up until 2011, according 
to the Ministry of Interior, Emirati mothers married to non-UAE citizens were 
not able to obtain citizenship for their children if the children were born before the 
fathers became citizens. However, in a new law passed in 2011, an Emirati citizen 
– regardless of gender – married to a non-Emirati may obtain citizenship for her 
child, and this has been successfully implemented since the passage of this law.
At the global level, a number of policies and legal categories created to address 
and combat what is loosely defined as “trafficking” have rendered the term opaque 
and led many to question the utility of the category or term as a whole.  For migrants 
and labourers, not only is the discourse perpetuated about trafficking problematic, 
but so too are the overwhelmingly negative effects of migration policies and the 
resulting response strategies that take a “raid and rescue” approach. Several of my 
interlocutors had become irregular migrants or employees specifically because they 
were trying to circumvent anti-trafficking legislature and outreach. Paradoxically, 
laws instated to help migrants are actually placing increasing numbers of them in 
situations of precariousness.
The UAE is a member of the International Labour Organisation and the 
Arab Labour Organisation and has ratified the Convention of the Rights of the 
Child, CEDAW, and the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. While the UAE is working 
towards improved labour standards, human trafficking, with a focus on sex work, 
has taken centrestage. In a statement responding to the 2009 Trafficking in Persons 
(TIP) Report, Minister Anwar Gargash, who is the head of the UAE’s National 
Committee to Combat Human Trafficking (NCCHT) formed in 2007, said “it 
is incongruous to equate alleged labour rights violations, which are critical but a 
separate issue, to the coercive and unacceptable sexual exploitation of women for 
profit. This report lumps all of these issues together in a manner that is generalized 
12. Immigration Specialist 2012.
13. Suter 2005.
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and unconstructive.”14 One official within this NCCHT task force emphasised 
that anti-prostitution activists from the US had played a large role in re-focusing 
the UAE’s efforts on sex trafficking. Responses to the TIP have included the 
establishment of the NCCHT (which is made up primarily of public prosecutors 
and law enforcement officials) as well as a human rights task force within the police 
sector whose mandate is to arrest people deemed as trafficked persons. In addition, 
the NCCHT has worked to create the Dubai Foundation for Women and Children, 
which has admitted 43 cases of trafficking (all women), and a shelter in Abu Dhabi 
which has admitted 15 women since its inception in 2009. In 2009, there were 20 
registered cases of trafficking (all related to the sex industry), up from 10 in 2008, 
and in 2008, six persons were convicted. While these are important and impressive 
measures of progress, one activist who has been working to reform the kafala system 
expressed frustration and felt that some officials were using the hyperscrutiny on 
women in the sex industry to get away from the larger issue of labour laws in need 
of reform. 
Lived Experiences – Between Labour and the Law
“I used to see my cousins and girlfriends come back to Ethiopia with lots of money, 
and nice magazines and nicer clothes,” Dorna said, reflecting on her decision to 
migrate to Dubai to work as a domestic worker. When I met her, she was working 
illegally as a nanny for three different families and occasionally engaged in sex work 
on the side. She had been in Dubai for almost five years and, in that time, had borne 
a son from an Emirati man with whom she lived for two years. She was very eager 
to return to Ethiopia to reunite with her family but was afraid of the heavy fines 
she would incur upon her departure. Migrants who overstay their visas or work 
illegally must pay heavy fines ($25) for each day they remain beyond their assigned 
departure date. The trouble for Dorna was that she did not have her passport or visa. 
Her previous employers had retained her documents and refused to return them to 
her.
Dorna’s trajectory from migrating to work in the formal sphere of domestic 
work to working in the informal economy of the sex industry and living as an 
“illegal alien” in Dubai was similar to at least seven other women with whom I 
spoke. After her father died, Dorna’s mother and siblings were left in high debt. 
Worried about her family’s future, she decided to ask her friends about possible 
14. http://www.wam.ae/servlet/Satellite?c=WamLocEnews&cid=1241072976464&pagename=
WAM/WAM_E_Layout.
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avenues of migration to the Gulf.  In recent years, the Ethiopian government – in 
response to moral panic about human trafficking – has passed a series of measures 
designed to regulate the flow of Ethiopians migrating for work, particularly to the 
Middle East.15 The state has imposed rules on licensing for recruiters and has been 
working towards a system of employee training (similar to that in the Philippines) 
and contract monitoring. This increased bureaucracy has resulted in many women 
looking for other ways to leave Ethiopia, ways that are seen as simpler and faster 
routes for securing transnational employment. 
Dorna’s friend put her in touch with an illegal recruiter who asked for a high 
fee, equivalent to $2,000, for securing her passage to Dubai (via boat through 
Yemen) and for drawing up a contract for her to work as a domestic worker. Dorna 
never saw the contract, but was told she would be met by another recruiter upon 
her arrival in Dubai.
When she arrived in Dubai after a long journey she was met by a recruiter and 
then taken to the home of her new employers, a Lebanese family who had moved 
to Dubai a few years earlier. The family took Dorna’s passport and few personal 
belongings that she had brought with her, and she never saw them again. The family 
made Dorna work up to 18-hour days, often locked her in the house when they 
left, and did not provide her dinner on a majority of weeknights. “But I don’t know 
where to go. I’m illegal lady, coming illegally, so I’m not going to embassy or police. 
But where to go?” she asked rhetorically. When she complained, she was beaten, 
and the male head of household would make further advances toward her, making 
sexual threats that he would rape her one night while she was asleep. She was very 
afraid of these threats, so one afternoon she ran away from the apartment where she 
had been sequestered for the last six months without pay. 
That day, Dorna jumped from the window of her room on the third story of an 
apartment building. When she jumped, she injured her right leg badly, but instead 
of going to the hospital or police, Dorna decided to go to the church that she had 
been permitted to attend once a month. “I know other Ethiopians at the church, 
I know if I can get there, I can get help,” she said. However, she did not know her 
way around town, and her injured leg severely restricted her mobility. After a few 
days of living on the street she met a young Emirati man who wanted to help 
her. After a few weeks, Dorna became romantically involved with this man and 
eventually became pregnant. The man was very happy to hear that she was pregnant 
and showered her with gifts and attention. He also promised her to get her a legal 
15. de Regt 2010.
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visa and be her sponsor and potentially her husband. Dorna was overjoyed. During 
this period, she converted to Islam and became very involved at the local mosque 
that her Emirati boyfriend attended. After their son was born, however, things 
changed. The young man, who had not yet succeeded in retrieving her working 
papers or passport, suddenly became agitated with Dorna and ordered her to leave 
the house with the baby. He told her his family had heard about their situation and 
did not approve of his decision to live with Dorna for those two years. He gave her 
some money for the child and sent her away. Though Dorna did not know it at the 
time, her son was undocumented because the boy’s father had never acknowledged 
paternity. If caught, Dorna would likely be deported, but her son would remain, 
stateless, in the UAE, according to UAE law. Technically, Dorna might be able to 
seek out Ethiopian citizenship for the young boy; however, even a suspicion that 
the child may have Emirati paternity would be enough to hold the child in-country 
until paternity could be established.
When she faced troubles with her boyfriend, Dorna and her son moved in with 
some of her friends from the mosque while she tried to look for any possible type 
of work to earn enough money to pay off the fines she incurred having overstayed 
her visa and to procure an outpass to return to Ethiopia with her son. Limited 
by not having legal working papers, Dorna began by working in a restaurant in 
the Ethiopian neighbourhood in town. After a few months working at this job, 
however, she was not getting paid. One evening, she met a group of women at the 
restaurant who worked as sex workers in a bar called Fantasia. They told her what 
her earning potential could be and she decided to join them that evening. This 
marked the beginning of Dorna’s work in the informal economy of sex work. After 
a few months working at Fantasia, Dorna was arrested one night in a raid. She was 
put in jail for three weeks and not permitted to see her son, who was still at the 
home of her friends with whom she had been living. 
Elham was born in a local hospital in Ras Al-Khaimah, UAE. Now twenty 
years old, Elham has returned to work as a volunteer in the same hospital in which 
she was born. She has never left the tiny Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah, not even to 
visit Dubai. From the little that Elham knows, her mother was a Nepali woman 
who had a “love case,” according to the prison wardens who narrated her story to 
Elham. Her mother had migrated to Dubai initially to work as a domestic worker. 
There she had met another Nepali young man working as a security guard at a 
local business. When he was transferred to Ras Al-Khaimah, he persuaded Elham’s 
mother to join him, which she did, absconding from her sponsor in Dubai, thus 
rendering her illegal. Elham’s father and mother had moved in with each other 
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in Ras Al-Khaimah and before long, Elham’s mother became pregnant. At some 
point, her mother was arrested, but Elham was not clear on this aspect of the story, 
as different jail wardens, including the one who informally adopted her and had 
raised her thus far, had told her different versions.
Elham’s mother was arrested and tried for the crime of zina, like many other 
women who become pregnant outside of wedlock.16 The wardens were unclear 
about whether her mother had been initially picked up because she was without 
working papers or whether someone had seen her swollen belly and brought her 
in. Either way, she was arrested and sent to jail after giving birth to Elham in a 
hospital. As soon as she was born, Elham was sent to live in the prison with her 
mother, who remained staunchly by her side for two years, refusing to go back to 
Nepal without her.
When Elham was just over two years old, her mother was informed that she 
was going to be deported, but that the child could not come with her. Distraught, 
she begged Amira, one of the prison guards with whom she had grown close, to 
take Elham in and to take good care of her. Amira had grown quite close to Elham; 
she had been working tirelessly to get her travel documents in order so that she 
could return with her mother. Many of the wardens were able to successfully help 
the women in their charge, and Amira noted that she alone had seen over a dozen 
babies return home with their mothers.
For the first few years that Elham lived with Amira, the latter continued to 
work to procure travel documents, citizenship papers, or some type of documentation 
for Elham. Frustrated at the seemingly never-ending series of closing doors, Amira 
finally accepted that Elham was likely to live with her, stateless, in Ras Al-Khaimah 
for many years to come. Elham and Amira grew closer as time passed, and Amira 
was able to talk with friends of hers at a local school to allow Elham to enroll 
in classes, despite her undocumented status. After graduating from high school, 
Elham began volunteering at the hospital in which she was born. Elham is now 
twenty years old and has never left the borders of the UAE. She remains, stateless, 
for the forseeable future, in Ras-Al-Khaimah.
As these stories show, migrants may end up moving, working, or living outside 
of the formal contours of the “legal” or “regular” economy for a variety of reasons. 
For many of my interlocutors, a combination of having to be creative in the face 
16. Zina is the act of unlawful sex outside of marriage. Within secular law in the UAE, zina 
appears in the Federal Penal Code (FPC, Law No. 3 of 1987). The Penal Code includes 
Sharia Law. 
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of ever-changing and harsh laws about migration, employment (through kafala), 
and citizenship, as well as a desire to mobilise their intimate lives led them to the 
irregular economy. Someone like Dorna chose (from among a series of limited 
options) to migrate irregularly because formal migratory routes were not available 
to her due to anti-trafficking legislature seeking to restrict the out migration of 
women in particular. Having begun the journey in an irregular fashion, it became 
increasingly preferable for her to choose not just irregular migration but also 
irregular employment. For people like Dorna, they chose the space of the irregular 
economy because it afforded them more freedoms, rights, and empowerment and 
also allowed them to fulfill their intimate lives. They do, however, experience some 
vulnerability in the spaces of the irregular economy, and this vulnerability also plays 
out in their intimate lives. Children of migrants, such as Elham or Dorna’s son are, 
in a sense, born into a situation of irregularity. Produced by laws about gendered 
employment as well as citizenship laws, these children’s situations and lives seem 
somewhat bleak. Though Elham – and at least seventeen other young people in 
similar situations with whom I spoke – was able to mobilise through her irregular 
status and work informally, her situation in the UAE remains precarious. Thus, it is 
important to recognise at least three aspects of irregular migration, employment, or 
status, which are eclipsed by policies that do not take into account lived experience. 
The first is that irregularity is most often produced by policies seeking to curb 
(gendered) migration and citizenship as can be seen in the cases of all three women 
introduced previously. The second is that irregular migration or working status can 
be seen and experienced as a more lucrative and empowering strategy and one that 
can afford migrants with limited mobility and many options for economic, social, 
class, physical, and intimate mobility.17 Finally, it is also important to highlight that 
while living, moving, and working irregularly may be attributed to weak laws and 
policies and may be seen as the comparatively desirable option, migrants encounter 
vulnerabilities when living and moving in these spaces. These include the possibilities 
for arrest or deportation – what Nicholas DeGenova has termed “deportability”18 – 
as well as precarious living and working situations wherein migrants are regularly 
abused, not paid their wages, and subject to difficult working conditions.
17. For an in-depth discussion of what I mean by “intimate mobility,” please see Mahdavi 
(forthcoming).
18. De Genova 2002.
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Irregularity and Intimacy – Intimate Migrations and Their Contents
Some migrants prefer the space of irregular migration and employment and are 
emphatic that they do not desire the opportunity to change their status. Several 
of my interlocutors indicated that it was only because their work was outside 
the sphere of the formal economy that it was lucrative, and they would not want 
their industries regulated by state laws. Other interviewees said that they did not 
“trust” their home countries or receiving countries and instead preferred to seek out 
irregular migratory routes (which seemed more expedient with less bureaucracy) or 
employment rather than having to “entangle” with the “state.” 
Migrants often make decisions that are best for themselves and their loved 
ones, not necessarily in accordance with laws or formal migratory and labour 
trajectories. It is often the case that migrating or working irregularly is the more 
desirable option due to financial opportunities and available avenues for increased 
mobility – be that physical, economic, or emotional. Policies designed to address 
gendered migration do not take into account the lived realities of migrants and, 
in so doing, eclipse the multidimensionality of migrant subjectivities. A focus on 
the intimate lives of migrant labourers allows for a more robust understanding of 
irregular migration and employment while also foregrounding migrant subjectivity 
and the needs of their loved ones. Current policies, including those contouring the 
kafala system, citizenship, and reunification laws, and anti-trafficking legislature 
need to be assessed from the perspectives of migrant experiences, allowing migrants 
themselves to have a voice in policies that most affect their lives. In re-thinking 
these policies, migrants and their experiences can be foregrounded in such a way 
that narratives which demonise those in situations of irregularity will celebrate the 
creativity and outlaw inventiveness that migrants employ in their quests for vertical 
and horizontal mobility.
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Irregular Migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf:  
Is Combatting It a Governance Challenge?
AKM Ahsan Ullah*
Abstract: Bangladeshis constitute a significant number of the pool of 
irregular migrants in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has been experiencing 
exponential growth in the number of irregular migrants, which has become 
a source of major concern for the government. The harsh policy in place and 
cooperation from sending country governments appears insufficient to combat 
the phenomenon. In fact, poor governance in the sending countries has 
contributed to the irregular migration. This chapter is based on a qualitative 
study conducted in Bangladesh between 2011 and 2014 of government 
departments and ministries and registered travel agents who send migrant 
workers abroad. Interviews were conducted with a select group of 10 officials 
and 45 Bangladeshi irregular migrants in Saudi Arabia by administering a 
well-designed checklist. No precise data on the number of irregular migrants 
is available. There are a significant number of irregular migrants who went to 
Saudi Arabia on Umrah and Haj visas and overstayed; some of them were 
left in the Kingdom by some government officials; some were left by some 
music bands and some overstayed their tourist visa. Others absconded and yet 
others abandoned abusive employers who withheld or confiscated their travel 
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documents. The sending government’s poor oversight and reluctance to combat 
irregular migration in dealing with this issue is evident. Irregular migration 
has crucial policy implications for both origin and destination countries and 
exposes migrants themselves to insecurity, abuse, and exploitation.  
Background
No country in the world is untouched by, or immune to the effects of international 
migration — particularly the undocumented form of it (Papademetriou 2005; 
Ullah 2011; 2012). Irregular migration goes hand in hand with regular migration 
though the extent of this varies depending on how migration regulations in host and 
sending countries are implemented. No country in the world can claim that they 
send or receive regular/documented migrants only. Some countries are lenient and 
tolerant toward them, and some are harsh. Some countries send irregular migrants, 
some countries receive them, and some countries are traversed by them. In recent 
years, in Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Africa and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region, irregular migration has become the 
subject of widespread public debate (Morehouse and Michael 2011; Ullah, Hossain 
and Islam 2015). Globally, this issue has assumed much public prominence in recent 
times, with daily reports of potential migrants and asylum seekers trying to reach 
the Mediterranean shores or floating on the Indian Ocean, with some of them 
tragically losing their lives in the process.
South Asia has undergone different phases of migration since the British 
colonial rule came to an end in 1947. In the 1971 liberation war, Bangladesh alone 
experienced displacement of 30 million people (20 million Internally Displaced 
Persons [IDPs] and 10 million who crossed the border) who moved to neighbouring 
countries (Dawson and Farber July 2012; Kelley 2009). Bangladesh, home to 158.5 
million people (UNFPA, November 18, 2014), ranks as the world’s eighth-most 
populous country. As of 2007, 50% of its urban population was living in squatters 
and slums (Duncan 2007). Bangladesh is prone to natural disasters, including 
cyclones, tornadoes, storm surges, floods, drought, earthquakes, riverbank erosion, 
and landslides (RRCAP 2001). Around two decades of political instability and 
political repression perpetrated by governments and continuous natural disasters 
have thwarted economic growth and, as a result, poverty levels have remained 
almost the same as they were two decades ago while economic disparity has widened 
(Ullah and Routray 2003). Bangladesh’s parliamentary democracy came to an end 
in 1975 with three coups, after which military dictators periodically governed the 
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country from 1975 to 1990. From 2007 until 2015, unelected governments ruled 
the country. These circumstances have contributed to the migration flows from 
Bangladesh. Widespread poverty, unemployment, underemployment, and pervasive 
corruption, in addition to the fact that youth account for one-third of the total 
population of Bangladesh (Ara and Tanha 2010), have contributed to the migration 
flows.
Migration flows from Bangladesh have been determined by factors such as 
religious belief, demand for labour, and emergencies (Ullah 2015). The liberation 
war forced a few millions to cross the border to India. On the other hand, in the 
early 70s, the Gulf oil boom sparked a different type (i.e., migration based on 
religious emotion) of labour mobility from South Asia, especially from Bangladesh 
to the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia in particular. Though foreign workers were a 
significant part of the workforce starting from the inception of the Kingdom’s oil 
industry in the 1930s, large scale inflows of workers began in the wake of the oil 
boom in the early 1970s. Since then, South Asian countries, including Bangladesh, 
have sent a significant number of temporary labour migrants to work in the Gulf 
(Doherty et al. 2014), as local labour supply often could not meet the demands of 
the booming construction sector. There are also claims that Saudi Arabia preferred 
South Asians, especially Bangladeshis, to Arab expat workers, because they would 
be less likely to settle and more easy to control (Pakkiasamy 2004). 
Saudi Arabia ranked as the second top remittance-sending country and was 
among the top five migrant destination countries worldwide (De Bel-Air 2014). 
Of the total migrants from Bangladesh, about one-third live in Saudi Arabia. 
From 1976 until 2007, the number of outgoing migrants to Saudi Arabia kept 
growing, though there has been a sudden drop from 2008 (BMET 2014). Two 
sets of explanations are offered for the steep drop. One set argues that this drop 
is a result of deteriorated diplomatic relations with the Kingdom, while the other 
set claims that the economic slowdown, rise in the number of local workers, and 
increasing competition from other labour-exporting countries have contributed to 
this (Miah, Khan and Rahman 2013). Though the government of Bangladesh does 
not track return migration, it is estimated that over a 10-year period, from 2000 to 
2010, return migration from the GCC countries was approximately half of regular 
migrant outflows (Islam 2010).
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Figure 11.1: Migration trend from Bangladesh
The desire to visit Makkah and Medina for pilgrimage has played an important 
role in increasing migration from Bangladesh to Saudi Arabia. During the 1970s 
and 80s, Bangladeshis used to pay visits to a returnee from pilgrimage to Saudi 
Arabia. They considered it as a religious responsibility. This is not to say that religion 
alone explains the Bangladesh-Saudi Arabia migration flow, but it seems to have 
been a contributory factor. The strained relationship between the governments of 
Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia have played negatively in the migration landscape. 
As a result, for the last few years, migration flows from Bangladesh to Saudi Arabia 
have come to a halt. In the wake of this development, potential migrants have 
sought to find alternatives i.e., irregular avenues. Getting to Saudi Arabia illegally 
from Bangladesh is not easy primarily because of its location. Saudi Arabia has 
practically impermeable borders (except for the one with Yemen). UAE and Oman 
are not considered a threat to the security of the Kingdom. Eritrea and Sudan are 
separated from Saudi Arabia by the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia and Iraq are separated 
by a 965 km wall which consists of twin fences and a ditch, and extends from 
near Turaif, where Saudi Arabia meets Iraq and Jordan, to Hafar al-Batin, on the 
Kingdom’s border with Iraq and Kuwait. 
This chapter is based on a qualitative study conducted between 2012 and 2014 
in the relevant government departments and among registered travel agents involved 
in exporting manpower. Interviews of 10 selected officials and 45 Bangladeshi 
irregular migrants in Saudi Arabia were conducted by administering a well-
designed checklist. Irregular migrants from both locations (Bangladesh and Saudi 
Arabia) were selected on a snowball basis: They considered themselves irregular (in 
their own words, “illegal”) and they remained in Saudi Arabia as irregular migrants 

















































 Source: BMET 2015.
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at least for six months. Government officials were selected purposively. This research 
went through the American University in Cairo (AUC) ethical review process since 
this involves human subjects. 
Table 11.1: Distribution of respondents
Governance and Irregularity
In literature various terminologies are used indifferently to denote irregularity in 
the migration process such as illegal, irregular, undocumented, clandestine, and 
unauthorized. “Illegal” is against the law, and “irregular” is against the regulations. 
While an act may be illegal, a person is not. Irregular migrants are persons who 
contravene regulations related to migration in their host country (Fargues 2009). 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been experiencing exponential growth in 
the number of irregular migrants, which has become a cause for major concern. 
Bangladeshis constitute a significant number of the pool of irregular migrants in 
the Kingdom. Existing policies and sending country government measures have 
proved insufficient to combat irregular migration. Poor governance in the sending 
countries has also contributed to this phenomenon. 
This chapter looks into the issue of governance failure in combatting the 
growing irregular migration phenomenon. It asks a few pertinent questions 
related to the flow of irregular migrants. The IOM (2010) had the same type of 
questions related to irregular migrants who are susceptible to falling into the hands 
of smugglers. For example, does the specific country have specific laws that make 
migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons crimes? Does the administration 
investigate irregular migration and prosecute those guilty of offences? And to what 
extent do the policies and related legislation respond to the need to address irregular 
migration at the international and national levels? 
Irregular 
migrants Locations of interview f %
Saudi Arabia 14 31
Bangladesh 31 69
Total 45 100
Officials Locations of interview
Saudi Arabia Government official plus 1 travel
agency owner 
2 20
Bangladesh Government officials, 3 travel
agency personnel and 3 brokers 
8 80
Total 10 100
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Figure 11.2: Migration path migrants go through 
Irregularity implies that a certain set of regulations have not been complied 
with or respected in the move to migrate. This may sound like it is the fault of the 
migrants. However, making potential migrants abide by rules is the responsibility of 
the government. The failure to do so is a failure of governance. Hence, lately policy 
attention has shifted from the political economy of migration (Freeman 1994) to 
the legal system. 
For the recipient countries, this is an unwanted, undesired, unexpected or 
unaccepted phenomena while for the sending country it is necessary for a variety of 
reasons such as increasing dependency on remittances and easing unemployment. 
The current failure in developing an adequate understanding of irregular migration 
has resulted in various terminologies being used to denote irregularity, such as 




























Source: Adapted from Rahman 2004:382; Ullah 2010.
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Table 11.2: Existing policies, acts and ordinances related to migration
Irregular migration is an area of investigation under broader migration 
management that concerns governments of sending, transit, and receiving countries 
(IOM 2010). The outcome of irregular migration may be detrimental to the 
migrants themselves as well as both sending and receiving countries. Bangladesh 
evidently has failed to combat irregular migration. As a result, it is facing an 
embargo in sending migrants to certain countries and stricter regulations than ever. 
The decision made by the Saudi government on March 22, 2015 to suspend Umrah 
visas for Bangladeshis is an example. The government expressed serious concerns 
about the Bangladeshi travel agencies that deal with Umrah visas. It claimed that 
thousands of Bangladeshis did not return after their Umrah was performed. The 
allegation has been that these travel agencies are involved in human smuggling in 
the name of Umrah (Khan 2015). 
In the last four decades, Bangladesh has undergone a number of phases of 
migration. The many changes in the political system, difficult economic situation, 
and natural climatic emergencies since the liberation war in 1971 created conditions 
that have contributed directly or indirectly to the current migration scenario. The 
following table demonstrates the interplay between migration and governance and 
shows how the role of government becomes trivial during different time periods. 
In the table, facilitators are placed in order of significance of the role they played 
in different phases. Often brokers and government (in government managed 
migration) appear as competing agents. 
 Name Category
Expatriates' Welfare Bank (2010 number - 55 Rules) Act
Special facilities for remittance sender nonresident Bangladeshi - 2008 Policy
Foreign Employment Policy - 2006 Policy
CIP Selection Policy - 2006 Policy
Recruitment Agency And License - 2002 Policy
Wage Earners Welfare Fund Rules 2002 Rule
Emigration Ordinance 1982 Ordinance
Bangladesh Entry Control Act 1952 Act
Bangladesh Passport Act 1920 Act
Bangladesh Immigration Act Act
Source: Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment (MEWOE), 2011; Ullah, 
Hossain and Islam, 2015.
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Table 11.3: Timeline: migration and role of government
 In practice, three legal and regulatory frameworks relating to migration exist 
in Bangladesh: international instruments; the domestic laws of both the destination 
countries and Bangladesh; and the bilateral agreements between Bangladesh and 
the receiving countries. There are several relevant laws focusing on the two main 
elements of migration that are within the mandate and scope of the government, 
i.e., maximisation of labour migration and the protection and welfare of the 
migrants working abroad. An interview with a relevant government official reveals 
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that sufficient efforts have been made to consolidate the laws and update them so as 
to address contemporary migration issues. Despite these advances, positive results 
are rarely visible at any level of migration process (Ullah, Hossain and Islam 2015; 
Siddiqui 2003). 
The Bureau of Manpower, Employment, and Training (BMET) of Bangladesh 
operates 42 District Employment and Manpower Offices (DEMOs) to provide 
business and entrepreneurial training to potential migrants and returnees to 
encourage best use of resources (and remittances). However, lack of sufficient funds 
and widespread corruption in fund management thwart the services of the DEMO 
(ILO 2013). Additionally, a new Welfare Branch of the BMET has been established 
to assist in the repatriation of stranded migrant workers and the remains of workers 
who die overseas, as well as to assist families in the collection of owed salaries or 
remittances (Ullah, Hossain and Islam 2015; Mian, Khan and Rahman 2013). One 
travel agency official complained to me that the expansion of BMET’s scope will 
only widen the scope for corruption. However, when the interviewer asked what 
the best policy would be for the government to combat irregular migration, an 
official responded that the government had every intention to manage migration in 
the most efficient manner. When his attention was drawn to incidents of migrants 
floating on unseaworthy boats, the official’s response was not encouraging. His 
replies reminded me of the statement made by the Prime Minister of Bangladesh 
Sheikh Hasina on May 23, 2015, in which she criticised migrants leaving the 
country, many of whom were stranded in dire conditions at sea, as “mentally sick” 
and accused them of hurting the country’s image. She warned that punishment 
would have to be given to those who are moving out of the country “illegally.” The 
prime minister’s statement was a signal that the government was not going to work 
on improving the conditions of the migration process, and the corrupt travel agents 
would go unpunished. 
Our interview with a travel agent broker clearly points to the state of affairs.
Travel agent broker: Our responsibility is to collect clients. We get commission 
on every client.
Question: Would you please tell me more about where you meet them, how 
do you convince them?
Answer: (Yelling at the interviewer): Oh everyone is desperately wanting to 
go abroad. Only that they have no means. We offer them better options.
Q: Like?
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A: Payment in instalments. We help in selling their assets, if any, to secure 
sufficient funds for their migration. They may not be in a position to do so. 
We do that on their behalf.
Q: If, at the end, they decline to migrate or pay?
A: No problem, we deduct an amount from their deposit.
Q: Deposits?
A: Yes, they have to deposit a certain amount when they express their intention 
to go abroad.
 Q: Do you have any idea whether your clients would be migrating in a legal 
way? 
A: That is not our job to look at. Our company is good and it takes care of 
those legal issues.
The irregular status of migrants is linked to their vulnerability to a wide range 
of abuses. Types of abuse range from exploitative employment and pay practices to 
physical and sexual abuse. Many of these problems can be traced to the dysfunctional 
dynamics of the recruitment system for Bangladeshi workers, especially the 
high levels of corruption at play within it. The recruitment process begins with 
potential overseas sponsors stepping forward (Kibria 2011:3). Recruiting agencies 
in Bangladesh that belong to BAIRA are in a position to act as intermediaries to 
arrange recruiting issues with overseas employers and Bangladeshi workers.
Another interviewee said:
I never knew that life would be so difficult here. I spent so much money to 
come here. I could have gone to America rather. But I was cheated.
Q: Who cheated?
A: I was made a member of a government delegation six years ago to come to Saudi 
Arabia. I was told I would be given a high salaried job. 
Q: Please tell me more what made you believe them?
A: I believed because I was told that this was not the first time, many people before 
were brought to many countries, including Saudi Arabia, and managed to obtain 
good jobs. They are respectable persons. I never thought they could cheat me. 
Q: How much money did you pay?
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A: It was about 8 lac taka (about $10,000). I felt good at the airport because there 
was no hassle at the airport. Everyone saw us off respectfully.
Q: How did you manage to stay back in Saudi Arabia? 
A:They just left me! They went out of the room and said that they would be back. 
They never did. I knew a Bangladeshi staying close to my hotel. I told him about the 
story. He helped me to secure a job. I was planning to go to our embassy but I knew 
that would result in repatriation. I did not want that at that time because I did not 
have any money left to repay the loan I made to finance my migration.
As long as high-level corruption in government and neglect on the part of the 
highest echelons of the government continue, no policy can make any difference in 
combatting such irregular migration.
Irregular Migrants in the Kingdom
Irregularity may result from a deliberate breach of the law by the migrant, or from 
a change in the law itself that affects the migrant’s status. Irregular migrants are 
not a homogenous group but belong to three distinct categories: labour migrants, 
refugees and transit migrants (Fargues 2009:6). 
Clearly, the economic landscape of the GCC countries has been shaped by 
migrant populations. This region is the most popular destination for temporary 
labour migrants from South and Southeast Asian countries. The biggest employer 
of foreign workers in the Gulf is Saudi Arabia with almost 7 million legal foreign 
workers who constitute around two-thirds of the total workforce (Pakkiasamy 
2004). Anecdotes suggest that another two to three million migrants are staying and 
working without any proper documents. Of about 8 million Bangladeshi migrants 
worldwide, one-third (or about 2.58 million) joined the labour market in Saudi 
Arabia. It is notoriously difficult to estimate how many of them are working in the 
Kingdom without proper documents. However, from the number of deportees from 
a country, we can make a guessestimate. For example, Saudi Arabia deports about 
700,000 per year (Shah 2008). This does not necessarily mean that all irregular 
migrants are deported or all deportees are irregular. Some recent news provides us 
with an idea about the magnitude of the problem of irregular migration in Saudi 
Arabia. For example, Islam (2013) says that around 750,000 Bangladeshi migrant 
workers have benefited from an amnesty offer for illegal workers by Saudi authorities. 
The Bangladesh embassy in Saudi Arabia reports that of the beneficiaries, about 
400,000 undocumented workers’ passports were renewed and issued while around 
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350,000 workers, who were at the risk of becoming undocumented, were able to 
change their professions. I have argued in another publication that the number of 
migrants in Saudi Arabia could be even higher due to the fact that Bangladesh does 
not have a net account of migrants (see Ullah 2013).
 I attempt to describe the category of irregular migration that may encompass 
Bangladeshis. For this, I use the concept of irregular status of migrants as presented 
by Jandl (2004), Ullah (2010), Zohry (2011) and Tapinos (1999). The categories of 
irregularity used by these authors present a few practical problems. This starts with 
the fact that a particular person may change his/her status over time, sometimes 
more than once. Therefore, persons may enter a country legally but then overstay 
their visa. First the person’s presence is legal, then it turns illegal. The person 
may later be regularised, thus becoming legal again, and still later fall back into 
irregularity. In some instances, some peoples’ stay turns irregular due to changes 
of laws and regulations. They may enter with legal documents and possess a legal 
residence permit, but the laws that regulate residence may undergo a change 
affecting a proportion of legal migrants and making them illegal migrants, usually 
with a deadline to legalise their status or leave the country (Zohry 2011).
Another interview provided an insight into the avenues of becoming an 
irregular migrant:
“I have been trying to go out of the country since long and was exploring the 
avenues. A friend sent me to his friend, an actor, saying, ‘Meet him, he will 
help to materialise your dream.’ I met him. He gave me startling information. 
He said their group was going to the Middle East to perform on the occasion 
of the Bangladesh independence day (It is a regular practice for expatriates to 
invite artists from Bangladesh). In such cases, obtaining a visa is easy. I may 
join them if I wish. I calculated the potential risks. I was given two weeks’ 
time to collect the required amount of money. I collected about 6 lac (about 
$8,000) and handed it over to the actor.”
Q: Did you ask or think what are you going to do there, if you can successfully 
get to the destination? 
A: No. 
Q: Why? How were you sure you could secure a job or if you can get to the 
destination at all?
A:They are respectable people. I was sure they would not throw me in the 
ocean. 
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Q: Ok, did you think why they asked for 6 lac taka? It is a huge amount of 
money for getting you to Saudi Arabia. 
A: He asked for this amount. I did not think about anything. I thought that 
was a golden opportunity for me. My family members also did not stop me.
Q: Then what happened? 
A:Once I got to the destination, his colleagues explained that finding a job 
is not their responsibility. I was not sure what to do and say. I tried to see the 
actor. I failed because he seemed to be very busy. Later I came to know that 
three others in the same group were also smuggled into the country like I 
was. They left me. I was arrested in (perhaps) the second week of my stay. It 
was a difficult time without Arabic language skills. After more than a year I 
was released. 
The outcome of irregular migration varies from person to person and from 
destination to destination. It could be damaging, horrific, and dangerous to migrants 
themselves. They remain invisible and, as a result, cannot be traced easily to be 
helped. The potential outcome of irregular migration could be: frequent arrest or 
detention en route, in transit and destination countries; deprival of basic rights, life-
threatening risks; and repatriation. This study found a number of factors that explain 
the large number of Bangladeshi irregular migrants in Saudi Arabia. For example, 
there are a significant number of irregular migrants who went on the Umrah and 
Haj visas and stayed put; others were left in the Kingdom by government officials, 
or by some music bands, and some overstayed their work visa. Some absconded 
abusive employers who withheld or confiscated their travel documents (Table 11.4). 
One respondent was very open in his interview. 
Q: You said you did not return after performing your Haj. Would you add a 
bit more on why you did so? 
A: Haj was my secondary aim, I wanted to stay in Nabiji’s soil (in the land of 
the Prophet), work there, and die there. After I was arrested, I tried to make 
the police understand my intention. They did not pay heed to me. 
Q: Did you know it was not legal and safe? 
A:Yes, but I did not want to stay there to do bad things. 
Q: Did the travel agency know your intention? 
A: Yes, this happens with their knowledge.
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Q: How do you know that? 
A: Those who express such intention to them have to add extra money to the 
rate fixed for normal cases. 
Table 11.4 shows that about one-third of the sample resorted to Umrah visa 
to move to Saudi Arabia and stay back and about 29% overstayed their work visa. 
Sixteen per cent came to Saudi Arabia with a music band and did not leave. One 
respondent who returned after being released from a prison in Saudi Arabia said: 
“I stayed in Saudi Arabia for about a year without any documents.”
Q: Why did you not have any document? 
A: The company I used to work for was very repressive. There were no fixed 
working hours. I used to work almost 24 hours. Salary was very low and was 
paid irregularly. I was not able to send money home when I needed to. So, 
my debt in the home country was growing bigger. I thought some more years 
of stay whether legally and illegally would help recoup the money I spent on 
financing migration.
Q: Did you face any problem? 
A: Many. 
Q: Like? 
A: Salary was reduced by half. They became more repressive because they 
knew I had no legal documents. I had no way for redressal. I was scared of 
going out for my groceries and for other needs. Police there are very bad.
Q: How did you manage to leave the country? 
A: I was arrested and was in jail for a few weeks. Then the government 
declared amnesty for those who wished to go back and on travel pass I was 
able to leave. 
Q: Does this mean you had a work visa initially? 
A: Yes.
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Table 11.4: How migrants become irregular – Pathways
Travel agents and brokers explained how difficult it is to obtain manpower 
export licenses without bribing. A few travel agency owners are relatives of ministers 
and MPs. Our interview further revealed that a sitting MP is allegedly directly 
involved in human smuggling. This is endorsed by media reports (such as Prime 
News 2015). 
Q: Did you initially plan to stay back in Saudi Arabia? 
A: Yes, because I thought this was the best way to enter the country. 
Q: Umrah is something religiously very sensitive. So why did you decide to 
use this method to enter? 
A: The broker in fact gave me ideas that this would be the best for me and 
there was no other option to go there. 
Q: Do you mean to say that the travel agency knew about your plans? 
A: Yes, of course.
About 40,000 pilgrims went to perform Umrah facilitated by 50 travel agents 
from Bangladesh last year. The government of Saudi Arabia accused the agencies 
of involvement in human trafficking under the pretext of arranging Umrah/Haj 
visas (Karim 2015). The authorities claimed that 11,483 pilgrims on Umrah visa 
did not return to Bangladesh in the last few years. The Saudi government alleged 
that that they were trafficked to the country and has suspended issuing Umrah visas 
for Bangladeshis for an indefinite period of time and blacklisted those 50 travel 
agencies (Dhaka Tribune 2015). These irregularities have also led the government to 




Government officials 6 13
Music band/cultural organisations 7 16
Overstayed work visa 13 29
Total 45 100
Source: Field data 2012-2014.
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Under the new rule, Umrah pilgrims can stay in Saudi Arabia for a maximum 
of 14 days, and the travel agencies cannot bring in large batches of pilgrims at 
one time, especially during Ramadan. Also, visa applicants for Umrah will soon 
have to record their biometrics before travelling to the Kingdom. More stringent 
rules await aspirant Bangladeshi Umrah/Haj pilgrims. Severe weaknesses in the 
migration governance system in Bangladesh have been detected. A newspaper 
reported that some dishonest officials from the Bangladesh passports office issue 
“official or government passports” in exchange for bribes to people who try to sneak 
out of the country (Daily Aamardesh 2015). 
Conclusion 
Bangladesh boasts growing remittances from overseas migrants and their 
contribution to the country’s GDP is significant. About one-third of the total 
remittances the country receives come from Saudi Arabia. Yet, migration governance 
in Bangladesh remains fragile. It is as though the government is reaping the fruit 
without sowing the seed. No meaningful efforts have been made by the government 
to improve the migration process, though it never fails to take credit for the growing 
remittances. It is frustrating when the head of the government makes statements 
that are derogatory of migrants leaving the country through illegal means, member 
of parliaments and government officials are involved in human smuggling, and 
some government officials take bribes to issue certificates to illicit travel agencies. 
No effective actions to counter these are visible. Understandably, migration through 
legal channels is time consuming due to its highly bureaucratic nature. As a result, 
potential migrants pay exorbitant amounts of money to finance their migration 
(Ullah 2008; 2010). This study offers an important finding that potential migrants 
accept the fact that in future they are going to be irregular, meaning that a significant 
number of them become irregular by intention. The role of government is getting 
weaker and more recruiting agencies are getting licenses for manpower export. 
Irregular migration, a variant of international migration, concerns both the 
less developed and developed countries, though the magnitude and dynamics of 
the problems are different. Receiving countries are concerned about the perceived 
threats to security, social unrest, and stiffer job competition, while sending 
countries are concerned about migrants’ rights and welfare, and salary issues, and 
the fundamental rights of those who enter the unauthorised migration stream 
(Papademetriou 2005). As both receiving and sending countries are affected by the 
migration process, the effective management of it rests on governments on both 
sides. 
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Bangladesh is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 
55/25 on November 15, 2000. This has perhaps contributed to the government’s 
reluctance to take strong action to bring human trafficking to an end. Widespread 
corruption, cronyism, and near absent transparency in the government have 
complicated issues. Poorly managed migration and an absence of a sound and 
comprehensive immigration policy in Bangladesh have largely contributed to an 
unabated flow of irregular migrants. The neglect and denial by the government of 
Bangladesh has only aggravated the gravity of this longstanding problem. 
According to the US Department of State (2014), Saudi Arabia failed to fully 
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and to make 
significant efforts to do so. In 2013, Saudi Arabia did not prosecute any trafficking 
offenders. To combat irregular migration, sending, transit and receiving countries 
have to work in coordinated manner. Blaming each other or punishing sending 
countries alone may prove shortsighted and harmful for all. The sponsorship system, 
including the exit visa requirement, continues to restrict the freedom of movement 
of migrant workers; the withholding or confiscating of the travel documents of 
the workers remains widespread because legislation prohibiting the practice is 
not enforced; officials continue to arrest, detain, deport, and sometimes prosecute 
trafficking victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked 
and have been receiving serious criticism from many governments and many human 
rights organisations (US Department of State 2014). There is no denying that both 
sending and receiving parties have downplayed the issues of irregular migration.
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Egyptian Irregular Migration  
in the GCC Countries
Ibrahim Awad & Nourhan Abdel Aziz*
Abstract:  The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region is a major destination 
for Egyptian workers who seek “temporary” employment opportunities and 
higher standards of living. While the vast majority of Egyptian migrant 
workers in the Gulf are regular migrants, a minority stays in the GCC 
countries in  irregular situations. This chapter looks at the causes of irregular 
migration at destination and origin. It briefly discusses the kafala system and 
its consequences, which can bring about irregular migration. It, then, analyses 
the functioning of the Egyptian labour market, especially for the young, 
and examines the operation of the institutional system of labour migration 
in Egypt. It is the assumption of the chapter that the interaction between 
causes at destination and origin generates irregular migration. The chapter, 
then, reviews, to the extent that our sparse data allows, the dimensions of 
Egyptian irregular migration in the second largest external labour market 
for Egyptian workers, Saudi Arabia, as well as in another of its main GCC 
destinations, namely, Kuwait. It is unfortunate that available information is 
scant. In Egypt, information on deported Egyptian migrants is supposed to 
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be accurately documented by the Interior Ministry. However, the data is not 
made available to the public, which makes field work with deported migrants 
difficult. We have employed scarce data published by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
on the numbers of deportees and on some specific cases of deportation. 
Introduction
Migration in an irregular situation, known in short as irregular migration, takes many 
different forms. According to Article 5 of the 1990 International Convention on 
Migrant Workers, migrant workers are considered to be documented or in a regular 
situation “if they are authorized to enter, to stay and to engage in a remunerated 
activity in the State of employment pursuant to the law of that State and to 
international agreements to which that State is a party.”1 When these conditions 
do not apply, they are considered irregular. Access to the territory without official 
authorisation and overstaying the authorised period are among these forms. But 
informal employment, even when access to and stay in the territory are legal, is also 
considered in this category. In other words, using legal access for purposes other 
than those for which entry was authorised is irregular migration.  
The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) do not use the term 
“migrants” to designate foreign nationals staying in their territories and employed in 
their economies. Migration is, thus, not part of the lexicon of GCC countries. Foreign 
workers are designated as “temporary contractual workers.” Immediately, then, there 
is the sense that workers should not expect to reside in any of the GCC countries 
permanently. Once the contracts under which they were brought in have expired, 
temporary contractual workers are expected to leave. Nevertheless, this chapter will 
use the terms “irregular migration” and “migrants in an irregular situation.” It will 
do so for three reasons. First, this volume is about “irregular migration in the Gulf.” 
Second, and more importantly, the chapter considers that the term “migration” does 
not imply any expectation on the parts of migrants as to permanence of stay or 
any other entitlements. If entitlements or rights exist they will be derived from the 
employment of foreign workers and extended stay, not from their designation as 
“migrants.” Third, “migrant” as a concept is only considered from a statistical point 
of view: any person staying in a country other than his/her country of birth for 
twelve months plus one day is a migrant.        
1. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, 1990.
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The overwhelming majority of migrant workers enter the GCC countries 
through airports or,  in a few cases, maritime ports: the only significant exceptions 
here are Yemenis and, more rarely, Jordanians (for Saudi Arabia). Controlled 
airports and ports make it next to impossible to illegally access GCC countries. 
Therefore, irregular migration in the GCC countries takes two forms: overstay and 
informal employment; and employment for purposes other than those for which 
entry was authorised. Causes for irregular migration in the GCC are similar to 
those in other countries but they also have their specifics. First, as everywhere else, 
migration policies of countries of destination are the main cause for the irregular 
situation of migrants. Undoubtedly, migrants would like to migrate regularly. 
However, the restrictive nature of policies or the working and living conditions 
deriving from them may result in matching supply and demand of migrant labour 
both informally and irregularly. In the GCC, restrictiveness cannot be argued given 
the high rates  of migration growth. Between 2010 and 2015, migrants in the GCC 
grew by 32%, from 20.45 million2 to 27 million.3 In contrast, working and living 
conditions and other consequences of the GCC migration policies are causes of 
irregular migration. These policies are epitomised by the kafala system. For reasons 
of poor terms and conditions of employment resulting from the actual functioning 
of the kafala system, migrant workers may abscond, abandoning the jobs for which 
they were contracted. They either informally work for other employers or become 
“loose labour,”4 working on their own account. Migrant workers may also have been 
brought in for fictitious jobs, a result of “visa trading.” These workers may equally 
become “loose labour” in order to recoup their investment in migration. In Saudi 
Arabia, persons accessing the territory of this country for pilgrimage purposes may 
overstay and informally join the labour market. 
Second, the causes of irregular Egyptian migration in the GCC countries 
are also to be found in Egypt itself. Unemployment, low-quality employment and 
informal employment in their own country, especially among the young, push 
Egyptians to seek employment in external labour markets, even if it means working 
in an irregular situation. Thus, the functioning of the Egyptian labour market may be 
considered one cause of irregular migration. The regulatory framework may equally 
have something to do with this situation. In other words, institutions responsible for 
labour migration, whose primary function is to protect Egyptian migrant workers, 
2. Al-Khouri 2012.
3. Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011.
4. Emala saeba ةبياس ةلامع.
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may be unable to effectively carry out their role. Approved employment contracts 
may later turn out to be fake or are changed causing workers to abandon their jobs. 
In situ, representatives of the Egyptian administration, i.e. labour counsellors and 
consulates, are not necessarily able to follow up on employers’ respect for  approved 
employment contracts. This can, also, result in irregular migration.
This chapter will take up the causes of irregular migration at destination 
and origin. It will examine the kafala system and its consequences, a system 
that can generate irregular migration. The chapter will, then, briefly analyse the 
functioning of the Egyptian labour market, especially for the young and examine, 
too, the operation of the institutional system of labour migration in Egypt. It is the 
assumption of the chapter that the interaction between causes at destination and 
at origin both generates irregular migration and explains it. To the extent of our 
available information, the chapter will then review Egyptian irregular migration 
in the second largest external labour market for Egyptian workers, Saudi Arabia, 
as well in another of its main destinations in the GCC, Kuwait. It is unfortunate 
that available information is so scant. In Egypt, deported Egyptian migrants are 
supposedly well known to the Interior Ministry. However, information is not made 
available to the public, which makes field work with deported migrants difficult: 
we lack then a first-hand record of irregular migration in the GCC countries as a 
control on assumptions made in the chapter. Some thin information published by 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on deportee numbers and specifics on some cases of the 
deportation of migrants who were staying in irregular situations will be the basis of 
this chapter.   
Causes of Irregular Migration in the GCC Countries: The Kafala System
The functioning of the kafala system and its consequences may be at the origin 
of irregular migration in the GCC for all migrant workers. The kafala system 
governs the entry, stay and work of foreign nationals in the Gulf countries. It was 
first introduced in the 1930s by the British in Kuwait in response to complaints 
by Kuwaiti merchants about competition from Indian nationals. The British 
authorities decided that no foreign national would be allowed to enter or work in 
Kuwait without a local partner. According to the system which developed and was 
adopted by all countries of the Gulf, a foreign worker cannot enter and work in any 
GCC country without a local kafeel (sponsor). The kafeel can be a public authority, 
a private firm or an individual. 
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Under the system, the worker is tied to the kafeel. He/she cannot change jobs 
or employers without the agreement of the kafeel.5 The kafala system also gives rise 
to an oversupply of labour. The “system” is designed to ensure that visas are only 
issued to migrant workers to meet the specific labour needs of employers. Once the 
employment relationship is terminated, the kafeel is responsible for the repatriation 
of workers. The unemployment of migrant workers, therefore, could not exist if 
the recruitment procedures worked well. The reality is, however, that unscrupulous 
kafeels may obtain visas for more workers than they actually need. Workers are set 
free in the labour market to find jobs in the informal economy as casual labour. If 
they do not find jobs, they become unemployed. There are consequences too. In 
Kuwait, in October 1999, unemployed Egyptian migrant workers rioted over their 
employment situation.6 
Working and living conditions stand equally behind irregular migration. In 
low-skilled jobs, wages vary according to whether workers are employed by large 
or small enterprises, but they are generally low. Low-skilled workers may be made 
to work in arduous conditions for longer hours than envisaged by the law. For low-
skilled workers, living conditions in collective densely-inhabited abodes are often 
trying and unsafe.7 
Policies aimed at restricting the inflow of foreign migrant workers and curbing 
irregular migration has emerged in the last two decades. In the mid-1990s, Saudi 
Arabia formulated the “Saudization” policy, to substitute Saudi citizens for migrant 
workers. The objective was to promote the Saudis’ employment and thus fight 
unemployment, especially among the young.8 In 2014, Saudi Arabia put a ban on 
visa issuance to new companies and to those who employed fewer than ten workers. 
Because small enterprises are large employers of migrant workers, this measure can 
in itself generate irregular migration.
Causes in Egypt of Irregular Migration to the GCC
The working of the Egyptian labour market and of the institutional framework 
of labour migration to the GCC countries may result in irregular migration. 
5. Al Najjar, unpublished.
6. Ibid.
7. Fares 2007.
8. “The Letter of the Law: Regular and Irregular Migration in Saudi Arabia in a Context of 
Rapid Change,” Mixed Migration Research Series: Explaining People on the Move, Regional 
Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2014.
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In the functioning of the labour market, labour supply clearly exceeds demand, 
which results in unemployment and both low-quality employment and informal 
employment. High unemployment and low-quality and informal employment is 
particularly prevalent in the age categories where migrant workers are concentrated. 
Faced with unemployment and informal employment if they return to Egypt, it 
is not surprising that Egyptian workers would join the informal labour market in 
the GCC countries. At least, payments for informal jobs are higher in the GCC 
than in Egypt.9 The actual operation of the institutional framework may either not 
detect fake employment contracts or it may be unable to support Egyptian migrant 
workers in the GCC countries if their contracts are infringed upon or if jobs turn 
out to be fictitious. In both cases, in order to improve returns on their investment in 
migration, workers may abscond, overstay or join the informal economy. 
The Functioning of the Labour Market 
Egypt has been a major country of origin since the early 1970s. Unemployment, 
underemployment, low wage levels and poverty became push factors for Egyptian 
workers. A 2013 labour market analysis using data of the Labour Force Sample 
Survey (LFSS), from 2007 to 2011, reveals just how serious unemployment is in 
Egypt. The official figures for unemployment and poverty published in 2012 and 
2013 confirmed this and showed how the economic slowdown after the popular 
uprising in January 2011 had compounded the problem.10
The information review generated by successive rounds of the LFSS reveals a 
consistently lower rate of growth for employment than for the labour force since 
2008, save for 2009-10. With a backlog in jobseekers, this meant persistently higher 
unemployment rates. The sharp economic downturn that followed the January 2011 
uprising greatly affected the unemployment rate, which increased by 29.7% between 
2010 and 2011. Statistical information published by CAPMAS in 2013 shows that 
the unemployment rate continued to increase, albeit at a slower pace, in 2012 and 
in early 2013. The unemployment rate for men and women reached, respectively, 
13.2% and 25% in the first quarter of 2013. Their higher unemployment rates do not 
mean that women are particularly affected by migration, be that migration regular 
or irregular. One explanation of high female unemployment rates is low mobility 
9. In their chapter in this volume, Shah and Al-Kazi quote an Egyptian worker in Kuwait who 
says that with earnings from his informal employment: “he can send money to feed his family 
as jobs in Egypt are difficult and the salary is low.”
10. This subsection draws on the labour market analysis in Amer and Fargues 2014.
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in the domestic labour market, let alone external ones.11 However, unemployment, 
in general, exerts pressures on the terms and conditions of employment, which is 
a cause for workers to seek and accept employment in external labour markets, 
including in informal jobs.
Unemployment particularly affects those aged 15 to 29 years. The 
unemployment rate is, indeed, negatively correlated with age. It reaches a peak in 
the 20-24 years age group and then gradually decreases. Young people seeking their 
first jobs after completing their studies or dropping out of school are particularly 
vulnerable. A specific characteristic of labour market outcomes in Egypt, shared 
by other countries in the MENA region, is that unemployment particularly affects 
the best educated. This does not imply that the highly-educated are more likely 
than other workers to find themselves in an irregular migration situation. Again, 
unemployment and lower terms and conditions of employment for all workers push 
those at the lower end of the labour market to accept informal jobs.   
The distribution of the unemployed by duration of unemployment reveals that, 
in 2010, the vast majority of those affected were long-term unemployed. With the 
above extended situation of unemployment that is of long duration and especially 
hits the young and the educated, it should not be surprising that a considerable 
number of Egyptians choose to migrate for employment, either legally or irregularly. 
And it is not unemployment alone that pushes Egyptians to migrate. Low-quality 
and informal employment at home also takes its toll. The interplay between low 
quality and informal employment in the Egyptian labour market may explain 
the readiness of Egyptian migrant workers to engage in informal employment in 
external labour markets where, at least, pay is higher.12 To illustrate this, take the 
following estimates of wage differentials between Qatar and Egypt in 2004. In 
Qatar wages, relative to Egypt, stood at 750% in tourism, 569% in tourism, 859% in 
transportation, 927% and 1,484% in construction.13
The findings of a school-to-work transition survey (SWTS) carried out in 
2012 by the International Labour Office (ILO) give a good idea of the quality 
of work available to young Egyptians.14 In 2012, a majority of young employees 
11. Assaad and Arntz 2005.
12. In interviews conducted with Egyptian migrant workers in Kuwait, unfavourable treatment 
and discrimination over low pay and poverty was repeatedly reported; see Taylor, Soudy and 
Martin 2015.
13. El Nozahy 2007,  as quoted in Awad 2007.
14. Barsoum et al., 2014. While in most contexts, a young person is defined as a person aged 
between 15 and 24 years, for the purpose of the SWTS and related reports, the upper age 
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in Egypt (75.7%) had no contract, leaving them vulnerable. The absence of an 
employment contract is a key sign of informality.15 Paid work, without a contract, 
concerned 80.9% of young male workers and 53.5% of young female workers. Only 
9.8% of male workers and 26.8% of female workers had permanent contracts.16 The 
corollary of the absence of contracts is that 91.1%, or almost all young workers in 
Egypt, were classified in informal employment. Informal employment is made up of 
two subdivisions: workers in the informal (unregistered) sector and paid employees 
holding informal jobs in the formal sector. 
Wages are obviously a good indicator of job quality. One quarter of young 
wage and salaried workers reported a below-average monthly wage. About one-
half of young employees were within the EGP500–999 per month pay range.17 
Professionals made up the highest percentage of young workers in the highest wage 
bracket of EGP3,000 and above (2.6%).18 Conversely, agricultural workers, clerks 
and the young in elementary occupations were those most likely to be in the lowest 
wage range (less than EGP300 per month).19 With such low wage levels it should 
come as no surprise that young Egyptian workers engage in informal employment 
in the Gulf. When it is remembered that agricultural workers get low wages and 
that most Egyptian migrant workers are from rural areas, the causes of informal 
employment and irregular migration become clear.
A further indicator of employment quality is job satisfaction, the opposite 
of which is the desire to change jobs, presumably to find better ones. The SWTS 
brought out how one-half (50.1%) of young workers indicated they would like to 
change their current jobs. As many as 50.1% of young working males expressed 
willingness to migrate for employment purposes with 15.8% stating they would 
move to another country.  The attraction – whether push or pull – towards migration 
seems to have existed only among young males. Only 2.8% of young female workers 
indicated they would consider moving abroad.20 This latter finding confirms the 
overwhelmingly male character of international Egyptian migration.
limit was extended to 29 years of age. 
15. Awad 2007.
16. Barsoum et al., p.23.
17. Roughly equivalent to $70 to 140.
18. Equivalent to some $420.
19. Barsoum et al., p.26, equivalent to some $42. 
20. Barsoum et al., p.28.
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The Operation of the Institutional Framework of Labour Migration in Egypt21 
At the Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MOMM), the General Department 
of External Employment and Representation (GEDEER) has mandate over 
external employment. It encompasses two departments: External Representation 
(DER) and External Employment (DEE). Together, these two departments 
exercise the protection functions of Egyptian labour migration. Irregular migration 
has been partially caused by their failure to carry out their functions effectively. The 
two departments do not recruit most workers. However, DEE has the function of 
checking the contracts of all workers, including those recruited through their own 
efforts. As previously indicated, failures include: the inability to detect unfavourable 
terms and conditions of employment, fake contracts, unscrupulous kafeels and failing 
recruitment agencies. The functions of these two departments are reviewed below. 
The Department of External Employment
In GEDEER, the Department of External Employment performs several functions:
1. Licensing and renewal of licenses of Recruitment Agencies for external 
employment;
2. Approving contracts for foreign employment whether they are directly 
submitted by individual workers or by recruitment agencies;
3. Matching supply and external demand for Egyptian labour: workers who 
register at the Central Department for Information are included in the 
database for external employment. When DEE receives direct demands 
for Egyptian labour from external employers or from labour counsellors 
posted in countries of destination, it tries to match them with workers in 
the database. 
4. Matching supply and Saudi seasonal demand for labour during the Haj 
season, the time of the yearly Islamic pilgrimage to Makkah.22 Workers 
know that the Haj season is one of high demand for labour; they gather 
at the Ministry in expectation of being called for interviews with Saudi 
21. The section on the operation of the institutional framework draws on Center for Migration 
and Refugee Studies (CMRS), “Labour Migration Governance in Egypt and Tunisia: The 
Case of Egypt,” Cairo, 2014 (FIERI/CMRS project on labour migration governance in 
Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring).
22. The annual Islamic pilgrimage brings millions of Muslims to Makkah. To carry out services 
for pilgrims, there is substantial seasonal demand for labour. Egyptian workers contribute to 
meeting this demand. 
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employers and their representatives. The procedures are the same as with 
recruitment in normal times;
5. Examining complaints submitted by migrant workers after their return to 
Egypt and finding solutions for them.      
External Representation for the Support of Egyptian Migrant Workers
The objective of external labour representation is to support Egyptian migrant 
workers in their countries of employment. For this purpose, Egypt deploys fourteen 
labour counsellors, including in each GCC country except Bahrain. Two counsellors 
are posted in Saudi Arabia, one in Jeddah and another in Riyadh. Labour counsellors 
report to the DER. 
Both offices in Saudi Arabia are staffed, in addition to the labour counsellors, 
with an attaché and a local secretary. Over one million Egyptian migrant workers 
in Saudi Arabia are serviced by four professionals. MOMM officials recognise that 
these professionals are far from being enough. The need to open a new office in 
northern  Saudi Arabia could not be met  presumably because of the unavailability of 
funds. There is only one labour counsellor in Kuwait for 500,000 Egyptian migrants 
there.  In the countries where they are posted, labour counsellors maintain relations 
with Ministries of Labour, especially their units responsible for migrant workers. In 
cases of disputes between Egyptian workers and their employers, counsellors try to 
settle disputes. Their attempts are not always successful: employers, particularly, but 
also, at times, workers can be rigid. The labour counsellors deal with Ministries of 
Interior for residence permits as well as for migrant workers in an irregular situation.
The performance of labour counsellors depends on their personal initiative. 
Some may set up simple computerised information systems where the characteristics 
of Egyptian workers and problems they encounter are entered. However, these 
systems, when they exist, are not designed in the light of policy needs. Their 
sustainability is not ensured. More importantly, they neither form a network nor 
are linked to MOMM headquarters in a manner that would allow them to deal 
with the problems of Egyptian migrant workers.
The relations of labour counsellors with government ministries in countries 
of destination centres on the problems of migrant workers. They are, essentially, 
about the terms and conditions of employment, resident permits and irregular 
migration. The terms and conditions of employment and residence permits, as 
such, are closely related to irregular migration. If they are fair, they prevent it; if 
they are not, they may trigger it. Egyptian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar have had experiences that support this assumption. Issues revolve around the 
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kafala system. They include changing the terms of the contracts upon arrival in the 
country of destination, discovering that no real jobs exist and the inability to change 
employers. Egyptian officials have reported that such issues were rare when demand 
for jobs was directly intermediated by the Ministry. They were more frequent when 
intermediation was made by private recruitment agencies and especially by informal 
recruiters.
In Saudi Arabia, when Egyptian workers find employment with more 
favourable conditions than the jobs which they were initially recruited for, original 
kafeels often refuse the transfer of their sponsorships to the new employers/kafeels. 
Other complaints include withholding final payment and a refusal to end the 
employment relationship, which is necessary for authorisation to leave the country. 
This is considered to be, at times, tactics on the part of the kafeel to bargain over 
the final payment.  It was reported that loopholes in the kafala system allow some 
fraudulent kafeels to bring in workers for whom there are no real jobs. These kafeels 
make profits out of permits for fake jobs, and they set recruited workers loose in 
the informal Saudi labour market. A number of pilgrims and especially workers 
recruited at the time of pilgrimage can stay behind and also join the informal 
economy. Likewise, regularly-recruited workers at times abscond. They abandon 
the jobs for which they were recruited and join the informal labour market, thus 
becoming migrants in an irregular situation. When they are arrested, runaway 
workers are imprisoned. They are released only with the agreement of their original 
sponsors. These workers obviously need legal assistance. Organs for the settlement 
of labour disputes are reported to be generally fair, helpful and intent on solutions. 
However, they can resort at times to procrastination in order to weaken the position 
of workers and to force them to forgo some of their entitlements. Mutatis mutandis, 
problems in the Saudi labour market also apply in other GCC countries. A notable 
difference is pilgrimage, which allows relatively easy seasonal access to Saudi Arabia, 
and the much larger volume of the Saudi labour market. 
In Qatar, the kafala system is unsurprisingly also reported to be the cause of 
problems faced by Egyptian workers. Kafeels at times surrender workers’ passports 
they have retained to the authorities pretending they had run away in order to avoid 
payments or to bargain over how much they will pay. Contract changes or changes 
in employment conditions and disputes over wages are reported to be common. 
The financial resources that the labour counsellor sometimes has to solve migrant 
problems are limited. The labour counsellor may have to turn to wealthy members 
of the Egyptian community to mobilise resources for such workers. 
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Another example of ineffectiveness in the protective institutional framework 
is the actual implementation of a ban on external employment in 24 occupations, 
pursuant to a Ministerial decree. The ban is a means to protect workers from 
abuse. Most of these occupations are carried out by women: e.g., house managers 
and private nurses. Consequent on the failure for employment contracts, which 
are necessary to obtaining the external employment permits from the Ministry 
of Interior, female workers who suffer from unemployment or low income may 
be tempted to travel to a country for which they do not need visas, from there 
flying to their final destinations. Workers risk abuse in their determination to earn. 
Here again, the Egyptian labour market outcomes combine with the ineffective 
protective institutional framework to produce migrant worker vulnerability. 
Expressions of Egyptian Irregular Migration in the GCC Countries
As indicated previously, irregular migration in the GCC countries is a result of the 
interplay between causes at both destination and origin. Very little to no information 
that is useful for analysis is accessible in destination countries or, for that matter, 
in Egypt. The scant information available about deportations will be used here to 
review some expressions of Egyptian irregular migration in the GCC countries.  
In one estimate, in 2013, there were approximately 6.5 million Egyptian 
migrant workers abroad, 75% of whom  were in Arab countries, including member 
states of the GCC.23 The reported estimates for the GCC were as follows: 1,300,000 
in Saudi Arabia; 450,000 in Kuwait; 260,000 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE); 
88,500 in Qatar; 45,000 in Oman; and 12,000 in Bahrain. Migrants in Saudi Arabia 
account for about 20% of all Egyptian migration, while those in Kuwait represent 
around 7.4%.24 
While most Egyptian migrant workers in the GCC are regular migrants, 
the existence of irregular migration has been clearly exposed by the increasingly 
systematic crackdown on migrants in an irregular situation, especially in Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. The first two are the largest host countries of Egyptian 
migrant workers in the sub-region. Even though the number of Egyptian migrants 
in an irregular situation are unknown, reported cases of migrant deportation for 
those in an irregular situation from the GCC back to Egypt provides an insight 
into the scale, forms, and patterns of Egyptian irregular migration in the GCC 
countries. 
23. Zohry, Migration for Development, 2009.
24. “Migration Profile: Egypt” 2013.
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In March 2013, Saudi Arabia adopted a new immigration policy that included 
targeting migrants in an irregular situation.25 This involved a heavy crackdown on 
businesses who hire migrants in irregular situation and on the migrants themselves. 
The Saudi authorities estimated that around one to two million migrants were 
working illegally. Hundreds of thousands of migrants in an irregular situation were 
deported or compelled to leave.  According to the new labour restrictions, foreign 
workers are only allowed to work for their kafeels. They are not authorised to work 
independently or to work for another employer. The Saudi authority gave its entire 
foreign irregular migrant workforce an amnesty period to legalise their stay and to 
conform to the new rules. 
In May 2013, two months after the enactment of the new law, the deportation 
of six Egyptians following a disagreement with their kafeels over monthly salaries 
and the recovering of their passports stirred fears of repatriation in the Egyptian 
migrant community. More than 6,000 Egyptian migrant workers, who considered 
themselves in situations similar to those of the deportees, stormed the consulate 
in Jeddah. They were seeking the consulate’s support in finding solutions for their 
status under the new rules.26 
At the expiry of the amnesty in November 2013, Egyptian migrant workers 
were among the major nationalities affected by the large-scale systematic raids 
at labour sites by the Saudi Ministry of Labour and police operations.27 Around 
300,000 Egyptians were returned to Egypt at the expiry of the amnesty period in 
November 2013: this number corresponded to 23% of the total Egyptian workforce 
in Saudi Arabia. As a result, towards the end of 2013 the number of Egyptian migrant 
workers in Saudi Arabia dropped from 1,300,000 to under a million.28 According 
to the Saudi Labour Department report for 2014, the number of Egyptian migrant 
workers was estimated at 968,000 at the end of 2013. They represented around 
40% of Arab migrants in Saudi Arabia.29 It is more than probable that after the 
300,000 repatriations, a number of Egyptian migrants in an irregular situation are 
still present in Saudi Arabia.30 
25. Ahram Online, May 27, 2013.
26. Ibid. 
27. De Bel-Air 2014.
28. The Cairo Post, May 31, 2015.
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
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In 2014 and 2015, Egyptian migrants continued to be deported for breaching 
residence laws: i.e., for irregular migration. According to the Saudi Passport 
Department, migrants overstaying their residence permits were detained for two 
weeks before deportation, when their kafeels refused to renew their residence 
permits.31 
Kuwait, the home of the second largest Egyptian community in the Gulf, has 
also adopted stricter immigration measures with a view to reducing the volume 
of its foreign workforce. Migrants in Kuwait currently make up around 69% of 
the population. The Egyptian community is the second largest in Kuwait after the 
Indian. In Kuwait, Egyptians are to be found both in highly-skilled occupations, 
such as managers, physicians and engineers as well as in low-skilled jobs: they are 
labourers, waiters, guards and drivers. Of course, the low-skilled are more exposed 
to irregular migration but the highly-skilled can also suffer. Irregularity typically 
takes the form of overstaying, but for both the low- and highly-skilled there is the 
practice of buying stay permits (iqama), or visa trading.32
According to the local media, the Interior Ministry Assistant Undersecretary 
for National and Passport Affairs justified, in 2015, the deportations by explicitly 
referring to irregular migrant workers who violate or overstay the terms of their 
visas. According to his estimates, around 7,000 Egyptian migrants in an irregular 
situation were going to be affected by Kuwait’s crackdown on migrants in an 
irregular situation.33 
Irregular migration, including that of Egyptians, is persistent in Kuwait. In 
2011,official estimates had put the number of Egyptian law violators at 24,433 
as of February of that year, equivalent to around 5% of the Egyptian migrant 
community. From among the violators, 2,664 (10.9%) individuals regularised their 
status, 9,585 (39.2%) departed, while 12,184 (49.9%) remained in Kuwait in an 
irregular situation.34 
Conclusion
Research on irregular migration is arduous, especially when the data on volumes 
and characteristics is so hard to come by. It is particularly so when destination 
and origin countries of migration guard data as confidential. This is the case with 
irregular Egyptian migration in the GCC countries. 
31. Ibid. 
32. See chapter by Shah and Al-Kazi and Taylor, Soudy and Martin, op.cit.
33. Ibid. 
34. Shah 2014.
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As with all irregular migration, its causes exist at both ends of the migration 
process. In the case at hand, the specific employment and immigration policies of 
the GCC countries, known as the kafala system, can generate living and working 
conditions that cause irregular migration through overstay or absconding. The 
temporary character of migration and the difficulties of changing employers under 
the system all compound this situation. At other times, the kafala system causes 
foreign labour in excess of supply, which also results in irregular migration, the 
workers brought in working in jobs other than those they were recruited for. 
Labour market outcomes in Egypt, in terms of unemployment and employment 
quality, especially for the young, are obvious causes of irregular migration whether 
to GCC countries or to other destinations. That these causes interact with the 
policies of the GCC countries to produce irregular migration is natural. These are 
the dynamics of irregular migration everywhere. Egyptian irregular migration in 
the GCC countries stands out for its large flows and stocks. The consequence is that 
Egyptian irregular migration is also quite large, at least according to the little good 
data we have. The reported repatriation of 300,000 Egyptians from Saudi Arabia, 
between 2013 and 2015, means that it affected almost one quarter of all Egyptian 
migrants in the largest of the GCC countries. This is a very high proportion that 
reveals significant loopholes in the Saudi governance of migration. The new Saudi 
policy announced in 2013 must have wanted to close these loopholes as an objective.
The repatriation of 300,000 Egyptians, over two years, compounds the 
challenges of employment creation for Egypt. The repatriated represent an addition 
of some 20% new entrants to the labour market over two years, for whom there 
was already too little employment. The solutions are clear: demand must be created 
for labour in Egypt; and the Egyptian government needs to upgrade migration 
protection policy measures. 
This needs to be done through the better application of these measures. 
Effective protection both at recruitment and in the countries of employment aimed 
at ensuring fair and favourable working and living terms and conditions should 
obviate reasons for absconding or overstaying. This requires sophisticated and better 
financed labour migration policy and institutions.          
Irregular migration exposes workers to exploitation and deprives them of many 
forms of protection. For countries of both destination and origin, this means the 
failure of  their migration and labour market policies. Responsibility for these failures 
lies primarily with these countries, not with those migrants who find themselves in 
an irregular situation. Coordination of policy measures at destination and origin 
should contribute to improving their design and to increasing their effectiveness. 
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Irregular Migration from  
Ethiopia to the Gulf States
Bina Fernandez*
Abstract: Migrants from Ethiopia to the Gulf States become irregular in five 
ways: entry through unauthorised border crossings, “overstayers” on temporary 
or tourist visas, entry through “free visas,” through irregular employment, and 
at birth, when children are born to irregular migrants. This chapter seeks to 
critically examine recent policy developments that have impacted irregular 
migration from Ethiopia to the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia. In 
October 2013, the Ethiopian government instituted a “temporary” ban on all 
migration to the Middle East, a ban that continues to date. This was widely 
considered a pre-emptive response to the imminent expulsion of over 163,000 
undocumented Ethiopian migrants from Saudi Arabia in November 2013, 
after the expiry of an amnesty for undocumented labour migrants to correct 
their status. While the Ethiopian government ban and the Saudi crackdown 
had the effect of temporarily stemming the flow of irregular migrants across 
the Horn of African to Yemen during the early months of 2014, by the end 
of the year, there was a 40% increase in the number of irregular migrants 
reaching Yemen by boat, with the probable intention of moving on to Saudi 
Arabia to seek work. Around 80% (72,000) of these migrants are Ethiopian, 
and a significant number of them are circular migrants, including those 
XIII
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who are returning after being deported. This chapter argues that the trends 
observed here are similar to patterns observed in other parts of the world; 
Ethiopian and Saudi Arabian policies intended to curb irregular migration 
have clearly had converse effects, and this is at the cost of migrants’ journeys 
becoming more dangerous and expensive. The chapter calls for a new politics 
of migration that protects rather than illegalises and endangers the lives of 
migrants.
Introduction
Within the Gulf region, the phenomenon of migrant “illegality,” “irregular” or 
“undocumented” status has recently attracted academic and policy attention (Shah 
2009, 2014; RMMS 2014b) in line with increasing attention to the phenomenon 
at other global “fault lines,” particularly in the US, the EU, and Australia (Cameron 
2013, Fekete 2003, Guerette and Clarke 2005, Cornelius 2005, Monzini 2007). 
The heightened visibility of the phenomenon is a by-product of, on the one hand, 
increasing cross-border mobilities in the “age of migration” (Castles and Miller 1998) 
and on the other, the tightening of border controls particularly for “undesirable” 
migrants in the Global North. “Irregularity” is produced by bordering practices 
of states, and unauthorised border crossings have become deeply politicised. As 
Anderson and Ruhs observe, “The contested nature of the adjectives attached to 
migrants ... undocumented, irregular, clandestine, non-compliant, unauthorized, 
trafficked, sans papières, etc. – is an indication of the intensely politicised nature of 
claims to knowledge and analysis” (Anderson and Ruhs 2009: 175). In this chapter, 
I follow the use of “irregular” as the “least worst” of terms that are problematic in 
different ways (for extended discussions, see Schrover et al. 2008 and Koser 2010). 
The construction of irregular migrants as a “problem” that needs to be “managed” 
emerged in the twentieth century as a feature of the nation-state based organisation 
of citizenship, in contrast to city based, or even empire based models of citizenship 
(Schrover et al. 2008, Mongia 2003, Torpey 2001). The primary state objectives 
for the “management” of irregular migration are control of the domestic labour 
market and welfare, and control over national security (particularly in the post 9/11 
global anti-terrorist environment of increased surveillance). Framed through these 
objectives, borders are not just “lines crossed in the sand,” but inscribed through 
processes of documentation and surveillance. State border control is visible not only 
at the physical border crossing, but also in access to the labour market, services, 
and mobility within the state. A secondary stated objective of “managing” irregular 
migration is to prosecute traffickers and smugglers, and protect their victims. 
Gulf Research Centre Cambridge            245
Bina Fernandez: Irregular Migration from Ethiopia to the Gulf States
Following de Genova (2002), this chapter is situated within a perspective 
that is critical of such stated aims of the law and seeks to denaturalise their 
nationalist assumptions. De Genova proposes the socio-historical analysis of the 
law as instrumental in the production of migrant “illegality.” Viewed through this 
perspective, we observe that while state laws controlling the entry of “undesirable” 
non-citizens to their territories may not achieve their stated objective of reducing 
the numbers of irregular migrants, they do achieve other desired consequences. 
One such useful and profitable consequence that has long been well-documented 
particularly in the context of Mexican irregular migration to the US is the creation of 
a legally vulnerable and therefore cheap and exploitable pool of labour (Bustamente 
1972, Portes 1978, Sassen 1988). Moreover, state prerogatives and capacities 
to control the entry of non-citizens to their territories are increasingly a mode 
of signalling state authority, indeed their very “stateness.” However, these stated 
and unstated consequences of border controls are achieved at the cost of irregular 
migrants: increasingly restrictive border policies and practices around the globe 
have led to the increasing stigmatisation and criminalisation of irregular migrants 
(Lee 2005, Gerard and Pickering 2012), which has resulted in their exposure to 
greater costs, risks, and higher fatalities as they attempt ever more perilous border 
crossings (Carling 2007, Weber and Pickering 2011). 
This chapter discusses the irregular migration of Ethiopians to the Gulf, 
with a specific focus on Saudi Arabia. It argues that the trends observed along this 
migration trajectory are similar to patterns observed at other global flashpoints of 
irregular migration, such as between the US and Mexico, on the maritime borders 
of the EU in the Mediterranean, and on the maritime borders of Australia. The 
Ethiopian and Saudi Arabian policies intended to curb irregular migration have 
had converse effects, and this is at the cost of migrants’ journeys becoming more 
dangerous and expensive. The chapter calls for a new politics of the border that 
protects rather than endangers the lives of the people crossing borders. The chapter 
draws on empirical research I have been conducting since 2009 on Ethiopian migrant 
domestic workers to the Middle East. The research methods included qualitative, 
semi-structured interviews with migrants, government and NGO representatives, 
brokers and agents in Ethiopia, in Kuwait, and in Lebanon. Cumulatively, I have 
conducted over 100 interviews in different phases of this ongoing research. Irregular 
migration was a topic of the interviews, as a large number of initially regular 
Ethiopian migrants experience some form of irregularity at later stages of their 
migration trajectory; I draw on some of these accounts in this chapter. I also draw 
considerably on secondary reports monitoring Ethiopian migration conducted by 
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international organisations such as the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) and the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS).1 
The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section outlines the primary modes 
of irregularity that are observable in the trajectory of Ethiopian migration. In the 
third section, I assess the calculus of risk, i.e., the balance of factors that influence 
Ethiopian migrants’ decisions to become irregular migrants. Specifically, I examine 
the drivers of Ethiopian irregular migration to the Gulf using Cvajner and Sciortino’s 
(2009) typology of irregular migration. The next two factors discussed within the 
calculus of risk are the dangers and the risks of deportation irregular migrants face. 
The fourth section examines the Ethiopian and Saudi Arabian governments’ stated 
policies of “managing” migration and the unstated consequences of these policies. 
This is followed by the conclusion.
Modes of Ethiopian Irregular Migration to the Gulf
Since the late1990s, there has been a rising stream of migration from Ethiopia 
to the Gulf countries. The majority of regular labour migrants from Ethiopia are 
women employed as domestic workers. The primary destinations in the first decade 
of the 21st century were Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, although there was a steady 
stream of migrants that made their way to other Gulf countries, particularly the 
UAE. Since 2011, an agreement between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia resulted in 
a steep increase in the number of legal migrants to Saudi Arabia. In part, this 
increased demand from Saudi Arabia was a consequence of the ban on migration to 
Saudi Arabia imposed by the Philippines and Indonesian governments, following 
cases of abuse of workers from these countries. Thus, according to the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA), the number of Ethiopian migrant 
workers that legally migrated to Saudi Arabia increased dramatically from 3,478 
between July 2009 and July 2010 to over 100,000 in 2011, and in 2012 again to 
over 160,000 (RMMS 2014a). MoLSA further estimates that the regular labour 
migrants represent only 30%-40% of all Ethiopians in the Gulf, suggesting that the 
remaining 60%-70% (300,000-350,000) of Ethiopians in the Gulf countries have 
irregular status (ibid).
1. The RMMS is a consortium of organisations operating in North Africa, including the Inter-
national Organisation of Migration (IOM), United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR), International Labour Organisation (ILO), Danish Refugee Council, and 
others. Since 2011, RMMS has been monitoring the movements of peoples in the region - of 
refugees, asylum seekers, and economic migrants.
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Irregular status can occur in a number of ways, and does not necessarily imply 
irregular entry. First, many Muslim Ethiopians travel to Saudi Arabia on Haj or 
Umrah pilgrimage visas. They enter legally, but overstay their visas and become 
irregular. Habiba, for instance, recounts that this was how she travelled to Saudi 
Arabia to join her sister, uncle and cousins who were already working there:
When you go out from here [Ethiopia] you will get a [Umrah] visa for one 
month and when you finish that month you can pay and add another month. 
I went there and I saw Makkah and Medina. Then I came to Jeddah, where I 
have a sister. Then all you have to do is not show your passport, and hide from 
the police... We went for Umrah and stayed illegally. My uncle is there legally 
but all the others who went with me are illegal (Interview, Addis Ababa, 
2010).
Habiba was from the Wollo region of Ethiopia, and not from a poor family – 
her family owned two shops. Her reason for leaving at the age of 18 was that her 
family was pressuring her to get married. She worked in Jeddah for three years and 
said that her employment conditions were satisfactory. According to her, abuse and 
exploitation occurred “when you go on a [contract work] visa; but I could change 
my job any time I wanted and move. So they treated me well.” When she wanted 
to return to Ethiopia, she used the strategy that many irregular workers in Saudi 
Arabia use of giving herself up to the police. She spent 10 days in a detention centre 
and was deported back to Ethiopia. I interviewed her five years after her return, 
when she was processing a regular work contract for Kuwait, through a Private 
Employment Agency (PEA).
The second mode through which irregular status occurs is when migrants 
enter on legal work contracts, but become irregular if they exit their employment 
contract either to escape abuse or to seek better opportunities. Some women who 
exit their contracts regularise their status by getting their next employers to arrange 
for a transfer of sponsorship. Many, however, remain irregular, living and working 
as freelancers either as domestic workers, or taking up jobs in the service sector 
(hotels, restaurants, beauty parlours and shops). Although accurate figures for the 
numbers of migrant domestic workers who exit their contracts and remain irregular 
are difficult to ascertain, informal estimates suggest that 25%-30% of women exit 
their employment contracts for varied reasons and thus become irregular.
The third category of irregular workers is of those who enter on what is 
colloquially known as a “free visa.” This is the term that covers the ubiquitous 
practice of “visa trading” in the Gulf countries, where migrant workers pay rent 
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to a kafeel (sponsor) for sponsorship papers, but are “free” to work for any other 
employer. Technically, this is an irregularity, and if the migrant worker is caught, 
they can be deported. Although there are no reliable figures, my research suggests 
a large number of Ethiopians working in the Gulf do so on “free visas” which is 
corroborated by quantitative research in Qatar that also shows a high density of 
Ethiopians on “free visas” (Pessoa, Harkness and Gardner 2014). Ayesha, a young 
Muslim woman I interviewed in Addis Ababa went to Saudi Arabia first on a 
“free visa” that was organised for her by her husband and his relatives who were 
already living and working there. Ayesha worked freelance in a part-time job as 
domestic worker for three years, but was finally deported because the irregularity in 
her documents was discovered: “My husband had tried to cover for his friend’s wife. 
My husband’s and my papers were together, but when they checked they found 
out it was not me so they deported us” (Interview, Addis Ababa, 2010). Given the 
widespread practice of visa trading, “free visas” have not (until recently) been subject 
to high levels of monitoring, and this case of deportation was primarily because the 
documents were being used not just for one but for two women rather than because 
it was a “free visa.” At the time of interview in Addis Ababa in 2010, Ayesha had 
obtained a regular work contract and was ready to return to Saudi Arabia; it was 
unlikely that she intended to stay in this contract, rather the aim was to rejoin her 
husband who had already returned there through the overland, irregular route via 
Yemen. 
A fourth mode of irregularity occurs when children are born to irregular and 
regular domestic workers. Pregnancy is prohibited under the regular domestic 
worker contract, and if a woman becomes pregnant, her employer may terminate her 
contract. Thus, even regular domestic workers who become pregnant (voluntarily, or 
as a consequence of rape) often choose to become irregular to avoid deportation. The 
children born under such conditions are without documentation of nationality and 
therefore often cannot access formal medical services or education. I have discussed 
elsewhere in greater detail the predicament of the women who find themselves 
with children, unable to leave the country, yet constrained in their ability to take on 
regular employment (Fernandez 2014).
The sea and land route via Yemen is the fifth mode of irregularity through 
physical border crossing. Irregular migrants from Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa 
who make border crossings follow the pattern of step-wise migration observed 
among migrants in other parts of Africa (Schapendonk and Moppes 2007; Cross 
2009), travelling in stages over land from Ethiopia to the coast of Djibouti or 
Somalia, then crossing the sea to Yemen. From Yemen, many attempt to cross the 
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land border with Saudi Arabia or travel to other Gulf States. 
While here too, estimates of the numbers of irregular migrants entering Saudi 
Arabia through these routes lack accuracy, three clear trends are discernible: the 
numbers of migrants from the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia) are 
increasing; Ethiopians constitute the majority of these flows; and third, men are 
more likely to embark on this trajectory. In 2012, 107,532 crossed the Arabian and 
Red Sea to Yemen, of whom 78% were Ethiopians. Cumulatively, between 2006 
and January 2014, over 500,000 migrants from the Horn of Africa have made the 
crossing, and the number of Ethiopians who arrived in Yemen in this period was at 
least 334,000 (RMMS 2014b:34). According to UNHCR figures, the number of 
migrants irregularly arriving in Yemen from the Horn of Africa in 2014 stood at 
82,000, as against 65,000 in 2013. 
Estimates of the number of arrivals and Ethiopian arrivals in Yemen are 
illustrated in Figure 13.1. The majority of these arrivals do not intend to stay in 
Yemen, but aim to cross the land border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, or to 
travel to other Gulf countries, where wages are higher. Yet, as de Regt (2008) shows, 
Ethiopian migrants may stay on and seek work in Yemen too and may find multiple 
creative modes of manoeuvring around their irregular status. 
The Calculus of Risk: Drivers, Dangers, and Deportation
Migrants’ entry into irregular status is almost always an exercise of agency, one 
that makes a considered calculus of risk. Weighing in the calculus are three sets of 
factors: the drivers specifically of irregular migration, the dangers of undertaking 
irregular status, and the ever present possibility of deportation. Overall, given the 
high numbers of Ethiopians that are irregular migrants, for the majority, it would 
seem that the drivers would appear to outweigh the dangers and the threat of 
deportation, both en route and at the destination. I outline the multiple influences 
within each of these three sets of factors. 
The general drivers of irregular migration are similar to those of regular 
migration: people migrate to improve their lives and the lives of their families. As I 
have discussed elsewhere, the majority of young unmarried Ethiopian women who 
migrate as domestic workers are imbued with a very strong sense of responsibility for 
the economic welfare of their natal families which propels them to seek opportunities 
outside Ethiopia (Fernandez 2011). Families too put pressure on their children to 
migrate, given the ecological and demographic pressures on the land and the lack 
of local employment opportunities (Bezu and Holden 2014; Jones et al. 2014). 
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The visible migration success of friends, neighbours, and peers is another strong 
driver of migration. Other reasons for migration are varied: some seek to rejoin 
families (as in the case of Ayesha mentioned earlier), while a few may be political 
dissidents who seek to escape government surveillance. Overall, these drivers have 
produced and re-inforced a “culture of migration” where “migration is associated 
with personal, social and material success, and where migrating has become the 
norm rather than the exception. In this vein staying at home is associated with 
failure” (RMMS 2014: 21; quoting de Haas 2006: 5-6). 
More specifically, the drivers of irregular migration systems can be usefully 
analysed using the typology of three trajectories identified by Cvajner and Ciortino 
(2009): atomistic, volume-based, and structural migration careers. They view these 
three systems as emerging along a (often overlapping) developmental continuum 
as migration trajectories consolidate. Atomistic careers are individual trajectories 
that are catalysed by unique combinations of contingent factors and are often 
descriptive of the experiences of migrant pioneers. More relevant for the analysis 
of Ethiopian irregular migration to Saudi Arabia are the two models of “volume-
based” and “structural” migration described by Cvajner and Ciortino (2009). In the 
volume-based model, large-scale flows of irregular migration develop within a short 
period in response to three pre-conditions, all observable in the trajectory of the 
Ethiopian irregular migrant to Saudi Arabia. The first pre-condition is the existence 
of a large pool of potential migrants in the sending country. This pre-condition 
is met in Ethiopia which is the second most populous country in sub-Saharan 
Africa (estimated population of almost 93 million in 2013), with high levels of 
youth unemployment. Youth unemployment is estimated at 40% for the 15-24 age 
bracket and 22% for those above 25 (IOM figures based on the 1999 and 2005 
Labour Force Surveys and the 1994 and 2007 Censuses). As discussed previously, 
this lack of employment opportunities increasingly pushes the youth to migrate 
(Bezu and Holden 2014; Piper et.al 2014).
The second pre-condition is the opening of employment opportunities in 
the receiving country. This is evident in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, 
where there is a strong structural demand for the kinds of low-skilled labour that 
Ethiopian men and women undertake. This demand allows for the rapid absorption 
of newly arrived irregular migrants into employment within weeks or often even 
days. 
The third pre-condition for Ethiopian volume-based irregular migration is the 
relatively greater difficulty of access to other potential destinations. Other migration 
destinations for Ethiopians are the US, Europe, and South Africa. However, each 
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of these destinations is fraught with greater barriers to entry, higher costs, and/or 
longer, more difficult journeys. In comparison, Saudi Arabia and other destinations 
in the Gulf are more accessible through overstaying short stay visas, but also through 
clandestine border crossing. 
The Ethiopian irregular migration trajectory also shows characteristics of 
the “structured migration career” described by Cvajner and Sciortino (2009). They 
differentiate the structured career from volume-based systems on three criteria: a 
well-established migration infrastructure, the existence of relatively strong social 
network ties, and linkages with legal flows of migrants. All three criteria are also 
observable in the trajectories of Ethiopian irregular migrants to Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf countries. The migration system of the kafala and its attendant system 
of “free visas” are a well-developed infrastructure of migration that regulate the 
entry, residence, and exit of both regular and irregular migrants. Social networks are 
essential to obtain these “free visas.” Anecdotal qualitative evidence from my research 
as well as quantitative research in Qatar (Pessoa, Harkness and Gardner 2014) 
indicates a high density of Ethiopians who obtain such “free visas,” suggesting that 
these are facilitated through the existing strong social ties and networks. The regular 
and irregular migration systems between Ethiopia and the countries are strongly 
inter-connected through the “legal” and “illegal” operations of intermediaries and 
social networks at both the origin and destination points (Fernandez 2013; see also 
Hertog 2010).
Another specific set of drivers influence the decision to undertake irregular 
migrant status, depending on the mode of irregularity. Ethiopians who entered 
Saudi Arabia with the required documentation but subsequently became irregular 
(either through lapsed visa status, or through exiting their work contracts) and those 
who entered through “free visas” often do so because they have better opportunities 
to earn higher incomes working in the informal economy. For instance, “freelance” 
domestic workers can work in multiple households or even informally in the service 
sector and earn between 2-3 times what they earn as contract domestic workers. 
This higher income is, of course, partially offset by the living costs they incur. An 
additional attraction is the greater personal freedom and mobility they attain. 
Unlike contract workers (both male and female) under the kafala in Saudi Arabia, 
the irregular migrant worker is not bound to a single employer and can change jobs. 
Particularly for women who were formerly contract domestic workers, it means basic 
freedom to move outside the four walls of their employer’s house, which they would 
have been prevented from doing previously. Paradoxically however, this relative 
freedom of mobility is offset by the increased vulnerability to exploitation (Pessoa, 
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Harkness and Gardner 2014) as well as by the condition described by Mahdavi of 
being an “immobilised migrant” (Mahdavi 2014): a condition of insecurity and fear 
of being reported, arrested, and deported.
 In addition to the factors outlined, the drivers for irregular migrants who 
make the journey over land and sea are first, people who embark on the irregular 
route often do so because of the widespread belief that the brokers who facilitated 
irregular travel were cheaper and quicker. However, an RMMS survey found that 
both the cost and time taken to travel via the irregular route was often much 
higher than prospective migrants expected (RMMS 2014a). Survey responses of 
returnee migrants indicated that it took between two weeks to two months to reach 
their destination countries. The cost of travel can also be higher than anticipated, 
particularly for those who are new, or those who do not have pre-established 
contacts with brokers along the routes.
Finally, a gendered driver of irregular migration is that the opportunities for 
regular migration are very limited for men; consequently, the majority of irregular 
Ethiopian migrants to Saudi Arabia are men. Although the majority of women 
migrate through regular channels or through Haj/Umrah visas, a few women 
do travel the irregular route over land and sea. This is because until 2011, the 
government of Ethiopia restricted the operation of Private Employment Agencies 
to Addis Ababa. This meant that women from other parts of the country who 
wanted to travel through the regular route had to first go to Addis Ababa to arrange 
their paper work, which increased the time and expense of migration. It is therefore 
often more convenient for prospective migrants to arrange their travel through the 
socially embedded networks of brokers that operate to facilitate a steady stream of 
irregular migration via Yemen to Saudi Arabia (Fernandez 2013). 
The dangers of irregular migration that migrants must weigh up in their calculus 
of risk are most evident in the fourth mode of irregularity – i.e., during the journey 
over sea and land via Yemen. Migrant support agencies operating in the region have 
documented the many dangers faced by Ethiopian migrants who travel to Saudi 
Arabia via Yemen: physical exhaustion, dehydration, sleep deprivation, starvation, 
death by drowning, degrading treatment and verbal abuse, sexual and gender based 
violence, moderate or extreme physical violence including torture, organ removal, 
and criminal kidnapping for ransom (Yitna 2006; RMMS 2014a; RMMS 2014c). 
Along the journey from Ethiopia overland to the coast of Somaliland or Djibouti, 
migrants risk physical exhaustion, starvation, and dehydration as they often walk 
long distances through the desert. Once they reach the coast, the next stage is a 
perilous sea journey to Yemen. Departures to Yemen used to be from Bossasso 
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in Somaliland, but are now more frequently from Obock in Djibouti due to the 
shorter sea journey. Capsized boats and drowning are a risk at this stage. Once 
they reach Yemen, migrants need to make their way overland to Haradh in North 
Yemen. At all stages, they are at risk of abuse and exploitation from the brokers and 
people smugglers; however, increasingly in the past five years, abduction and torture 
of migrants for ransom while they transit through Yemen has become widespread. 
There are reports of migrants’ families being forced to pay up to $2,000 for the 
release of their relatives. 
 An overview of the more severe dangers faced by migrants from the Horn 
of Africa, drawing on data from RMMS Monthly Reports (2011-2015) include 
deaths, torture, rape and sexual assault, kidnapping, and abduction. The cumulative 
number of deaths RMMS reported between 2011-2015 is 371; however, this 
may be an underestimate, as according to UNHCR, in 2013 and 2014 alone, the 
verified deaths were 179 and 223, respectively. Although the data are not always 
disaggregated by nationality, this reporting shows that deaths due to drowning are 
less frequent than the marked rising trend of high levels of torture, abduction, and 
sexual violence. An explanation for the lower level of migrant deaths suggested by 
RMMS is that 
“a migrant’s life has increased in value (‘commoditization’), due to the 
evolving practice of kidnapping migrants for ransom, as well as subjecting 
them to extortion. Reports from migrants themselves suggest that significant 
numbers of (mainly Ethiopian) female ‘new arrivals’ in mixed migration flows 
are separated, abducted and often sold on to other criminals or directly to 
private ‘buyers.’ Some of these women are never heard of again, according to 
those who crossed to Yemen with them” (RMMS 2014a:11).
The third factor Ethiopian irregular migrants consider in their calculus of risk 
is deportation. Deportation is highly contingent on the administrative capacity 
and the economic and political imperatives of states to implement the expulsion 
of “unwanted” irregular migrants. Irregular Ethiopian migrants face deportation 
not only from the destination, Saudi Arabia, but also from the countries they may 
pass through en route – i.e., Djibouti, Somaliland, and Yemen. Although these 
are transit countries for the majority of Ethiopians, they periodically authorise 
deportations of Ethiopians (along with Somalis and Eritreans) if the numbers of 
irregular migrants are viewed as a local law and order problem and/or if the countries 
need to demonstrate control over border security and smugglers. Although data on 
deportations is patchy, Figure 13.2 represents an indicative listing of deportations 
since September 2011, showing that the numbers are large and frequent. 
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The deportation figures show that the single largest deportation of over 
163,000 Ethiopians occurred from Saudi Arabia during the period November 
2013-February 2014. Previously, periodic amnesties and deportations of Ethiopians 
from Saudi Arabia were relatively common, but smaller in number. While Ethiopians 
with irregular status faced the constant risk of imprisonment and deportation, like 
many irregular migrants in Saudi Arabia, they occasionally used these amnesties 
and deportations as an opportunity for a “free ticket” home (as in the case of Habiba 
mentioned previously). 
However, since 2012 there has been a shift in the typical Saudi practice of 
deporting irregular migrants directly to their home countries. There were reports 
that Saudi authorities left irregular migrants stranded in the desert a few kilometres 
from the border with Yemen (RMMS 2014b: 49). These deportees were then forced 
to travel through the desert without food or water, and there have been many reported 
deaths in this border zone. Many Ethiopian irregular migrants became stranded in 
Haradh, a town in Hajja governorate of Northern Yemen, on the border of Saudi 
Arabia – either because Saudi Arabian authorities had deported them to the border 
and they were unable to make their way back home from there, or because they were 
seeking to enter but were unable to cross into Saudi Arabia. Assisted repatriation for 
such stranded migrants has been facilitated with the support of IOM and UNHCR, 
contingent on the availability of funds. In 2010, IOM set up the Haradh Migration 
Response Centre, and in 2011, its voluntary return programme helped 7,000 mainly 
Ethiopian migrants to return home (Zelalem 2012). Despite the ongoing needs of 
stranded migrants for assistance, the IOM programme was temporarily suspended 
due to lack of funds. The programme resumed in 2015 with financial support from 
the Dutch government, after the escalation of conflict in Yemen rendered large 
numbers of migrants vulnerable. In June and July 2015, nearly 900 Ethiopian 
migrants have been assisted to return (IOM 2015). 
In contrast to previous deportations, the 2013-4 deportation signalled a major 
shift in the scale of operations to regularise the migrant population in Saudi Arabia. 
Under the Nitaqat programme, the Saudi Arabian government announced that all 
irregular migrants had to regularise their documentation or face expulsion. The initial 
deadline of May 2013 was extended to October 2013. Before the deadline, according 
to Saudi Arabian news reports, thousands of irregular migrants handed themselves 
in for voluntary deportation. After the deadline, by mid-November on average 20-
80 Ethiopians were deported per day, and in December and January, these numbers 
increased dramatically. By the end of February 2014, 163,018 Ethiopians (100,688 
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male, 53,732 female and 8,598 children including unaccompanied minors) had 
been deported to Addis Ababa (IOM 2015). 
Despite the dangers and the risk of deportation, a survey conducted by the 
RMMS (2014a) regarding the knowledge and attitudes of irregular Ethiopian 
migrants showed that prospective migrants are well aware of the risks of irregular 
migration. For example, more than 90% knew the risks of serious physical hardship, 
arrest, exhortation and robbery, and about 80% were aware of the risks of sexual 
abuse, including rape.
Thus, the calculus of risk is weighted towards the very strong drivers that 
encourage migrants to become irregular. Although the intensification of dangers 
to which migrants are exposed and the increased rate of deportation suggest the 
need for a different calculus of risk, clearly this has not produced any significant 
reduction in the numbers that continue to arrive irregularly in Yemen (Figure 13.1). 
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Figure 13.2: Deportations of Ethiopians 
The Politics of ‘Managing’ Irregular Ethiopian Migrants
Ethiopia
The Ethiopian government’s regulatory framework to manage the movements of its 
nationals out of the country is fragmented, operationalised through criminal laws 
against smuggling and trafficking, as well as labour proclamations regulating the 
activities of Private Employment Agencies. As I have discussed elsewhere, there 
is a blurring of distinctions between smuggling and trafficking in the prosecution 
of the law, and the government has weak enforcement capabilities against people-
smugglers (Fernandez 2013). Paradoxically, amendments to the legislation 
regulating PEAs have been punitive and resulted not in improved “management” 
but an increase in the irregular flows of migrants.
Until recently, the Ethiopian government usually turned a tacit blind eye 
to the flows of irregular migration to the Gulf and other destinations, despite 
Month Forced Repatriations 
September 11  Somaliland government announced forced expulsion of 80,000 Ethiopians. 
UNHCR estimates 20,000 actual deportations.
October 11 150 Ethiopian Oromo migrants were deported from Somaliland back to Ethiopia 
December 11
January 12
20 Ethiopians were forcibly returned from Somaliland 
March 12 277 Ethiopians to be returned from Yemen to Ethiopia via air evacuation  
27 Ethiopians were forcibly repatriated by Somaliland authorities; 
    400 Africans (mainly Ethiopians) expelled by Yemeni authorities
September 12 Forcible deportation of Ethiopians (numbers unknown) from Somaliland 
October 12 4,000 Ethiopians deported from North Yemen 
May 13 4,329 Ethiopians deported from Yemen 
July 13 137 unaccompanied minors returned from Yemen to Ethipoia 
November 13
February 14
Continued expulsion of over 163,000 Ethiopians from Saudi Arabia 
July 14 97 people (mainly Ethiopians) deported from Somaliland
December 14 -
January 15
50 Ethiopians repatriated from Djibouti
June 12
Source: Data compiled from RMMS Monthly Reports.
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pressure from Europe, the US, and international organisations to control smuggling 
(often ex-post relabelled trafficking) from Ethiopia. The government’s strong dual 
incentive to ignore irregular migration is because it offers an alternative to the 
high levels of unemployment and because migrant remittances are a boost to local 
economies (Andersson 2014; Reinart 2007; Fernandez 2010); both incentives have 
the additional effect of easing the pressure of potential political discontent within 
the country. 
The first ban issued by the Ethiopian government in May 2008 prohibited 
Ethiopians from travelling to Lebanon to work as contract domestic workers (The 
Daily Star, May 8, 2008). The ban was implemented due to the high numbers of 
reported deaths, suicides, and cases of physical and sexual abuse of Ethiopian women 
in Lebanon. Although regular migration was prohibited, the flow of irregular 
migrants to Lebanon continued, as women travelled to Lebanon via Sudan, Dubai, 
or Egypt.
The next and more drastic all-encompassing ban on migration from Ethiopia 
was put into force by the government in November 2013, a few days preceding the 
(expected) Saudi Arabian expulsion of irregular Ethiopian workers. Although the 
government initially expected around 30,000-50,000 Ethiopian deportees, it was 
completely unprepared for the unprecedented numbers of repatriated Ethiopians 
from Saudi Arabia. Many of the deportees arrived with possessions or funds, and 
some were physically and mentally ill (IOM 2014a). Resources for the deportees 
were mobilised with the support of the IOM, ILO, UNHCR, and other international 
and domestic NGOs. Six transit centres were established in Addis Ababa to receive 
the returnees who were provided with temporary accommodation, meals, medical 
services, and a $50 transportation allowance to help them return home (ibid). 
At the time of writing, the blanket ban on migration continues to be in force, 
and in a press release in October 2014, the Ethiopian National Taskforce Council 
for Illegal Migration announced that permanent jobs had been created for 54.1% 
of the 163,000 repatriates from Saudi Arabia and that the government plan was 
to encourage its youth to find employment within the country. The Deputy Prime 
Minister and head of the National Task Force Demeke Mekonen said: “Since the 
main pillar of this plan is to bring attitudinal change, we have to come up with 
society based mechanisms against the problem. So, if the society stands against illegal 
migration, we can have [a]strong force that can deter the problem” (Mohamedsani 
2014). 
As part of its plan, after the initial relief provided to the deportees, the 
Ethiopian government announced that it aimed to create alternate employment 
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opportunities locally, in the regions they came from. However, during fieldwork in 
the two villages of Assela and Debra Birhan in October 2014, it was apparent that 
the actual support was largely limited to awareness raising and facilitating credit 
linkage support for the deportees and other prospective migrant youth. 
In support of the Ethiopian government’s efforts to raise awareness about 
the dangers of irregular migration, in 2014 the IOM organised a travelling street 
theatre production of a play tilted Mutach (meaning “The Last One”) that toured 
rural areas in migrant sending areas of Wollo, Tigray, Jimma, and Oromia. IOM 
Ethiopia, in partnership with the government and civil society, has also launched an 
initiative to engage Ethiopians in discussions on the dangers of irregular migration 
besides local alternatives to migration through “community conversations” in five 
high-risk migration regions, including Oromia, Tigray, Amhara, SNNPR National 
Regional States and Addis Ababa City Administration (IOM 2014). 
Further, the Ethiopian government has entered into dialogue with the Saudi 
Arabian government on managing labour migration. In an effort to engage in 
bilateral discussions on labour migration (and other key issues such as investment), 
an Ethiopian delegation was invited by the Shura Council (legislative institution) 
of Saudi Arabia to visit between December 26, 2014 and January 2, 2015 (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2015). The Ethiopian Speaker of the House of People’s 
Representatives, Abadula Gemeda, told the Shura Council that the Ethiopian 
government 
aimed to create a nation-wide movement against illegal migration through 
various educational and sensitization programs. He said Ethiopia had banned 
the recruitment of workers to the Middle East for the time being to thoroughly 
analyze the problems of illegal migration and curb human trafficking. He 
stressed Ethiopia’s resolve to make the process of foreign employment free 
of intermediaries who had actually been responsible for human trafficking 
under the guise of legal migration. He said the Ethiopian Government 
had identified poverty and unemployment as main push factors for illegal 
migration and therefore it believed that job creation in Ethiopia had become 
a major step in preventing human trafficking and illegal migration, adding 
that “Ethiopia is witnessing positive changes; we are creating more than two 
million jobs every year.” The two sides also discussed the rights of Ethiopian 
workers in Saudi Arabia. [Saudi Arabian] Minister Adil Faqih noted that 
a draft labor agreement had been drawn up between the two ministries of 
labour. He stressed the need to speed up the signing and ratification process 
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to put in place effective mechanisms to safeguard workers’ rights. (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2015)
Notwithstanding the ban, the awareness raising measures, and bilateral 
negotiations, my field research in two migrant sending regions of rural Ethiopia 
(Kormageffia in the Debre Birhan region and Oda Dawata in the Oromia region) 
conducted in October-November 2014 showed that although the public and official 
discourse indicated people’s awareness of the ban, there was tacit acknowledgement 
that people were continuing to migrate irregularly. Indeed, as we see in Figure 13.1, 
the ban clearly had only a temporary dampening effect (between November 2013 
and February 2014) on the numbers of Ethiopians arriving in Yemen irregularly. At 
the time of writing, the escalation of the conflict in Yemen has resulted in an almost 
total halt to the numbers of irregular Ethiopian migrants making the sea crossing 
to Yemen. Indeed, the flows of people are in reverse, as Yemeni refugees are crossing 
over to the coast of Africa, fleeing the conflict in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia
Migration systems in Saudi Arabia (like elsewhere in the Gulf ) are recognised 
for the restrictive system of migrant sponsorship known as the kafala, high ratios 
of migrants to nationals, and restrictive barriers to the long-term settlement of 
migrants. Migrant workers predominantly from Asia and Africa and the MENA 
countries constitute over one-third of the Saudi national population, and Bel Air’s 
review of news reports suggest that up to 5 million of these are irregular migrants 
(Bel Air 2015:7). The high level of irregular migrants in Saudi Arabia is largely due 
to visa trading and the ”“free visa” system. The degree to which “free visas” prevail 
is indicated by the estimate that over seven million migrant workers (nearly all the 
regular migrants) corrected their status during the amnesty period and more than 
one and a half million changed their status entirely (Walker 2013).
The analysis of the situation of irregular migrants in Saudi Arabia is 
necessarily linked to the examination of policies affecting the labour market for 
regular migrants and nationals. The Saudi Arabian labour market is characterised 
by a dual, segmented structure, with the majority of nationals concentrated in the 
public sector, while migrants (regular and irregular) are concentrated in the private 
sector. Following the Arab Spring, the Saudi government initiated the policy of 
“Saudization,” to redress the burgeoning problem of high youth unemployment in 
the country, which was viewed as a potential political tinderbox (de Bel Air 2015; 
Ramady 2013). The government began to implement Saudization in 2013 through 
260            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
the instrument of the “Nitaqat.” The aim of Nitaqat is to create more jobs for young 
Saudi nationals, through a combination of inducements and punishments that force 
companies in the private sector to comply with strict quotas for the employment 
of Saudis. 
Achieving the Saudization objectives are a formidable challenge, for 
multiple reasons (detailed in Ramady 2013, Sadi 2013 and other commentators); 
most relevant to the situation of irregular migrants is the relatively rigid and 
segmented structure of the labour market. As Shah (2008) has argued for the 
Gulf more generally, the consequence of this segmented structure is that Saudi 
nationals prefer to work in the public sector because of the higher wages, greater 
security of employment, and lower work demands. A major shift in the cultural 
expectations and sense of entitlement of Saudi nationals would be necessary for 
genuine Saudization to occur (Sadi 2013), failing which there would be a negative 
impact on productivity (Ramady 2013). Third, even if private sector jobs become 
more desirable to them, Saudi nationals are extremely unlikely to accept triple-D 
(“dirty, difficult and demeaning”) labour – typically in the agriculture, construction, 
and personal and household services sectors. Thus, notwithstanding the policies of 
Saudization or similar policies of nationalisation of the labour force in other Gulf 
receiving countries, the unwillingness of nationals to undertake such labour leads to 
a persistent structural demand for expatriate labour in these sectors. 
The structural demand for and unsustainability of the mass deportation of 
unskilled labour is evident in the ensuing unskilled labour shortage that necessitated 
a halt in the expulsions. Tirunesh was a young Ethiopian woman who had been 
living and working in Saudi Arabia for 12 years without papers. She had entered 
initially on an Umrah visa, and overstayed. When the deportations in Saudi Arabia 
began, she voluntarily gave herself up, as she wanted to return to Ethiopia on a “free 
ticket” as others had. However, she said that by the time she gave herself up, there 
was an acute shortage of domestic workers as a result of the mass deportations, and 
the Saudi authorities were unwilling to deport her:
We asked them to send us back home, but they refused and told us to go 
back to work, they said domestic workers are needed in the country. So I paid 
for myself [to return to Ethiopia]. When we came back, we were too many 
(Interview, Debre Birhan, October 2014). 
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Conclusion
Ethiopian regular and irregular migration to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf is 
characterised by circular migration. There are strong drivers for this trajectory on 
both the Ethiopian and Saudi Arabian ends, but the absence of any possibility 
for settlement in these countries pushes the migratory system into a high volume, 
circular organisation. When regular migrants complete their contracts, they often 
seek to return on another contract. Irregular migrants who are deported will also 
seek to return – either to another Gulf destination, or to the same country, but 
through irregular entry. Over the past two decades, a significant formal and informal 
infrastructure to facilitate regular and irregular migration has developed in Ethiopia 
that is plugged into the (longer-established) apparatus organising migrants in the 
Gulf. Strongly socially embedded networks of migrants and migrant intermediaries 
are critical to the functioning of these networks. Here, it is useful to draw on Cvajner 
and Sciortino’s argument that:
…different types of social networks will react to policy changes in different 
ways. It is consequently the interaction of networks and policies that help 
determine their respective roles in activating further inflows. Changes 
in immigration controls interact with network strategies, creating an 
environment where some possibilities are positively selected while others are 
discouraged. As well as the specific contents of policies, it is likely that the 
timing of policies and also the anticipation by the migrants of their medium-
term stability will also prove to be important factors (Cvajner and Sciortino 
2009: 222).
I have shown in this case how state policies to “manage” or “control” migration 
have complex and often contradictory goals. We saw this with the Ethiopian 
government responses which were a mix of protection of its citizens, responding 
to international pressure to control trafficking and smuggling, encouragement of 
remittances by its nationals abroad, and the tacit acknowledgement that migration 
provides an important economic alternative as well as a political safety valve in 
a context of high unemployment. While the prohibition on migration currently 
in force is sustained by a nationalistic rhetoric of creating sufficient domestic 
employment, there is a mismatch with reality, and consequently, the numbers of 
Ethiopians exiting the country through the irregular route has seen no significant 
decline post the ban.
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A similar mismatch is observable in the context of the Saudi Arabian 
government’s Nitaqat policy. Ostensibly the goal is to create employment for 
Saudi nationals and curb visa trading, with the consequent expulsion of irregular 
migrants. However, given the likelihood of a continued structural demand for the 
low-skilled labour performed by Ethiopians and other irregular migrants in Saudi 
Arabia, how then do we account for the fact they were a large proportion of the 
over 800,000 migrants who were deported from Saudi Arabia after the expiry of the 
amnesty period in 2013? Although only preliminary assessments of the impact of 
Nitaqat are available (Ramady 2013, Sadi 2013, Alsheikh 2015, de Bel Air 2015), 
drawing on Hertog’s (2010) incisive sociological analysis of mechanisms through 
which rents of visa trading are distributed in the Saudi economy, it is likely that 
in addition to Saudization, an unstated underlying objective of the Nitaqat is the 
re-structuring of the states’ informal channels for the distribution of resources 
from rents. The ultimate beneficiaries of this high-stakes re-ordering of the Saudi 
economy are perhaps not yet identifiable. However, for the purposes of this chapter, 
the immediate, stringent by-product consequence of Nitaqat for irregular migrants 
is likely to be the exacerbation of their vulnerablity to exploitation by employers, 
rather than any real reduction in the demand for the unskilled labour typically 
engaged in by Ethiopian irregular migrants. 
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Migration (In)flux: Impact of Legislation on  
Patterns and Quantum of Irregular Mobility  
between India and Saudi Arabia
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Abstract:  Despite policies of highly regulated entry and recent regularisation 
drives, Gulf States have a sizeable share of irregular workers who live and 
work in irregular conditions (RMMS 2014). Rigid sponsorship systems, 
nationalisation policies, and limited quotas for foreign workers in the 
receiving countries, coupled with the operation of transnational networks and 
migration intermediaries in countries of origin and destination, perpetuate 
a parallel labour market for irregular entrants. Despite their economic and 
political salience, there are few recent estimates of irregular migration in the 
region. This chapter delivers new estimates and quantitative information based 
on field research, analysis of administrative data (arrests and regularisation 
statistics), expert opinions, and published data sources. Drawing on four 
Kerala Migration Surveys (KMS) and data made available through the Gulf 
Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) programme, the chapter presents 
estimates and analysis of irregular migratory movements from India to 
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Saudi Arabia with a view to elucidate the structural frameworks that create 
conditions of irregular migration in the region. 
Introduction
In the past year, coverage of Europe’s “Mediterranean migration crisis” and “Syrian 
refugee crisis” has catapulted the issue of irregular migration and its human costs 
to global attention. Despite increasing incidence of irregular migration and its far-
reaching implications, there remains much to be learnt about the phenomenon. Put 
simply, irregular migration can be defined as what it is not – population movements 
that take place outside the regulatory norms and policies of the sending, transit, 
and receiving countries. This includes instances of unauthorized entry, residence or 
work, as well as crossing of international borders without valid documentation or 
fulfillment of formal administrative requirements. This chapter presents a case study 
and estimates of irregular migratory movements between India and Saudi Arabia 
with a view to elucidate the structural frameworks that create conditions of irregular 
migration in this key migration corridor. In doing so, it challenges conceptions of 
irregularity as a category of migrants, instead examining irregularity as a socio-
political condition produced by social, administrative, legal and political processes 
(Goldring et al. 2009; Squire 2011).
 In the given context, those deemed irregular migrants comprise persons who 
willingly or unwittingly engage in irregular migration, work and/or residence. In 
Saudi Arabia, individuals who (a) enter the country unofficially, are trafficked or 
smuggled; (b) enter the country through official channels and overstay the length of 
visas and/or work permits [Articles 20, 21- Saudi Arabia Labour Law]; (c) engage 
in informal employment, work in a profession other than that officially stated on 
the permit, work for someone other than their official sponsor (kafeel) [Article 11- 
SA LL], work in a Red zone company below Saudisation threshold or run away 
from the Saudi employer; (d) work on non-work visas such as Haj, Umrah or family 
visas [Article 12- SA LL]; or (e) are born to or are dependents of undocumented 
migrants are deemed irregular migrants. 
Irregularity is not a fixed status; it is complex, dynamic, and fluid. Many 
migrants weave in and out of legal and administrative compliance at different 
points of their migration cycle. In order to develop estimates, it is important to 
consider pathways into irregularity. Figure 14.1, based on the CLANDESTINO 
(2012) project definitions of irregular migration, points to the different ways of 
becoming and being irregular in the Indo-Saudi Arabian context. Typologies of 
migrant irregularity are not exhaustive and, indeed, not mutually exclusive. The 
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shaded areas denote the overlap between irregular migration, work, and residence. 
Due to its many manifestations and clandestine nature, irregular migration is nearly 
impossible to quantify accurately, the cells bordered by dotted lines denote the grey 
areas that generally do not figure in estimates of irregular migrants.
Figure 14.1: Avenues to irregularity in Saudi Arabia
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Incidence of Irregular Migration Flows between India and Saudi Arabia: 
Our Estimates
The Gulf represents a strong magnet for historic and contemporary migration flows. 
The 1973 oil boom and attendant flurry in the construction sector enhanced the 
demand for foreign labour. This oil-led infrastructural development was fuelled by 
large-scale labour importation primarily from South and Southeast Asia. Today, the 
Gulf countries host the largest share of migrants in proportion to their population. 
To better understand the scope and scale of irregular Indian migratory movements 
to Saudi Arabia, it is important to understand the broader context in which these 
flows occur. 
Migrants account for nearly half the total population in the GCC countries, 
ranging from 32.7% in Saudi Arabia to 88.5 and 85.7% in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and Qatar, respectively (GLMM 2014a). The proportion of migrants to 
labour force ranges between 56% in Saudi Arabia to 93.9% in Qatar (GLMM 
2014b). South Asians constitute the principal migrant populace across the GCC, 
constituting over half the total migrant stock in each GCC country (Rajan and 
Narayana 2011). World Bank estimates (2014) peg the stock of Indian migrants 
in the Gulf at 6.5 million (Table 14.1). Based on extensive experience working on 
migration in the Gulf, discussions with Indian ambassadors/labour attaches, media 
reports, and press releases by Indian missions, this chapter intends to extend current 
estimates of Indian migrants in the Gulf. 
According to our estimates, based on extrapolations from World Bank 
estimates and current and previous Kerala Migration Surveys, there are currently 
9 million Indians in the Gulf, of whom 3 million live in Saudi Arabia and 3.2 million 
in the UAE. Based on data made available through the Gulf Labour Markets and 
Migration (GLMM) database, Shah (2014) notes that migrants in the Gulf are 
currently estimated at between 23-24 million. Correspondingly, it can be inferred 
from our India-specific estimates that 40% of all migrants in the Gulf are Indians. 
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Table 14.1: Estimated Indians in the Gulf, 2015
With respect to Saudi Arabia, Indians are the largest migrant community, 
and the Kingdom hosts among the biggest concentrations of Indian passport 
holders globally. According to Saudi Ambassador Saud Mohammed Alsati, the 
Saudi Embassy in India issued 1.2 million visas in 2014, a global record for Saudi 
missions.1 Based on our estimates, a third of Saudi Arabia’s 9 million immigrant 
population is Indian. This 3 million strong Indian contingent (Table 14.1) remits 
upwards of $10 billion annually (World Bank 2014). India is the top recipient of 
Saudi Arabia’s foreign remittances, accounting for 25% of total outward flows from 
the Kingdom. Low-wage workers, deemed unskilled or semi-skilled, constitute a 
significant element (85%) of Indo-Saudi Arabian labour flows. Daily, approximately 
1,000 low-wage Indian migrant workers are provided with emigration clearances to 
travel to Saudi Arabia (MOIA 2013). In this category, there is a strong observable 
preference for Saudi Arabia as a destination. Data from the Ministry of Overseas 
Indian Affairs (MOIA) indicate that over the past five years, roughly 50% of all 
workers who obtained emigration clearances from India were destined for Saudi 
Arabia (Table 14.2). A majority of Indian migrants in the Gulf hail from the 
state of Kerala (Table 14.1). KMS 2014 emigration estimates point to 2.4 million 
Kerala emigrants, 85% (2 million) of whom reside in the Gulf, with the UAE 
accommodating nearly 40% (0.9 million) and Saudi Arabia 20% (0.5 million). 
1. IANS, Business Standard, February 21, 2015.
Country  Keralites (2014) a Indians (2013) b  Our Estimates (2015) c
Saudi Arabia 522,282 2,000,000 3,039,681
UAE 898,962 2,268,200 3,164,346
Oman 189,224 644,704 834,478
Kuwait 183,329 739,558 912,978
Qatar 106,107 545,000 650,000
Bahrain 149,729 262,855 413,252
Gulf 2,049,633 6,451,317 9,015,172
Gulf (Total Migrants) quoted in Shah (2014) based on GLMM Database 23,000,000
Sources: (a) The stock of Keralities for 2014 comes from the sixth round of Kerala Migration 
Survey conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, funded by 
the State Planning Board, Government of Kerala and Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 
Government of India; (b) The 2013 numbers are from the World Bank estimates of migrant 
stock; (c) Total number of Indian migrants across the GCC, estimated by the authors.
274            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
Table 14.2: Number of emigration clearances granted, 2011-2015
Despite the increasing programmatic, policy, and media attention to 
irregular migration, there are few firm estimates available on the quantum of 
irregular migrants in the Gulf countries. Indeed, the most common working 
estimate for the region goes back to Kapiszewski’s 2001 assessment that “illegal 
immigrants in each GCC country make up at least 10% of the total population or 
15% of the workforce” with numbers as high as 700,000 in Saudi Arabia. Based 
on information from field research, secondary analysis of administrative data (local 
crime and police detection statistics, border enforcement data, regularisation and 
deportation data, census data), and expert and official opinions, we now provide 
an updated rough minimum and maximum range of irregular migration in the 
region. While data shortcomings and biases may dilute the degree of exactness, 
it is nevertheless integral to have a reference point of the incidence of irregular 
migration for policy-making and institutional strengthening and to make more 
refined and rigorous calculations. 
Saudi Arabia hosts the largest number of migrants in the Gulf region, a vast 
yet unrecorded number of who remain irregular (Fargues 2006, 14-15). According 
to Shah (2014), a total of 5.3 million regularisation procedures were undertaken 
during the first four months of the 2013 amnesty in Saudi Arabia. This, however, is 
not representative of the total number of individuals who corrected their irregular 
status since persons may have undergone more than one form of regularisation. 
Reportedly, the final number of regularisation procedures conducted during the 
April-November 2013 amnesty period was over 11 million (Table 14.3). Based on 
media reports,2 De Bel-Air (2014) infers that just 4.7 million workers corrected 
their status during this period, while another 1 million were either expelled 
from the country or left voluntarily by availing the amnesty, totaling about 5.7 
million as undocumented. Both Shah’s (2014) and De Bel-Air’s (2014) accounts 
indirectly put the incidence of irregular migration at between 50-60% of the 
2. Arab News, November 11, 2012.
Source: Lok Sabha Starred Question No. 309 answered on 18/03/2015 by Sushma Swaraj, 
MOIA.
 April 2011 -  April 2012 -  April 2013 -  April 2014 -
 March 2012 March 2013 March 2014 February 2015
Saudi Arabia 299,276 377,494 339,857 299,560
Total  649,794 776,672 820,947 738,327
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non-national workforce. This is in stark contrast to media reports3 in the wake of the 
Saudi correction drive that estimated a fringe population of 1.5 million migrants – 
about 16% of the total 9 million non-Saudi workforce – as having violated residency, 
work, and visa regulations. 
Table 14.3: Number of work status corrections in  
Saudi Arabia during Amnesty 2013
According to Indian government estimates in 2013, over 1.4 million of the 
3 million Indians4 (and 4.7 million total migrants who corrected their status) in 
Saudi Arabia regularised their stay over the six month amnesty period by transferring 
their services to new employers, changing job titles, or renewing job permits (Table 
14.3).5 Another 140,000 were deported and approximately 250-500 Indians were 
granted exit shortly after the grace period.6 Accordingly, over 1.5 million Indian 
migrants in Saudi Arabia were found in some iteration of irregular status during 
the period under question, while many more continued to live and work invisibly 
in the country, some choosing not to avail concessions while others were ineligible 
owing to pending legal cases. Given that half of the 3 million Indian migrants in 
Saudi Arabia (who constitute a third of the Kingdom’s labour force) were affected 
by the regularisation drive, the total potential pool of irregularised migrants appears 
to be closer to 4.5 million migrants, or half the total migrant stock of Saudi Arabia. 
3. Al Jazeera America, November 5, 2013.
4. IANS, January 18, 2014.
5. The Indian Express, November 4, 2013.
6. Embassy of India Riyadh Press Release, March 3, 2014.
Source: Compiled by authors from GLMM Database, Saudi Arabia, IRR 1.1 Table 1 and Lok 
Sabha Starred Question No. 89 answered on 11/12/2013 by Vayalar Ravi, MOIA.
Regularisation operation / Total no. of corrections No. of corrections 
document/Worker’s  April 3-Nov. 3, 2013 among Indian migrants 
final exit  April 3-Nov. 3, 2013
Change of profession 2,423,779 481,233
Recruitment visas granted 935,441 n.a
Labour permits granted 3,890,916 470,000
Workers registered  1.086,593 n.a
Transfer of services 2,615,280 434,667
Final exits 713,524 141,301
Total 11,665,533 1,527,201
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Hence, all available indicators suggest that around 50% of migrants in Saudi Arabia 
hold irregular status.
With half of the total Indian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia availing amnesty 
to correct their administrative situation, this reflects an ever-bigger incidence of 
irregularity among Indians in Saudi Arabia. Taken together, Indian migrants who 
were identified as irregular during the last amnesty represent over 16% of the Saudi 
Arabian workforce. From this figure, it is apparent that the regional press and 
authorities severely underestimated the magnitude of irregular migration in the 
Kingdom. This can partially be attributed to enumeration difficulties that make 
it tough to gauge the extent of clandestine flows; however, it was most likely a 
strategic sleight of hand to dissuade public anxiety over demographic imbalances 
and persistent unemployment.
To further enumerate the scale of irregular migration in the Gulf, and Saudi 
Arabia in particular, we utilise results of surveys conducted at various points of time 
in Kerala. Four surveys were consulted for this purpose: (i) Return Migrant Survey 
(RMS) conducted in 2007 among 378 persons who worked in the Gulf (ii) Emigrant 
Households Survey (EHS) carried out in 2007 among 529 emigrant households 
(iii) RMS 2008 conducted along with Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) 2008 
covering 2,037 return migrants from the Gulf (iv) Survey on returnee professionals 
(RPS 2012) among 1,106 highly skilled professionals who had returned both 
voluntarily and forcibly from the Gulf to India during the period 2006-2011. 
First, we focus on the visa category under which respondents migrated to 
the GCC (see Table 14.4). All four surveys included a common question: “With 
what type of visa have you gone to the Gulf ?”7 The answer options were as follows: 
(a) employment visa (b) visit visa (c) tourist visa (d) pilgrimage visa and (e) “free 
visa.” While it is true that individuals who hold valid visas and enter the country 
legally can become irregular through multiple avenues, Shah (2014) notes that it is 
primarily those persons who migrate without valid employment visas that are most 
susceptible to irregularisation. 
7. With the exception of the EHS 2007, all the surveys were answered by migrants themselves 
with respect to their visa position when they left to the Gulf.
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Table14.4: Percentage of Kerala emigrants who travelled to the  
Gulf without valid employment visa, 2006-2011
According to the four surveys, between 20 to 40% of Kerala migrants travel 
to the Gulf without an official employment visa (see Table 14.4). Non-work visit 
visas and “free visa” function as informal gateways that are misused in the countries 
of destination. The “free visa” is an unauthorised category of informal visa that 
purportedly allows migrants to freely seek employment without being tied to a 
sponsor – leaving them outside the legal employment relationship. The burgeoning 
black markets of visa trading agents ensnare potential migrants seeking to bypass 
the stringent sponsorship system in Saudi Arabia, resulting in steady streams 
of irregular and precarious migrant workers. Furthermore, RPS 2012 reported 
that about 22% of return migrants came back to Kerala due to expiration of 
contracts and at least 10% of these migrants became irregular in the Gulf due to 
overstaying.
Based on this analysis of workers who migrate without adequate papers 
and permits, we conclude that a conservative estimate of irregular migration in 
the Gulf ranges from 20 to 40% of the total migrants in the region. For countries 
with a relatively lower stock of migrants (Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain) our 
estimate ranges from about 20% to 30%. However, in the leading regional migrant 
destinations,  the UAE and Saudi Arabia, our lowest estimate is about 30% and the 
higher estimate is about 40%. From our calculations, based on recent population 
figures from the GLMM database, Saudi Arabia is the primary destination for 
irregular migrants in the GCC, hosting between 3 million and 4 million of them. 
The UAE also hosts a large number of irregular migrants ranging from 2.2 million 
Source: Special tabulations by the authors from Emigrant Household Survey 2007, Return 
Migrant Survey 2007, Return Migration Survey 2008 and Return Professional Survey 2012.
Country EHS 2007 RMS 2007 RMS 2008 RPS 2012
Saudi Arabia 21.7 27.2 17.4 31.6
UAE 21.5 38.7 22.0 47.4
Oman 33.3 24.2 23.5 37.1
Kuwait  30.2 14.3 17.0 25.0
Qatar 23.8 21.1 21.8 22.9
Bahrain 5.6 20.7 20.6 32.3
Gulf 23.1 29.8 19.9 39.3
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to 3 million. We estimate that irregular migrants in the Gulf range between 6.5 
million to 9 million, i.e., approximately a third (and potentially half ) of all migrants 
in the GCC are irregular.
Table14.5: Irregular migrants in the Gulf, 2015
Accordingly, the rolling stock of irregular Indian migrants in the Gulf can 
be pegged between 2.4 and 3.3 million. Our estimates for Saudi Arabia range 
between 0.9 and 1.2 million (Table 14.5), reflecting a moderate decline that can be 
traced to the Kingdom’s ongoing efforts to curb irregular migration. These estimates 
indicate that over a third of Indians in the Gulf remain irregular with the numbers 
approaching close to half the Indian populations in some GCC countries. 
Table 14.6: Irregular Migrants in the Gulf as a percentage of GCC  
labour force and total population
Country IM-lower IM-upper IM-lower IM-upper IM-lower IM- upper
 range range range range range (Total Range
 (Indians) (Indians) (Keralites) (Keralites) Mig)* (Total Mig)*
Saudi Arabia 913,471 1,217,962 104,456 130,571 3,020,352 4,027,136
UAE 949,304 1,265,738 179,792 224,741 2,194,822 2,926,429
Oman 166,896 250,343 37,845 47,306 365,118 547,677
Kuwait 182,596 279,894 36,666 45,832 575,536 863,303
Qatar 109,078 163,617 21,221 26,527 291,283 436,925
Bahrain 82,650 123,976 29,946 37,432 136,764 205,145
Gulf 2,403,995 3,295,530 409,927 512,408 6,583,875 9,006,615
Source: Estimated by the authors based on EHS 2007, RMS 2007, RMS 2008, RPS 2012 and 
*GLMM, GCC, POP 1.1
Source: Estimated by authors based on *World Bank Labour Force database (2010-2014) and 
** GLMM, GCC, POP 1.1
  IM-lower IM-upper  IM-lower IM-upper
 Labour range (% of range (% of Total range (% of range (% of
Country Force* labour force) labour force) Population** population) population)
Saudi Arabia 11,232,277 26.9 35.9 30,770,375 9.8 13.1
UAE 6,325,502 34.71 46.3 8,264,070 26.6 35.4
Oman 1,809,462 20.2 30.3 4,161,404 13.8 20.7
Kuwait 1,733,184 33.2 49.8 4,161,404 13.8 20.7
Qatar 1,624,057 17.9 26.9 1,699,435 17.1 25.7
Bahain 738,890 18.5 27.8 1,314,562 10.4 15.6
Total 23,463,372 28.1 38.4 50,359,763 13.1 1800
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With respect to the share of irregular migrants in GCC populations and 
labour force, Kapiszewski (2001) estimates that irregular migrants comprise, at a 
minimum, 10% of the total population or 15% of the workforce in GCC countries, 
with numbers as high as 700,000 in Saudi Arabia. Correspondingly, our estimates 
indicate that irregular migrants comprise between 20-40% of the labour force in the 
GCC countries, and up to 50% in some countries (UAE, Kuwait). The proportion 
of irregular migrants in the total population of GCC countries lies between 
10-20%, constituting up to 25-35% of UAE’s population, with numbers as high as 
4 million in Saudi Arabia. 
Social and Structural Determinants of Irregular Migration 
There are a host of policies and practices that induce irregular migration from India. 
Acknowledging the systemic production of irregularity (Goldring et al. 2009, 241) 
shifts the responsibility of irregularity from individual migrants towards structural 
processes that situate persons in positions of precariousness, irregularity, or illegality 
(Bauder 2014). Gosh (1998) suggests that irregular migration principally results 
from a mismatch between the number of people who aspire to leave the country 
and opportunities for safe, legal migration. Low economic opportunity, lack of 
information, a culture of migration, transnational migrant networks and the 
operation of unregulated intermediaries, organised racketeers and trafficking rings 
are among the key determinants of irregular migration from India (Rajan et al. 
2011:134). 
The institutional framework of emigration governance in India includes the 
Emigration Act of 1983 and offices of the Protector of Emigrants (PoE). Critics 
of the Act allege that it is one-sided, outdated and largely ineffective (Sasikumar 
and Hussain 2008). Currently in its thirty-second year of operation, and having 
seen several amendments, the archaic Act has yet to provide a comprehensive legal 
framework to manage the emigration of Indian nationals. Tellingly, Kumar and 
Rajan (2014) quip that the framework managing 21st century migration from 
India is a vestige of a 19th century mindset imbued in 20th century law. Under 
its purview, the key instrument of emigration management is the designation of 
“emigration clearance required” (ECR) status based on educational status. ECR 
passport holders seeking to migrate to any of the 17 ECR countries must obtain 
clearance from PoE offices.8 Low and semi-skilled workers (who constitute the bulk 
of GCC migrants) seeking to work/move legally are forced to navigate mounting 
formalities that disincentivise formal registration. 
8. MOIA Press Information Bureau, August 9, 2012.
280            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
Specific gender-based regulatory controls on Indian women migrants are 
a compelling illustration of the paradoxical effects of protective legislation. The 
Emigration Act provides that “no [unmarried/unskilled] female below the age 
of thirty years shall be granted Emigration Clearance.” State-imposed minimum 
age requirements are wielded as protections for women’s welfare and safeguards 
against trafﬁcking (Oishi 2005). However, in practice, they restrict women’s right 
to mobility (Kodoth and Varghese 2012) and drive potential migrants to illegal 
conduits that render them especially vulnerable to trafficking and conditions of 
forced labour. Furthermore, restrictive regulations in this context are in direct 
violation of the terms of the MoU on Labour Cooperation for Domestic Service 
Workers Recruitment signed between India and Saudi Arabia in 2014 outlining 
that India will “[e]ndeavour to put in place procedures/mechanism[s] to allow and 
ease departure of prospective Indian Domestic Service Workers for Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia” (Article 5: vi).
In the face of bolstered bureaucratic burdens, some migrants resort to the 
“informed informality” (Rajan et al. 2011, 133) of facilitated irregular migration 
through organised smuggling rings, while others are trafficked into Saudi Arabia 
and coerced into exploitation (Occhipinti 2014, 436). Imperfect regulation of 
migration intermediaries perpetuates a network of fraudulent recruitment agents 
operating with virtual impunity. A 2012 CARIM-India report outlines the modus 
operandi of duplicitous agents including passport and photo tampering, contract 
substitution, forging and stealing visas and work permits, switching of boarding cards 
and encouraging overstay on tourist visas, resulting in deception and entrapment of 
migrant workers. Government officials are not exempt from recruitment fraud, and 
some are even involved in facilitating the unfettered flow of irregular migrants.9 The 
Kochi Protector of Emigrants (PoE), a top emigration official, was arrested in June 
2015 for collusion with unlicensed, fraudulent recruitment agencies and abetting 
the extortion of money from nursing recruits.10 The arrest came only months after 
an Amnesty International (2014, 12) report called out the PoE Kochi office for 
its lack of institutional and regulatory capacities. In light of the arrest, it is evident 
that the exploitation and deception of emigrants is not only an informal practice of 
rogue recruiters but an implicitly institutionalised feature of the Indian emigration 
regime.
9. Minister of External Affairs Smt. Sushma Swaraj’s answer to parts (c) & (d) of question in 
Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1558 on July 29, 2015).
10. http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Kochi/cbi-arrests-protector-of-emigrants/arti-
cle7320459.ece.
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Aside from the web of recruitment agents and brokers, networked communities 
of Indians also operate as informal intermediaries supporting the movement of 
irregular migrants. While legal channels are perceived as cumbersome and non-
transparent, the use of personal linkages incorporates elements of intimacy and 
trust (Rajan et al. 2010). Activating transnational social capital is a key strategy 
employed by irregular migrants to migrate, secure employment, and avoid detection. 
Additionally, Rajan et al. (2011) note that migrants embarking on informal chain 
migration report observably lower overheads and fees. The results of their Kerala 
survey among intending migrants, emigrant households, and return emigrants 
indicate that over 70% of emigrants utilise networks of friends and relatives as their 
preferred emigration channel, and most of these flows fall outside the purview of 
legal stipulations.
Among the defining dynamics of GCC economies is the proliferation of 
irregular or non-standard employment. In the Saudi Arabian context, pervasive 
irregular migration is an outgrowth of restrictive migration policies and labour 
practices aimed at reducing reliance on foreign workers. According to economist 
and journalist Hassan al-Sobhi,11 “red tape, the expensive process to get expatriates, 
the limited quotas of visas for foreign workers that are largely secured by well-
connected companies” combined with the operation of informal economies and 
ineffective monitoring allows irregular flows of migration to Saudi Arabia to 
continue relatively unhindered. 
The labour migration system to Saudi Arabia is designed exclusively for 
temporary migration, with built-in controls on residency and duration of stay. Saudi 
Arabia shares with other GCC countries a strong reluctance to use terms such as 
“immigrant” or “migration” preferring “temporary labour mobility” (Thiollet 2011). 
The overarching policy focus is on import of “short-term contract workers” to ensure 
turnover of the labour force. Since the early 1990s, Saudi government initiatives 
toward labour nationalisation, such as Saudization and Nitaqat, have had some 
degree of success while simultaneously generating irregularity (Alsheikh 2015). 
Continued private sector dependence on foreign workers ultimately outweighs 
bureaucratic controls on visa procurement that drive thousands of migrant workers 
underground. Despite (or perhaps owing to) labour localisation initiatives and the 
rigid sponsorship system (kafala), there exists a robust black market for visa trade and 
irregular work. Mismanagement of the sponsorship system is rife, with fraudulent 
sponsors peddling visas or setting up illegal cover-up businesses (tasattur). An 
11. BBC News Middle East, November 29, 2013.
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established nexus between manpower companies and visa merchants organises this 
informal trade in visas, enabling migrants to subvert the mounting costs of formal 
migration. Agents broker the employment of freelance migrants to other employers 
or extract payments to release them to informal self-employment (Hertog 2014), 
leaving them outside formal sponsorship and vulnerable to arrest and deportation. 
The visa trade industry is so widespread that in 2004 the Saudi Minister of Labour 
reported that 70 % of the visas issued by the government were sold on the black 
market.12 The latest battery of measures is unlikely to staunch irregular migration 
from India as long as demand exists in Saudi Arabia’s shadow economy, owing to 
expansive underground networks and the acute shortage of Saudi nationals willing 
and able to carry out a number of private sector jobs. 
Saudi Arabia’s Efforts to Curb Irregular Migration
The proliferation of irregular migration to Saudi Arabia has been linked to an 
escalation of socio-political anxieties and heightened security concerns.13 The 
Saudi government places irregular migration high on its political agenda, deploying 
deeply politicised rhetoric14 that criminalises and stigmatises irregular workers as 
threats to state sovereignty, autonomy, and cultural identity (Longva 1999, 22). 
This framing of irregular migration as a socio-political and security concern has 
resulted in increased societal securitisation, criminalisation and reinforcement of 
the nation’s borders. According to the GLMM database, 0.6 million “infiltrators” 
were apprehended by authorities as they attempted to unlawfully enter Saudi 
Arabia (GLMM 2014c). The expansion of border controls and adoption of multiple 
deterrents (biometric, detention, police coercion) further amplifies the risks and 
costs associated with irregular border crossing. 
The Gulf States enact periodic amnesties to flush out irregular migrants, 
convicted criminals, and other “undesirables.” The Saudi government in 2013 
declared an amnesty to encourage the departure/regularisation of irregular migrants 
during which migrants would be absolved of any fines. The Kingdom intensified 
efforts to issue identity documents and permits to all migrants and ensure that 
all migrants were accounted for on a public database. This grace period offered a 
“path to legality” but due to bureaucratic delays many were unable to regularise 
their status. According to 2013 government estimates, 4.7 million migrants (of 
12. Ibid.
13. Arab News, September 11, 2012.
14. Al Jazeera, November 5, 2013.
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whom 1.4 million were Indians)15 regularised their status over the amnesty period 
by transferring their services to new employers, correcting job titles, or renewing 
permits.
Over 2 million immigrants have since been deported, after failing to legalise 
their status during the amnesty. In contrast to previous incentive-based approaches, 
the government in 2013 launched a sweeping national campaign to detect, detain, and 
deport migrants working and residing in the country illegally, and to dismantle the 
structures or networks supporting and/or exploiting them. Enforcement measures 
intended to repatriate irregular migrants include indiscriminate and indefinite 
detention and “voluntary” [assisted] returns. According to the Ministry of Interior, 
there were 675,952 deportations from Saudi Arabia in 2013, averaging 2,000 daily 
deportations (HRW 2015), and a cumulative total of 2.2 million between the years 
2011 and 2014. One million migrants were either forcibly expelled or allowed to 
avail amnesty (RMMS 2014) with an additional one million slated for deportation 
in 2014.16  
Table 14.7: Preliminary figures of Indian workers arrested and deported by  
Saudi authorities for residency and visa violations and issued Emergency 
Certificates by the Indian Consulate (2014)
The Saudi government crackdown on irregular migrants included arbitrary 
police inspections, raids on companies, residences and labour camps, and a special 
Ministry of Labour taskforce to conduct identity checks to determine migrants’ 
legal status.17 This included the hiring of 1,000 inspectors in early 2013 and an 
additional 1,000 later.18 In November 2013, a total of 20,703 inspection raids 
were conducted across the Kingdom.19 These internal checks and controls pushed 
scores of irregular migrants into hiding against the constant pursuit of the state, 
15. IANS, NDTV, January 18, 2014.
16. The Guardian, November 29, 2013.
17. Al Jazeera, November 5, 2013.
18. Gulf News, April 17, 2013.





Source: Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 1625 answered on 
03/12/2014 by V.K. Singh, MOIA.
284            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
culminating in commercial disruptions and work stoppages in sectors manned 
primarily by migrants. It also compelled migrants to take up sponsored jobs with 
lower salaries to avoid hefty fines and deportation. The resultant undercutting of 
migrants’ reservation wages saved local businesses an estimated $4 billion in the 
first three months of the amnesty alone.20 In a move to comprehensively curb 
opportunities for informal, unregistered work, Saudi Arabia has extended the 
imposition of fines and jail time from migrant workers to employers, recruitment 
agencies, and anyone found sheltering, aiding, or abetting irregular migrants. The 
new clause ensures that the crackdown on irregular workers does not unintentionally 
generate profits for local companies. In November 2013, the Saudi Labour Ministry 
penalised 5,640 firms for violating labour and residency laws and failing to provide 
proper addresses for all employees ensuring that employers and recruitment agents 
remain accountable.
Saudi Arabia recently announced the rollout of the third phase of the 
Nitaqat programme.21 Although the implementation slated for April 2015 has 
been postponed, the adjusted programme ostensibly outlines a system to identify 
those authorised to work in Saudi Arabia, prevent identity theft/spurious visas, and 
address structural factors that sustain irregular migration. More recently, a specific 
Nitaqat programme for recruitment firms was announced on June 15, 2015.22 The 
enhanced programme aspires to set recruitment standards such as a cost-ceilings 
and turnaround times and has the potential to introduce much-needed adjustments 
to enhance the efficiency of Saudi Arabia’s labour brokerage system.
India’s Efforts to Curb Irregular Migration
Until recently, policies, legislation, and institutional architecture governing Indian 
emigration at federal and state levels did little to ensure swift, safe, and secure legal 
migration from the country. The establishment of a dedicated Ministry of Overseas 
Indian Affairs in May 2004 was the first step towards recognising the needs of 
overseas Indians. Since then, a number of targeted measures intending to impede 
irregular migration and promote formal emigration have been implemented.23 
20. Quartz, June 24, 2013.
21. Gulf Business, April 9, 2015.
22. Migration News, June 15, 2015.
23. These measures are detailed in the Minister of Overseas Indian Affairs’ answer to a question 
in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha Starred Question No. 309) on March 18, 2015.
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A number of MoUs and bilateral Labour Agreements have been signed 
with key destination countries to organise safe, legal recruitment of workers and 
Joint Working Groups ( JWGs) have been constituted to ensure their effective 
implementation. Although India had inked labour MoUs with other GCC 
countries, the signing of the Agreement on Labour Cooperation for Domestic 
Service Worker Recruitment in September 2014 marked the first time that India 
entered into a labour agreement with Saudi Arabia. The agreement is widely 
considered the first step towards a comprehensive labour agreement covering the 
wide spectrum of Indian workers in the Kingdom.
In 2009, the MOIA constituted a high-level Inter-ministerial Core Group 
(IMCG) to combat “illegal” migration from India and coordinate state government 
strategies (Arokkiaraj 2015). The MOIA launched the Overseas Workers Resource 
Centre (OWRC) in 2014, which operates a toll-free 24x7 helpline in 11 languages 
to provide information and assistance to prospective emigrants and enable emigrants 
to file complaints against recruiters and foreign employers.24 However, to date, the 
international helpline is only made available for calls from the UAE. Three Migrant 
Resources Centres (MRCs) have been established for information dissemination 
and counselling of potential migrants. The government of Kerala, through the 
Department of Non-Resident Keralites Affairs, has launched awareness campaigns 
and job portals for prospective migrants. National and state publicity campaigns are 
also periodically undertaken to create wider awareness on the risks associated with 
irregular migration and unauthorised intermediaries.
The Emigration Act, 1983 (Section 10) stipulates mandatory registration of 
all Recruiting Agents (RA) with the PoE. The Emigration (Amendment) Rules 
2009 stipulate further conditions on recruitment agents including a Bachelor’s 
degree requirement and a bank guarantee of $30,000 valid for thirteen years.25 
The amendment also mandates that RAs must provide details of employment 
conditions to the intending emigrant before recruitment and ensure proper 
reception of the emigrant, timely renewal of documents and emigrants’ custody of 
travel and employment documents. Complaints of exploitation against registered 
and unregistered Recruiting Agents are investigated at the national level and state 
level, respectively, and if found valid, penal action initiated to suspend or cancel 
RA registration. Complaints received from overseas workers are handled by the 
concerned Indian mission, which contacts the foreign employer/RA for grievance 
24. MOIA Press Information Bureau, January 5, 2015.
25. The Times of India, June 17, 2011.
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redressal. If resolution is unviable, proceedings for blacklisting of the RA/employer 
are initiated, and they are placed on the Prior Approval Category (PAC) and not 
allowed to recruite new workers.
Table 14.8: Complaints received and legal action taken against Unregistered 
Recruitment Agents at State level
Central and state governments and Indian missions have implemented several 
initiatives to extend logistical and financial support to Indian migrants in distress, 
including food, accommodation, and shelters for runaway and irregular workers 
besides the establishment of the Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF).  For 
migrants in the ECR category, the employment contract is required to be signed by 
the foreign employer and intending emigrant and produced before the PoE before 
emigration clearance is granted. Attestation of work contracts by Indian missions 
has been made mandatory in all cases of women workers holding ECR passports 
migrating to ECR countries. Further, to ensure timely assistance and grievance 
redressal, the Indian Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia reportedly operates on an 
open house policy and deploys its Arabic speaking officials to detention centres 
(tarheel) and Passport Offices (jawazat). The embassy issues air tickets to deserving 
cases. 
Despite multi-pronged control and containment efforts, irregular Indian 
migration to Saudi Arabia persists. This is not unexpected, given the complexity 
and ubiquity of the issue and the socio-political tensions it generates. We hope 
that our estimates encourage other alternative estimates to emerge, so as to build a 
more robust assessment of the scope, scale, and solutions to irregular migration in 
the region.
Conclusion
At the turn of the century, Kapiszewski (2001) estimated that irregular workers 
across the GCC countries accounted for about 10 % of the total population or 15% of 
Source: Compiled from annexure in reply to part (c) of Lok Sabha Starred Question No. 309 
on 18/03/2015 and parts (a) and (b) of Unstarred Question No. 430 on 22/07/2015.
 No. of Cases referred to  Prosecution  Prosecution 
Year complaints State Government/ sanction sought sanction issued
  PoE for action 
2012 254 254 16 16
2013 272 272 05 05
2014 198 175 12 11
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the workforce with numbers as high as 700,000 in Saudi Arabia. Our estimates peg 
the labour force share of irregular migrants between 20-40% in the GCC countries, 
and up to 50% in UAE and Kuwait. The proportion of irregular migrants to the 
total population of GCC countries lies between 10-20%, constituting up to 25-35% 
of UAE’s population, with numbers as high as 4 million in Saudi Arabia. In terms of 
irregular migrants as a proportion of the total non-national population, we ascertain 
that in Saudi Arabia and across the Gulf region, this ranges between 20-40% of 
total migrants. From our assessments, Saudi Arabia is the primary destination for 
irregular migrants in the GCC, hosting between 3-4 million irregular migrants. 
We estimate that the numbers of irregular migrants in the Gulf range between 
6.5-9 million, i.e., approximately a third (and potentially half ) of all migrants in 
the GCC. The number of irregular Indian migrants in the GCC can be pegged 
between 2.4-3.3 million with 0.9-1.2 million in Saudi Arabia alone. Given their 
vast numbers, the position of the irregular Indian migrant is of strategic importance 
to understanding state processes and structures in Saudi Arabia.
The 2013 announcement of renewed initiatives to stem the influx of irregular 
migrants and reduce foreign workers in Saudi Arabia sparked fear of a massive 
exodus; however, the projected departures did not occur. Thousands of workers were 
able to validate their visas and Saudi estimates suggest the number of Indians has, in 
fact, expanded by about 100,000 during this period.26 The Indian embassy in Saudi 
Arabia noted that augmentation of the Indian community during the grace period 
was indicative of the resilience of Indians in the Gulf and the broader benefits 
reaped from regularisation processes. 
Overall, Nitaqat labour reforms and allied measures of expulsion/regularisation 
resulted in the decline of irregular migrants from several source countries. In the 
case of India, however, these curtailment measures led to an increase of migrants 
in the Kingdom to the tune of 100,000.27 Several thousand workers were able to 
validate their visas, while thousands were simultaneously expelled. The unwavering 
persistence of irregular migratory movements adds a potentially destabilising 
dimension to the interdependencies that have long bound Saudi Arabia to India. 
Nevertheless, current trends indicate that the India-Saudi Arabia migration 
corridor will remain a vital component of South Asia-Gulf strategic relations for the 
foreseeable future. Within this context, the fraught politics of irregular migration is 
likely to remain a potent political issue.
26. The Indian Express, November 4, 2013.
27. Ibid.
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Irregular Migration to the Gulf: An Analysis of the 
Status of Pakistani Migrant Workers
Ghulam Mohammad Arif and Tahira Ishaq*
Abstract:  Since the 1970s Pakistan has been a major supplier of  labour to the 
Gulf region. This across-the-border movement, which is temporary in nature, 
requires not only recruitment of labour at origin but also their placement in 
the overseas job market, following the rules and procedures set for their legal 
entry and employment. Pakistan has made all institutional arrangements and 
legislations necessary for the recruitment and placement of its labour in an 
the overseas labour market. However, despite these arrangements, irregular 
migration is not uncommon among Pakistani workers in the Gulf - the cases 
of deportation of irregular migrants from the region and human trafficking/
smuggling have often been reported in the press. However, there is a dearth of 
information about the magnitude of irregular migration, types of irregularity, 
reasons for it and the adequacy of legislations and policies for its control. This 
chapter aims to fill this knowledge gap by using an historical approach, based 
on a conceptual framework that irregular migration takes place because of a 
mismatch between the number of persons wishing to work in the Gulf region 
and available opportunities for legal migration as well as continuity in overseas 
jobs. Opportunity-seeking migrants may take the risk of overstaying, switch 
their employers/sponsors, or run away to maximise the benefits of overseas 
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employment, while survival migrants, because of the high cost involved 
in legal emigration, are vulnerable to human trafficking and smuggling. 
Rationalisation and reduction in the cost of migration, implementation of 
recruitment rules and protection of migrants’ rights in the overseas job market 
can play a key role in controlling irregular migration in the Gulf region.
Introduction
Since the 1970s, Pakistan has been a major supplier of labour to the Gulf region. 
This across-the-border movement, which is temporary in nature, requires not 
only the recruitment of labour at origin but also their placement in the overseas 
job market, in accordance with the rules and procedures set for their legal entry 
and employment. Pakistan has made institutional arrangements and legislations 
necessary for the recruitment and placement of its workers in an overseas labour 
market. Despite these arrangements, irregular migration is not uncommon among 
Pakistani workers in the Gulf – the cases of deportation of irregular migrants from 
the region have often been reported in the media (Dawn, April 13, 2015). Irregular 
and illegal migration is a source of mounting concern for all states in the Gulf 
region because of high unemployment among the citizens as well as security issues. 
The governments of the Gulf countries have started taking strict action against 
irregular migrant workers; of late, Saudi Arabia, where about half of the Pakistanis 
working in the region are employed, has been one of the most active countries in 
implementing policies to restrict migration (RMMS 2014).
Irregular migration in the Gulf takes place because of a mismatch between the 
number of persons wishing to work in the region and available opportunities for 
legal migration as well as continuity in overseas jobs. Suter (2005) divided irregular 
migrants into two categories: survival migrants and opportunity-seeking migrants. 
Poverty, unemployment, and economic hardship serve as the principal push factors 
for survival migrants, while lack of opportunities to enhance economic welfare is 
a pull factor for opportunity-seeking migration. The former are more driven by 
economic despair; risks of punishment and discomfort are less likely to keep them 
from moving. They are vulnerable to human trafficking and smuggling. The latter 
are more cautious about potential risk and rewards of irregular migration and are 
more willing to stay in the country of origin if the risk and punishment of migrating 
are too high. However, opportunity-seeking migrants, if employed overseas, may 
take the risk of becoming irregular by overstaying or switching their employers/
sponsors to maximise benefits of overseas employment (Suter 2005).
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As a consequence of the concern among Gulf labour-importing countries 
regarding irregular migration, there is a growing interest in the analysis of the 
phenomenon. For example, the Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) 
programme, which is a joint venture of the Gulf Research Center and the Migration 
Policy Centre at the European University Institute, and the Regional Mixed 
Migration Secretariat (RMMS 2014) have produced some good work on irregular 
migration in the Gulf region (Shah 2014; RMMS 2014).
Based on newspaper reports, the incidence of illegal immigration in each 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country was estimated by Kapiszewski (2001) 
as being at least 10% of the total population or 15% of the labour force. Suter 
(2005) has also examined both regular and irregular migration in Dubai. Pakistan, 
as a major labour-sending country to the Gulf labour market, has been part of 
all these analyses. The information thus gathered is very useful to understand the 
phenomenon of irregular migration in the GCC countries, but it is insufficient to 
know where each labour-sending country, like Pakistan, stands in it.
The issue of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants across the Pakistani 
border has also been addressed in annual reports of the United Nations Office for 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development (ICMPD), but their focus is largely on illegal migration to Europe 
(UNODC 2012, 2013; ICMPD 2013). There is a dearth of information about the 
magnitude of irregular migration among Pakistani workers in the Gulf countries, 
types of irregularity, reasons for irregularity, and the adequacy of legislations and 
policies for its control. This chapter aims to fill this knowledge gap based on the 
conceptual framework that irregular migration is the result of a mismatch between 
the number of persons wishing to work abroad and available opportunities for legal 
migration and continuity in overseas jobs.
Concept Clarification and Methodology
Irregular migration is a broad concept which includes violations of legal and 
documented entry, illegal or unrecognised stay, as well as absolutely illegal entry 
and stay. However, there is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular 
migration. The RMMS defines it as a “movement that takes place outside the 
regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries” (RMMS 2014). 
So, from the perspective of destination countries it is illegal entry, stay, or work in 
these countries, meaning that a migrant does not have the necessary authorisation 
or documents required under immigration regulations to enter, reside, or work 
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in a given country. From the perspective of Gulf labour-receiving countries, 
Shah (2014) identifies four types of irregular migration: human trafficking and 
smuggling; overstaying on work, tourist, dependent or specific purpose visa (Haj 
or Umrah); change of sponsor or visa trading; and running away from employer 
or absconding. From the perspective of the sending country, irregularity happens 
when a person crosses its international boundary without a valid passport or other 
travel documents, or does not fulfill the administrative requirements for leaving the 
country. 
Pakistan’s emigration rules not only make unlawful emigration punishable but 
also impose a fine on those migrant workers who violate the terms of the agreement 
with their foreign employers by abandoning employment (BEOE 2012). By taking 
into account the perspective of both sending and receiving countries, for this study, 
an irregular migrant is defined as one who crosses the international border illegally 
or one who has crossed the border legally, but is residing or working in the host 
country in violation of the rules and regulations there. So, irregular migration 
includes human trafficking and smuggling, illegal entry to a foreign country, all 
types of overstaying at the country of destination, and taking up employment for a 
person/firm other than the sponsor without permission. 
A close look at the information available from media, official documents, and 
international reports reveals that examples of all types of irregular migration can 
be found among Pakistanis working or living in the Gulf region. Apprehension 
of illegal workers and deportation to Pakistan is recorded in these reports and 
documents. Despite this, there is no information on the magnitude of irregular 
migration among Pakistanis presently working in the six GCC countries except 
for the number of deportees from the region. A comprehensive analysis of irregular 
migration requires access to data on illegal entry (without documents or with 
forged documents), human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, overstaying, 
and abandoning the employer/sponsor. However, the required data are not readily 
available, making the analysis of irregular migration difficult. 
With respect to the methodology used, this study views that all types of 
irregularity among Pakistanis working in the GCC countries, except human 
trafficking and smuggling, happens at the destination. Cases for temporary 
employment in these countries are processed by the relevant Pakistani authorities 
in accordance with the rules and procedures set by both the GCC countries and 
Pakistan. But, some of the migrants fall into an irregular situation because of the 
violation of the rules and regulations of the host country. In this context, irregular 
migration among Pakistanis in the GCC countries can be better understood 
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through the examination of migration management in Pakistan. Therefore, the 
analysis in this study is carried out in three steps: firstly, legal placement of Pakistani 
workers in the GCC countries is examined by focusing on the methods used for 
labour recruitment and the regional arrangements for processing cases of overseas 
migration. Secondly, human trafficking and smuggling of migrants across borders 
is analysed; and thirdly, an in-depth analysis of deportation of Pakistanis from the 
GCC countries is carried out by linking it with regular or legal flows of workers 
to the GCC countries. The analyses are supported by the data generated through 
recent small (not representative) household surveys.
Legal Placement of Pakistanis in the Gulf Labour Market
The government of Pakistan has taken numerous steps to control and regulate 
the country’s labour recruitment process. In the 1970s when labour migration to 
the Middle East began on a large scale, three organisations, National Manpower 
Council, Directorate of Seamen’s Welfare, and Protectorate of Emigrants were 
amalgamated into a Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE). 
The Emigration Act of 1922 and the Emigration Rules of 1959 were replaced 
by the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 (BEOE 2012). The BEOE as a regulatory 
body/authority controls, regulates, facilitates, and monitors the emigration process 
through the seven regional offices of the Protector of Emigrants in: Lahore, 
Rawalpindi, and Multan in Punjab; Karachi in Sindh; Peshawar and Malakand 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP); and Quetta in Balochistan, with areas (districts) of 
their jurisdiction (Appendix Table 15.6).
Between 1971 and 2015, the BEOE processed the placement of 8.365 million 
Pakistani workers in overseas labour markets. Ninety six per cent of them found 
employment in the GCC countries, including in Saudi Arabia (50%) and UAE 
(33%). Oman is the destination country for about 8% of Pakistani workers who 
went abroad through the BEOE. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have a relatively 
small share of 1.7, 2.2 and 1.4% respectively (Table 15.1). Pakistani workers, like 
other guest workers, know that their overseas jobs are temporary, and they have 
to return home when their contracts expire. In fact, this is happening. The current 
stock of Pakistanis in the Middle East is estimated at around 3 million (Amjad et 
al. 2012; ILO 2015), suggesting that more than 5 million workers have returned 
home during the last four decades, although repeat migration cannot be ruled out.
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Table 15.1: Total placement of Pakistani workers abroad by the country of 
destination (1971-2015)
Legally, Pakistanis can procure overseas employment through the public or 
private sector. The Overseas Employment Corporation (OEC) is the only agency 
in the public sector which recruits workers for overseas employers, but its role as a 
recruiting agency has gradually declined. In the early 1980s, about 9% of the total 
workers placed abroad were recruited by the OEC, while more recent data shows 
that its share in the total placement of workers is very low, less than 1% (Figure 
15.1). In the private sector, the recruitment is primarily conducted through the 
licensed Overseas Employment Promoters (OEPs), besides direct employment by 
which an individual is legally allowed to procure foreign employment either through 
his own efforts or through friends and relatives working abroad. At present, there 
are more than 1,100 licensed OEPs in the country (BEOE 2015b). It is mandatory 
for workers going abroad for employment to register with the BEOE irrespective 
of the method used to secure such employment. For registration or legal placement 
of Pakistanis abroad, the BEOE has laid down separate procedures or steps to be 
followed for workers recruited through OEPs and for those who secure visa through 
direct sources.1 
1. Seven to eight steps have been given in the official documents, including submission of 
documents, such as passport, CNIC, Visa, contract or foreign employment letter, air tickets, 
payment of fee, and attendance of briefing at a regional office of the Protector of Emigrants 
(BEOE 2015a).
Country of destination Total placement of Pakistani % distribution
 workers abroad (1971-2015)  
UAE 2,757,436 33.0







Source: BEOE 2015. 
Note: Data for 2015 covers the January to October period.
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Figure 15.1: Distribution (%) of Pakistani workers placed abroad for 
employment by the mode of recruitment, 1980-2014
The registration data of the BEOE for the last four decades shows that half 
the Pakistani workers went abroad through OEPs while the remaining half secured 
employment through direct contacts with overseas employers. Social networks in 
the form of friends/relatives already working in the GCC countries and direct 
contacts of employers with potential migrants have played a major role in workers 
securing employment visas without the involvement of a recruiting agency. The 
magnitude and pattern of irregular migration may vary depending on the method 
used to recruit workers; however, data is not available to examine this association. 
To understand the dynamics of legal migration from Pakistan to the Gulf, 
there is a need to examine how and where legal recruitment takes place. As 
mentioned earlier, the BEOE manages overseas migration for employment through 
its seven regional offices in the four provinces of the country (Appendix Table 
15.6). Punjab has three regional offices of the Protector of Emigrants located in 
Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Multan, covering central, northern, and southern districts 
of the province. The share of Punjab in the total population is about 55%, and it has 
almost retained its share, 51.8%, in total placement of workers abroad (Table 15.2), 
primarily through these three regional offices.
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Table 15.2: Total placement of Pakistanis abroad for temporary employment as 
processed by the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, 1981-2015
The share of Sindh in total annual placement, at 9.4%, is two and half times 
lower than its share in the total population (23.98%). Mobility among the Sindhi 
population is in general lower than that of other ethnic groups, particularly Punjabis 
and Pashtuns. Karachi, the largest coastal city of the country and capital of Sindh, 
attracts migrants from all parts of the country, but the movement of the Sindhi 
population to Karachi remains low. Poverty, high cost of migration, and inadequate 
infrastructure are the other core factors behind low participation in overseas 
migration from Sindh. In this province, there is only one regional office of the 
Protector of Emigrants, located in Karachi, from where approximately one-fifth of 
the total outflows were processed.
Although the coverage of the Karachi office extends officially to some coastal 
districts of Balochistan (see Table 15.1), many migrants from other provinces, 
particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), it has been seen, were likely to have been 
processed through the Karachi office during the last four decades. This is clear from 
the KP share in overseas migration (25.7%) and the proportion of emigration cases 
(20%) processed through the two regional offices of the Protector of Emigrants, 
located in Peshawar and Malakand. Table 15.2 shows that only a small number 
of overseas employment contracts are processed from the Multan (Punjab) and 
Quetta (Balochistan) regional offices of the Protector of Emigrants. So, the bulk of 
cases are processed from the remaining five offices. Except the one in Karachi, the 
Region of Origin Share in total Share in total
 population number of migrants Protectorate-wise share
 (2015) processed by BEOE
Punjab 54.93* 51.8 59.6 [Lahore (23.9%);
   Rawalpindi 29.6%;
   Multan 6.1%]
Sindh 23.98 9.4 19.1 (Karachi)
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 13.47 25.7 20.6 [Peshawar (14.6%; 
   Malakand 6.0%)]
Balochistan 5.18 1.2 0.6 (Quetta)
AJK, Northern areas, 2.41  11.9 -
 (FATA only)
Total (%) 100 100 100
Total (number) 199.708 7,757,248  7,757,248
 million (1981 - 2015)
Total (number) - 8,365,341  -
  (1971 - 2015)
Source: Government of Pakistan 2015; BEOE 2015. 
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other four cover the central-north belt of Punjab and the KP province. Irregular 
migration is found to be relatively higher among migrants originated from Punjab, 
particularly central Punjab.
It appears that the recruitment of workers for employment in the GCC 
countries in the past has been primarily carried out in the central-north belt of 
Punjab, KP, and Karachi. These, except Karachi, are also high-migration areas in 
terms of both the incidence of emigration and the amount received as remittances 
from a household member working abroad. The standard of living of the population 
in the high-migration areas is much better than the standard of living in Sindh, 
Balochistan, and Southern Punjab, characterised as poverty stricken areas. Thus, 
emigration activities are concentrated in relatively better-off regions where people 
have the capacity to finance costly overseas migration. In this context, the migration 
of Pakistani workers for overseas employment can be viewed as opportunity-seeking 
migration or a livelihood strategy of the participating households to diversify their 
sources of income. Depending on the destination country in the GCC and the 
recruitment channel used for finding a job abroad, a migrant pays, on average, more 
than Rs. 200,000 per overseas job. He also bears the opportunity cost in the form of 
giving up his local employment and earning opportunities.
Magnitude of Irregular Migration
It is evident from the earlier discussion that Pakistan has established the necessary 
institutions and put in place procedures and mechanisms for legal and regular 
placement of its workers in overseas labour markets. Pakistan has followed these 
procedures to place more than eight million workers abroad during the last four 
decades. However, deportation of Pakistanis from abroad because of their illegal 
or irregular status has been reported frequently in the media. Therefore, this study 
examines the phenomenon of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants across 
borders and follows it up with an analysis of the reasons for the deportation of 
Pakistanis from the GCC countries.
Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants
The reported cases of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants are often based 
on the data in the annual reports of international organisations such as UNODC and 
ICMPD and reports on the arrest of human smugglers by the Federal Investigation 
Agency (FIA). The series of annual reports of UNODC in particular provides 
updates about human trafficking across borders. The US Department of State has 
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also recently released a report on human trafficking in Pakistan. Two conclusions 
are commonly drawn in all these reports. First, Pakistan is a source, transit, and 
destination country for trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, 
and second, the problem manifests itself within the country and across borders. 
Estimates shows that 3.351 million irregular migrants were present in Pakistan 
in 2004 (UNODC 2012). Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are the three 
major source countries for these irregular migrants in Pakistan (Table 15.3).
Table 15.3: Estimated numbers of irregular migrants in Pakistan (2004)
The common methodology used for estimating the phenomenon of human 
trafficking and smuggling of migrants from Pakistan to other countries is as follows. 
Firstly, three major routes have been identified through which the trafficking 
takes place: (i) Pakistan-Iran-Oman, (ii) Pakistan-Iran-Turkey-Greece, and (iii) 
Pakistan-Middle East-West Africa-Spain. Some other routes leading to Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Australia have also been identified in the ICMPD migration 
report on Pakistan (ICMPD 2013). Secondly, Pakistanis who used these routes 
to illegally reach countries such as Iran, Turkey, Oman, Greece, and Spain, and 
were subsequently deported, are considered trafficked human beings or smuggled 
migrants (UNODC 2011). The deportation of Pakistani nationals from these five 
countries increased from 12,343 in 2007 to 14,546 in 2013; in between, the number 
of deportees jumped to more than 20,000 in 2011 and 2012 (Figure 15.2). Iran 
and Oman consistently deported the maximum number of Pakistanis during these 
years. The largest number of deportees who are sent back by the sea route arrive 
from Oman while those sent back by air largely return from Spain and Turkey.
But, this methodology has several flaws. For example, the assumption that all 
deportees were smuggled or trafficked may not reflect the real situation. A wide 
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passport, illegal stay, entry refused, violation of emigration laws, illegally working 
on student visa, asylum refused, overstay, and visa cancelled.2 A large number of 
Pakistanis are working in Oman. Their stay in Oman can be considered illegal or 
irregular if they are staying without securing extension of their contracts. Their 
deportation because of illegal stay cannot be categorised as human trafficking 
or smuggling. Similarly, the deportation of visitors from the five countries Iran, 
Turkey, Oman, Greece, and Spain for staying beyond the permitted time is likely 
to be counted as human trafficking or smuggling of migrants. However, despite 
these limitations, available information reveals the existence of networks of human 
traffickers and smugglers in the country (Dawn, November 10, 2015).
Figure 15.2: Deportees from five countries (Iran, Turkey,
Oman, Spain and Greece) 2007-2014
The government of Pakistan has taken serious steps to develop strategies to 
combat these crimes and protect the rights of victims. In 2002, the Prevention 
and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance (PACHTO) was enacted (UNODC 
2013). The PACHTO makes it illegal to be involved in the process of human 
trafficking, directly and/or indirectly (ICMPD 2013). This was followed by the 
development of a National Action Plan for Combating Human Trafficking and 










2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: UNODC 2014.
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of the FIA. A liaison office has also been established in Muscat, Oman by FIA 
in order to help identify and protect victims of human trafficking in the Middle 
East3 (ICMPD 2013). In 2014, the FIA also established a research and analysis 
center responsible for collecting and analysing data and trends related to human 
trafficking and smuggling. The FIA and police also began to use standard operating 
procedures for the identification and referral of trafficking victims to protective 
services (US Department of State 2015).
Regarding human trafficking and smuggling, this discussion, therefore, leads 
to three broad conclusions. First, the number of deportees from Iran, Turkey, Oman, 
Greece, and Spain may not necessarily reflect the magnitude of human trafficking 
and smuggling of migrants because the deportation could be linked to many other 
factors which made the stay of deportees at their destinations illegal. Second, Oman 
is the only country, among the GCC countries, for which human trafficking and 
smuggling of migrants is regularly reported in the form of number of deportees. 
There is hardly any evidence of trafficking to Saudi Arabia, though several cases in 
the UAE have been reported in the media. Third, while the government of Pakistan 
has made serious efforts to eliminate human trafficking and smuggling, the real 
worry is about the existence of networks involved in these criminal activities and 
the persistence of trafficking and smuggling. More legal and administrative efforts 
are required to control these illegal activities.  
Deportation of Pakistani Workers from GCC Countries
Over 250,000 illegal Pakistani immigrants have been deported back between 
2009 and 2014, according to reports in the media (Table 15.4). Three-quarters of 
these illegal migrants were deported from the GCC countries, with the highest 
numbers coming from Saudi Arabia, followed by UAE and Oman. These statistics 
on deportation are used in this study to determine the magnitude of irregular 
migration among Pakistanis in the GCC countries. Table 15.4 provides data on 
the total number of Pakistanis placed in the six GCC countries between 2009 and 
2014 as well as the number of deportees from these countries during the respective 
period, as reported in the newspapers (Dawn, April 13, 2015). The share of deported 
migrants from Saudi Arabia was 64% while the country’s share in the placement of 
workers during the period 2009-2014  was 50%. The same was the case of migrants 
deported from Oman.
3. FIA has also negotiated for the establishment of similar offices in Turkey, Greece, Iran, and 
UK (ICMPD 2013). 
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The last column of Table 15.4 shows deportees as a percentage of total 
Pakistani workers placed in the respective GCC country during 2009-2014. The 
deportees from Saudi Arabia constitute 8% of the total placement in the Kingdom 
during this period while the ratio goes up to about 11% in the case of Oman. It 
is 3% for the UAE; however, some sources put the number of deportees from the 
UAE at more than 60,000, which increases the ratio from 3% to more than 5%. 
Outflows to Kuwait during 2009-2014 were quite low, and only 2,234 persons were 
admitted for temporary employment (Table 15.4). The main reason for the large 
number of deportees from Kuwait (1,908) shown in Table 15.4 hinges on the fact 
that new visas (work, visit, as well as family) for Pakistanis were almost banned 
starting in 2010, although there was no written notification of such a ban. That 
situation generally continues until today, with a few exceptions. Thus, the deportees 
during 2009-14 are probably the ones who were in the country prior to 2009, and 
not necessarily a subset of those placed in 2009-14.
Table 15.4: Number of Pakistanis deported from the Gulf countries between 
2009 and 2014 as  a proportion (%) of workers placed in the region by the 
BEOE during this period
Table 15.4 shows that, overall, the Pakistanis who were deported from the 
GCC countries during the 2009-2014 period were 6% of the total placement of 
Pakistani workers in the region during this period. A small survey of 200 return 
migrants in Jhelum, a high-migration district in Punjab, was carried out in 2014. The 
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Source: BEOE 2015; Dawn 2015.
* Deportees as a percentage of total Pakistani workers in Kuwait is reported not because new 
visas for Pakistanis have not been given since 2010, the deportees probably were in the country 
prior to 2009 (see text for details)
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The study analysed post return entrepreneurial activities undertaken by the return 
migrants. A return migrant is defined as “a Pakistani citizen, who had migrated 
abroad and returned to Pakistan after staying at destination at least for one year 
either voluntarily or involuntarily, and has started any business or participated in 
any income generating activity after return.” According to this study, 6% of migrants 
who had returned from the Middle East reported deportation as their reason for 
return, while the corresponding percentage for migrants who returned from Europe 
was 25% (Table 15.5). Jhelum is among those districts which have sent its labour 
force to all regions: Middle East, Europe, and North America.
Table 15.5: Reasons for return as reported by migrants who returned from  
overseas employment in District Jhelum (Punjab)
It may be a coincidence that the findings of a small survey and ratio of deportees 
to total placement of workers between 2009 and 2014 show the same figure of 6%. 
Several questions that need further investigation arise: Why were these workers 
deported? Did they enter the GCC countries illegally, without legal documents? 
Were they overstayers? Did they abandon their sponsors/employers? The available 
information does not provide answers to these questions. It is, however, argued that 
undocumented migration, crossing the border illegally, of Pakistani workers is not a 
common phenomenon except to Oman, which is used as a base for illegal movement 
or human trafficking to Europe, according to reports produced by UNODC and 
ICMPD (UNODC 2014; ICMPD 2013;). The Pakistan-Iran border is also used 
by some migrants to work in UAE and Europe (ICMPD 2013; UNODC 2014). 
Most often, the deportation of Pakistanis from the GCC countries, particularly 
Saudi Arabia and UAE, happens because workers fall into the category of over-
stayers or change their employers/sponsors without permission. If this argument is 
accepted, the magnitude of irregular migration among Pakistanis could be around 
6% assuming that the overstayers and those who changed their sponsors are the 
same persons.4 
4. If the total stock of Pakistani workers in GCC countries is used in the denominator for the 
Reasons for return Middle East Europe All
Work permit expired 52.0 26.0 39.0
Factory/work closed 15.0 16.0 15.5
Deportation 6.0 25.0 15.5
Health problem/retired 15.0 11.0 13.0
Family reasons 12.0 22.0 17.0
Source: Iqbal 2015.
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If they are treated separately, then the incidence of irregular migration ratio 
can go up. Based on a small survey of returned migrants from the Middle East, 
Arif (2009) reported that 5% of them changed their employers during overseas 
employment. Such a change would not be irregular or illegal if the change occurred 
with the permission of the previous sponsors. Assuming that the change occurred 
without the permission of the workers’ previous employers, the magnitude of 
irregular migration among Pakistanis, based on available statistics on the number of 
deportees and those who changed their sponsors/employers may then vary between 
6 and 11%. However, emigration rules in Oman allow workers to change their 
employers after a certain duration of employment. During the recent amnesty 
in Saudi Arabia, an estimated 4.7 million foreign workers corrected their status, 
including the transfer of sponsors (Shah 2014). This study thus estimates that 6-8% 
of Pakistani workers in the GCC countries could be irregular because of overstaying 
or changing of employers without permission.
A relevant question is: have all irregular Pakistanis in the GCC countries been 
deported? There is no straightforward answer to this question. However, the strong 
possibility is that the current stock of irregular migrants in the GCC countries 
could be very low. Although Shah (2014) has reported that if the experience of 
Kuwait during its last amnesty period is reflective of the usual response of irregular 
migrants in other GCC countries, the amnesty programmes have been only partially 
successful in facilitating the regularisation of irregular workers. A majority of them 
were still in the country at the end of the last amnesty period in Kuwait. However, 
she also states that the latest amnesty in Saudi Arabia appears to have been relatively 
more successful, although irregular workers are still found on the streets. Since half 
of the Pakistanis in the GCC countries are employed in Saudi Arabia, the relative 
success of this latest amnesty is likely to have reduced the phenomenon of irregular 
migration among Pakistani workers in the country. However, the current situation 
of irregular migration among Pakistanis in the UAE remains unclear.
It is argued that some estimates of irregular migration, as given in the reports 
of international organisations, are not credible. For example, the ICMPD country 
report on migration in Pakistan says with reference to Colombo Process, Country 
Information that “it is estimated that 300,000 people have been migrating from 
Pakistan each year by using one of the irregular channels including the existing 
wide network of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in the country” 
(ICMPD 2013, pp. 38). During the forty-year history of labour migration to the 
calculation of irregular migration, the result may not be very different either.
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Middle East, Pakistan has only recently been able to place in the region more 
than 300,000 workers annually, with its strong legal network of more than 1,100 
OEPs, seven regional offices of the Protector of Emigrants and social networks. 
The BEOE data show that between 1971 and 2007, Pakistani labour export did 
not exceed the 300,000 per year figure. Moreover, all Pakistanis deported between 
2009 and 2014 from different parts of the world, including the GCC countries, 
were less than 300,000 (Table 15.4). In this context, a very high estimate of annual 
irregular migration from Pakistan by the ICMPD report not only exaggerates the 
situation but also undermines the institutional arrangements and legal framework 
functioning in the country for four decades to recruit workers through legal and 
regular channels.5 
Root Causes that Generate and Sustain Irregular Migration in GCC 
Countries
This chapter is based on a conceptual framework that irregular migration is the result 
of a mismatch between the number of persons wishing to work abroad and available 
opportunities for legal migration as well as continuity in overseas jobs. The literature 
divides migrants into two broad categories: survival migrants and opportunity-
seeking migrants. The survival migrants, because of poverty, are considered to be 
vulnerable to human trafficking and smuggling. The Pakistan National Action Plan 
for Combating Human Trafficking also views poverty as the main root cause for 
human trafficking and seeks “to institute poverty mitigation measures and safety nets 
to promote economic development and social inclusion with a view to ameliorate 
the situation with regard to supply/push factors” (Government of Pakistan 2015a).6 
However, as reported earlier, it is worth noting that the bulk of illegal immigration 
to Europe, according to the ICMPD (2013) report, occurs from Punjab, particularly 
from the Gujrat, Gujranwala, Mandi Bhauddin, Sialkot, D.G. Khan and Multan 
districts. All these districts, except Multan, are among the high-migration districts 
in terms of outflow of workers as well as inflow of foreign remittances. Gujrat, 
Gujranwala and Sialkot are among the prosperous or better-off districts of the 
country. It appears, as the UNODC (2014) report shows, that illegal immigration 
5. In fact, the ICMPD report has summed up key institutional actors involved in migrant 
management and diaspora affairs, and it has also presented an overview of the key domestic 
legislation related to migration management (ICMPD 2013). In addition to ministries of 
Interior, OP & HD and departments, special cells, circles and task force have been created for 
migration management.
6. http://www.fia.gov.pk/HUMAN.htm.
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from high-migration areas is a function of legal immigration. Regions with large 
traffic flows have a higher risk of exploitation by illegal networks. Survival migrants, 
who cannot afford the high cost of migration through legal sources, are probably the 
victims of illegal networks. In addition to poverty mitigation measures, reduction 
in the cost of legal migration can help to move the survival migrants away from the 
use of illegal networks.
With the focus on irregular migration among Pakistanis working in the GCC 
countries, this study takes the position that Pakistani workers in the GCC countries 
are primarily opportunity-seeking migrants, who are less likely to cross borders 
illegally; however, they may take the risk of overstaying or switching of employers/
sponsors to maximise the benefits of overseas employment. Pakistan is currently 
passing through a demographic transition, which has resulted in a youth bulge 
and an increase in the working age population. Migration to the Gulf region has 
provided opportunities for productive and remunerative employment for the young 
workforce (Amjad 2013). The results of a small survey of return migrants in district 
Jhelum show that more than one-third of the young migrants in the Middle East 
were unemployed in Pakistan before migration, and upon their return, they have 
started new businesses from the amount saved during overseas employment (Iqbal 
2015). As Shah (2014) has reported based on interviews of those workers who did 
not take the benefit of amnesty in Kuwait, and preferred to live and work as irregular 
migrants to achieve their specific goals in terms of ensuring that they established 
a sound financial base before return, Pakistani migrants working in other parts of 
the region may also take this risk to maximise the benefits of overseas employment.
Moreover, the contemporary labour migration system in the Middle East may 
itself be a root cause for irregular migration. The contract period of two years normally 
given to an expatriate worker is too short to achieve the goals set by opportunity-
seeking migrants. Similarly, a restriction on changing the employer undermines 
the workers’ efforts to achieve their financial goals in the shortest possible time. 
The rigidity of the temporary labour migration system probably generates irregular 
migration.
The high cost of overseas migration affects migrants in several ways. It may 
push potential migrants to illegal networks. It could also be the root cause for the 
generation of irregular migration in the form of overstaying or switching employers 
among opportunity-seeking workers, who could not achieve their financial goals 
because of the short duration of the contract and low wages at destination. The 
weak implementation of recruitment rules in Pakistan as well as abroad and lack 
of protection of migrants’ rights in overseas job markets may push them to switch 
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to irregular status. Finally, the support of social networks at destination probably 
enables irregular migrants to sustain themselves and feel comfortable (Shah 2014). 
Irregular Migration and Policy Challenges
The government of Pakistan has not neglected its regulatory role, as mentioned 
earlier; a specific agency, BEOE, and seven regional offices of Protector of Emigrants 
are in place as the principal regulatory bodies. Rules exist to regulate and control 
the recruitment process. The official costs of recruitment have been kept very low. 
However, questions remain as to whether these procedures are followed in practice 
by the concerned stakeholders, whether official fees and charges are respected, and 
whether the government is effectively able to control illegal and undocumented 
migration, particularly human trafficking and smuggling of migrants which remains 
a major policy challenge.
A major policy question is how Pakistan can contribute to controlling irregular 
migration in the GCC countries which may be traced primarily to overstaying and 
switching of sponsors/employers. Pakistan can contribute in three ways. First, it 
should work with other Asian labour-sending countries to negotiate with the major 
labour-importing countries of the Gulf region to revise their policies regarding the 
renewal of workers’ contract and allow them to change employers after a certain 
period. In view of the high costs involved in migration to the GCC countries and 
the financial goals of participating households, workers may legally be given a chance 
to work for four to five years. Oman has relaxed the rules regarding the change of 
employers after a certain period of time; other countries, particularly Saudi Arabia 
and UAE, may also be persuaded to consider this relaxation. Second, several recent 
studies have pointed to the highly exploitative market for visas which enhances the 
cost of finding a job in the GCC countries. There is need to set up a fair market 
to enhance the capacity of migrant workers to earn, save, and sent a considerable 
amount of money back home during the legal period of stay abroad. Third, a briefing 
at the office of the Protector of Emigrants must be made mandatory for outgoing 
workers, where they are given directions to follow the rules and regulations of the 
country of employment. This type of counselling should be continuous; community 
welfare officers in the Pakistan embassies in the GCC countries can play a role in 
this counselling. Violators of the rules and regulations of the host country may be 
punished according to the 1979 Emigration Ordinance if they are deported back.    
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Conclusion
The estimation of the incidence of irregular migration among Pakistanis working 
in the GCC countries is not easy because the data required for such estimation is 
not available in either the labour-sending or -receiving countries. Data on amnesty 
programmes and deportation are commonly used for the estimation of irregular 
migration at destination. However, the high estimates by some international 
organisations of irregular migration from Pakistan through different illegal channels 
are not credible. Based on the number of deportees between 2009 and 2014, this 
study has estimated that the incidence of irregular migration among Pakistanis 
working in the GCC countries is likely to be around 6 to 8% of the outflows during 
this period. This estimate is based on the number of deportees and the result of a 
small survey showing the proportion of workers in the GCC countries who changed 
their sponsors/employers without the permission of their previous sponsors. With 
the recent amnesty in Saudi Arabia, the magnitude of irregular migration is likely 
to have declined considerably. 
On the one hand, the decline in irregular migration indicates the effectiveness 
of Pakistan’s institutions in placing workers in the GCC countries on a large scale 
through legal channels. On the other hand, overstaying and switching of employers 
by some migrants not only violates the rules of destination countries but is also 
against the Pakistani rules as laid out in the 1979 Emigration Ordinance. Therefore, 
efforts to control both overstaying and switching of sponsors by Pakistani workers in 
the GCC countries need to be enhanced. Labour migration rules are rigid regarding 
the renewal of contracts, which are usually just for two years, and do not permit 
workers to easily switch their employers for better wages and working conditions. 
As a result of the high costs involved in migration to the Gulf region, and the 
consequent financial expectations of migrants and their families, a relatively longer 
stay of workers at their destination with decent working conditions is required. Visa 
costs need to be brought under control as well.
No doubt, the dependence of GCC countries on foreign labour is very high, 
and their concerns about the irregularities in immigration are justified, but regular 
return flows of workers to their home communities at the expiry of their contracts 
is a matter of satisfaction. It also shows the success of the labour migration systems 
in the Middle East. Careful handling of irregular migration by involving both 
labour-sending and -receiving countries will make the systems more beneficial for 
all stakeholders.
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Appendix 
Table 15.6: Regional Offices of Protector of Emigrants  
with areas (districts) of jurisdiction
No. Name of Protector Office Areas (Districts) of jurisdiction
 1 Protector of Emigration, Lahore District Lahore, Kasur, Okara, Sheikhpura, Faisalabad, Jhang,
   T.T. Singh, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Narowal, Hafizabad, Sargodha,
   Mianwali, Jhang, Khushab, Bhakar and Pak Pattan 
 2. Protector of Emigrants Districts Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum, Chakwal, Gujrat, Mandi
   Bhauddin, Islamabad and Territory of State of Azad Jammu and
   Kashmir.
 3. Protector of Emigrants, Multan Districts Multan, D.G. Khan, Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar,
   Layyah, Lodheran, Muzafargarh, Sahiwal, Rahimyar Khan,
   Vehari and Rajanpur and Khanewal.
 4. Protector of Emigration, Karachi Province of Sindh including Districts Lasbela, Khuzdar,
   Gawadar, Pasni, Jiwani and Oramara of Baluchistan. 
 5. Protector of Emigrants, Peshawar Province of NWFP and FATA excluding Districts Dir, Swat and
   Malakand Agency, Kohistan Buner, Chitral Bajopre Agency and
   Shangla.
 6. Protector of Emigrants, Malakand Districts of Dir, Swat and Malakand Agency, Kohistan Buner
   Chitral, Bajore Agency and Shangla.
 7. Protector of Emigrants, Quetta Province of Baluchistan excluding Districts Lasbela, Khuzdar,
   Gawadar, Pasni, Jiwani and Ormara.  
Source: Arif 2009.
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Stemming Irregular Migration at the Source:  
The Philippine Experience
Graziano Battistella and Maruja M.B. Asis*
Abstract:  The Philippines has developed an elaborate legal and institutional 
framework to govern the different aspects and phases of international labour 
migration. The institutionalisation of labour migration started in the 1970s, 
ushered by the country’s first experience with state-organised labour migration 
in response to the need for workers in the Gulf countries. Although other 
destination countries have entered the scene, the Gulf countries continue 
to be major destinations for Filipino workers. Flow data on the annual 
deployment of overseas Filipino workers point to the enduring importance 
of the Gulf countries, with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain figuring among the top ten destinations. 
Despite the regulatory mechanisms that have been in place for decades in 
the Philippines (and in the Gulf countries as well), irregular migration takes 
place. Of the stock estimate of 10.4 million overseas Filipinos as of 2012, 47% 
are permanent migrants, 40% are temporary migrants (largely workers), and 
12.8% are migrants in an irregular situation. In West Asia, of the 2.8 million 
Filipinos in the region, the overwhelming majority are temporary migrants 
XVI
* Graziano Battistella is director of the Scalabrini Migration Center as well as founder and 
co-editor of the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal and the Asian Migration News. Maruja 
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316            Gulf Labour and Migration (GLMM) Programme
Irregular Migration to the Gulf
(86.4%), less than 1 percent (0.26%) are permanent migrants, and 13.3% 
are migrants in an irregular situation. Some country variations are notable: 
the UAE has the largest share, 22.2%, while it is relatively smaller in Saudi 
Arabia, 8.5%. Reports of stranded workers, absconding workers, distressed 
workers in Filipino Workers Resource Centers, passengers being offloaded 
from flights to Gulf destinations, and workers transiting through Gulf 
countries bound for other destinations provide some indication of the scale 
and facets of irregular movements. Overall, the picture of irregular migration 
from the Philippines to the Gulf countries is very patchy and is based mostly 
on media reports. In an attempt to understand this phenomenon, this chapter 
will review the literature, media reports, data, and policies and actions taken 
by the Philippine government to address the following questions: (1) what is 
the level of irregular migration from the Philippines to the Gulf countries? 
(2) What are the types of irregular migration in the Philippines-Gulf region 
corridor? What are the characteristics of migrants who are caught in an 
irregular migration situation? Related to this, how does irregular migration 
to the Gulf countries compare with irregular migration to other regions? (3) 
What are the policies and actions developed by the Philippine government 
to curb irregular migration and to support migrant workers? Efforts will be 
expended to interview labour attaches, welfare officers, recruitment agencies, 
and overseas Filipino workers concerning their experiences of and views 
about irregular migration in the Gulf region.
Introduction
Irregular migration has been one of the major concerns of policymakers, advocates for 
migrants’ rights, and other stakeholders. Although irregular migration has been the 
object of research scrutiny (Battistella and Asis 2003; Bogusz et al. 2004; Levinson 
2005; Battistella 2008; Koser 2010; Morehouse and Blomfield 2011; Haroff-Tavel 
and Nasri 2013; Shah 2013 and 2014, among others), it eludes generalisations, and 
research findings to date provide limited guidance on how to effectively reduce it. 
The emergence of different forms of irregular migration, their links with regular 
migration, and their intermingling with smuggling and trafficking in persons 
obfuscate the usefulness of traditional concepts and require a rethinking of anti-
irregular migration policies.
Over ten years ago, based on a four-country study of irregular migration in 
Southeast Asia, we suggested that regular and irregular migration must be studied 
together because the root factors as well as the intermediate factors that lead to 
irregular migration are the same (Battistella and Asis 2003). To some extent, 
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the migrants are also the same; the main difference between legal migrants and 
those in an irregular situation is their access to legal or irregular channels. It is also 
important to underscore that legal and irregular status can be fluid – i.e., migrants 
can go from legal to irregular status (e.g., when a migrant worker runs away from 
his or her employer), and those in an irregular situation can become legal when a 
regularisation programme is offered. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter intends to examine the approach of a 
country of origin like the Philippines toward stemming irregular migration to the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, motivated by the view that irregularity 
often originates in the home country. The chapter concludes that, although inspired 
by the objective to protect migrants, policies aimed at curbing irregular migration 
are to some extent ineffective because of the lack of compliance of different 
stakeholders, the lack of or inadequate incentives (or the many requirements) to 
comply with legal migration, and the need for cooperation between origin and 
destination countries.
Data for the chapter were mostly drawn from existing academic literature and 
reports and data generated by relevant government agencies in the Philippines.1 
An interview was conducted with a consul who was previously assigned to Saudi 
Arabia, and a focus group discussion was held with eight labour attaches and welfare 
officers who were posted in various GCC countries to gather information on the 
experiences of Philippine foreign missions in dealing with irregular migration. 
Filipino Migrants in the GCC Countries: Flows, Profiles, and Stocks
Flows
From the beginning of the overseas labour programme launched under the Marcos 
administration in the early 1970s, the GCC countries have been the main destination 
of labour migration from the Philippines. In 2014, the overall deployment to the 
GCC countries was 60.7% of the total, but the share of the new hires2 was 67% of 
the total. The higher overall proportion of new hires from the Philippines going to 
the Gulf countries compared to other regions indicates that the demand for labour 
in the GCC countries remains strong (Table 16.1).
1. We would like to thank the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for making 
available unpublished data on the numbers and profiles of overseas Filipino workers deployed 
to the GCC region.
2. The statistical reports of the POEA distinguish between “new hires” (workers who go abroad 
for the first time or with a new contract or to a new country) and “rehires” (workers who are 
renewing their contract to go abroad).
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Table 16.1: Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) deployed to the  
GCC countries (new hires and rehires), 2014
Profiles
The annual flows of Filipino migrants (new hires) to the GCC countries 
concentrate mainly in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Table 
16.2). Variations over the years mostly reflect the deployment of domestic workers. 
Controversies or tensions between the Philippines and countries of destination 
(such as those with Saudi Arabia in 2011 and 2012, and the UAE in 2014, as 
discussed later) affect the overall deployment of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) 
to those countries.
Table 16.2: Deployment of OFWs (new hires) to GCC countries, 2011-2014





193,457 209,380 402,837 48.0
United Arab Emirates 56,589 189,642 246,231 23.0
Qatar 26,831 87,680 114,511 23.4
Kuwait 36,731 33,367 70,098 52.4
Bahrain 8,641 10,317 18,958 45.6
Oman 5,935 9,945 15,880 37.4
Total GCC
 
328,184 540,331 868,515 37.8
Percentage of total deployment 67.4 57.3 60.7
Total deployment 487,176 943,666 1,430,842 34.0
Source: POEA 2014 Overseas Employment Statistics.
 
2011 2012 2013 2014
Bahrain 2.5 3.4 2.9 2.7














United Arab Emirates 24.4 26.4 24.6 17.4
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Unpublished POEA data (deployment through the regional offices  
are not included).
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The gender distribution is skewed in favour of females in the UAE, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, and Oman. On the other hand, males and females are about in equal 
numbers in Saudi Arabia and in Qatar (Figure 16.1).
Figure 16.1: Deployed OFWs to GCC countries by gender, 2014
 The occupations of migrants largely determine the gender distribution of the 
migrant population. Table 16.3 shows that Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE 
absorb mostly service workers, who are predominantly female domestic workers. 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Qatar hire a large share of workers employed 
in production, transportation and as equipment operators and labourers, who are 
mostly male.
Table 16.3: Deployment of OFWs (new hires) to the GCC  








Female % Male %
Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi
Arabia
UAE
Source: Unpublished POEA data (deployment through the regional offices not 
included).
 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia UAE Total
Administrative and managerial 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2
Agricultural and related 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.4 0.2 0.3
Clerical and related 4 1.8 1.4 5.3 1.3 8.8 3.1
Production and labourers 6.2 7.1 9.5 28.3 32.3 16.9 25.4
Professional and technical 5.4 2.5 17.9 12.1 14.3 6.8 11.3
Sales 3.6 1.1 2.4 3.8 0.9 6.8 2.3
Service 80.2 87.3 68.6 49.9 50.7 60.3 57.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Unpublished POEA data (deployments trough regional offices are not included).
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The occupational profile of OFWs for individual GCC countries is somehow 
similar, in the sense that migrants are employed mostly in services, production, 
and professional and technical occupations. The differences are in the share of 
the occupational categories in the different countries (Table 16.3). In the UAE, 
for example, sales and clerical workers are a significant component. Overall, the 
top five occupations across the GCC are domestic workers (42%), professional 
nurses (4%), waiters and bartenders (3.5%), charworkers and cleaners (3.5%), and 
labourers in general (3.3%). However, some specifics vary in the ranking of the top 
five occupations – Bahrain lists hairdressers and cooks among the top five; Kuwait 
has cooks, supervisors, and ship ratings; Qatar includes plumbers and fitters and 
wiremen (electrical); while the UAE has salesmen and hairdressers.
Overall, 42% of OFWs are married and 57% are single. The share of singles 
is higher in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE; overall, differences in the marital 
status of OFWs do not appear to have relevant significance.
As noted earlier, domestic workers constitute the great majority of service 
workers deployed to the GCC countries. They include people performing domestic 
work as well as babysitting and driving. They are almost exclusively females 
(98% in 2014). In the past few years, the flow of domestic workers to the GCC 
countries has remained rather stable, except to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. When 
the Philippine government implemented the minimum monthly salary ($400) for 
domestic workers (which was part of the 2006 Household Service Workers reform 
package),3 Saudi Arabia decided to stop the granting of visas to Filipino domestic 
workers. Negotiations between the two governments led to the adoption of a 
bilateral agreement on domestic workers in 2013, which explains the sharp increase 
in deployment to that country (Figure 16.2). On the other hand, the UAE has 
yet to accept the Philippine required minimum salary for domestic workers, which 
explains the decline in their numbers in 2014. According to unpublished POEA 
data, almost all domestic workers are reported to be earning $400 per month. It 
is not possible to ascertain whether this is simply a contractual compliance or 
whether it is the real salary received by domestic workers, since a study assessing 
the impact of the household service workers reforms suggested that recruitment 
agencies, employers, and migrants were nominally complying with requirements, 
but disregarding them in reality. Workers are aware of the scheme and agree to a 
lower salary so that they can leave and work abroad (Battistella and Asis 2011).
3. For details, see Battistella and Asis (2011).
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Figure 16.2: Deployment of Filipino domestic workers to GCC countries, 
2011-2014
Professional workers include a variety of occupations. The most numerous is 
that of nurses (39%) who are deployed overwhelmingly to Saudi Arabia (82%). 
Engineers in the various diversifications (electronic, electric, mechanical, civil etc.) 
are the second category of professionals. The median salary for new hire nurses is 
$715.
Stocks
Stock estimates give a glimpse of the Filipino community living and working 
in the GCC countries. Table 16.4 reports data from two different sources. The 
Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) gathers stock data from the periodical 
reports that foreign posts provide to Congress as mandated by law. Data are 
disaggregated by permanent and temporary status and even venture to estimate the 
irregular population in the destination country. The accuracy of estimates depends 
on the sources utilised. Sometimes destination countries provide such estimates, 
sometimes they do not. Obviously, most Filipinos in the GCC countries are in a 
temporary status, as contract workers with a two- or three-year contract.4  According 
4. If contracts lasted strictly for two years, the estimate of the number of temporary workers 
abroad would be: P = NHi + NHi-1 + RHi, where NH are New Hires and RH are Rehires. 
Also RHi should equal NHi-2. However, RHi is always higher than NHi-2 (the number of 
the new hires of two years before), which indicates that contracts can last more than two years 
and that some workers might return abroad more than once within a year.

















Source: Unpublished POEA data (deployment through the regional offices are not included).
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to CFO data, the largest community is in Saudi Arabia, followed by the UAE. To 
help assess the accuracy of CFO estimates, we have also included the UN-DESA 
estimates of the total number of Filipinos in the Gulf countries. For most countries, 
the UN-DESA estimate is much lower than the CFO estimate, except for Saudi 
Arabia, where it is exactly the same. 
Table 16.4: Stock estimate of Filipinos in the GCC countries, 2013
Irregular Migration from the Philippines to the GCC Countries: 
Literature, Estimates and Typology 
Insights from Research
Although international migration has been well-studied in the Philippines, only a 
few studies have focused on irregular migration. The information gap has been filled 
to some extent by media reports which provide some information on numbers, policy 
developments, and personal accounts of migrants in an irregular situation. One of the 
few studies that focused on irregular migration was the Southeast Asian study cited 
earlier, which covered the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The study 
found that compared with Indonesia, irregular migration from the Philippines is 
smaller but more widely distributed; the latter trend further suggests how irregular 
migration and legal migration are intertwined (Battistella and Asis 2003). Findings 
from the said study concerning the factors contributing to irregular migration, types 
of irregular migration, and the fluid legal status of migrants are similar to what has 
been suggested about irregular migration in the GCC countries (e.g., Shah 2009; 
Baldwin-Edwards 2011; Suter 2005; Rahman 2011) and in African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries (ACP Observatory on Migration 2014).5 Interestingly, 
5. The study of Sarausad and Archavanitkul (2014) on Filipino migrants in Thailand reveals that 
in addition to legal migrants (those with work permits) and irregular migrants (those without 
work permit), there is a third category of those in a “semi-regular status” which refers to those 
 
Temporary Irregular Total UN-DESA
Bahrain 91 69,307 2,685 72,083 43,971
Kuwait 502 191,787 6,000 198,289 122,214
Oman 140 53,360 2,090 55,590 21,669
Qatar
 
16 189,534 15,000 204,550 96,487
Saudi Arabia 264 948,038 80,500 1,028,802 1,028,802
UAE 1,711 777,894 42,805 822,410 477,139
Total 2,724 2,229,920 149,080 2,381,724 1,790,282 
Permanent
Source: Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2013; UN-DESA 2013.
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in the survey of irregular migration across selected ACP countries, the following 
conclusion was reached: 
“ . . . despite the existing differences among African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries, a series of common trends and challenges related to irregular 
migration exist, as irregularity and lack of documentation often prevent 
migrants from benefitting of the advantages of migration, exposing them to 
a wide range of vulnerability and abusive situations both at the psychological 
and physical level” (ACP Observatory on Migration 2014: 19).
An element that is distinctive about migration to the GCC countries is the 
sponsorship or kafala system (for details, see Baldwin-Edwards 2011; see also Khan 
and Haroff-Tavell 2011). Introduced as a regulatory mechanism, in practice and 
as it evolved, the system generated irregularities which render migrant workers 
vulnerable to exploitation. It has also become a lucrative business for GCC 
nationals, which makes it resistant to reform. The highly profitable visa trading is 
linked to many problems for migrants, including leaving migrant workers stranded 
(for details, see MFA n.d.). Another reason why it is difficult to dismantle the kafala 
system relates to how it contributes to making labour migration flexible. 
An issue that has come to light is the case of children born to women outside 
of marriage. Under the strictly temporary migration regime in Asia, women migrant 
workers who become pregnant are repatriated.6 In the GCC, the situation of women 
migrant workers who become pregnant outside of marriage is more complicated. 
Such situations are called “love cases” by Philippine missions. In the UAE, it may 
be possible for women to return home and to give birth in their home countries. 
Those who deliver their babies in the GCC countries face a jail sentence; for those 
who run away, the mothers become irregular and their children inherit the irregular 
status of their mothers. 
Estimates of Irregular Migration
As mentioned earlier, the CFO stock estimate also includes estimates of the 
irregular Filipino migrants in the various countries where Filipinos are present 
(Table 16.4). Estimating the irregular population is notoriously difficult because 
who move from legal to irregular or vice-versa. It also includes those who have moved in or 
out of legal or irregular status due to employment transitions (Sarausad and Archavanikul 
2014: 57-58).  
6. Nicole Constable (2014) has interrogated this issue in Hong Kong, which is a different 
context compared to the GCC countries.
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by definition irregular migrants escape the administrative procedures from which 
migration data are culled (Massey and Capoferro 2004). CFO uses the Reports to 
Congress in which sometimes estimates of irregular migrants are missing. The basis 
for the estimate, thus, is not clear. In the FGD with labour attaches, it emerged that 
they first try to contact the competent local ministry to obtain information on the 
number of Filipinos in that country. When such information is not available or is 
not released, they rely on information from the field, i.e., from the actual cases of 
irregular migrants handled at the foreign post and from the contacts they have with 
the Filipino migrant associations. Estimates also have to consider that numbers 
can vary through the years or according to the time of the year. For instance, the 
number of runaways in the UAE is currently lower than before – this reflects the 
lower deployment of domestic workers due to UAE’s refusal of the Philippine 
Embassy request regarding contract verification. In Saudi Arabia, the number of 
irregular migrants may increase after the Haj to Makkah, when some pilgrims tend 
to overstay to look for an employment opportunity. A comparison of entry and exit 
data would provide reliable information on irregular migration. However, it is not 
known whether and/or how efficiently this procedure is conducted. Considering 
the methodological weaknesses behind the estimations, data on irregular migrants 
must be taken as an approximation.
A different glimpse of the irregular migration of Filipinos in the GCC 
countries comes from data on Filipinos in distress sheltered at the Filipino Workers 
Resource Centers or similar institutions. They comprise Filipinos who escape from 
their employers and those who have been in an irregular status for some time and 
have approached the Philippine authorities to be repatriated.
Table 16.5: Filipinos in distress sheltered at FWRC or similar institutions or 
repatriated, January to June 2013
Sheltered Repatriated
Male Female Male Female
Bahrain 2 280 15 157
Kuwait (2012) 1 2,258 36 1,112
Oman 203 8 120
Qatar 1,188 116 833
Saudi Arabia 489 344 1,957 1,175
UAE 1 1,259 209 1,258
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Undersecretary of Migrant 
Workers’ Affairs, Report to Congress, January to June 2013.
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Two aspects stand out: the overwhelming number of female migrants in 
distress including those who have been repatriated; and the distinctive situation in 
Saudi Arabia, where many male workers are also hosted in rented places or tents 
prior to repatriation. In regard to the requirement of the no-objection certificate 
from the employer/kafeel for repatriation cases, the labour attaches have reported 
that the procedures have been streamlined and if the migrant reports immediately 
to the embassy or consulate, he or she is then presented to immigration authorities 
within 48 hours.
Typology of Irregular Migration to the GCC Countries
Irregular migration from the Philippines to the GCC countries occurs in a variety 
of forms.7 From the Philippines’ point of view, a distinction is made between being 
irregular according to the legislation of the country of destination and being irregular 
according to the rules and regulations of the Philippines. We will draw a typology 
on the second aspect, keeping in mind that complying with Philippine rules means 
that legally deployed OFWs are covered by the welfare and protection programmes 
extended by the Philippine government. Such benefits derive from membership in 
the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, in the Social Security System, and 
in PhilHealth (health insurance).8 
Many irregularities can be committed against the regulation of overseas labour 
in the Philippines. The following are specifically those which render a migrant in 
an irregular situation.
Avoiding Philippines procedures. According to Philippine laws and regulations, every 
migrant must register with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. 
Migrants who avoid this procedure and all its requirements are considered irregular 
migrants. This is done particularly when workers cannot comply with the rules, 
such as the minimum age (23) for domestic workers. Even if they bypass Philippine 
procedures, it is still possible for migrants to be admitted and obtain employment 
in the GCC countries, thanks to the connivance of smugglers and officials at the 
ports of exit and the cooperation of intermediaries in the destination country. Often 
the migrant is required first to go to a transit country before arriving at destination, 
7. This typology is reconstructed from the information gathered at the FGD with labour 
attaches, conducted at the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration on April 23, 2015.
8. However, by law, Philippine foreign missions cannot withhold assistance to migrants in an 
irregular situation. In crisis situations, for example, repatriation assistance extends to all 
Filipino nationals regardless of legal status.
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as it is easier to enter as a tourist in a neighbouring Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) country, for which a visa is not required.
Overstaying the Haj. Some Muslim Filipinos utilise the traditional pilgrimage to 
Makkah as a way of being admitted to Saudi Arabia and thereafter remain to find 
work. Many pilgrims from other countries also use the Haj to look for employment 
in Saudi Arabia.
Migrating through illegal recruitment. RA10022 and the POEA Rules and 
Regulations for landbased workers provide a long list of possible cases of illegal 
recruitment. The most common violations which render the migrant irregular are: 
- Contract substitution. The migrant signs a contract to comply with the Philippine 
regulation and another contract, sometimes in Arabic only, which is enforced and 
which usually has less favourable conditions for the migrant. In this case, the migrant 
is legally employed in the GCC country, but cannot seek redress in the Philippines 
if something goes wrong as he or she is working under the wrong contract;
- Re-processing of visas. The agent sells unused visas for which he has the power of 
attorney to another agent, who uses them to deploy workers who will engage in an 
occupation different from the one stated in the visa.
Freelancing. Migrants with experience of working in a GCC country and with the 
right connections find an employer or sponsor who has a job opportunity but does 
not have the visa. The migrant then buys the visa directly from another sponsor, uses 
an agency in the Philippines to process the papers, and is able to find employment 
for himself/herself or for another migrant (often a relative).
Transferring to another country. A less known form of irregularity takes place through 
transfers within the GCC countries or to other countries in the Middle East. In the 
first case, the migrant is admitted to a country and hired by the employer, but then 
either moves to another country with the employer (which is typical of domestic 
workers) or is handed to another employer in a different country. In the second case, 
the migrant is admitted to a GCC country, but is then transferred by the agent to 
another country in the region, where the migrant could not have been deployed 
because that country is under a ban from the Philippine government. This was how 
the ban to Lebanon, Jordan, or Syria was circumvented. It is also possible that 
migrants are temporarily sent to another Middle East country while arranging a 
visa to return to a GCC country. Such transfers are handled legally by the agents or 
employers, but do not correspond to the initial authorisation received to go abroad. 
Similar procedures might involve cooperation among agents in the Philippines and 
in the GCC countries as well as the consensus of the migrants involved.
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The typology illustrates that irregular migration is often undertaken with the 
migrant’s knowledge and consent. At the same time, it shows that migrants rarely 
engage in irregular migration without the participation of someone else: in most 
cases, this involves recruitment agencies and government officials; in other cases, 
the social networks of relatives and friends are the facilitators. 
Philippine Policies against Irregular Migration
Philippine policies address irregular migration in direct and indirect ways. Direct 
policies consist in preparing migrants, making it difficult to forge documents, 
requiring compliance with the standard employment contracts, and combating 
illegal recruitment. Indirect policies consist in the overall regulations and institutions 
to govern migration created to ensure that migrants are protected (IOM and SMC 
2013).
Preparing Migrants 
To prevent irregular migration, the government has instituted an orientation system 
that takes place in stages. At the beginning of the process, the migrant is invited to 
attend the pre-employment orientation seminar (PEOS), which is provided at the 
local level and which aims at equipping aspiring migrant workers with adequate 
information and warns them against illegal recruitment and trafficking. Since 1983, 
the government has instituted a mandatory one-day pre-departure orientation 
seminar (PDOS) focused on working and living overseas. Besides, some Philippine 
foreign missions have taken the initiative to provide post-arrival orientation 
seminars (PAOS) as a follow-up education programme. 
Making it Difficult to Forge Travel Documents 
Many stories were reported in the past of migrants forging data (like the date of 
birth) or even identity to obtain a passport. RA 8329, known as the “Philippine 
Passport Act of 1996,” established the requirements to obtain a passport. The 
introduction of the electronic passport with the biometric data of the holder in 
2010 reinforced the security of the document. 
Establishing the Standard Employment Contract 
The standard employment contract for OFWs consists of minimum provisions in 
regard to salary and working conditions that a Filipino going abroad should be 
granted. A Filipino worker is allowed to go abroad only if his/her contract complies 
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with the minimum conditions stated in the standard employment contract. Various 
standard employment contracts have been formalised by occupation. This policy has 
been useful but not completely successful. Sometimes the migrants themselves agree 
to have a different contract once they are abroad; sometimes contract substitution 
happens against their will. To avoid this, the Philippine Overseas Labour Offices 
(POLOs) are tasked to verify contracts. This is difficult to implement because, 
among others, the destination country sees this practice as a form of interference by 
the origin country.
Combating Illegal Recruitment
Labour migration from the Philippines is largely mediated by employment agencies. 
Presently, there are 1,255 licensed recruitment agencies (850 in the land-based 
sector; 405 in the sea-based sector).9 Although instrumental for placing thousands 
of migrants abroad, agencies are also involved in illegal practices. Anti-illegal 
recruitment policies have been the centerpiece of the Philippine government’s fight 
against irregular migration. 
Licensing employment agencies. Only agencies properly licensed by the POEA 
can engage in recruitment. The licensing procedure ensures that agencies operate 
according to the provisions codified in the 2002 and 2003 rules and regulations issued 
by POEA for the land-based and sea-based sectors, respectively.10 Unfortunately, 
unlicensed operators still prosper, particularly in the provinces, and sometimes 
operate in connivance with licensed agencies. The effectiveness of the licensing 
procedure is also undermined by the practice of licensed principals functioning as 
cover for foreign agencies, which are not allowed to operate in the Philippines. The 
main tool in the hands of the POEA against illegal recruiters is license revocation. 
The POEA website lists agencies in good standing and recommends migrants to 
deal only with licensed recruiters. 
The Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch (AIR). A specific bureau, the Anti-Illegal 
Recruitment Branch, was created in POEA to crack down on illegal recruitment 
actors and activities. The Presidential Task Force on Anti-Illegal Recruitment 
(PTFAIR) was reactivated in 2011 “to sustain a more focused, coordinated and 
9. Status of recruitment agencies as of June 29, 2015—http://www.poea.gov.ph/cgi-bin/agList.
asp?mode=actSB.
10. To balance the proscriptive approach, in 1984 the POEA introduced an incentive system 
to acknowledge performing agencies. Award recipients enjoy benefits, largely in the form of 
facilitation of transactions undertaken with POEA (for details, see Asis and Go 2014).
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effective programme of action to curb illegal recruitment.” It carries out both 
preventive (e.g., runs information campaigns about illegal recruitment and human 
trafficking, produces information materials, etc.) and remedial (e.g., surveillance, 
closure of establishments, assistance to victims, etc.) activities.11 
Prosecuting illegal recruiters. Illegal recruitment is a crime which carries stiff 
penalties, according to the law. Victims can lodge a case with PTFAIR at POEA for 
prosecution. Fifty six cases were lodged in 2013 and 40 in 2014. Of the cases in 2013, 
ten were dropped, fourteen were terminated, five were endorsed for prosecution, 
thirteen were submitted for resolution with the Department of Justice, and eight 
warrants of arrest were issued. Thirty were cases of simple illegal recruitment, nine 
of large-scale illegal recruitment, five of syndicated illegal recruitment, while 38 
were cases of estafa.
Anti-trafficking Initiatives 
The Philippines ratified the Palermo Protocol in 2003, passed the Anti-Trafficking 
Act in 2003 (RA 9208), and amended it into the Expanded Anti-Trafficking 
Act in 2012 (RA 10064). As part of preventive measures, in 2011, the Bureau of 
Immigration (Memorandum Order No. 2011-011) took on the task of offloading 
passengers who were found with “fraudulent travel documents” or those who 
had “doubtful purpose of travel.”12 Persons who had been identified as victims of 
trafficking can access specific support and assistance to ease their post-trafficking 
reintegration process. Those who had been trafficked overseas and were accurately 
determined as victims of trafficking can access support provided by the Migrant 
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act.
Assessing Philippine Anti-Irregular Migration Policies
There are no studies which make a formal evaluation of the effectiveness of 
Philippine anti-irregular migration policies. To some extent, all migration policies 
are partially ineffective and for various reasons (Teitelbaum 2002; Castles 2004; 
Thielemann 2004). Migration policies of countries of origin have even lower efficacy 
in determining migration than policies of countries of destination, which control 
admission, stay, and repatriation. Nevertheless, some observations can be advanced 
in comparing the results of these policies.
11. For more details, see http://www.poea.gov.ph/ptfair/about.htm.
12. This action raised concerns about the constitutional right to travel. 
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Orienting migrants through seminars conducted at various stages is certainly 
helpful to the majority of migrants, but it does not eliminate some migrants’ 
recourse to irregular migration channels because migrants differ in terms of needs 
and possibilities to plan and fulfill the migration project. Financial pressure, family 
demands, and the opportunity to reach results by cutting corners can lead to the 
choice of irregularity. Document verification has improved in regard to passport, 
but it remains inadequate in other areas. The efficacy of the standard employment 
contract rests on the possibility of contract verification in the country of destination, 
which also requires international cooperation. Documents submitted for non-
working visas must also be authentic. For instance, in an attempt to reduce the 
abuse of the social visit pass, those going to Dubai, UAE are required to provide 
affidavits that they have sufficient financial resources and that they will return to the 
Philippines. However, many such affidavits have been found to be fake. Determining 
the integrity of documents could be made more effective with tighter coordination 
among government agencies.
Anti-illegal recruitment initiatives are not fully effective because of many 
reasons. The lucrative industry of job recruitment has enticed many players, who are 
now in stiff competition against each other. Competition should serve the interest 
of migrants, instead it reduces the costs for employers. Also, those who cannot 
compete might decide to earn through irregular practices. The distinction between 
recruiters and kafeels is often blurred and Philippine agents might sometimes be 
stand-ins or dummies, when in fact, the agency is owned or controlled by the kafeel. 
The recruitment industry is often depicted as lacking solid ethics in its procedures. 
This cannot be generalised and efforts have been made to establish codes of conduct 
and reform the sector, also in cooperation with other countries of origin.13 To date, 
the results of such efforts are far from satisfactory.
In addition to inherent deficiencies, the inefficacy of anti-irregular migration 
policies at the origin also depends on three general factors. The first is that policies, 
although well formulated, are poorly implemented. Proper implementation requires 
a prepared, adequately paid and efficient bureaucracy. The number of personnel 
in the migration agencies has remained about the same although the number of 
Filipino migrants has doubled or tripled. Labour attaches in foreign posts have 
lamented that they are too few for the number of migrants abroad. A more adequate 
and prepared personnel would ensure better monitoring of law enforcement.
13. The Alliance of Asian Associations of Overseas Employment Service Providers (AAA-
OESP) is engaged in furthering ethical recruitment.
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The second is that migrants are sometimes victims and sometimes partners 
in irregular migration. To ensure compliance, there should be a premium to 
legality. Such premium could consist of welfare benefits that regular migrants are 
entitled to while the costs of irregular migration should be steep. However, welfare 
benefits for regular migrants are not sufficient to discourage some migrants from 
resorting to illegal channels. And the costs of irregular migration do not dissuade 
migrants because ultimately the government comes to the rescue. The public outcry 
against the execution of Flor Contemplacion, a domestic worker in Singapore in 
1995, contributed to strengthening the protection base of the Philippines’ labour 
migration policy, which may have had the unintended consequence of encouraging 
risk-taking in migration decisions.
Finally, stemming irregular migration at the source cannot be achieved solely by 
the origin country as migration is a transnational phenomenon. The intractability of 
irregular migration is in part the result of insufficient coordination and cooperation 
among countries. Employment agencies, intermediaries, and migrants can find 
ways to exploit conflicting interests of national policies. Irregular migration has an 
inherently international dimension; reducing it requires international cooperation. 
Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated the importance of the GCC countries as destination of 
migration from the Philippines, the profile of Filipinos working in those countries, 
the typology of irregular migration based on Philippines laws and regulations, and 
the policies against irregular migration adopted by the Philippines and provided an 
assessment of such policies. The impressive menu of initiatives would suggest that 
the Philippines is in control of migration and irregularities are minimal. In fact, 
many stories of Filipino migrants in distress are reported by the media, and often 
such stories concern migrants who left as regular migrants and became irregular 
migrants. We have indicated several reasons why irregular migration persists: 
migration pressure, inadequate implementation and monitoring of policies, the 
difficulty to reduce unethical practices in the recruitment industry, the insufficient 
incentive for migrants to avoid irregular migration, and inadequate international 
cooperation.
Ultimately, there are some questions that persist in efforts addressing irregular 
migration. 
Migration is an attempt to overcome the unequal distribution of opportunities, 
but migrants do not get a fair share of the wealth created by migration. Irregular 
migration can be considered as an attempt by migrants to get a larger share of the 
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pie. Is it possible that a better distribution of migration benefits (beginning with 
reducing migration costs) might be more effective in reducing irregular migration 
than increasing regulation and penalties?
Irregular migration disproportionately affects women, in particular domestic 
workers, both in the disregard of policies in the country of origin as well as in 
the disregard of their rights in the countries of destination. The international 
community has provided a legal framework for the protection of the rights of 
domestic workers (ILO Convention No. 189). However, ratification of international 
instruments is not very popular in the region. Can complementary solutions, such 
as professionalising the sector and providing orientation to employers, contribute to 
reducing irregularities by and against domestic workers? 
Migration policies in the country of origin are designed for the protection 
of the most vulnerable migrants, those with a deficit in negotiating power. What 
are the costs of protection and who pays for them? Can the costs of protection be 
distributed to ensure that protection does not encourage risk-taking?
Irregular migration will not go away soon. While it is possible that countries 
can accept or tolerate some level of irregular migration, tolerance should not be 
allowed for irregularities against migrants. No safe and sound migration can take 
place without respect for the human rights of migrants – and yes, irregular migrants 
have rights too. 
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Conclusion:
Irregular Migration - Has It a Future in the Gulf?
Philippe Fargues*
The year 2015 and the few years preceding will be remembered as those of the 
first global migration crisis. It is not that the number of migrants and refugees 
has suddenly exploded. Globally, migrants and refugees represent, as usual, a tiny 
drop compared with the immense waves of back-and-forth travellers who find 
no obstacles in crossing borders for business or leisure. The real novelty in the 
2010s was not the fact of migration so much as its rejection by governments and 
public opinion.  As a result of increased difficulties in obtaining visas or extending 
expiring permits of stay, irregular migration became one of the top issues on the 
global agenda.  The detection, detention and deportation of migrants in an irregular 
situation became common practice in the Gulf as elsewhere. 
Human beings are intrinsically mobile. Whether they move for issues 
of survival or prosperity, people find reasons to sustain their quest for safer and 
better lives when their homelands do not meet their needs or aspirations or when 
citizens are put at serious risk. Once on the move, people are not easy to deter. 
States, meanwhile, challenged by globalisation and exploding communication and 
connectivity between places and people, tend to hang on to sovereignty: borders, 
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flags, identity and the containment of otherness. The more the planet shrinks, 
the more states erect barriers. As these two trends collide — on the one hand, 
people’s need for circulation and, on the other, states’ concerns about openness — 
international migrants, all too often, find themselves in an irregular situation.
The Gulf States are among the most sought-after destinations by global 
migrants.  Migrants in the GCC remitted $105 billion to their home countries 
in 2015, representing 18% of the $581 billion remitted worldwide. From South 
Asia to East Africa and from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, tens of 
millions of people are living off money sent by members of their household or their 
community, who left their homes to work in the Gulf. Labour mobility has been, 
over the last half a century, the royal avenue by which part of the gigantic oil wealth 
could spread beyond Gulf citizens and reach the working classes of the developing 
world. Money earned in the Gulf is essential for scores of Asian, Arab and African 
families to build houses, to educate their children, and to set up businesses. In brief, 
migrants have pressing reasons for going to the Gulf and staying there: no matter 
what hurdles must be overcome, and what risks are taken. 
The Gulf States, meanwhile, need migrant workers to address acute imbalances 
between economy and demography, between enormous incomes and scarce local 
working population. Migration, however, is subject to policy tensions that are 
specific to these states. Their oil wealth has grown much faster than their native 
population, and they have called in massive numbers of foreign workers. At the 
same time, they have always adamantly kept a strict separation between nationals 
and non-nationals. They have, in effect, refused a classical immigration process 
under open markets by which part of the newcomers and their children gradually 
become full members of the host society.  The Gulf States have set up rules to make 
sure that the foreign nationals they employ will not overstay their work contract 
and end up settling permanently. They have designed policies for reducing their 
dependency upon migrant workers by nationalising the workforce. 
But facts have resisted policies and the proportion of foreign nationals has 
continuously grown in the labour force and in the population over the last fifty 
years. There is a strong feeling in the Gulf that there are too many foreign nationals 
and that states are helpless to curb the trend. Moreover, the Gulf States have all 
maintained a traditional sponsorship rule (kafala) which delegates to citizens 
the surveillance of non-citizens and individually binds each foreign national to a 
national sponsor. But the formal kafala rule grates against other, informal rules: 
those of market economies which require labour mobility, and those of free 
individuals intent on deciding for themselves and ready to do whatever it takes 
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to escape exploitative or abusive sponsors. Throughout this volume, evidence was 
gathered to show how in all six GCC states the kafala system is one of the root 
causes resulting in some migrants falling into an irregular situation, and leaving 
one’s sponsor is in certain cases the best option in terms of agency and income, even 
though it is contrary to the law. An additional major cause for irregular migration is 
specific to Saudi Arabia: the pilgrimage to Makkah that brings millions of believers 
and a number of clandestine migrants who vanish into the country every year.  
While the exact magnitude of irregular migration in the Gulf States is difficult 
to estimate, two facts emerge. First, the proportion of migrants in an irregular 
situation varies enormously from country to country. Saudi Arabia, in addition to 
the factors shared by all GCC countries, is exposed to unauthorised entries across 
a long land border with non-GCC states and to a unique sort of visa overstayers 
because of the presence of the holiest places of Islam. The country also has the 
highest numbers of migrants in irregular situation in absolute and relative terms. 
Second, the GCC states are no exception. They just fall into the wide spectrum 
of situations observed across the world. In none of them is irregular migration 
the overwhelming issue it has become in the USA where 27% of the 42.4 million 
immigrants, i.e., 11.3 million people are believed to live and work with an unlawful 
status: though it is estimated in this volume that up to one third of the three million 
Indians in Saudi Arabia would have some kind of irregular status. Moreover, in 
none of the Gulf States has the detention and deportation system become as large 
as in the USA.  
More than numbers, it is the treatment reserved for migrants in an irregular 
situation that seems to mark out the Gulf States. Arrest and detention are, in the 
Gulf, widespread practices in spite of constitutional guarantees against arbitrary 
imprisonment. Staying without a proper visa or absconding from a sponsor is 
regarded as a criminal act and foreign nationals who commit such acts are detained 
in the same prisons as common-law criminals with no clear right of recourse. 
Because domestic workers, most of whom are women, are employed by private 
households and therefore not protected by labour laws, which in the Gulf apply 
only to businesses, they are particularly vulnerable to arbitrary sanctions and jail. 
This is true even when they are the victims (in particular of sexual exploitation) 
and their sponsors the culprits. It must be noted that the International Labour 
Organisation’s convention of 2011 concerning decent work for domestic workers 
(ILO Convention No. 189) has been, to date, ratified by only 22 countries, none of 
them in the region relevant to Gulf migration except the Philippines.
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Five main causes of irregular migration were identified in this volume, acting 
in isolation or in combination: entering without a proper visa; overstaying once 
a visa or residence permit has expired; being employed by someone who is not 
the sponsor; absconding from a sponsor; and less significant in statistical than 
in ethical terms, being born in the Gulf to parents with an irregular status. How 
could foreseeable developments in the Gulf, in migrants’ origin countries and at 
international level affect these various causes and what do future trends of irregular 
migration to the Gulf States look like? 
The current oil crisis – with Brent oil price falling from over $100 per barrel 
in the early 2010s to below $50 since mid-2014 – sets the stage for deep changes 
in the political economy of the region and consequently both regular and irregular 
migration. Oil revenues are likely to play a decisive role in triggering long-awaited 
economic transitions across the region. At the time of writing, falling oil prices are 
driving governments in the Gulf to overhaul economic policies and to speed up 
the move towards diversified post-oil activities. Large construction companies have 
already started to drastically cut their workforces, and it is likely that a number of 
labour-intensive projects will be cancelled. Because the vast majority of workers 
in private firms are foreign nationals, project cancellations will translate into job 
losses for migrant workers. Low-skilled activities, which are those with the highest 
prevalence of irregular status, will likely be the most affected, and depleting demand 
in labour-intensive sectors may eventually curb job opportunities that support 
informal employment and irregular migration.
 Moreover, making better use of the enormous investment that states and 
households have made on education and fully employing their natives’ skills 
is a priority in all the Gulf States. Falling oil revenues will be seized upon by 
governments as an opportunity for stepping up the nationalisation of labour force 
policies. Fewer and fewer are able to rely on governments for finding jobs in the 
public sector: young generations of nationals will, meanwhile, turn to the private 
sector, something their fathers (and mothers) avoided.  Substituting nationals for 
foreign nationals in private firms will mostly happen at mid- or highly-skilled levels 
where irregularity is uncommon. Nationalisation policies can, then, be expected to 
have little impact on irregular migration. Conversely, irregular migration does not 
create unfair competition with citizens and, therefore, is not a matter of concern for 
them.
However, other responses to the current economic setbacks could go in the 
opposite direction. Non-oil dependent options that might make Gulf economies 
more competitive at the world level include the establishment of free trade zones and 
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incentives for direct foreign investment. If the newly-created industries follow the 
pattern of current industries and mostly hire migrant workers, then the remarkable 
dependency on a foreign workforce will not fall off. In either case – if fewer 
migrants are brought in or if reliance on migration continues – irregular migration 
will likely rise. This would be, first, because of the resilience of workers deprived of 
their jobs and, second, from the already noted contradiction that migrants might be 
unwelcome to governments, but they are sought after by employers. 
Additional responses to persistently falling oil revenues include fiscal 
adjustments and reform of the kafala. Taxing labour incomes (of migrants only or of 
nationals as well?), taxing migrant workers’ remittances and raising fees on residence 
permits are among the many measures currently under discussion. They would all 
make migration to the Gulf less attractive and possibly deter some migrants from 
staying irregularly in spite of the risks this entails. Abolishing or reforming the 
kafala – a critical change, long-discussed but never really begun – could also be part 
of a package to move away from migration-driven economies. By the same token, 
it would remove one of the main causes for migrants falling into irregularity in the 
Gulf. Indeed, if the obligation of a sponsor was lifted, the widespread, lucrative 
practice of sponsoring foreign workers without employing them (visa trading) 
would become irrelevant, and labour mobility would no longer be impeded by a 
rigid bond between a worker and a sponsor. The shift from a private to a public 
sponsor as contemplated in Qatar would produce a comparable result. In brief, the 
Gulf States may be on the verge of great changes brought about by the oil crisis. 
Novelties such as nationals’ full employment, including in the private sector, income 
taxation or amendment of the kafala would all mean that a shift in political culture, 
from a rentier to a productive model, was underway in the Gulf.
Irregular migration was also found in this volume to be linked with migrants’ 
origin countries. First, failures in the homeland’s labour market can be drivers of 
irregular migration. In a number of countries, prevailing informal employment 
with no contract has developed a culture of unregistered and volatile work which 
predisposes the migrant to leave a job and a sponsor once they are abused and 
exploited, no matter what the consequences are for their contract and legal status. 
Moreover, the unavailability of jobs in the origin country discourages the workers 
whose visa expires from returning to their homeland, thereby encouraging them to 
overstay in the Gulf. Second, failures in the institutional framework of emigration 
at origin can trigger irregular situations at destination. It might be that institutions 
in charge of placing their citizens on foreign labour markets lack the means to 
monitor their actual terms of employment, or, indeed, the bargaining power to 
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defend their workers abroad. It can also work the other way around when states of 
origin have set minimum standards to allow migration (in terms of age, salary and 
benefits at destination, etc.) that the migrants did not respect thereby losing their 
state’s protection. There is a growing tendency among migrant-sending countries 
to “lay claim” to their expatriates: encouraging migrant ties with the homeland and 
defending their position in the host country are common policies today. Promoting 
bilateralism in the governance of migration, and closer cooperation between the 
Gulf States and migrant workers’ origin countries in matters related to migration 
and employment, could indirectly help in curbing irregular migration.1 
1. Philippe Fargues, Françoise De Bel-Air, Nasra M. Shah “Addressing Irregular Migration 
in the Gulf States,” GLMM Policy Brief No. 1/2015, Gulf Labour Market and Migration 
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